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Abstract 
A Breakdown in the Good of Order: An Analysis of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
Informed by Bernard Lonergan’s Notion of the Human Good 
 
Joseph R. Cioni 
 
Advisor: Professor Patrick Byrne 
 
 In this dissertation, I attempt to contribute to Lonergan scholarship by bringing 
greater clarity to his notions of general and group bias. By applying these notions to a 
concrete event, the subprime mortgage crisis, I intend to shed light on their meaning and 
significance in a new way. Over the course of this dissertation, I will investigate and 
employ other theoretical tools that Lonergan provides, such as his notions of 
transcendental method, self-appropriation, common sense, and values, and especially the 
destructive impact of group and general bias upon the good of order. The theoretical 
ideas that are examined in this dissertation have a heuristic value, for they have the 
potential to help individuals notice areas and respond to issues that might have otherwise 
been overlooked. 
The subprime mortgage crisis, which arguably began when American house 
prices dropped in July of 2006, was the product of an accumulation of biased decisions 
over time. Lonergan’s notion of the general bias of common sense afflicted many of the 
central parties involved in the subprime mortgage market leading up to the crisis, 
prompting them to conclude that house prices would interminably rise. Institutional 
relationships that were impaired by this biased orientation toward the housing market 
came to be further plagued by Lonergan’s notion of group bias. Ultimately, I argue that 
subprime mortgage crisis was a manifestation of a breakdown in the good of order, which 
is a component of Lonergan’s notion of the invariant structure of the human good.  
 
 
 Chapter One consists of a presentation and explication of the set of Lonergan’s 
theoretical tools that are utilized in this study. The chapter begins with an exploration of 
his transcendental method and then proceeds with a discussion that includes his notions 
of cognitional structure, self-appropriation, common sense, values and judgments of 
value, conversion, self-transcendence, authenticity, bias, and the invariant structure of the 
human good. 
 Chapter Two serves a bridge between these theoretical terms and my analysis of 
the parties that were involved in the subprime mortgage crisis. In addition to arguing that 
the general bias of common sense distorted the decision making processes of many of the 
significant players in the subprime mortgage market, I will also contend that group bias 
was operative leading up to and during this crisis. The emphasis in this latter section will 
be on instances of “co-opted” group bias, or arrangements in which different parties 
cooperated with one another in mutually advantageous ways in the short-term, but to the 
detriment of the good of order. 
 Chapters Three through Six each focus on one of the parties that played an 
instrumental role in the development and outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis: 
subprime lenders (Chapter Three), arrangers (Chapter Four), credit rating agencies 
(Chapter Five), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Chapter Six). I examine key 
regulatory relationships in these chapters as well and note that, in many cases, they were 
ensnared by general and group bias. My concluding analysis is that, as an accumulation 
of biased decisions, the subprime mortgage crisis was an avoidable outcome, for 
individual submission to bias is not inevitable. 
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“For in human affairs the decisive factor is what one can expect of the other fellow.” 
       Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 248 
 
Introduction 
Homeownership, for many Americans, has come to be associated with prosperity, 
success, freedom, security, and independence. Consider this advertisement that 
accompanied an article in Scribner’s Magazine entitled “A Hundred Thousand Homes: 
How They Are Paid For,” written in 1876: 
Fourth of July! Independence Day! Young man and woman, stop and  
reflect! The money you fritter away uselessly will make you independent. 
Today sign the magna charter of your independence, and, like our 
forefathers, in about eight years you will, in a great degree, be  
independent by saving only thirty-three cents each day. In that time 
you will realize $2,000, or have a home and be independent of the  
landlord.1 
 
In 1892, Seymour Dexter, the founder and first president of the United States League of 
Local Building and Loan Associations, declared, “It is a firm conviction with me that the 
future of the Republic depends upon the question [of] whether we can make this nation a 
nation of homeowners or not.”2 Tellingly, the league’s first motto was “The American 
Home: The Safeguard of American Liberties.”3 Five years later, in 1897, Dexter 
described the ideal American home as being one that is “a comfortable modern home 
surrounded by a large lawn in which children are at play.”4 Additional images invoked by 
Dexter in his depiction of this home included “a little daughter running to greet her 
                                                 
1 Kathleen Day, S&L Hell (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 39. 
2 Ibid., 40. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
2 
 
approaching father,” and both a church spire and a New England school house nestled in 
foliage in the distance, the latter of which was bearing a waving American flag in front.5  
 This enthusiastic promotion of homeownership in the late nineteenth century 
certainly was not an American historical anomaly. Over 100 years later on June 17, 2004, 
President George W. Bush delivered a speech that echoed Dexter’s affirmation of the 
importance of homeownership by way of supporting an “ownership society.” Bush 
reasoned that “…if you own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our 
country. The more ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, 
and the more people have a vital stake in the future of the country.”6 Bush demonstrated 
support for American homeownership by promoting the American Dream Down-
payment Initiative, which offers assistance with down-payments on homes to over 40,000 
low-income American families. Furthermore, Bush proposed the Single-Family 
Affordable Housing Tax Credit, which aimed to increase the supply of affordable homes 
in the United States. He also declared that there is a dual-need for the simplification of 
the home buying process and the expansion of financial education, both of which share 
the end of helping Americans understand what is involved in being a homeowner.7 
 It is interesting that Bush incorporated the phrase “American Dream,” originally 
coined by James Truslow Adams in his 1931 book The Epic of America,8 in describing an 
initiative that aims to make homeownership more available to those who are typically 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: America’s Ownership Society, Expanding Opportunities,” 
(August 9, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-9.html. 
7 Ibid. 
8 John Truslow Adams, The Epic of America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 374. Writing in 
the midst of the Great Depression, Adams does not include the notion of widespread homeownership in his 
vision of the American Dream. Still, he does say that the American Dream is “the dream of a land in which 
life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability 
or achievement.” 
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unable to afford a home. Homeownership has become central to the American Dream. 
Collectively, the idea seems to be that the more homeownership that there is in America, 
the more America will have invested citizens who will care about the health of the 
country, since they have more at stake than non-homeowners. Owning a home provides 
security to one’s family and represents success, while collective homeownership 
contributes to the security of the country and displays its high standard of living. 
 Given the salience of this value in America, it was not surprising to observe the 
shockwaves that were sent throughout the nation as the subprime mortgage crisis began 
to unfold. A vital and cultural value was being and continues to be threatened as more 
and more homes slip into foreclosure. In 2007, 405,000 households lost their home, an 
increase of 51% from the figure of 268,532 in 2006.9 Delinquency rates among subprime 
mortgages rose from 10.27% at the end of the first quarter in 2004 to 14.27% at the end 
of the fourth quarter of 2006.10 By 2011, 11.1 million American homeowners owed more 
on their mortgages than their homes were worth.11 In the first quarter of 2012, 7.4% of 
the nation’s mortgages were either 90 days or more past due or in foreclosure, 
approximately 335% higher than the average throughout the 1990’s. CoreLogic glumly 
estimates that there were approximately 3 million foreclosures that were completed over 
the course of 2009-2011.12 
 Nor is this crisis limited to those who took out subprime mortgages. Indeed, part 
of what is so alarming about the present housing crisis is the degree of collateral damage 
                                                 
9 Les Christie, “Foreclosures Up 75% in 2007,” CNNMoney, (January 29, 2008), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/29/real_estate/foreclosure_filings_2007. 
10 Todd Sinai, “The Inequity of Subprime Mortgage Relief Programs,” FreedomWorks Foundation: Issue 
Analysis (Washington: FreedomWorks Foundation, 2008), 3. 
11 The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, The State of the Nation’s Housing 2012 
(Cambridge: Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2012), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2012.pdf, 1. 
12 Ibid., 11. 
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that has occurred. If one has a house that forecloses in a given neighborhood, it can cause 
the values of neighboring houses to drop as well. The Center for Responsible Lending 
estimates that 40.6 million neighboring homes “will experience devaluation because of 
subprime foreclosures that take place nearby,” with an average loss of around $5,000 per 
household.13 Decreased property values also increase the likelihood of neighborhood 
instability as well as reduce the amount of tax revenue that a city can generate for public 
projects. Baltimore, which has already lost tens of millions of dollars in subprime-related 
foreclosures, sued Wells Fargo for allegedly targeting black borrowers, offering them 
high-risk and unfairly priced home loans.14 The City of Cleveland, provocatively, filed a 
public nuisance lawsuit against 21 investment banks for facilitating subprime-related 
losses in the city.15 Added to this fray is the rise of intentional foreclosures, ones that take 
place not because borrowers are unable to afford the monthly mortgage payments, but 
because they simply no longer want to pay the loan back, given that their property has 
dropped in value and, perhaps, the value of the property is now worth less than the 
remaining amount that needs to be repaid.16 Other factors exacerbating the volatile 
American housing market include the first-ever year over year drop in the median price 
of houses (since reliable records began to emerge around 1968),17 and a “shadow 
inventory” of 1.5 million homes that are either seriously delinquent, in the foreclosure 
                                                 
13 The Center for Responsible Lending, “Subprime Spillover: Foreclosures Cost Neighbors $202 Billion; 
40.6 Million Homes Lose $5,000 On Average,” CRL Issue Paper (January 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/subprime-spillover.pdf. 
14 Gretchen Morgenson, “Baltimore is Suing Bank Over Foreclosure Crisis,” The New York Times (January 
8, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/us/08baltimore.html. 
15 Christopher Maag, “Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders Over Subprime Mortgages,” The New York Times 
(January 12, 2008). http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/us/12cleveland.html. 
16 Sandra Hughes, “Anatomy of an Intentional Foreclosure,” CBS News (February 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/12/eveningnews/main3823531.shtml. 
17Michael M. Grynbaum, “Home Prices Sank in 2007, and Buyers Hid,” The New York Times (January 25, 
2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/business/25home.html. 
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process, or real estate owned (REO) that are not listed for sale.18 Homes owned by a 
lender that were acquired by foreclosure or similar means are known as REO.19 
It is hard to determine how much of an impact the subprime mortgage crisis has 
had on our economy as a whole. According to The Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), there were 25 bank failures in 2008, 140 bank failures in 2009, 157 
bank failures in 2010, 92 bank failures in 2011, and 31 bank failures over the first six 
months of 2012.20 To put the magnitude of these bank failures in perspective, there were 
only 27 bank failures over the course of 2000-2007.21 
From December of 2007 to June of 2009, household income in the United States 
fell 3.2%.22 Inflation-adjusted median household income fell another 6.7% from June 
2009 to June 2011.23 In April of 2012, the unemployment rate stood at 8.1%24 with 
approximately 13.7 million jobless workers in the United States.25 Before the outbreak of 
the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, people who were long-term unemployed, those 
who were looking for work for more than six months, accounted for 0.8% of the 
                                                 
18 “CoreLogic Reports Shadow Inventory Fell in April 2012 to October 2008 Levels,” The New York Times 
(June 14, 2012). 
19 Harvey S. Jacobs, “Learn the Rules of Fannie Mae Before Buying a Home from the Agency,” The 
Washington Post (September 30, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/learn-the-
rules-of-fannie-mae-before-buying-a-home-from-the-agency/2011/09/28/gIQAf7kp9K_story.html. 
20 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Failed Bank List,” (July 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Robert Pear, “Recession Officially Over, U.S. Incomes Kept Falling,” The New York Times (October 9, 
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/us/recession-officially-over-us-incomes-kept-
falling.html. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Binyamin Appelbaum, “Unemployment, Beyond the Rate,” The New York Times (May 4, 2012), 
available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/unemployment-beyond-the-rate. 
25 Catherine Rampell, “Reasons Abound for Ebb in Job Growth,” The New York Times (May 4, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/business/economy/us-added-only-115000-jobs-in-april-
rate-is-8-1.html. 
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American labor force.26 By 2010, the long-term unemployed accounted for 4.2 percent of 
the work force, a number that does not even include those who gave up looking for 
work.27 Indeed, the U6 unemployment rate, which includes not only those who are 
unemployed and seeking full-time employment, but also those who are working part-time 
(and desire full-time employment) as well as those who are unemployed and discouraged, 
having given up on looking for employment, was at 14.7% as of August of 2012. From 
July of 2007 to August of 2012, the average monthly U6 unemployment rate was 
14.9%.28  Significantly, as Binyamin Appelbaum has noted, “People who lose jobs, even 
if they eventually find new ones, suffer lasting damage to their earnings potential, their 
health and the prospects of their children. And the longer it takes to find a new job, the 
deeper the damage appears to be.”29 One poll in The New York Times revealed that 81% 
of respondents feel that the United States is headed on the wrong track, and 78% 
indicated that they feel that the nation is worse off now than it was five years ago.30 
My aim in writing this work is to unpack the phenomenon of the subprime 
mortgage crisis by relying upon a selected set of theoretical tools that Bernard Lonergan 
presents in his writings. The first chapter will consist of a presentation and explication of 
this set of tools. The chapter will begin with an exploration of his transcendental method. 
Lonergan’s notions of emergent probability, schemes of recurrence, cognitional structure 
                                                 
26 Dean Baker and Kevin Hassett, “The Human Disaster of Unemployment,” The New York Times (May 12, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/opinion/sunday/the-human-disaster-of-
unemployment.html. 
27 Ibid. 
28 This information was acquired at the Portal Seven database, available at 
http://portalseven.com/employment/unemployment_rate_u6.jsp#. 
29 Binyamin Appelbaum, “The Enduring Consequences of Unemployment,” The New York Times (March 
28, 2012), available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/the-enduring-consequences-of-
unemployment. 
30 David Leonhardt and Marjorie Connelly, “81% in Poll Say Nation is Headed On Wrong Track,” The 
New York Times (April 4, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/us/04poll.html. 
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and the self-correcting process of learning, bias, positions and counterpositions, common 
sense, and the invariant structure of the human good will all be explored as well. 
The second chapter of this dissertation will serve as a bridge between Lonergan’s 
theoretical tools and an analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis. I will begin this chapter 
by briefly presenting the findings of a report published by two senior economists at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and one research economist at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta. The authors of this report argue that “bubble fever,” or what Lonergan would 
call general bias, impaired the decision making processes of many of the major players in 
the subprime mortgage market. I will focus on borrowers and investors as portrayed in 
this report. I will continue this section by providing a sketch of how group bias was 
operative leading up to and during the subprime mortgage crisis. The emphasis in this 
section will be on instances of “co-opted” group bias, or arrangements in which different 
parties cooperated with one another in mutually advantageous ways, but to the detriment 
of the good of order.31 The five relationships of this sort that will be covered briefly in 
this subsection are: lenders and their federal regulators, lenders and arrangers, arrangers 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission, arrangers and the credit rating agencies, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Congress. 
To help provide a context for the later chapters on the different parties involved in 
the crisis, I will call attention to how a federally accepted definition of the term 
                                                 
31 To be sure, many of the parties of the subprime mortgage crisis fell prey to group bias without having to 
cooperate with a separate party. Goldman Sachs’ relationship with AIG, for example, was unquestionably 
beneficial to them, but disastrous for AIG and, later, American taxpayers. Importantly, this “individual” 
form of group bias is implicit in the “co-opted” form. The way in which the Office of Thrift Supervision 
grossly under-regulated Washington Mutual was, in the short-term, mutually beneficial, but the driving 
force behind this under-regulation was simply group bias: the Office of Thrift Supervision generated fee 
revenue and enhanced the perception of its regulatory relevance, while Washington Mutual was able to 
recklessly take on risks that were immensely profitable in the short-term. Absent those fundamental 
benefits, the “co-opted” form of group bias would have never come into being. 
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“subprime” never emerged before or during the subprime crisis, which likely made it 
difficult to effectively regulate the subprime mortgage market. Next, I will unpack the 
important distinction between the primary and secondary market. I will then examine a 
few of the historical preconditions that were in place that later created conditions for the 
subprime mortgage market to flourish. Among the most prominent of these preconditions 
was the Savings and Loan Crisis, which, like the subprime mortgage crisis, was plagued 
by the general bias of common sense. Finally, I will present an account of the original 
subprime mortgage crisis that erupted in the late 1990’s. This crisis accentuated the 
riskiness of subprime loans and the fragile interconnectedness of participants in the 
financial markets. For these reasons, this original subprime crisis should have triggered 
an alarm that subprime loans merited stricter oversight. Yet, general bias and group bias 
reared their head once again in the early 2000’s as the profit potential of the subprime 
mortgage market proved to be too tempting to many large market participants. 
In the third chapter, I will investigate the first of five parties that were involved in 
the subprime mortgage crisis: the lenders. This chapter will begin by untangling the 
fragmented and intricate nature of mortgage banking regulation in the United States and 
then move into an argument that this regulatory apparatus was ill-equipped for providing 
sound oversight of subprime lenders. After investigating whether certain types of lenders 
are distinct enough to warrant the complicated regulatory structure that was in place, I 
will specify how involved each type of lender was in the subprime mortgage market. 
Next, I will discuss the importance of the advent of securitization and then examine 
certain deregulatory preconditions, both of which made the explosion of subprime 
lending in the early 2000’s possible. I will then raise the question of how effectively the 
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) were able to regulate their lenders and protect borrowers in light of the fact that 
they competed with one another for charters and preempted crucial state consumer 
protection laws. In order to make this latter discussion more concrete, I will provide a 
snapshot of the OCC and OTS in action: the former with respect to Wells Fargo Home 
Mortgage and Chase Home Finance, and the latter with respect to Washington Mutual. 
After providing a summary of their regulatory failure, I will turn to the third federal 
regulator of lenders, the Federal Reserve. I will argue that the Federal Reserve absolved 
themselves of their responsibility to oversee non-depository mortgage lending affiliates, 
which created an enormous regulatory blind spot. To substantiate this latter point, I will 
examine the Federal Reserve’s relationship with Countrywide Home Loans. Finally, I 
will discuss how the fourth type of regulator, state regulators, were overwhelmed by the 
size and complexity of large subprime lenders like Ameriquest and New Century 
Financial.   
In chapter four, I will investigate the role that the five largest investment banks, 
the arrangers, played in the subprime mortgage crisis. Included in this chapter will be an 
argument that the subprime mortgage boom in the early 2000’s was instigated, at least in 
part, by a supply-side, arranger-fueled demand for subprime mortgages, which is 
exemplified by the fall of Lehman Brothers. I will then explore the multiple roles that 
arrangers played in the subprime securitization process and follow up this discussion with 
a thumbnail sketch of collateralized debt obligations. Next, I will chronicle the 
spectacular collapse of “the Wal-Mart of the CDO [collateralized debt obligation] 
10 
 
industry,”32 Merrill Lynch. Shifting gears, I will examine the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s misguided and ill-fated adoption of the alternative net capital rule and 
their creation of the regrettable consolidated supervised entities program. These decisions 
created conditions for arrangers to go on a leverage binge, which, when coupled with an 
overreliance on a short-term funding source (repurchase agreements), led to the swift and 
sensational decline of all five arrangers once house prices declined. The collapse of Bear 
Stearns is a paragon of this unreasonable regulatory arrangement and irresponsible 
business practice. The five arrangers were attracted to credit-default swaps (CDSs), so it 
is necessary to explain the basis of this attraction as well as describe the nature of these 
contracts. I will then explore the breathtaking fall of the largest CDS protection seller, 
AIG, and show how they were blinded by general and group bias. In the final two 
sections, I will examine the decline of “the gold standard” in investment banking, 
Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. 
 In chapter five, I will focus on the lynchpin of the subprime mortgage crisis, the 
credit rating agencies. I will begin this section by providing a brief history of credit 
ratings in the United States and then an explanation of the function of the credit rating 
agencies. Next, I will provide an analysis of the credit rating industry and then consider 
various criticisms that have been leveled against the three largest credit rating agencies, 
ultimately arguing that they were in a position to privilege volume over accuracy when it 
came to their ratings. By privileging volume, those three credit rating agencies stood to 
make large sums of money in exchange for inundating the investing community with 
financial product of (at best) questionable credit risk. 
                                                 
32 Serena Ng and Carrick Mollenkamp, “Merrill Takes $8.4 Billion Credit Hit --- It Plunged Into CDOs In 
’03, Hiring Pioneer Of the Debt Securities,” The Wall Street Journal (October 25, 2007). 
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 Chapter six will consist of an exploration of the two housing government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and their contribution to the 
subprime mortgage crisis. First, I will provide a brief history of the enterprises and then 
explain what the term “government sponsored enterprise” means. Next, I will argue that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the recipients of an implicit government guarantee of 
their debt obligations, which enabled them to receive a unique subsidy from the federal 
government. After examining the two lines of business that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
conduct in the mortgage market, I will explain why one is riskier and more profitable 
than the other. Both of the housing GSEs were embroiled in a scandal in the early 2000’s, 
which created an opportunity for Congress to strengthen their regulatory oversight of 
them. I will argue that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac successfully evaded any meaningful 
regulatory restrictions by executing offensive and defensive mechanisms to protect their 
place in the mortgage industry, most notably their knack for tapping into the social value 
of American homeownership. The importance of this congressional inaction will come to 
light in the next two sections. I will contend that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
forced to serve “two irreconcilable masters,”33 which stipulated that they provide two sets 
of particular goods: one to their investors and the other to Congress and the American 
public. In a fascinating mixture of an over-zealous pursuit of profit and a congressional 
mandate to delve deeper into the subprime mortgage market, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac took progressively greater risks. The two housing GSEs were part of a gambit that 
could only be pulled off as long as house prices continued to rise. Once those prices 
                                                 
33 I discovered the phrase “serving two irreconcilable masters” from a text edited by Peter Wallison, 
Serving Two Masters, Yet Out of Control (Washington: AEI Press, 2001). 
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declined, both collapsed with great celerity and were placed into conservatorship in 
September of 2008. 
 In the final analysis, many parties contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis, 
and the ones that are covered most extensively in this study deserve to shoulder the bulk 
of the responsibility. Lonergan’s thoughts on the notion of collective responsibility are 
worth quoting in full: 
The notion of collective responsibility is not without its difficulty. One 
may claim that, as men individually are responsible for the lives they lead, 
so collectively they must be responsible for the resultant situation. But 
that claim is too rapid to be convincing. No doubt, single elements 
in the resulting situation are identical with the actions or the effects for 
which individuals are responsible. But the resulting situation as a whole 
commonly was neither foreseen nor intended or, when it does happen 
that it was, still such foresight and intention are apt to reside not in the 
many but in the few and rather in secret schemes and machinations 
than in public avowal.34 
 
Over the course of this study, one will discover startling instances of both ignorance and, 
if not secret at the time, at least under-publicized schemes and courses of action that were 
executed by parties who stood to greatly profit from them, at least in the short-term. The 
subprime mortgage crisis was not inevitable and this study will attempt to explain why. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Bernard Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, Ed. Frederick E. 
Crowe (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), 169. 
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Chapter One 
1.0. A Selection of Lonergan’s Theoretical Terms 
1.1. Introduction 
On January 13, 2010, the CEOs of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan 
Chase, and Bank of America testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(FCIC), a body created by Congress to investigate the causes of the subprime mortgage 
crisis. At one point during the hearing, the chairman of the FCIC, Phil Angelides, pressed 
Goldman Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, to discuss the excessive nature of the risks that 
his firm took leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis. One of the more pointed 
questions that Angelides asked was whether Blankfein believed that Goldman Sachs, 
with its excessive risk profile, would have survived the crisis, bereft of the federal bailout 
that the firm received.  
Blankfein’s response was memorable. Likening the financial crisis to a hurricane, 
Blankfein implied that the adverse conditions that Goldman Sachs encountered at the 
time were due to factors that were outside of the firm’s control. Implicitly, then, the firm 
was not responsible for its precarious position. After this response, Angelides stated, “Mr. 
Blankfein, I want to say this. Having sat on the board of the California Earthquake 
Authority, acts of God we’ll exempt. These were acts of men and women.”35  
The theoretical groundwork of my study of the subprime mortgage crisis will be 
laid out in this chapter. My thesis is that the crisis was the product of an accumulation of 
biased human judgments and decisions that, over time, resulted in a partial, though 
                                                 
35 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “The Official Transcript of the First Public Hearing,” (January 13, 
2010), available at http://groups.haas.berkeley.edu/realestate/Research/rosen/FCIC_Public_Hearing_2010-
0113-Transcript.pdf, 33-36. Italics mine. 
14 
 
serious, breakdown in what Lonergan calls the good of order. This latter notion is part of 
his notion of the invariant structure of the human good. To understand this structure and 
the particular breakdown that will occupy much of this study, one needs to come to terms 
with Lonergan’s foundational, transcendental method (section 1.2). Building upon this 
method, I will explore Lonergan’s notions of self-appropriation (sections 1.3 and 1.4), 
common sense knowing (section 1.5), evaluating and deliberating (section 1.6), values, 
judgments of value, and feelings (section 1.7), religious and moral conversion (section 
1.8), moral self-transcendence, deciding, and authenticity (section 1.9), and the three 
biases (section 1.10). Having discussed these theoretical tools, I will be in a position to 
examine Lonergan’s notion of the invariant structure of the human good (section 1.11) 
and, in later chapters, explain precisely how general and group bias inflicted damage on 
this structure. The subprime mortgage crisis was not an act of God or due to chance, but 
rather was the cumulative product of biased human judgments and decisions that were 
freely made by various distinct, related, and involved parties. 
 
1.2. The Foundational Method and Cognitional Self-Transcendence 
Lonergan’s transcendental method is “a normative pattern of recurrent and related 
operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”36 The method is transcendental 
in the sense that “it is not categorically determined to some particular field.”37 While 
there are particular methods, such as the scientific method, which can be specially 
adapted to the needs and opportunities of particular fields, Lonergan’s method underpins 
                                                 
36 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973), 4. 
37 Ibid., Early Works on Theological Method I, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 22, Ed. 
Robert M. Doran, Robert C. Croken (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2010), 572. 
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all of those categorically-limited methods.38 Lonergan conceives of this method as “the 
assault on the citadel: it is the possession of the basic method, and all other methods are 
just so many extensions and adaptations of it.”39  
This method has as its first principles not universal premises or abstract logical 
propositions, “but concrete realities, namely, sensitively, intellectually, rationally, and 
morally conscious subjects.”40 As Lonergan declares, “[I]t is the de facto empirically 
existing subject that is the basis of everything I’m saying. And I’m asking each subject to 
be his own basis and to find in himself what his own basis is.”41 He discusses the 
transcendental method not to have a basis in some objective set of statements, but rather 
to help us be aware of ourselves.42 Lonergan puts the matter this way in his 
Understanding and Being: 
What do you do not to have to depend on somebody’s definition, or 
somebody’s say-so, or ‘It is the way we always talk’? What do you base 
your ultimates on? What do you get from them? Is there any method of 
tackling that problem? And I think that’s the use I see in 
self-appropriation.43 
 
When one successfully arrives at what Lonergan calls “self-appropriation,” one will have 
something in oneself that will be one’s “ultimate court of appeal.”44 This court of appeal 
was sorely needed leading up to and during the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis. 
Lonergan urges “the necessity of self-appropriation of the subject, of coming to know at 
first hand oneself and one’s own operations… It is there that one will find the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods,” A Third Collection, Ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah, Paulist 
Press, 1985), 150. 
39 Ibid., “Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation,” 52. 
40 Ibid., 45-46. 
41 Early Works on Theological Method I, 573. 
42 Ibid., 439. 
43 Bernard Lonergan, Understanding and Being, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 5, Ed. 
Elizabeth A. Morelli and Mark D. Morelli (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1990), 264. 
44 Ibid. 
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foundations of method.”45 Indeed, in Method in Theology, Lonergan states that self-
appropriation is “a grasp of transcendental method.”46 In another work, Lonergan writes, 
“Insofar as there is the self-appropriation of the subject, insofar as he becomes clearly 
and distinctly aware of his operations, there arises method.”47 
 Lonergan’s transcendental method, then, is not a set of verbal pronouncements 
enouncing rules to be followed,48 but is rather a matter of “how you do things.”49 For this 
reason, I believe, Lonergan places a pattern of operations in the foreground of his notion 
of method.  The operations include “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, 
inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshaling and 
weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing.”50 
Lonergan assumes that everyone is familiar with at least some of the operations and has a 
notion of what the other terms mean.51 These operations form a pattern, whose proper 
understanding Lonergan calls “an explanatory apprehension” of the operations.52 When 
one knows the operations in their interrelations, one has grasped the operations’ pattern.53  
The basic terms in Lonergan’s method are the operations, while the basic relations 
are the interrelations between those operations.54 Similar to contemporary 
mathematicians, Lonergan notes that he is attempting to “set up a basic vicious circle in 
which the terms are clarified by their relations to one another and the relations are 
                                                 
45 Ibid., “The Future of Thomism,” A Second Collection, Ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrell 
(Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1974), 51. 
46 Method in Theology, 83. 
47 Early Works on Theological Method I, 138. 
48 Bernard Lonergan, “Theology in its New Context,” A Second Collection, Ed. William F.J. Ryan and 
Bernard J. Tyrell (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974), 64. 
49 Early Works on Theological Method I, 427. Italics his. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Method in Theology, 7. 
52 Early Works on Theological Method I, 427. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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clarified by the terms that they relate.”55 These basic terms “denote the conscious and 
intentional operations that occur in human knowing,”56 which raises the question of what 
Lonergan means by “conscious” and “intentional.”  
Lonergan’s appraisal of human consciousness is quite complex.57 According to 
him, consciousness is “interior experience of oneself and one’s acts, where ‘experience’ 
is taken in the strict sense of the word.”58 Experience in “the strict sense” is a 
“preliminary unstructured sort of awareness that is presupposed by intellectual inquiry 
and completed by it.”59 This awareness is preliminary in the sense that it is a condition 
for the possibility all intellectual inquiry.60 Lonergan maintains that this awareness is 
unstructured because “if it were already intelligibly formed, further inquiry would be 
superfluous.”61  
Experience in this strict sense can be either exterior or interior. With exterior 
experience “we see colors, hear sounds, taste flavors, smell odors, and feel things hard or 
soft, hot or cold, heavy or light, smooth or rough.”62 These exterior experiences precede 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., “Lecture 1: Philosophy of God,” Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, The Collected 
Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 17, Ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 2004), 167. 
57 Ibid., “What Are Judgments of Value?,” Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, Collected 
Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 17, Ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 2004), 143. 
58 Ibid., The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, The Collected Works of Bernard 
Lonergan, Vol. 7, Trans. Michael G. Shields, Ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
2002), 157. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 159. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
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any inquiries, formulations of concepts, or judgments, which is why they qualify as 
experiences in the strict sense of the word.63 
Consciousness, though, is interior experience of oneself and one’s acts. Lonergan 
explicitly contends that a human being is not conscious “through some distinct and 
special operation by which one intuits oneself on the side of the object,” for no such 
operation exists.64 Instead, human consciousness is “a certain presence of oneself to 
oneself.”65 
To help clarify the sort of presence that Lonergan has in mind here, one can turn 
to his Understanding and Being, where he notes that the term is ambiguous and proceeds 
to distinguish three types of presence.66 First, there is a material presence in which 
inanimate objects are present in some space, such as a room. Lonergan notes, for 
instance, that “you could say that the chairs are present in the room, but you cannot say 
that the chairs are present to the room or that the room is present to the chairs.”67 This 
latter, second type of presence, of being present to someone, applies to both human 
beings and animals. Of greater interest to Lonergan is the third, fundamental type of 
presence, one in which one is present not to someone else, but to oneself. Someone or 
something else being present to me presupposes that I am somehow present to myself.68 
 Lonergan underscores the elusiveness of this primordial presence, playfully 
noting that it cannot be attained by craning one’s neck around and looking into oneself to 
                                                 
63 Ibid. Please also see: Bernard Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure,” Collection, The Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 4, Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto, 
1988), 209. 
64 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 183. 
65 Ibid., 187. 
66 Understanding and Being, 15. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
19 
 
see if one is there.69 To be conscious of oneself, one would not look at oneself as though 
one were an object.70 Human consciousness is not awareness “on the side of the object 
that is observed, but on the side of the subject that observes.”71 As Joseph Flanagan 
writes, “Consciousness is not something that you can hold up for examination, rather it is 
known indirectly through certain conscious acts you perform and through you, the 
subject, consciously acting.”72 In other words, human beings are only conscious of 
themselves by way of their acts or operations, which is precisely what Lonergan’s terse 
definition of consciousness suggests.73 Salvino Biolo argues that Lonergan’s account of 
human consciousness is original, for he was able to define the indefinable, conceptualize 
the pre-conceptual.74 
While all of the operations listed above are conscious, they are also intentional.75 
An operation is intentional in the sense that, by way of the performance of the operation, 
objects become present to the subject.76 Consider the intentionality accompanying the 
operation of seeing, for example. Lonergan states, “The objects become present to me... 
If I close my eyes, the operation of seeing does not occur. I open them, and I do see 
colors and shapes before my eyes.”77 The “psychological sense” in which the operations 
                                                 
69 Ibid.  
70 Understanding and Being, 20-21. 
71 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 183. 
72 Joseph Flanagan, Quest for Self-Knowledge (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997), 132. 
73 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 167. 
74 Salvino Biolo, “A Lonergan Approach to St. Augustine’s Interpretation of Consciousness,” Science et 
Espirit, Vol. 31 (1979), 327. I discovered this reference from: Thomas Naickamparambil, Through Self-
Discovery to Self-Transcendence: A Study of Cognitional Self-Appropriation in Bernard Lonergan (Rome: 
Gregorian University, 1997), 65.  
75 Method in Theology, 9. 
76 Early Works on Theological Method I, 428. 
77 Ibid. 
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have objects is what Lonergan means by the term “intentional”: it is “my awareness of 
objects and the object’s presence to me.”78 
In sum, all of the operations listed above, as conscious and intentional, have a 
twofold psychological dimension. As intentional, when one performs any of the 
operations, objects become present to the subject.79 As conscious, when one performs any 
of the operations the subject and the operations become present to the subject.80 
While there are different kinds of presence, there are also different kinds of 
intentionality and different kinds of consciousness.81 In an effort to discuss these 
differences in intentionality and consciousness, Lonergan notices four interrelated levels 
of conscious intentionality: the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the 
responsible. For now, I will focus only on the first three of those levels. 
What distinguishes the levels of conscious intentionality from one another is the 
quality of self-presence of the subject to himself or herself when performing the 
operations on each level.82 The performance of different operations yields “qualitatively 
different modes of being conscious subjects… and qualitatively different modes of 
intending.”83 Before examining the qualitatively different modes of consciousness and 
intentionality on each level, it will be helpful to highlight a distinction that Lonergan 
makes between two types of movements: a vertical movement and a horizontal 
movement.84 What accounts for this distinction is the type of data that are serving as the 
point of departure for the subject’s operations. One should note that Lonergan’s method 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 430. 
82 The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 165. 
83 Method in Theology, 10. 
84 Early Works on Theological Method I, 430. 
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embraces both kinds of data,85 but places in a privileged position the data of 
consciousness.86 The vertical movement describes the process of cognitional self-
transcendence, whereas the horizontal movement describes the critical process of self-
appropriation. 
The vertical movement starts with the given data of sense, which one experiences 
sensitively. The data of sense includes “colors, shapes, sounds, odors, tastes, the hard and 
soft, rough and smooth, hot and cold, wet and dry.”87 From these sensitive experiences, 
one can move up through the other levels of consciousness, inquiring, getting insights, 
reflecting, and judging, to making statements about sensible things.88 Importantly, the 
driving force behind the vertical movement, beyond the initial, modest movement from a 
dreaming to a waking state, is inquiry: the posing of certain types of questions to oneself. 
The horizontal movement, on the other hand, involves the data of consciousness, 
which is consciousness of the human operations identified above.89 The data of 
consciousness is made possible by the performance of the operations that are present in a 
vertical movement. To help clarify this point, Lonergan states: 
The operations become conscious [in a horizontal movement] insofar as 
you start from the data of sense, inquire, understand, formulate, reflect,  
weigh the evidence, judge, deliberate, evaluate, decide. In the  
occurrence of the operations is to be found consciousness of the 
operations… Insofar as this consciousness has been elicited, there are 
available the data of consciousness to which you can again apply the  
operations, this time as intentional, to the operations as conscious. You  
can inquire about the data of consciousness and come to understand them 
and formulate what you have understood, reflect on your formulations,  
                                                 
85 Ibid., “Religious Knowledge,” A Third Collection, Ed. Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 
1985), 141. 
86 Ibid., “Theories of Inquiry,” A Second Collection, Ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrell 
(Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1974), 37. 
87 Ibid., Insight, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 3, Ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. 
Doran (Toronto, University of Toronto, 2000), 299. 
88 Method in Theology, 8-9. 
89 Insight, 299. 
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weigh the evidence for the accuracy of your formulations, make your 
judgments, and decide on your methods.90  
 
Similar to the movement that is possible vertically, one is capable of moving horizontally 
from “the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to 
statements about conscious subjects and their operations.”91 Lonergan characterizes the 
process that is contained in this movement as one of objectification, which is “a matter of 
applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.”92 This is the crucial 
process of self-appropriation,93 the foundation of Lonergan’s method.94 This horizontal 
movement, then, is of special interest. 
With the distinction between these two movements in mind, one can now turn to 
the three initial levels of conscious intentionality and better understand how there are 
qualitatively different modes of consciousness and intentionality on each level. Empirical 
consciousness, the first level, is characteristic of sensing, perceiving, imagining.95 In 
Method in Theology, Lonergan adds the operations of feeling, speaking, and moving to 
this level.96 When one is only empirically conscious, one is sensing things, but not 
worried about any meaning in them.97 One will have “empirical presentations without 
inquiry.”98 Lonergan gives the example of an empirically conscious subject as one who is 
lying on the beach on a warm day watching the clouds pass by without any concern for 
                                                 
90 Early Works on Theological Method I, 437. 
91 Method in Theology, 9. 
92 Early Works on Theological Method I, 437. 
93 Ibid., 436. Here, Lonergan writes, “[Self-Appropriation] is a process of objectifying oneself from the 
evidence supplied by oneself.” 
94 Ibid., “The Future of Thomism,” A Second Collection, Ed. William F.J. Ryan and Bernard J. Tyrell 
(Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1974), 51. 
95 Insight, 346. 
96 Ibid., Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973), 9. 
97 Ibid., Topics in Education, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 10, Ed. Robert M. Doran and 
Frederick E. Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2000), 82. 
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anything whatsoever.99 Confined to this level, the subject is experiencing empirical 
presentations, but is not exerting any effort to understand them.100 The mode of intending 
at this level, made possible by the vertical movement from the dream state to the waking 
state,101 is a matter of attending to the data of sense.102 With respect to the horizontal 
movement, the mode of intending at this level consists of “heightening one’s 
consciousness of one’s experiencing, understanding, judging.”103 
On the intellectual level of consciousness, one is inquiring, seeking 
understanding, having insights, expressing what one has understood, working out the 
presuppositions and implications of that expression, and raising further questions for 
intelligence.104 When one is intellectually conscious, one is engaging in “intellectual 
inquiry and in acts of understanding and defining, operating as an intelligent person.”105 
Intelligence is operating in all of the above acts. The next step in the vertical movement is 
made possible by inquiry, the posing of questions for intelligence such as “what and why, 
what for and how.”106 The mode of intending on this second level, which is made 
possible by this next step in the vertical movement, is an active apprehending, not of the 
given data of sense, but of “a unity or relationship that is possibly relevant to the data.”107 
In terms of the mode of intending that is present on this level in a horizontal movement, 
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the object to be understood is “one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, 
deciding.”108  
The rational level of consciousness is characterized by activities such as 
reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence, grasping sufficient grounds for 
judging, and passing judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a 
statement.109 On this level, one is critically inquiring whether something exists and is 
so.110 One is rationally conscious insofar as one “puts questions for reflection, grasps the 
unconditioned, and passes judgment.”111 One moves vertically, up from the second level 
of consciousness to the third, by way of posing a question for reflection to oneself: “Is it 
so?” The mode of intending that is present on this third level of consciousness is 
something that is independent of oneself: a judgment about whether something is so.112 
With respect to the horizontal movement on this level, the object to be affirmed is the 
“understood relations of experienced experiencing, understanding, judging, and 
affirming.”113 
At each of these levels of conscious intentionality, the subject is conscious in a 
qualitatively distinct way. Furthermore, the intentionality of the subject’s operations at 
each level is qualitatively distinct. Despite these differences among the levels, they are 
also related to one another. Lonergan argues that the relations among the levels can be 
expressed as instances of sublation, by which he means the lower levels are “retained, 
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preserved, yet transcended and completed by a higher.”114  As Lonergan states, 
“Experiencing is presupposed and complemented by inquiry and understanding. 
Experiencing and understanding are presupposed and complemented by reflecting and 
judging.”115 Each of the later levels goes beyond the preceding ones, “introduces 
something entirely new, [and] makes that element a new basis of operation.”116 Far from 
sabotaging or interfering with the preceding levels, the later levels preserve, perfect, and 
extend their relevance and significance.117 Without the preceding levels, though, the later 
levels would not have anything to complete.118 
One may wonder what propels the subject from the lower levels to the higher 
ones. Lonergan argues that the source of this movement lies in the dynamism of our 
conscious intentionality,119 what he calls the transcendental notions: the intelligible, the 
true, and the good.120 These notions are transcendental because they transcend any 
specific content.121 When one asks a question for intelligence, such as “What is it?,” one 
is intending the intelligible.122 On the third level of consciousness, one can ask the 
question, “Is that so?,” which intends the truth of one’s understanding and the reality of 
what one takes to be a fact.123 The transcendental notions are what one ultimately intends 
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when one asks a question124 and they apply to every single object “for the very good 
reason that they are grounded in the successive stages in our dealing with objects.”125  
The transcendental notions “constitute our capacity for self-transcendence.”126 
They are subunits or stages of the unfolding of the pure, disinterested, detached, and 
unrestricted desire to know. The pure desire to know is “something substantial and 
common to human nature and human activity.”127 It is “the eros of the human spirit,”128 a 
subject’s imperiously inquiring and critical spirit.129  
The pure desire to know is a subject’s basic orientation. It is a fundamental, total 
openness to all questioning.130 As unrestricted, the pure desire “inquires into everything, 
and asks everything about everything.”131 It demands “the intelligent and critical handling 
of every question,”132 which is the source of the recurrent nature of the subject’s 
operations that take place at the second and third levels of conscious intentionality. It is 
worth reiterating that the operations contained in Lonergan’s definition of method are not 
only related, but also recurrent. Our conscious and intentional operations are 
characterized by an “ever going beyond what happens to be given or known, ever striving 
for a fuller and richer apprehension of the yet unknown or incompletely known totality, 
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whole, universe.”133 This “ever going beyond” requires the subject to perpetually perform 
the operations at the second and third level of consciousness.    
Lonergan notes that this desire is also the subject’s immanent source of 
transcendence.134 By “transcendence,” Lonergan means that human development is a 
matter of the subject’s transcending or going beyond himself.135 As Lonergan states, “All 
development is development inasmuch as it goes beyond the initial subject, but in man 
this ‘going beyond’ is anticipated immanently by the detachment and disinterestedness of 
the pure desire.”136 The operator of our cognitional development is precisely this pure 
desire to know.137 
As soon as one wakes up and starts the day, one begins to be pushed or pulled 
beyond oneself.138 Lonergan writes, “Already on the level of experience we are going 
beyond ourselves in apprehending and in responding to persons and things about us.”139 
As modest as this self-transcendence may be, one is still moving out of oneself.140 
Not content with the level of experience, with the inescapable and spontaneous 
flow of sensible presentations, images, feelings, conations, and movements,141 one 
spontaneously succumbs “to the wonder that Aristotle named the beginning of all of 
science and philosophy.”142 This wonder can be formulated by asking questions for 
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intelligence, such as why, what for, or how.143 Inquiring is an active principle that intends 
more than the “cinematographic flow of presentations and presentations,”144 its intention 
is an answer, an insight.145 The process triggered by wonder and the subsequent inquiry 
prompts the subject, then, to go beyond the sensibly given and methodically seek, 
accumulate, and classify possibly relevant data that may, with a little luck, give rise to the 
desired insight or insights.146 Once the relevant insight is reached, the pure desire is 
transformed into one that aims “to formulate, to express in concepts and in words,” what 
the insight has grasped.147 The transcendence accomplished at this point comes in the 
form of the subject moving out into a world through his intelligence.148 The world 
Lonergan seems to have in mind is one that is constructed by the subject, a whole 
hypothetical world in which the sensibly given data find their place and their 
relationships with one another.149 
However intellectually satisfying the grasping and subsequent formulating of a 
direct insight may be, the pure desire is not assuaged.150 There is still a more radical, 
decisive stage in the process of cognitional self-transcendence, one that goes beyond “the 
more elementary concerns of both sense and intelligence.”151 One has moved past 
“imagination and guesswork, idea and hypothesis, theory and system, to ask about 
reality.”152 Greeting the formulated insight is the pure desire’s demand for sufficient 
evidence. This demand is encapsulated in the question for reflection: “It is so?” Should 
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one grasp the sufficiency of the evidence, grasp the virtually unconditioned, and judge 
that something is or is not so, the subject has transcended himself and arrived at what 
would be so even if he did not exist.153 This is the apex of cognitional self-transcendence, 
when the subject has moved to what is independent of himself.154 
This, in brief, is an outline of Lonergan’s cognitional structure, which I will 
examine in slightly greater detail below. For now, the point that I would like to 
emphasize is that the pure desire to know and its unfolding “impose a normative structure 
upon man’s cognitional acts” and enable one to transcend oneself.155 On the level of 
experience, one cannot escape sensations, percepts, and images.156 Lonergan notes that 
one “cannot be one of the Seven Holy Sleepers,” sleeping all of the time.157 Experiencing 
is inevitable, it cannot be avoided.  
On the intellectual level of consciousness, the normativity can be discerned 
through the way in which “the intelligence in each of us prompts us to seek 
understanding, to be dissatisfied with a mere glimmer, to keep probing for an ever fuller 
grasp, to pin down in accurate expression just what we so far have attained.”158 The 
relentless quest of the pure desire to know for intelligibility is made manifest by the 
questions that one asks about one’s experiences. In Insight, Lonergan underscores how 
being unintelligent is not a practical choice.159 He writes: 
I can deprecate intelligence; I can ridicule its aspirations; I can reduce  
its use to a minimum; but it does not follow that I can eliminate it. I can 
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question everything else, but to question questioning is self-destructive. I 
might call upon intelligence for the conception of a plan to escape  
intelligence, but the effort to escape would only reveal my present 
involvement, and strangely enough, I would want to go about the  
business intelligently, and I would want to claim that escaping was the  
intelligent thing to do.160 
 
One cannot avoid the fact that one has intelligence and questions for understanding 
continually emerge.161 
 Likewise, on the third level of consciousness, “one quickly encounters the 
inevitability of reflection and judgment.”162 Insights are a dime a dozen, “so critical 
reasonableness doubts, checks, makes sure.”163 There is a “self-assertive spontaneity that 
demands sufficient reason for all else but offers no justification for its demanding.”164 
This spontaneity “arises, fact-like, to generate knowledge of fact, to push the cognitional 
process from the conditioned structures of intelligence to unreserved affirmation of the 
unconditioned.”165 Moreover, not only does this spontaneity occur, it will recur whenever 
the conditions for reflection are fulfilled.166 The work performed by the subject on the 
second level of consciousness is not done for its own sake, but rather for the sake of an 
ulterior motive: judging.167  
The key point here is that there are immanent criteria in one’s operations at each 
level of consciousness and these criteria beckon the subject to go beyond himself.168 
Lonergan observes, “[I]nsofar as you invite subjects to try and put off their intelligence, 
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to try and put off their reasonableness, that they will find in the subject as subject that 
they cannot do so.”169 He forcefully characterizes this immanent normativity this way: 
 Spontaneously, we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; 
 and the spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; on the contrary, it is 
 constitutive of our conscious intelligence, just as the absence of the 
 effort to understand is constitutive of stupidity. Spontaneously we move 
 from understanding with its manifold and conflicting expressions to  
 critical reflection; again the spontaneity is not unconscious or blind; it  
 is constitutive of our critical rationality, of the demand within us for 
 sufficient reason; and it is the neglect or absence of this demand that 
 constitutes silliness.170  
 
There is, then, a normativity that one cannot dodge without amputating one’s 
reasonableness, intelligence, and sensitivity.171 This normativity is especially made 
manifest by the types of questions that spontaneously emerge at each level. 
Spontaneously, questions for intelligence and reflection emerge and place demands upon 
the subject. The questions delimit both what the answers will have to be about and which 
operations are going to have to be employed in order to answer them.172 One’s questions 
serve as signposts, directing one about how to go about transcending oneself. 
In light of this immanent normativity, three unexpressed173 transcendental 
precepts can be appropriated as binding on oneself: Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be 
reasonable.174 These transcendental precepts “have a prior existence and reality in the 
spontaneous, structured dynamism of human consciousness.”175 They are permanent176 
and their reality becomes apparent simply through a study of the operations 
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themselves.177 Following the bidding of the pure desire to know, that “built-in law of the 
human spirit,” one cannot help but make decisions to either cooperate or fail to cooperate 
with one’s own normative structure. Since one must use this very structure in order to 
decide whether to cooperate with it, this implies precepts or imperatives that one ought to 
do so. 
Up until this point, I have been attempting to provide a first approximation of 
what Lonergan means by “a normative pattern” and “recurrent and related operations” in 
his definition of method. My focus so far has been exclusively on the subject’s 
cognitional operations. Since these operations are both conscious and intentional, I 
examined what Lonergan means by both of those terms. I also attempted to explain, 
within the confines of the subject’s cognitional operations, what Lonergan means by a 
normative pattern. Hopefully, this discussion cast light on how these operations are 
continually recur and are related to one another. 
  Presently, I would like to examine Lonergan’s cognitional theory more 
explicitly, which is a theory “about what goes on when we know.”178 According to this 
theory, human knowing is a structure. This structure applies to both the data of sense and 
the data of consciousness. I will examine both of them, in turn.  
Human knowing, according to Lonergan, is a materially and formally dynamic 
structure.179 It is a structure in the sense that it is a whole whose parts are functionally 
related to one another.180 Each part of this structure “is just what it is because of its 
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functional relations to the other parts.”181 Importantly, the parts also determine what the 
whole has to be.182 
Human knowing is a materially dynamic structure because its parts are not made 
of material things, like an automobile, but instead are operations.183 While being 
functionally related to each other, these operations are dissimilar and distinct from one 
another and include “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, 
understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshaling and weighing the 
evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing.”184 As a formally 
dynamic structure, human knowing is self-assembling or self-constituting.185 As 
Lonergan explains, “It puts itself together, one part summoning forth the next, till the 
whole is reached.”186 This self-assembling occurs consciously, intelligently, and 
rationally, as opposed to unconsciously or blindly.187  
With respect to the vertical movement, which begins with the given data of sense, 
our operations of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling occur on what Lonergan 
calls the level of presentations.188 One’s empirical presentations are the materials that are 
presupposed by the posing of questions for explanation or intelligence such as “What?,” 
“Why?,” and “How often?”189 In response to these questions, there are “insights and 
thoughts, concepts, formulations, hypotheses, theories.”190  
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Every tentative answer to a question for intelligence, however, merely raises 
further questions for reflection: “Is it?” or “Is it so?”191 Answers to questions for 
reflection demand judgments of yes or no, although they can be qualified in an indefinite 
number of ways, such as “‘certainly,’ ‘probably,’ and ‘possibly’.”192 What are the 
grounds for one’s prospective judgment, for judging that the content of an insight 
generated at the level of intelligence is so?  
The initial answer that Lonergan provides to this question in Chapter 10 of Insight 
is that one has grasped the sufficiency of the evidence for a prospective judgment by an 
act of reflective understanding.193 When one has grasped the sufficiency of evidence for a 
prospective judgment, one has grasped the prospective judgment as virtually 
unconditioned.194 The virtually unconditioned involves three elements: a conditioned, a 
link between the conditioned and its conditions, and the fulfillment of the conditions.195 
As Lonergan explains, “The function of reflective understanding is to meet the question 
for reflection by transforming the prospective judgment from the status of a conditioned 
to the status of a virtually unconditioned; and reflective understanding effects this 
transformation by grasping the conditions of the conditioned and their fulfillment.”196 
This process can be illuminated by examining the three elements of the virtually 
unconditioned. 
The conditioned is the prospective judgment in virtue of the fact that “it stands in 
need of evidence sufficient for reasonable pronouncement.”197 The link between the 
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conditioned and its conditions is “a law immanent and operative in cognitional 
process,”198 which is “simply a way of doing things, a procedure within the cognitional 
field.”199 To get a handle on this law, Lonergan examines the difference between 
vulnerable and invulnerable insights. When an insight is vulnerable, further pertinent 
questions may be raised on the same issue, which reveal the “unsatisfactoriness of the 
insight” and evoke “the further insights that put a new light on the matter.”200 
Invulnerable insights, conversely, meet the issue squarely and are not, therefore, subject 
to further pertinent questions.201 In the absence of any further questions, there cannot be 
any “further insights to challenge the initial position.”202  
Lonergan argues that the distinction between vulnerable an invulnerable insights 
is an operational distinction, one that precedes the conceptual distinction between correct 
and mistaken insights. Lonergan declares, “Insights are correct as a matter of fact, and 
the fact is that there are no further relevant questions.”203 If, in fact, there are no further 
pertinent questions, “then in fact the insight is invulnerable; if in fact the insight is 
invulnerable, then in fact the judgment approving it will be correct.”204 Insights that are 
susceptible to further pertinent questions should indicate to the subject that the requisite 
conditions have not been fulfilled for affirming or denying a prospective judgment. In 
other words, under such conditions, one has not grasped the virtually conditioned and 
one’s judgment should be a reflection of that fact, perhaps by proceeding to make one 
that affirms that the conditioned cannot yet be affirmed or denied.  
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Building upon this point, Lonergan stresses that it is not enough that “no further 
relevant questions occur to me, but that there are no further relevant questions.”205 He 
explains: 
The mere absence of further questions in my mind can have other causes.  
My intellectual curiosity may be stifled by other interests. My eagerness 
to satisfy other drives may refuse the further questions a chance to 
emerge. To pass judgment in that case is to be rash, to leap before one 
looks.206 
 
In addition to rashness, another potential pitfall for judgers is that they can be indecisive 
due to a dissatisfaction with “the mere absence of further [pertinent] questions.”207 One 
could also fail to have “good enough judgment to judge whether [the further relevant 
questions] are relevant or not.”208 As Patrick Byrne observes, the biases, which I will 
examine in a separate section, can also “block one’s awareness of further pertinent 
questions, which, if entertained and answered, would indeed lead to a partial or total 
correction of the insight under consideration.”209  
One may wonder how to become a good judge when there are so many ways to go 
astray. Fortunately, Lonergan provides a brief guide to developing good judgment. First, 
one needs to allow the seed of the pure desire to know “to grow into a rugged tree to hold 
its own against the desires and fears, conations and appetites, drives and interests” that 
inhabit one’s heart.210 Second, Lonergan suggests that a significant amount of experience 
and time is needed to become a good judge. He argues that a “good judgment about any 
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insight has to rest on the previous acquisition of a large number of other, connected, and 
correct insights.”211 One needs to learn from past mistakes and allow the spontaneous 
self-correcting process of learning to take place.212 This process of learning “is a circuit 
in which insights reveal their shortcomings by putting forth deeds or words or thoughts, 
and through that revelation prompt the further questions that lead to complementary 
insights.”213 When one permits the self-correcting process of learning to occur, one will 
become progressively familiar with concrete situations and know what to expect in the 
midst of them.214 In the event that something unexpected occurs, the fruits of the self-
correcting process of learning will create conditions for one to identify “what happened 
and why, and what can be done to favor or to prevent such a recurrence.”215  
In an important sense, the self-correcting process of learning is part of what 
enables Lonergan’s method to yield “cumulative and progressive results.” By 
“progressive results,” Lonergan means that “the operations include new discoveries,” and 
by “cumulative results,” he means that “the new discoveries have to be integrated with 
previous discoveries, the new insights added on to all previous insights.”216 When one 
has an insight, “one has only to act, or to talk, or perhaps merely to think, on the basis of 
that insight, for its incompleteness to come to light and thereby generate a further 
question.”217 One’s openness and receptivity to the cascade of further questions that 
emerge in response to one’s insights put one in a position to have “an accumulation of 
insights in which each successive act complements the accuracy and covers the 
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deficiency of those that went before.”218 It would be difficult to have new insights, let 
alone to be in a position to integrate those insights with previous ones in a meaningful 
way, without actively and routinely engaging in the self-correcting process of learning. 
Certainly a failure to do so would hinder oneself from becoming a person of good 
judgment.219 
 
1.3. Self-Appropriation and Its Importance 
In addition to the vertical movement in the cognitional process described above, 
there is also the crucial horizontal movement, which is a reduplication or mirroring of 
that process.220 The key difference is that, in the horizontal movement, the relevant data 
are the data of consciousness instead of the data of sense.221 Lonergan invites us inquire 
into our own data of consciousness and “come to understand them and formulate what 
you have understood, reflect on your formulations, weigh the evidence for the accuracy 
of your formulations, make your judgments.”222  
On the level of experience, one “has to experience one’s experiencing, 
understanding, judging.”223 Lonergan notes that this experience is a matter of 
“heightening one’s consciousness of one’s experiencing, understanding, judging.”224 
Next, in coming to understand one’s experienced experiencing, understanding, and 
judging, one understands that “the operations are experienced not in isolation but in their 
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concomitance.”225 There is a flow, within consciousness, from experience to inquiry, 
leading up to insight, which is the act of understanding that makes one able to 
intelligently operate in a given situation.226 One further understands that within 
consciousness “there is a critical demand for evidence, the refusal to assent with 
insufficient evidence, and the necessity of assenting because the evidence really is 
sufficient.”227  
Ultimately, what one understands is that there is a unity of consciousness itself228 
and that this unity is given.229 By the very nature of the relatedness of the operations, 
there “must be one and the same [subject] that is inquiring and is perceiving,” for 
otherwise one’s inquiring would not be about one’s empirical presentations.230 Similarly, 
for an insight to be into one’s sensible presentations and elicited by one’s inquiry, “it 
must be one and the same that has the perceptions and has the insights.”231 In order for 
one’s conceiving to be able to “pick out what is essential to the insight in the 
presentations, it must be one and the same that is conceiving and understanding and 
perceiving.”232 Finally, in order for “a judgment to proceed rationally from the grasp of 
the unconditioned, it must be one and the same that grasps the unconditioned and 
judges.”233 
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The last step in this horizontal movement, in this process of self-appropriation, is 
that one has to affirm whether one’s conscious operations actually occur.234 Or, as 
Lonergan puts it, one needs to affirm “the understood relations of experienced 
experiencing, understanding, judging.”235 The conditioned, prospective judgment is “I am 
a knower.”236 The link between the conditioned and its conditions is contained in the 
proposition: “I am a knower if I am a unity performing certain kinds of acts.”237 The 
fulfillment of the conditions is found in the data of consciousness.238 Lonergan poses a 
number of questions in Insight to help one grasp the sufficiency of the evidence that one 
is a knower: 
Do I see, or am I blind? Do I hear, or am I deaf? Do I try to understand,  
or is the distinction between intelligence and stupidity no more  
applicable to me than to a stone? Have I any experience of insight, or is 
the story of Archimedes as strange to me as the account of Plotinus’s  
vision of the One? Do I conceive, think, consider, suppose, define,  
formulate, or is my talking like the talking of a parrot? I reflect, for I 
ask whether I am a knower. Do I grasp the unconditioned, if not in 
other instances, then in this one? If I grasped the unconditioned, would I  
not be under the rational compulsion of affirming that I am a knower, 
and so either affirm it or else find some loophole, some weakness, some 
incoherence, in this account of the genesis of self-affirmation?239  
 
Only a “non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist” would declare that these 
conscious and intentional operations do not exist.240  If one wanted to deny that one is a 
knower, one would have to use one’s own knowing in the very process of attempting to 
deny the fact that one is a knower.241 
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Not only must the operations be affirmed as existing, one must also affirm that 
they exist in the normative pattern described above, the one that is constituted by one’s 
own intelligence and reasonableness.242  The basis for this affirmation stems from the fact 
that any dramatic revision of this pattern would consist of “putting out a new edition of 
man as something radically different from what we have known him to be.”243 Yet, such 
revisions would have to be limited, for one would have to appeal to data and, therefore, 
presuppose an empirical level of operations.244 One’s revisions would also have to serve 
as a better explanation of the data, which would presuppose an intellectual level of 
operations.245 Finally, one’s revisions, which hypothetically and tentatively explain the 
data in a better fashion, would have to be judged as being, in fact, or at least probably, 
superior to the pattern that one affirmed as operative in oneself.246 Thus, if one affirmed 
the superiority of one’s revisions, one would be presupposing a rational level of 
operations.247 
Lonergan admits that the pattern could potentially be improved upon, for new 
things could be learned, further complexities could be discovered, and a fuller and more 
adequate account could be provided.248 Any possibility of a revision, however, would 
have to include the pattern of operations that are at the core of the transcendental 
method.249 As Lonergan states, “[The] invariance of the pattern that grounds the 
possibility of a revision also limits the possibility of revision.”250 In this sense, 
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Lonergan’s method can serve as “a rock on which one can build.”251 Every other known 
becomes known through this process, since “no known could impugn the process without 
simultaneously impugning its own status as a known.”252 
In this section, for the sake of clarity, I have underscored a variety of cognitional 
operations that are part of Lonergan’s transcendental method, the ones that are confined 
to the first three levels of conscious intentionality: the empirical, the intellectual, and the 
rational. Over the course of this discussion, I examined what Lonergan means by 
cognitional self-transcendence. I concluded the section by providing a brief sketch of 
cognitional self-appropriation, which was then applied to the levels of experiencing, 
understanding, and judging. I hope that the importance of this procedure, which Lonergan 
readily admits must be performed by oneself,253 has become clear. 
 
1.4. Rational Self-Consciousness and the Extension of Self-Appropriation 
There is a fourth qualitatively distinct level of human conscious intentionality, 
one that is characterized by the operations of evaluating, deliberating, deciding, and 
acting.254 Lonergan calls this fourth level responsible255 or rational self-consciousness.256 
Human consciousness emerges at its fullest257 on this level. At play on the fourth level of 
consciousness is the principle of self-control, which is “responsible for [the] proper 
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functioning on the first three levels.”258 Self-control manifests itself in the measure that 
one is attentive or inattentive in experiencing, intelligent or unintelligent in one’s 
investigations, reasonable or unreasonable in one’s judgments.259 
On this fourth level of consciousness, the unrestricted, detached, disinterested, 
pure desire to know “extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional 
activities through the field of knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts.”260 
Walter Conn summarizes this phenomenon in this way: 
 Our desire to know and our achievement of knowledge is not an end 
 point. There is more. Our knowing is oriented toward action… Our 
 experiencing, understanding, and judging are directed not just to what 
 is, but to what can be done, not just to knowing reality, but to creating 
 reality, and creating ourselves in the process.261  
 
In a real way, the stakes are raised at the fourth level of consciousness. The subject’s 
operations at this level have the potential to take the subject beyond the cognitional self-
transcendence described above and, instead, achieve “a self-transcendence that is real.”262 
In Method in Theology, Lonergan calls this variety of self-transcendence “moral.”263 
Human beings “emerge as persons” on this level.264 One’s character, one’s personal 
essence is now at stake.265 On the fourth level of consciousness, one has to “decide for 
oneself what one is to make of oneself.”266 
This is the level of consciousness characterized by freedom and responsibility.267  
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In the introduction to Insight, Lonergan intimates the importance of extending the 
range of self-appropriation to the operations that are present on the fourth level. Lonergan 
writes:  
The crucial issue is an experimental issue, and the experiment will be 
performed not publicly but privately. It will consist in one’s own 
rational self-consciousness clearly and distinctly taking possession of 
itself as rational self-consciousness. Up to that decisive achievement all 
leads. From it all follows.268 
 
At least one of the things that follows from this particular enterprise of self-appropriation 
is that it is the foundation of Lonergan’s notion of the possibility of ethics. In 
Understanding and Being, Lonergan claims that the “notion of the possibility of ethics 
has its grounds in the extension of self-appropriation from the subject as knowing to the 
subject as both knowing and doing.”269 Patrick Byrne, in his “Analogical Knowledge of 
God and the Value of Moral Endeavor,” stresses the importance of the subject’s self-
appropriation of what he calls “the structure of ethical intentionality.”270 By exploring 
this structure, I will be able to simultaneously shed light on the substance and importance 
of the level of rational self-consciousness. 
  The activities of evaluating, deliberating, deciding, and acting significantly build 
upon the work of the antecedent operations that take place on the prior levels of 
consciousness. Lonergan writes, “It is quite true that objective knowing is not yet 
authentic human living; but without objective knowing there is no authentic living; for 
one knows objectively just insofar as one is neither unperceptive, nor stupid, nor silly; 
and one does not live authentically inasmuch as one is either unperceptive, stupid, or 
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silly.”271 A little later in the same piece, Lonergan continues, “If any authenticity we 
achieve is to radiate out into our troubled world, we need much more objective knowing 
than men commonly feel ready to absorb.”272 One should note that authenticity, or 
authentic human living, consists in self-transcendence.273 Cognitional self-transcendence, 
then, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the “real” or “moral” self-
transcendence that can be achieved on the fourth level of consciousness.  
 Precisely what sort of objective knowledge is needed in order to put oneself in a 
position to morally transcend oneself?274 This prior question needs to be met before I can 
explore Lonergan’s structure of ethical intentionality and the operations that are present 
on the fourth level of consciousness. Consequently, I will now very briefly examine the 
domains of both common sense and theoretical knowing. 
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1.5. Practical Common Sense and Theoretical Intelligence 
As there are theoretical fields like physics, chemistry, and biology, there is also 
the practical field of human events and relationships that Lonergan calls common 
sense.275 This distinction in fields is the product of a more basic distinction within human 
intelligence, for the latter can be both speculative and practical.276 I will discuss common 
sense intelligence first and then briefly compare and contrast it with theoretical 
intelligence.  
Lonergan bluntly writes, “Common sense is practical.”277 It is practical in the 
sense that it “seeks knowledge, not for the sake of the pleasure of contemplation, but to 
use knowledge in making and doing.”278 Common sense intelligence is a specialization of 
intelligence in the particular and concrete, as opposed to the universal and abstract.279 
Lonergan maintains that it is “the vague name given to the unknown source of a large and 
floating population of elementary judgments which everyone makes, everyone relies on, 
and almost everyone regards as obvious and indisputable.”280 Its business is daily life,281 
the familiar world of what Lonergan calls “things for us,”282 and its terms are derived 
from everyday experience.283 These terms are constant and include descriptions such as 
“visible shapes and spectrum of colors, the volume, pitch, and tone of sounds, the hot and 
cold, wet and dry, hard and soft, slow and swift.”284 
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 Common sense’s “apparently secure and modest undertaking” 285 is to understand 
things in terms of describing their relations to us, which is tantamount to understanding 
things as they “enter into the concerns of man.”286 This domain of ordinary description, 
as Longeran calls it, has as an object what is to be known by concrete judgments of 
fact.287 Similar to other objects of knowledge, it is reached by the self-correcting process 
of learning.288 The proper domain of common sense is precisely this descriptive field of 
concrete, particular matters of fact, which is “divided up and parceled out among the men 
and women familiar with its several parts.”289  Common sense does not entirely reside in 
the mind of any one individual.290 It has to be acquired and for this reason it is not 
possessed equally by all.291 
To shed light on the nature of common sense, Lonergan contrasts it with scientific 
theoretical intelligence.292 Unlike common sense, science has theoretical aspirations, 
which embrace an advance “from description to explanation, from things as related to our 
senses, through measurements, to things as related to one another.”293 Scientific inquiry 
departs “from the familiar to the unfamiliar, from the obvious to the recondite.”294 
Science’s heuristic assumptions “anticipate the determination of natures that always act 
in the same fashion under similar circumstances, and as well the determination of ideal 
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norms of probability from which events diverge only in a nonsystematic manner.”295 
Science is typified by both utilizing a technical language with unambiguously defined 
terms and aiming to arrive at generalizations that “offer a premise from which correct 
deductions can be drawn.”296 These generalizations express the scientist’s “rounded set of 
insights that holds in every instance or none at all.”297 
Lonergan argues that both science and common sense’s generalizations are 
arrived at through a process of collaboration.298 Focusing on the common sense form of 
collaboration, which is fundamentally a communal collaboration in the self-correcting 
process of learning,299 Lonergan notes that human beings are “born into a community that 
possesses a common fund of tested answers.”300 Insights that were generated by previous 
generations accumulate and are then handed down to later generations. The common 
sense generalizations that have emerged from past generations can take the form of 
proverbs, which “communicate pointers that ordinarily it is well to bear in mind.”301 They 
admit of numerous exceptions, but do not lose their validity in virtue of that fact,302 for 
they are a “more or less invariant element in variable relations.”303 Each fresh, concrete 
situation demands that an individual call upon the available accumulated storehouse of 
previous insights and add complementary insights of his own that will meet the 
situation’s precise requirements.304  
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What is common in common sense is “not some list of general truths about which 
all men can agree.”305 Nor is it “some list of particular truths about which all men can 
agree.”306 Instead, the common element is “a collaboration in the erection of a basic 
structure by which, with appropriate adjustments, each individual is enabled to fill out his 
individual list of particular truths.”307 Lonergan classifies common sense as a “multiple-
purpose and multiple-adjustable tool that can be employed in all sorts of ways but never 
is actually to be employed without the appropriate adjustment being made.”308 As a 
result, common sense is a remarkably flexible type of intelligence that allows one to have 
the capacity to adapt to and successfully meet the immediate challenges posed in a given 
concrete situation. 
Common sense, then, is inherently incomplete since it needs those appropriate 
adjustments.309 Lonergan affirms that common sense “consists in a basic nucleus of 
insights that never is utilized without the addition of at least one further insight into the 
situation at hand.”310 The generalizations of common sense consist of an incomplete set 
of insights that the individual draws upon in every concrete situation, but the 
generalizations become “proximately relevant only after a good look around has resulted 
in the needed additional insights.”311 Exactly which insight or insights an individual 
chooses to draw from this accumulated common fund in a given situation is shaped by 
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“his capacity, his interests and his energy.”312 For these reasons, common sense is 
endlessly variable.313 
Another important feature of common sense that differentiates it from science is 
that it varies according to one’s occupation, social group, place, and time.314 
Differentiations within science are due to theoretical differences within different 
departments.315 With respect to common sense, Lonergan observes, “At a given place, in 
a given job, among a given group of people, a man can be at intelligent ease in every 
situation in which he is called upon to speak or act.”316 However, that man’s achievement 
“is relevant only to its environment.”317 If you remove that man from the milieu to which 
he has become accustomed and place him instead “among others in another place or at 
another job,” awkwardness and hesitancy will unavoidably ensue until “he has 
accumulated a fresh set of insights.”318 This is why Lonergan argues that common sense’s 
methodological precepts do not consist of generalizing or arguing from analogy, but at 
building up and retaining a core of habitual understanding that is to be adjusted by further 
learning in each new situation that arises.”319 One should note that, in contrast to common 
sense knowers, if one removed the scientist or another theoretical knower from his 
environment, his explanatory insights would still remain universally valid.  
Perhaps the starkest difference between science and common sense is one of 
attitude. What one considers to be the criterion of the relevance of further pertinent 
questions marks what Lonergan calls “the great divide between a scientific attitude and a 
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commonsense attitude.”320 Due to the fact that the scientist “aims at ultimate 
explanation,” he persistently asks why “until the ultimate explanation is reached.”321 The 
man of common sense, however, cuts off his questioning as soon as “further inquiry 
would lead to no immediate appreciable difference in the daily life of man.”322 Lonergan 
underscores how the man of common sense’s inquiry is intensely interested and restricted 
by noting, “Descriptively, what does a man of common sense do when you start raising 
theoretical problems? He’ll either excuse himself, or he’ll ask you, ‘What’s the good of 
it?’”323 A common sense knower pursues knowledge motivated by a desire to live,324 or 
to develop more intelligent and successful ways of living.325 
The man of common sense’s inquiry, then, is informed by a pragmatic criterion of 
success.326 The pertinence of the further questions in a common sense inquiry is 
constrained by whether the questions are directed at answers that make an immediate, 
palpable difference.327 Lonergan calls this “the supreme canon of common sense,” which 
is that further questions are restricted to “the realm of the concrete and particular, the 
immediate and the practical.”328 The further pertinent questions that the man of common 
sense raises and the subsequent insights that emerge from those questions “are bounded 
by the interests and concerns of human living, by the successful performance of daily 
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tasks, by the discovery of immediate solutions that will work.”329 Stated simply, common 
sense understanding does not seek “strict universality, but general utility.”330  
Despite the differences between science and common sense, there is an innate, 
intimate complementarity between them. The two types of knowing are “the functionally 
related parts within a single knowledge of a single world.”331 Lonergan claims that 
science and common sense are essentially “partners.”332 Science comprehensively grasps 
the intelligibility of the concrete that common sense deals with effectively.333 It is the 
successful cooperation between science and common sense “that constitutes applied 
science and technology, that adds inventions to scientific discoveries, that supplements 
inventions with organizations, knowhow, and specialized skills.”334 The rational choice is 
not between science and common sense, rather “it is a choice of both, of science to 
master the universal, and of common sense to deal with the particular.”335 
 
1.6. Evaluating and Deliberating 
 Imagine that one has successfully made a concrete judgment of fact that 
something is so. According to Lonergan, another kind of question spontaneously 
emerges, indicating that there is still more to be known. One no longer wonders whether 
the “it” in the “Is it so?” question is so. That “it” was the content of one’s direct insight, 
which, prior to the judgment of fact, possessed a hypothetical status: what was grasped by 
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an act of understanding was a unity or relationship that was possibly relevant to the 
previously experienced and questioned data.336 Now, one’s judgment of fact serves, as it 
were, as a new “it,” for one spontaneously wonders, “What is to be done about it?”337 
Patrick Byrne calls a “What can I do?” question a practical question.338 One knows that x 
is so, now one spontaneously wants to further know what one could practically do about 
x. Lonergan notes that this level is evaluative.339 Practical questions, as Byrne makes 
clear, “extend a process of coming to know a situation into a process of practical response 
to the situation as known.”340 
Obviously, this suggests that human beings can be oriented in a practical direction 
by which they seek not simply “what is,” but also “what might be.”341 Human knowing, 
likewise, can be practical in the sense that “its concern is with something to be done and 
with the reasons for doing it.”342 One’s previous reflective insights, by which one came to 
judge that something was so, appear to have a latent practical function. In Chapter 10 of 
Insight, Lonergan proclaims, “The remarkable fact about reflective insight is that it can 
make use of those more rudimentary elements in cognitional process to reach the 
virtually unconditioned.”343 It appears that the operations on the fourth level of 
consciousness can make use of the fruit of one’s prior cognitional work for further 
cognitional and, ultimately, performative purposes.  
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Evaluating, for example, seems to resemble brainstorming.344 In light of a nucleus 
of concrete judgments of fact, one attempts to mentally work out hypothetical, possible 
courses of action that could be performed. One’s storehouse of concrete judgments of fact 
can be used to “size up” a situation and thereby offer assistance to one’s evaluating 
efforts.345 Insofar as one’s concrete judgments of fact are correct, one’s idea of what is 
going on will be accurate. To the extent that one’s grasp of what is going on is accurate, 
one will be in a better position to further grasp what practically could be done.346 The 
operations at the first, second, and third levels of consciousness take on a special 
                                                 
344 Byrne mentions that “practical insights presuppose processes or structures of conscious activities that 
result in practical insights.” Patrick H. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 112. I am defining the operation 
of evaluating in this way based upon Lonergan’s comment, “On the fourth level, there arises the further 
question, What is to be done about it, What am I to do? This level is evaluative.” Please see: Early Works 
on Theological Method I, 431. Byrne situates what I am calling the operation of evaluating under the larger 
umbrella of the structured sequence of operations known as deliberating. Byrne argues that deliberating “is 
not just a single act or operation of consciousness, but a structured sequence of conscious operations.” 
(Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 111). There is ample textual evidence to support Byrne’s claim about 
deliberation. For example, Lonergan mentions “the evaluation in the judgment of value itself,” which runs 
contrary to my use of the term since I place evaluating before the judgment of value, not coalescing with it. 
(Bernard Lonergan, “The Human Good,” 340). Another example can be discovered in Method in Theology, 
where Lonergan writes, “There is the responsible level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own 
operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry 
out our decisions.” Here, the operation of evaluating appears to take place after or simultaneously with the 
operation of deliberating. (Method in Theology, 9. Italics mine). A third example can be found in 
Lonergan’s “The Subject,” where he writes, “Results proceed from actions, actions from decisions, 
decisions from evaluations, evaluations from deliberations, and all five from the existential subject, the 
subject as deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting, bringing about results.” (Bernard Lonergan, “The 
Subject,” 84). However one elects to define the operations of evaluating and deliberating, clearly there are 
operations that are operative before one has a practical insight and deliberates over whether one should 
carry out the proposed course of action. Namely, one is attempting to discern (or evaluate) what the 
proposed course of action could be, not yet whether one should perform the course of action. 
345 Patrick H. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 113-115. As Byrne makes clear, one should not overlook 
the difficulty in grasping the virtually unconditioned. He writes, “Of course it is one thing to work out a 
formal criterion for the correctness of insights, such as there being no further pertinent questions. It is quite 
another to dedicate oneself to the enormous, personal struggle required in order to develop the self-
awareness and honesty needed for discerning whether or not there are lurking questions one has overlooked 
or fears one must face.” (Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 114). 
346 Indeed, one will also be in a position to deliberate more effectively as well, discerning what should be 
done. 
55 
 
significance when one considers their ramifications on the operations at the fourth level 
of consciousness.347 
Suppose that one has grasped a possible course of action. Evaluating has reached 
its term and one has had a practical insight. Byrne defines a practical insight as “an act of 
intelligence by means of which a person comes up with some idea about what she or he 
might do.”348 Lonergan points out that these practical insights share similarities with 
factual and speculative insights, such as the way in which they result from questioning 
one’s experiences.349 Practical insights also grasp “some intelligible unity or correlation,” 
like factual and speculative insights.350 Third, all three types of insight are met by a 
subsequent question for reflection.351 
Nevertheless, practical insights differ from factual and speculative insights 
because they do not reveal “the unities and relations of things as they are, but the unities 
and relations of possible courses of action.”352 As such, the follow-up question to a 
practical insight is not “Is it so?,” but rather “Shall I do it?”353 This time, the “it” is the 
content of the practical insight, which is a hypothetical, possible course of action.354 The 
question provokes one to assess the value or worthwhileness of performing the possible 
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proposed course of action.355 The “Shall I do it?” question intends a judgment of value, 
an affirmation or denial of the value of performing that action.356 
The “Shall I do it?” question evokes another operation on the level of rational 
self-consciousness to assist with the effort of arriving at a judgment of value: the 
operation of deliberating.357 In Insight, Lonergan seems to call this operation “practical 
reflection.”358 Simply because one has grasped a possible course of action by way of a 
practical insight does not necessitate that one automatically and blindly executes it.359 
Further pertinent questions can be raised about the situation at hand, the proposed course 
of action itself, and one’s motives for performing the action.360 The extensive and 
potentially indefinite nature361 of these further questions accentuates the complexity and 
richness of the operation of deliberating. Joseph Flanagan notes that “deliberating can go 
on indefinitely because you are dealing not with a fact,” but instead with a possible 
course of action “that will not be actualized unless you decide to do so.”362 
One’s need for posing further questions about the situation at hand depends upon 
one’s familiarity with that situation as well as “the seriousness of the consequences of the 
proposed course of action, with the uncertainties and the risks it involves.”363 Lonergan 
also claims that one’s “antecedent willingness or unwillingness to assume responsibility 
for the consequences and to run the risks” associated with the proposed course of action 
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can influence the need to subject the situation at stake to further questioning.364 One’s 
deliberations could, in other words, incite one to balk at making a judgment of value and 
realize that the gravity or riskiness of the situation at hand demands more accurate 
judgments of fact concerning it. 
One could also deliberate by submitting the proposed course of action to further 
scrutiny. Perhaps the course of action is still fuzzy and more details are needed, such as 
its successive steps, its alternatives, its consequences, its overall feasibility, and the 
probability or certainty of its various features.365 One may need to ask about what the 
proposed course of action excludes.366 
Third, one may need to deliberate about and marshal one’s underlying motives for 
performing the proposed course of action. Lonergan provides a hint of how intensive this 
form of deliberation could be: 
Would [the proposed course of action’s] execution be agreeable?  Are  
there other features to compensate for its disagreeableness? What is its 
utility? How desirable are the goals to which it is useful?... Does the  
proposed act come under the accepted order? If not, is it merely egoistic, 
or is it a contribution to the initiation of an improvement in the accepted 
order? Or if it does come under the accepted order, is not that order in 
need of improvement? Is not this the time to begin improving things?367  
 
Lonergan appears to give special prominence to these last two forms of deliberating. He 
writes, “But I become rationally self-conscious inasmuch as I am concerned with reasons 
for my own acts, and this occurs when I scrutinize the object and investigate the motives 
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of a possible course of action.”368 Precisely what are these questions for deliberation 
intending? 
  
1.7. Values, Judgments of Value, Feelings 
The chief question for deliberation, “Shall I do it?,” and all of the sub-questions 
for deliberation touched upon above, intend value.369 In Method in Theology, Lonergan 
argues that a value is what is intended in questions for deliberation.370 One should recall 
that intending “is neither ignorance nor knowledge but the dynamic intermediary between 
ignorance and knowledge.”371 It is “a conscious movement away from ignorance and 
towards knowledge.”372 One is intending, not knowing, value when one “asks whether 
this is truly and not merely apparently good, whether that is or is not worth while.”373 
Those questions are what Lonergan calls questions for deliberation.374 Thus, as Joseph 
Flanagan observes, deliberating “raises the whole new question of values.”375 
 Values are only known in judgments of value.376 In order to better understand 
values, it will be helpful to discuss them within the context of judgments of value. 
Lonergan argues that three components unite in a judgment of value. First, there is 
“knowledge of reality and especially human reality.”377 Second, there are intentional 
responses to values. Third, there is “the initial thrust towards moral self-transcendence 
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constituted by the judgment of value itself.”378 I will briefly explore each of these 
components in turn. 
First of all, judgments of value “have to have a basis in concrete human 
reality.”379 They “presuppose knowledge of human life, of human possibilities proximate 
and remote, of the probable consequences of projected courses of action.”380 The 
previous section on common sense intelligence and its complementarity with theoretical 
intelligence circumscribed much of the “knowledge of human life” that Lonergan has in 
mind here. Without this basis in human reality, one would “get into moral idealism, 
beautiful ideas with terrific appeal, but unfortunately, if it were put into practice, the 
results would be disastrous.”381 Judgments of value depend upon previous judgments of 
fact.382 
 The two types of judgment share certain structural similarities with one another. 
First, both the “Shall I do it?” and the “Is it so?” questions intend “one or the other of a 
mutually exclusive pair of conscious operations,” namely an affirmation or denial.383 
Second, both judgments “proceed from self-transcending subjectivity, from attention, 
intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility.”384 Third, for the judgment of value to be 
responsible, and for the judgment of fact to be reasonable, both need to be “motivated by 
reflective understanding of the virtually unconditioned.”385 In the former case, practical 
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or value reflective understanding386 needs to grasp “the possible course of action as 
virtually unconditional value,”387 while in the latter case, reflective understanding needs 
to grasp “the prospective judgment as virtually unconditioned.”388 Byrne explains: 
 [J]ust as a reasonable judgment of the correctness of an insight rests  
upon the insight as virtually unconditioned because invulnerable, so also  
 responsible affirmation of a possible course of action as valuable  
emanates from grasp of the practical insight as virtually unconditioned 
(‘there being no further pertinent questions’).389 
 
One can responsibly affirm or deny that a possible course of action is valuable when one 
has had what Brian Cronin calls a “deliberative insight.” Such an insight, according to 
Cronin, is a “cognitive activity by which we grasp the sufficiency of the evidence for the 
positing of a judgment of value.”390 As noted above, Lonergan was keenly aware of the 
possibility that proposed courses of action could be examined in meticulous detail, which 
could raise an overwhelming array of further pertinent questions.391 As a result, one’s 
attainment of a deliberative insight and subsequent affirmation or denial of the worth of a 
proposed course of action could be obstructed or indefinitely postponed.  
 Nevertheless, one should note the way in which the self-correcting process of 
learning is operative in the process of deliberation and the subsequent grasp of a 
deliberative insight, just as it was operative in the process of reflecting and the 
subsequent grasp of a reflective insight. A prospective judgment of value may need to be 
complemented and modified by further insights. The further pertinent questions that are 
entertained in the self-correcting process give rise to further and complementary 
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insights.392 Significantly, as it will be argued below, the crucial role of intentional 
feelings in the deliberating process is that they determine which questions a subject will 
consider to be pertinent. 
 In addition to these structural similarities, there are differences between the two 
types of judgment. One of the important differences between judgments of value and 
judgments of fact is that the former lacks a capacity of its own to come to an end.393 
Whereas the processes of reflection that occur on the third level of consciousness “reach 
their natural end in judgments of fact,” the processes of deliberation on the fourth level of 
consciousness “do not reach their natural end in judgments of value.”394 Actually arriving 
at and making a judgment of value provides “but an initial thrust towards moral self-
transcendence.”395 One should note that judgments of value are merely a cognitional 
milestone that requires the performance of further operations on behalf of the subject: 
deciding and doing.396 Nevertheless, they are a significant milestone, for they are “the 
door to one’s fulfillment or to one’s loss.”397 
 In order to effectively examine the operations of deciding and acting, as well as 
what Lonergan means by moral self-transcendence, it is necessary to probe how 
intentional responses to values fit into this discussion. These intentional responses to 
values are one of the components that comes together in a judgment of value.398 What are 
intentional responses to values? 
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 Longeran gives a clue to answering this question when he states, “Intermediate 
between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. These 
apprehensions of value occur in feelings that are intentional responses to values.”399 Not 
all feelings are intentional responses to values. In an effort to comprehend what Lonergan 
means by a feeling being an intentional response to value, I will quickly explore the 
divisions that Lonergan makes within the domain of feelings. 
Broadly speaking, Lonergan divides feelings into two general classes: non-
intentional states and trends, and intentional responses.400 Non-intentional states and 
trends are not evoked by objects.401 Both non-intentional states and trends occur 
“independently of perception or apprehension.”402 An example of a non-intentional state 
is fatigue. Fatigue, like other non-intentional states, has a cause, but it does not require 
any “perceiving, imagining, or representing [of] the cause” to be felt.403 Hunger is an 
example of a non-intentional trend, which has a goal. One simply feels hungry, but does 
not yet know that what one needs is something to eat.404 Values are not apprehended in 
these states and trends.405 
Feelings that are intentional responses arise from an object, as they are answers to 
what is intended, apprehended, or represented.406 There are two main classes of these 
feelings. On the one hand, there are feelings that are intentional responses to “the 
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agreeable or disagreeable, the satisfying or dissatisfying.”407 Lonergan calls these feelings 
“self-regarding.”408 This subset of intentional feelings regards “the already achieved, de 
facto constitution of the subject.”409 In other words, what is made present “by intentional 
responses to the subjectively satisfying or dissatisfying is the constituted subject.”410  
On the other hand, there are intentional responses to values,411 which Lonergan 
calls “self-transcending” feelings.412 These feelings “‘break in’ like an ‘other’ upon the 
self as constituted.”413 Byrne calls attention to how Lonergan distinguishes these feelings 
from value questions, which intend values, and value judgments, which know values.414 
According to Lonergan, “value properly so-called is something that calls one to 
transcend oneself.”415 Those feelings that are intentional responses to value beckon or 
invite one to transcend oneself. What is made present “by an intentional response to value 
is that for the sake of which the subject transcends himself as constituted.”416 
Self-regarding feelings include pleasures and pains, desires and fears.417 Self-
transcending feelings recognize excellence.418 This distinction enables one to 
comprehend what Lonergan means when he says that self-transcending feelings can 
“reveal values to us.”419 A self-transcending feeling is a felt recognition that something is 
valuable. A self-regarding feeling, on the other hand, merely reveals that something is 
pleasurable or painful, desirable or fearful. This distinction is tacitly contained in the 
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“Shall I do it?” question. As Lonergan affirms, “The mere fact that we ask it points to a 
distinction between feelings that are self-regarding and feelings that are disinterested.”420 
Lonergan argues that self-regarding feelings are ambiguous because they may or 
may not be simultaneously responding to a value.421 He declares, “You can have a 
response to something disagreeable and nonetheless go ahead and do it without too much 
lamentation.”422 In Method in Theology, Lonergan observes, “Most good men have to 
accept unpleasant work, privations, pain, and their virtue is a matter of doing so without 
excessive self-centered lamentation.”423 Thus, one can feel that some course of action is 
disagreeable, but nevertheless judge that the course of action is truly valuable and then 
decide to move forward with putting that course into action.  
Returning to self-transcending feelings, Lonergan claims that these feelings 
respond to values “in accord with some scale of preference.”424 As a result, Lonergan 
makes a distinction between vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values, in an 
ascending order.425 Vital values include health, strength, grace, and vigor. We 
spontaneously prefer them over “avoiding the work, the privations, the pains involved in 
acquiring, maintaining, restoring them.”426 The spontaneity embedded in this preference 
is captured in Lonergan’s comment, “We feel contempt for a person who destroys his 
own health.”427  
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Social values, such as the good of order that conditions the vital values of the 
whole community, are preferred by the community to the vital values of single 
individuals.428 This preference is made manifest not by the community’s choice to 
sacrifice individuals, but instead by the community’s expecting and demanding 
individuals to be willing to sacrifice themselves.429 Lonergan conceives of the social as “a 
way of life, a way in which men live together in some orderly and therefore predictable 
fashion.”430 This orderliness can be observed “in the family and in manners, in society 
with its classes and elites, in education, in the state and laws, in the economy and 
technology, in the churches and sects.”431 What social values assure is the “recurrent 
achievement of hosts of vital values.”432 As Byrne states, “[The social] includes the kinds 
of institutions and patterns of human interaction which are responsible for cooperative 
production and distribution of goods, services, information, and learning.”433 
Cultural values address the fact that while human beings live and operate, “they 
also have to find a meaning and a value in their living and operating.”434 As Lonergan 
states, “Not on bread alone doth man live.”435 Culture, for Lonergan, is “the meaning of a 
way of life.”436 Human beings wish to “discover and to express the appropriateness, the 
meaning, the significance, the value, and the use of their way of life as a whole and in its 
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parts.”437 This discovery and expression constitutes the cultural. Lonergan notes that a 
culture “stands to social order as soul to body, for any element of social order will be 
rejected the moment it is widely judged inappropriate, meaningless, irrelevant, useless, 
just not worthwhile.”438 A given culture does not stand within practicality, but above it.439 
Personal values are human subjects themselves in their self-transcendence.440 
They are realized in one’s loving and in one’s being loved. These values consist in one 
being an originator of values in oneself and in one’s milieu as well as “an inspiration and 
an invitation to others to do likewise.”441 
At the top of the scale of values lie religious values, which “are at the heart of the 
meaning and value of man’s living and man’s world.”442 They are the values that “arise in 
and from real self-transcendence in response to God.”443 This self-transcendence toward 
God is an ultimate in self-transcendence. Lonergan notes that the love of God is a unique, 
total loving that “actuates the unrestricted character of human conscious 
intentionality.”444 This full love of God is also joy and peace. It is transformative, for it 
banishes “the emptiness, the unrest, the alienation, the flight from one’s depths that haunt 
lives lived without God.”445 Lonergan writes, “Full love, joy, peace enhance all one’s 
virtues, press against all one’s defects; they make a man a power for good, zealous in 
achieving.”446 Ultimately, religious values have two aspects: the aspect of the relationship 
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to God as fulfillment within the human person, and that of being a source of proper 
human action in this world.447 
 
1.8. The Importance of Religious and Moral Conversion in the Process of Moral 
Self-Transcendence 
 
The question still remains: Relative to one’s effort to transcend oneself morally, 
what is the impact or relevance of intentional feelings? To adequately answer this 
question, one needs to understand Lonergan’s notion of a horizon. One’s horizon is “the 
limit, the boundary, where one’s concern or interest vanishes.”448 Similar to how, in a 
visual horizon, “there is a periphery beyond which one cannot see,” each subject has an 
existential horizon, the periphery of which “marks the difference between what is 
relevant or meaningful and what is irrelevant or meaningless.”449 Lonergan notes that 
one’s horizon is “the world, the totality of objects, with which I can promptly deal in 
virtue of my acquired habits.”450 In another work, Lonergan succinctly summarizes a 
person’s horizon as “the boundary of what he knows and values.”451 One’s horizon at any 
point in time is determined by one’s “past insights, past judgments of fact, past judgments 
of value, past decisions and past actions.”452  
Mark Doorley makes the useful distinction between the basic horizon and a 
relative horizon. The basic horizon “is constituted by the unrestricted desire to know and 
choose the good,” while a relative horizon “is a limited achievement in response to this 
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unrestricted desire.453 Lonergan makes clear that this distinction is grounded in an 
inherent, ineluctable tension within the subject:  
[I]t is the opposition between the world of sense of man the animal and, 
on the other hand, the universe of being to be known by intelligent grasp 
and reasonable affirmation. On the side of the subject, it is the  
opposition between a center in the world of sense operating self- 
centeredly and, on the other hand, an entry into an intelligibly ordered  
universe of being to which one can belong, and in which one can  
function, only through detachment and disinterestedness.454 
 
Inevitably, the subject functions within those two modes of operation. The subject as 
animal is characterized by perceiving and self-regarding intentional feelings, enjoying 
and suffering. Within this mode of operation, the subject functions as “a self-attached and 
self-interested center within its own narrow world of stimuli and response.”455 
Conversely, insofar as the subject is carried by the pure desire to know, he finds himself 
confronted by a universe of being, one in which he is “not the center of reference, but an 
object to be coordinated with other objects.”456 Doorley emphasizes how this unavoidable 
tension “is not a negative characteristic to be overcome,” but is rather “a reminder of the 
limitation of any achievement.”457 Lonergan notes that human development is stamped by 
“a law of limitation and transcendence,” which is precisely this unavoidable tension 
between the subject as he is and the subject as he is to be.458 
 The subject, in his animality, is dominated by intentional feelings of the self-
regarding variety that only respond to the subjectively satisfying or dissatisfying.459 What 
is made present by these feelings is, as mentioned before, the constituted subject. On the 
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other hand, the subject, as carried by the pure desire to know and choose the good, is 
dominated by intentional feelings of the self-transcending variety that respond to the “that 
for the sake of which the subject transcends himself as constituted.”460 Insofar as one’s 
feelings are self-transcending, one is oriented by one’s affectivity toward some value that 
transcends one’s limited constitution.461  
As Byrne argues, the crucial role played by these intentional feelings is that they 
can determine which questions are considered pertinent in one’s deliberating efforts.462 
Intentional feelings, then, “establish a horizon in which deliberation occurs.”463 
Moreover, our other, prior cognitional operations, such as our experiencing, 
understanding, and judging are laden with these intentional feelings. One’s “seeing, 
hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, 
formulating, reflecting, marshaling and weighing the evidence, [and] judging”464 are 
informed and shaped by one’s intentional feelings. As such, they “fix the meaning of 
what will count as further pertinent questions in concrete situations,” including those 
questions for intelligence and reflection.465 The self-centered person allows intentional 
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responses to what is subjectively satisfying to dominate his cognitional processes and “so 
sets the criterion for the relevance of further questions.466 Conversely, the subject that is 
under the sway of self-transcending feelings will consider pertinent and entertain any 
question that might bear upon the realization of value.467  
Embracing the appropriate criteria for further pertinent questions at each level of 
consciousness is a consequence of moral conversion and, ultimately, moral self-
transcendence. Lonergan writes, “If basically one’s questions are of the self-regarding 
type, then one has not attempted moral self-transcendence.”468 Lonergan states in Method 
in Theology that moral conversion “changes the criterion of one’s decisions and choices 
from satisfactions to values.”469 Moral conversion is about a turn away “from objects of 
desire and fear as ultimate, to the normative, to what ought to be so whether one likes it 
or not.”470 When one is morally converted, one has “ceased to need the carrot of desire 
and the stick of fear.”471 Instead, one has “become a self-starter, a principle of 
benevolence and beneficence, a genuine person whose words and deeds inspire and invite 
those that know him or her to aspire themselves to moral self-transcendence, to become 
themselves genuine persons.”472 
As one deliberates upon the “Shall I do it?” question and its further pertinent 
questions, the morally converted person’s inquiry will not be constrained by what is 
subjectively satisfying or dissatisfying. As a result, there will be a higher likelihood that 
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the morally converted person will be able to grasp a course of action as a virtually 
unconditioned value. In turn, there will be a higher probability that the morally converted 
person will realize value through his decisions and actions. 
Moral conversion, like intellectual and religious conversion, consists of 
“repudiating characteristic features of an old horizon and beginning a new sequence that 
reveals ever greater depth and breadth and wealth.”473 But going beyond, transcending 
one’s old horizon is no easy feat. Lonergan contends that there is “an organized 
resistance” to being converted and, consequently, to transcending oneself. He writes:  
Within one’s horizon, one’s ready-made world, one is organized, one 
has determinate modes of living, feeling, thinking, judging, desiring, 
fearing, willing, deliberating, choosing. But to move beyond one’s  
horizon in any but the most casual and insignificant fashion calls for a 
reorganization of the subject, a reorganization of his modes of living, 
feeling, thinking, judging, desiring, fearing, willing, deliberating,  
choosing. Against such reorganization of the patterns of the subject,  
there come into play all the conservative forces that give our lives their 
continuity and their coherence. The subject’s fundamental anxiety, his 
deepest dread, is the collapse of himself and his world.474   
 
This reorganization of the human subject that makes human development and self-
transcendence possible “is not only advance into the known unknown but also a flight 
from anxiety and, in more marked instances, from uncanny feelings of horror, loathing, 
dread.”475  
Lonergan carefully notes that the temporal succession of conversions is typically 
not intellectual, moral, and then religious. Rather, religious conversion tends to come 
first, followed by moral conversion, and then intellectual conversion.476 Robert Doran 
maintains that religious conversion is “a process that frees one from the self-enclosure 
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that Lonergan calls radical lovelessness,”477 which is the privation of total loving.478 To 
the extent that one is consumed by radical lovelessness, one is “persuaded that, in the last 
analysis and even if one has human companionship, one is finally alone in this universe, 
with no ultimate connection.”479 Lovelessness, at root, is about the isolation of the 
individual,480 a profound narrowing of one’s horizon. Within this cramped horizon, self-
regarding intentional feelings are liable to shape one’s experiencing, understanding, 
judging, evaluating, deliberating, and deciding. Lonergan memorably captures this point 
in some notes that he wrote in 1963: 
I am that for the sake of which I myself am perfected. My perfection is for 
the sake of me. My food is for the sake of me. My delight in eating is for 
the sake of me. My studies are for the sake of me. My good works are for 
the sake of merit, and merit is for the sake of rewards, and rewards are for 
the sake of me. If it is for the sake of me, there is no need to inquire  
further… The ultimate end is my happiness. Other things are chosen as 
means to attain this end.481 
 
Religious conversion radically transforms this narrow horizon and thus serves as a 
precondition for moral conversion. The essence of religious conversion is a “twofold 
process of being loved unconditionally [by God] and responding to that radical gift by 
cooperating in the process whereby one’s own loving becomes unconditional.”482 
Lonergan describes this loving as one that is “without conditions, qualifications, 
reservations; it is with all one’s heart and all one’s soul and all one’s mind and all one’s 
strength.”483 The unrestricted character of this loving resembles the unrestricted character 
of human questioning, but it does not pertain to this world alone. It is, instead, an 
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“otherworldly fulfillment, joy, peace, bliss.”484 The eye of this love “reveals values in 
their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization.”485 Religious 
conversion, therefore, creates conditions that are rife for moral conversion,486 since it 
enables and sustains the subject to operate in a horizon in which self-transcending 
feelings are at home. As Doran writes, “Love establishes human consciousness, the 
consciousness of the individual, precisely as interpersonal.”487 Moreover, love reveals 
values to the subject that were previously unappreciated.488 
The other-centered focus of this love expands the subject’s horizon and enriches 
his intentional feelings to respond to values. Again, quoting Doran, “The issue is the 
orientation, the criterion, the basic and total horizon within which one makes one’s 
decisions, the self-constituting option to be a certain type of person. Is it all just for me?... 
Or is it all for a set of goals that transcend me and all narrow group interests, even if these 
goals are attained only by me.”489 Religious conversion transforms the subject “into a 
subject in love, a subject held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and so an other-
worldly love.”490 When this state of being in love is developed, it becomes “the fount of 
all one’s actions.”491 With religious conversion comes “a new basis for all valuing and all 
doing good,”492 a basis that paves the way for one to become morally converted and, 
later, to morally transcend oneself.493 For insofar as one is morally converted, one will be 
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ever more faithful to “the full dimensions of the scale of values” articulated above, and 
one will be in a more stable position to align one’s own scale of values to that normative 
scale.494  
 
1.9. Moral Self-Transcendence, Deciding, Authenticity 
Moral self-transcendence is the culmination of a complex process.495 Presupposed 
in this process is: 1) an accumulation of true judgments of fact reached through one’s 
own cognitional self-transcendence;496 2) the posing of the “What can I do?” practical 
question; 3) an accumulation of practical insights that answer the “What can I do?” 
question and provide the content of the “it” in the “Should I do it?” question; 4) a seeking 
for what is worthwhile497 by posing “Should I do it?” questions to oneself; 5) a 
cultivation of self-transcending feelings that enhances one’s ability to raise further 
pertinent questions at each level of consciousness, but most vitally at the level of 
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deliberation;498 6) being morally and religiously converted; 7) earnestly arriving at true 
judgments of value.499   
As Lonergan notes, however, a judgment of value only provides “the initial thrust 
towards moral self-transcendence.”500 Moral self-transcendence is not simply a matter of 
successfully asking and answering questions for deliberation, those that intend value. One 
also needs to live by the answers in order to effect in one’s living a moral self-
transcendence.501 Consequently, one’s judgments of value need to be completed by the 
operation of deciding or choosing.502 Indeed, the deliberating process reaches its natural 
end in an act of deciding.503 As Lonergan writes, deliberating “does not come to an end 
once the object and motives of a proposed action are known; it comes to an end when one 
decides either in favor of the proposal or against it.”504 If one elects to postpone making a 
decision after one has grasped that a course of action is truly valuable, further questions 
emerge that prolong the deliberation process, such as “Why can’t I do this when I know 
that I should?”505 
Lonergan notes that there is an element of uncertainty and risk connected with our 
decisions, for one cannot know the effects or results that one’s decision will generate.506 
Still, it is by way of deciding that one makes and becomes oneself. For this reason, 
Lonergan underscores the elements of freedom and responsibility that accompany our 
                                                 
498 Patrick H. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 117. 
499 Method in Theology, 233. 
500 Ibid., 38. Italics mine. 
501 Method in Theology, 104. 
502 Patrick H. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge…,” 116. 
503 Ibid., 116. 
504 Insight, 637. 
505 Patrick H. Byrne, “Analogical Knowledge of God and the Value of Moral Endeavor,” 116. 
506 Bernard Lonergan, “On Being Oneself,” Phenomenology and Logic The Boston College Lectures on 
Mathematical Logic and Existentialism, The Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan:, Vol.18, Ed. Philip J. 
McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001), 237.  
76 
 
decisions.507 He writes, “Because man determines himself, he is responsible; because the 
course of action determined upon and the process of determining are both contingent, 
man is free.”508 One did not necessarily have to be attentive, intelligent, and reasonable in 
arriving at true judgments of fact. Nor did one necessarily have to fall under the sway of 
self-transcending feelings and entertain the further pertinent questions that enabled one to 
deliberate effectively and grasp a course of action as truly valuable. Finally, one does not 
necessarily have to decide to put into action what one has judged to be truly valuable. 
What one decides to do, in other words, does not necessarily have to be consistent with 
what one knows is truly valuable.509 From the antecedent cognitional work to, especially, 
the culminating act of deciding, contingency is present each step of the way. Lonergan 
argues that freedom is a special kind of contingence, one that emerges “in the order of 
spirit, of intelligent grasp, rational reflection, and morally guided will.”510 
The responsible element that marks the operation of deciding is nicely captured 
by Byrne. He writes: 
[W]hile all cognitional acts are constitutive of the subject, decisions are 
constitutive in the most profound and thoroughgoing way. Compilation of 
acts of experiencing constitute one as increasingly aware; accumulation of 
insights constitute one as learned and, when they combine with judgments 
which they ground, one is constituted as wise. But it is decisions that 
constitute the kind of being one is to be. Decisions constitute one as 
authentic or inauthentic…511 
 
When one has grasped that a course of action is truly valuable and subsequently decides 
to act in a way that is consonant with that judgment, one has morally transcended oneself 
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and thereby contributed to one’s formation as an authentic person. This important point 
warrants a few words of elaboration. 
Our decisions give rise to dispositions and habits, and these habits and 
dispositions make oneself into a certain kind of person, one for which we are responsible. 
One can decide to be a drifter or an inauthentic person, one who is satisfied with simply 
being one of the crowd. Lonergan argues that the world is teeming with people of this 
sort.512 In this case, one’s decisions result in the creation of a person whose individuality 
is blurred, for one is limited by a concern over “consenting to be like everybody else, 
wanting to be like everyone else.”513 The drifter finds “security, assurance, peace of soul 
in being like everyone else.”514 The product of the drifter’s decisions is “another instance 
of the average man in a given milieu.”515 In an outline of a lecture on Martin Heidegger, 
Lonergan notes that the drifter wants “release from being one’s own self, [from] freely 
and responsibly discovering and realizing one’s own potentialities with all of the risk 
involved.”516 Unfortunately, drifters have not attempted moral self-transcendence since 
their questions for deliberation tend to be of the self-regarding type.517 As such, they 
disqualify themselves from becoming authentic individuals and they are responsible for 
that disqualification. 
In contradistinction to the drifter, Lonergan pits the resolute, decisive, authentic 
person. In Insight, Lonergan identifies this type of person as possessing the quality of 
genuineness. Insofar as one is genuine or authentic, one “does not brush questions aside, 
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smother doubts, push problems down, escape to activity, to chatter, to passive 
entertainment, to sleep, to narcotics.”518 The authentic person “confronts issues, inspects 
them, studies their many aspects, works out their various implications, contemplates their 
concrete consequences in one’s own life and in the lives of others.”519 While one may 
respect “inertial tendencies as necessary conservative forces,” one does not accept the 
conclusion “that a defective routine is to be maintained because one has grown 
accustomed to it.”520 Lonergan is sensitive to the fact that the authentic person may fear 
“the cold plunge into becoming other than one is,” but he is nonetheless “capable of 
assurance and confidence, not only in what has been tried and found successful, but also 
in what is yet to be tried.”521 The authentic person possesses a certain amount of stamina, 
as he “grows weary with the perpetual renewal of further questions to be faced” and 
longs for rest.522 Yet, despite faltering and failing, he is aware of his weaknesses and 
failures, and does not attempt to rationalize them away.523 The authentic person’s 
decisions bring to light his own unique individuality524 and they give rise to the reward of 
a happy conscience.525   
This beautiful sketch of the authentic or genuine person highlights the fragile 
nature of authenticity. Lonergan maintains that authenticity is never “some pure, serene, 
secure possession; it is always precarious, ever a withdrawal from unauthenticity, ever in 
danger of slipping back into unauthenticity.”526 In large part, authenticity is “a matter of 
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uncovering still more oversights, acknowledging still further failures to understand, 
correcting still more mistakes, repenting more and more deeply hidden sins.”527 As 
Robert Doran asserts, “Authenticity is achieved in self-transcendence, and consistent self-
transcendence is reached only by conversion.”528 To be authentic, one needs to be 
consistently self-transcending. To be consistently self-transcending, one needs to 
“undergo a multiple and ongoing process of conversion.”529 The reason one needs to 
repeatedly undergo processes of conversion is attributable to one’s susceptibility to 
bias.530 Bias brings about the distinction between the self-transcending and the self-
regarding.531  (I will examine the threefold bias of the practical subject in the next 
section).532 
It would be a mistake to conclude that Lonergan thinks that one’s responsibility is 
limited to one’s making of oneself. Human beings also have a responsibility “to the 
future of mankind.”533 Lonergan argues that the course of human history, like the 
universe at large,534 is in accord with emergent probability.535 What he means by that is 
that human history “is the cumulative realization of concretely possible schemes of 
recurrence in accord with successive schedules of probabilities.”536 Schemes of 
recurrence are “are circular relationships between events of kinds, such that if the events 
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occur once in virtue of circular relationships, then, other things being equal, they keep on 
recurring indefinitely.”537  
Many human actions are recurrent and their recurrence is regular, though not 
inevitable. This regularity “is the functioning of a scheme, of a patterned set of relations 
that yields conclusions of the type: If an X occurs, then an X will recur.”538 Assuming 
that “there occurs an appropriate conjunction of abstract laws and concrete 
circumstances,” human schemes of recurrence will emerge and function automatically.539 
Lonergan gives some examples of schemes of recurrence existing and functioning in the 
realm of human affairs: 
Children are born only to grow, mature, and beget children of their own. 
Inventions outlive their inventors and the memory of their origins.  
Capital is capital because its utility lies not in itself but in the  
acceleration it imparts to the stream of useful things. The political 
machinery of agreement and decision is the permanent yet self-adapting 
source of an indefinite series of agreements and decisions.540   
One of the chief features of emergent probability is its “upward but indeterminately 
directed dynamism.”541 It is “upward” in the sense that “current innovations, whether 
natural or human, build upon earlier innovations.”542 It is “indeterminate” because “the 
part taken by this building process is unpredictable.”543 
 Lonergan argues that human affairs fall under the dominion of emergent 
probability in a unique way. As human intelligence develops, progressively “less 
importance attaches to the probabilities of appropriate constellations of 
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circumstances.”544 Instead, progressively more importance “attaches to the probabilities 
of the occurrence of insight, communication, persuasion, agreement, decision.”545 Human 
material and social conditions are not only intelligible, but also intelligent. Not only can 
they be understood, they are also increasingly the fruit of insight and decision. Lonergan 
dramatically notes that “man becomes for man the executor of the emergent probability 
of human affairs.”546 Rather than passively being shaped by his environment, “man turns 
to transforming his environment in his own self-development.”547 One’s insights are 
anticipations of possible schemes and one’s decisions bring about the concrete conditions 
of their functioning.548  
The upshot is that human beings, by their living and decisions, are inevitably 
“making their own personal contribution to the historical process.”549 Lonergan calls this 
an “historic authenticity.”550 Similar to how one can decide to morally transcend oneself 
and live an authentic existence, so too can one take seriously the “responsibility of man 
for man,”551 the notion that, collectively, human beings are responsible for the resultant 
social situation and the trajectory of human history.552 Lonergan writes, “In each stage of 
the historical process, the facts are the social situation produced by the practical 
intelligence of the previous generation.”553 The objective social situation at any point in 
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time “possesses the intelligibility put into it by those that brought it about.”554 Each 
individual’s decisions contribute to the direction in which history ultimately heads. This 
is one of the reasons why Lonergan stresses the importance of one’s personal 
authenticity,555 for without it genuine historic authenticity cannot be actualized. Since 
bias disrupts personal development and distorts the unfolding of human history, it is now 
necessary to examine the three biases of the practical subject. 
 
1.10. The Three Biases 
All human beings, according to Lonergan, are subject to bias, which is “a block or 
distortion of intellectual development.”556 Of interest in this study is the threefold bias 
that infects the commonsense intelligence of the practical subject: individual bias, group 
bias, and general bias.557 Although these biases are distinct from one another, they share 
at least one feature in common: they are all “aberrations of human understanding which 
exclude and repress insights, along with their further relevant questions they would have 
engendered.”558 Characteristic of the biased subject is a partial, though incomplete, 
development of intelligence that leads to an exclusion of correct understanding.559  
The three biases, to the extent that they are operative in oneself, hinder one from 
being able to act intelligently. If one cannot act intelligently, one cannot be expected to 
act reasonably. And if one cannot act reasonably, one cannot be expected to act 
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responsibly.560 Insofar as people fail to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and 
responsible, a breakdown ensues “in the individual case, the group case, and the general 
case.”561 The irrational and irresponsible behavior that follows from this breakdown 
“creates a non-intelligible, absurd situation, where everything is out of place.”562 The 
three biases and the resultant absurd situation will now be discussed.563 
The root of the first bias, individual bias, is found in the tension between personal 
or animal spontaneity564 on the one hand, and spontaneous intersubjectivity - along with 
the unrestricted, detached, disinterested intelligence that is characteristic of the pure 
desire to know - on the other.565 The egoist, who is afflicted with individual bias, is not 
altogether “devoid of the disinterestedness and detachment of intelligent inquiry.”566 
When it comes to intellectually engaging and striving to satisfy the appetites afforded by 
his personal, perhaps culturally-refined spontaneities, the egoist exceeds many others in 
his ability to “face issues squarely and to think them through.”567 If the egoist is 
concerned about something, he permits “the immanent norms of intelligent inquiry [to] 
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overrule any interference from desire or fear.”568 Within his own “restricted terms of 
reference,” the egoist permits the free play of intelligent inquiry.569 
The egoist’s horizon of concern or interest is too restricted. As Lonergan writes, 
“With remarkable acumen one solves one’s own problems. With startling modesty one 
does not venture to raise the relevant further questions, Can one’s solution be 
generalized? It is compatible with the social order that exists?”570 Thus, the egoist’s area 
of interest “is confined to the insights that would enable him to exploit each new situation 
to his own personal advantage,” often at the expense of others.571 Questions arising from 
“the demands of intersubjective spontaneities and springing from the love of others” are 
summarily blocked.572  
Human beings not only naturally and spontaneously seek to satisfy their own 
appetites, they are also naturally and spontaneously predisposed to “help others in the 
attainment of their satisfactions.”573 This latter form of spontaneity, which Lonergan calls 
intersubjective spontaneity, means that “human persons spontaneously take care of one 
another.”574 Similar to how “one spontaneously raises one’s arm to ward off a blow to 
one’s head, so with the same spontaneity one reaches out to save another from falling.”575 
This intersubjective spontaneity is so primordial that it prompts Lonergan to declare, “It 
is as if ‘we’ were members of one another prior to our distinctions of each from the 
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others.”576 There is, then, an earlier, prior “we” that precedes the more familiar “we,” the 
one which results “from the mutual love of an ‘I’ and a ‘thou’.”577 An elemental feeling 
of belonging together makes manifest this primordial “we.”578 Lonergan warns that the 
efficacy of this primordial “we” diminishes rapidly with distance in place or time.579 
The egoist consciously orients himself in such a way that “he devotes his energies 
to sizing up the social order, ferreting out its weak points and its loopholes, and 
discovering devices that give access to its rewards while evading its demands for 
proportionate contributions.”580 Above all, what the egoist attempts to do is delegitimize 
and make unnecessary the well-being of others and employ his intelligence for the sake 
of his own aggrandizement. It is in this sense that individual bias is an incomplete 
development of intelligence.581 Individual bias is the interference that disallows the 
“complete free play” of intelligent inquiry. Those afflicted by individual bias give free 
rein to the unrestricted desire to know, but only with respect to the whims of his or her 
own personal spontaneities. In short, the successful egoist is one who overcomes “both 
the drive of intelligence to raise the relevant further questions that upset egoistic solutions 
and, as well, the spontaneous demands of intersubjectivity.”582 
Lonergan provocatively argues that the egoist is not “totally unaware of his self-
deception.”583 Amidst all of the egoist’s rationalizations and reassurances that his 
intelligent selfishness is justified, he cannot completely quell “the dynamic criterion of 
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the further question [that is] immanent in intelligence itself.”584 The egoist is marked by a 
peculiar disingenuousness, for he knows the value of the unrestricted, detached, 
disinterested desire to know through the pursuit of his own narrowly-conceived interests, 
yet he simultaneously elects to cut the reach of the desire short.585 
Group bias, the second bias, is blinder, more secure, and more powerful than 
individual bias.586 Lonergan observes that “individual bias is, of course, something that is 
always disapproved of by all the groups. But when you have group bias, well, everyone 
in the group is all for it.”587 Whereas individual bias was characterized by an effort to 
overcome the natural and spontaneous intersubjective fellow-feeling, group bias finds 
itself supported by such feelings.588 To get a clearer grasp of group bias, it will be helpful 
to examine Lonergan’s discussion of social progress. 
Social progress is a “cyclic and cumulative process that results when situations 
give rise to insights revealing new possibilities.”589 These new possibilities, when 
grasped and implemented, lead to new courses of action. The new courses of action, in 
turn, produce new situations, and those new situations give rise to further insights that 
reveal additional possibilities.590  
This cyclical and cumulative process “admits of an indefinite unfolding.”591 As 
long as a community of individuals possesses a self-transcending orientation, the 
mistakes of the past will be illuminated and, to some extent, eliminated. More worthwhile 
                                                 
584 Ibid., 247. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Method in Theology, 231; Bernard Lonergan, “Mission and the Spirit,” A Third Collection, Ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1985), 31. 
587 Early Works on Theological Method I, 507. 
588 Insight, 247. 
589 Bernard Lonergan, “The Human Good,” 344. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid.  
87 
 
courses of action will be grasped in response to existing problems. Human intelligence 
will be able to effectively guide the unfolding of the historical process so that it is marked 
by cumulative progress. Lonergan declares that such progress would potentially be 
inevitable if all of these responses were made by pure intelligences.592 Human progress in 
this fashion is a fact, but only a first approximation to fact, for it is stymied and marred 
by bias.593 
In theory, the course of social change could consist of “a succession of insights, 
courses of action, changed situations, and fresh insights.”594 Under such circumstances, 
the key distinction would be between “fresh insights that are mere bright ideas of no 
practical moment and, on the other hand, the fresh insights that squarely meet the 
demands of the concrete situation.”595 A community would embrace and participate in a 
collaborative laboratory that welcomed insights and rigorously tested them for their 
efficacy and accuracy. But individuals can freely decide to develop a self-regarding 
orientation, which results in the promotion of a special type of intelligence, one in which 
the particular interests of a group or groups are promoted, encouraged, and even imposed 
on others.596  
Under these conditions, an interference in the development of practical common 
sense emerges, which Lonergan calls group bias. When this bias is functioning, groups 
are not completely content with the criteria of an insight squarely meeting the demands of 
the concrete situation. Instead, biased groups are predisposed to sort through pools of 
practical insights in an effort to determine which serve their interests and which do not. 
                                                 
592 Insight, 248. 
593 Bernard Lonergan, “Mission and the Spirit,” 31. 
594 Insight, 249. 
595 Ibid. 
596 Bernard Lonergan, “The Human Good,” 344.  
88 
 
Consequently, truly practical insights “have to be divided into operative and inoperative; 
both satisfy the criteria of practical intelligence; but the operative insights alone go into 
effect for they alone either meet with no group resistance or else find favor with groups 
powerful enough to overcome what resistance there is.”597  
At stake here is that group bias prevents practical intelligence from being truly 
practical. As Doran declares, “[Group bias] is responsible for the neglect or rejection of 
those practical insights that could genuinely meet social problems, but that call for the 
renunciation of narrow group or class interests, or the subordination of these interests to 
some larger viewpoint embracing the whole community.”598 It is not enough to simply 
have a good idea, even if that idea is precisely what is needed at the time. Under the 
conditions created by group bias, the timely idea cannot “simply emerge from the man on 
the spot, diffuse, give rise to new potentialities in a chain reaction.”599 Instead, it “has to 
combine with power, with wealth, with popular notion, before it can be realized.”600  
The historical process, when plagued by group bias, becomes grotesquely 
distorted. The social situation that results “does not correspond to any coherently 
developed set of practical ideas.”601 Instead, it merely reflects “the fraction of practical 
ideas that were made operative by their conjunction with power, the mutilated remnants 
of once excellent schemes that issued from the mill of compromise, the otiose structures 
that equip groups for their offensive and defensive activities.”602 Groups can offensively 
strike down practical plans of action that serve the common good, or defensively protect 
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the status quo in the face of practical insights that “reveal [the group’s] well-being to be 
excessive or its usefulness at an end.”603 Group bias is particularly potent when it comes 
to changes in economic and political institutions.604  
 Over time, the historical process, burdened by group bias, unfolds in such a way 
that some groups are favored and others are neglected.  The longer group bias functions, 
“the smaller the group it favors and the larger the group it neglects.”605 This can result in 
what Arnold Toynbee calls “the schism in the body social.”606 Yet, Lonergan argues that 
this distorted development “creates the principles for its own reversal”607 because 
eventually the social situation will deteriorate to the point where “there is no need to call 
upon experts and specialists to discover whether anything has gone wrong, nor even to hit 
upon a roughly accurate account of what can be done.”608 In other words, it will become 
blatantly obvious that things have gone awry. The neglected groups will come to discover 
and later champion the practical insights and ideas that were neglected by the favored 
groups. Lonergan calls this deterioration the shorter cycle of decline.609 
 More intractable and grave than group bias is the third bias, which Lonergan calls 
general bias. At its core, general bias stems largely from “a failure on the part of practical 
knowers to accept the fact that common sense knowing is a limited, specialized form of 
knowing.”610 The extraordinary success and productivity of common sense, which 
“engenders and maintains enormous structures of technology, economics, politics, and 
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culture,”611 is glaringly vulnerable to cherishing the illusion that it is omnicompetent.612 
The fact that common sense works, it gets things done, incites people to relegate the 
value of theoretical knowing. Lonergan notes that common sense is “easily led to 
rationalize its limitations by engendering a conviction that other forms of human 
knowledge are useless or doubtfully valid.”613 If a current pattern of behavior is leading 
to the generation of satisfactory results, common sense pats itself on the back and then 
rises to meet the next immediate challenge. While this is an integral part of human living, 
common sense “is very, very weak at paying attention to long-term results and 
consequences.”614 As Lonergan affirms, “The general bias of common sense prevents it 
from being effective in realizing ideas, however, appropriate and reasonable, that suppose 
a long view or that set up higher integrations or that involve the solution of intricate and 
disputed issues.”615 
 To use an analogy of vision, common sense is far-sighted. Up close, it sees the 
present concrete situation with utmost acuity. However, with regard to issues that are far 
away, the long-term issues, common sense is profoundly blind. Common sense needs the 
corrective lens of theoretical knowing to enable human beings to consummately function 
intelligently.616 Lonergan uses the analogy of a court of law to accentuate this point when 
he writes, “One can entrust common sense with the task of a juror; one cannot ask it 
formulate the laws of a country, to argue cases in its courts, to decide on issues of 
procedure, and to pass sentence on criminals.”617 Theory anchors the latter four activities, 
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while common sense, with its predilection for the immediate, practical, and concrete is 
well-equipped to handle the task of the juror. 
 Portraying general bias as a certain kind of blindness is only part of the story, 
however. In addition to what Lonergan calls “sins of omission,” general bias involves 
“sins of refusal” as well.618 Lonergan points out that general bias involves not only the 
dismissal of theoretical ideas that could be potentially profitable in the future, it also 
involves actively and willingly refusing to entertain and having disdain for those same 
ideas. Common sense’s “complacent practicality” banishes ideas that fail to address the 
satisfaction of immediate desires or the alleviation of present fears.619 Lonergan provides 
a snapshot of this pernicious attitude in Insight: 
 To advance common sense is to restrain the omnivorous drive of  
 inquiring intelligence and to brush aside as irrelevant, if not silly, any 
 question whose answer would not make an immediately palpable  
 difference… [T]he man of common sense (and nothing else) is ever on  
 his guard against all theory, ever blandly asking the proponent of ideas  
 what difference they would make, and if the answer is less vivid and less  
 rapid than an advertisement, then solely concerned with thinking up an  
 excuse for getting rid of the fellow. After all, men of common sense are 
 busy. They have the world’s work to do.620 
As one can imagine, this additional refusal on the part of common sense makes the illness 
of the general bias all the more severe. It is not just a matter of common sense knowers 
being immoderately caught up in the fruits of their specialized intelligence. It also 
consists of common sense knowers pretending “to be omniscient knowers who tend to 
spurn and depreciate theoretical knowers as impractical idealists lost in their 
abstractions.”621 Lonergan expresses concern over the general bias of common sense by 
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wondering how the world’s work could ever be done efficiently and effectively if men of 
exclusive common sense never bother themselves with the contributions of theory.622 
 Devoid of the guidance of theoretical intelligence, the human social situation, 
rather than progressing intelligently, deteriorates cumulatively.623 This is what Lonergan 
calls the longer cycle of decline. Whereas the shorter cycle of decline consists of 
dominant biased groups selectively making inoperable ideas that may detract from their 
well-being, but nevertheless have potential for serving the common good in some 
capacity, the more pervasive longer cycle of decline consists of a general “neglect of 
ideas to which all groups are rendered indifferent.”624 Regardless of whether one is part 
of a dominant or depressed group, insofar as one is afflicted with general bias, one will 
exhibit a certain apathy, if not hostility, towards those theoretical ideas that suppose a 
long view. What is “unnecessary and disastrous” is not practical knowing itself, but the 
“exaltation of the practical.”625 
This neglect accumulates over time as each generation inherits an increasingly 
unintelligible social situation that is composed of “quick fix” solutions and “arbitrary 
fragments,” which the previous generation’s biased common sense used to palliate the 
symptoms of the social situation that they inherited. The situation can be likened to 
hammering shingles over the holes found in the rotting roof of the house that one 
inherited from one’s parents, and then bequeathing this same house to one’s offspring. 
General bias sets up an underlying opposition between “the decisions that intelligence 
and reasonableness would demand and the actual decisions, individual and common, that 
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are made.”626 Remote and, to some extent, uncertain future payoffs discourage the 
implementation of intelligent and reasonable courses of action, especially when those 
courses of action place demands on the biased subject’s time.627 
To the extent that “the courses of action that men choose reflect either their 
ignorance or their bad will or their ineffectual self-control, there results the social 
surd.”628 The social surd, which Lonergan also calls a “social dump,”629 is a “tangled 
skein of intelligibility and absurdity in concrete situations.”630 What Lonergan means by 
a surd is “something that lacks the intelligibility one would expect an object to have.”631 
One would expect the social situation to be an object that reflects the wheel of progress 
moving forward “through the successive transformations of an initial situation in which 
are gathered coherently and cumulatively all the insights that occurred along the way.”632 
But when the social situation becomes a dump “in which are heaped up the amorphous 
and incompatible products of all the biases of self-centered and shortsighted individuals 
and groups,” the likelihood of occurrences of fruitful insights decreases.633 Without 
occurrences of fruitful insights, the subsequent cumulative development becomes 
characterized by a lack of intelligibility. One cannot abstract from the unintelligibility 
embedded in the biased social situation if one wants to consider the facts as they are.634  
Lonergan argues that the more the social surd expands, the more irrelevant 
theoretical knowing seems to become. The link between theoretical enterprises like 
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culture, religion, and philosophy to the social situation is intelligibility. The social surd 
creates conditions that encourage culture to retreat into the ivory tower, religion to 
become an inward matter of the heart, and philosophy to glitter “like a gem with endless 
facets and no practical purpose.”635 The permeation of the social surd leads to the 
seeming irrelevance of intelligence, reason, and the pure desire to know to the world as it 
stands.636 The incoherence of the social situation causes the dynamic progress of 
intelligence in both the personal and community spheres to be replaced first by 
sluggishness and ultimately by stagnation.637 
Worse still, the expansion of the social surd generates objective evidence for false 
conclusions, which can taint the entire enterprise of theoretical knowing.638 Lonergan 
argues that the longer cycle of decline can infect theoretical knowers, resulting in the 
major surrender of the unrestricted, detached, and disinterested desire to know. 
Describing this surrender, Joseph Flanagan writes:  
Theoreticians grow up in the same concrete social order and 
disorders as practical knowers, and so theory can be subject to similar 
pressures and disorientations which may gradually compromise the  
different long-term objectives and disinterested desires that initiate and 
sustain their passion for learning. Gradually the goal of disinterested  
knowing is no longer an open-ended inquiry and critical reflection, but 
some truncated version of it, which, in the limit, surrenders its own norms  
and objectives. In such a limit case, instead of the disinterested desire  
providing norms for judging the situations, the reverse occurs, as the facts 
of the socially disordered situations become the basis and provide norms 
for an empirical science of human behavior.639  
The pure desire to know can come to be supplanted by a type of theorizing whose basis is 
derived from the data provided by the disordered social situation. Theory, under these 
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circumstances, is confined to the “empirical, scientific, realistic”640 and norms for 
“questioning and understanding… are to be subordinated to the concrete disordered 
performances of different communities.”641 Theoretical intelligence can eventually come 
to be viewed as a mere instrument for developing a new philosophy, a new ethics, and a 
new religion that conforms to the objective facts. As Lonergan explains, “As the 
objective facts get worse and worse, the new ethics, the new religion, the new 
philosophy, keep getting worse and worse. That is the social surd expanding in the world 
of community and in the world of theory.”642 
 Understandably, this perversion of the whole enterprise of theorizing has 
deleterious effects on human living. Stripped of its endless resources to formulate 
creative, intelligent, and beneficial theories, the detached and disinterested desire to know 
becomes radically uncritical.643 There are no available criteria to enable one to 
differentiate between social achievement and social surd.644 Individuals still have the 
freedom to follow the dictates of reason as they see fit, but they must also cultivate “the 
virtue of tolerance to the equally reasonable views and actions of others.”645 Having 
transformed our naturally endowed unrestricted desire to know into a spectator of 
incoherent events that creates theories grounded in what Lonergan calls false facts,646 
human beings muddle through one crisis and into another647 and eventually become 
crippled by the mounting unintelligibility that has come to saturate the social situation. 
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Lonergan surmises that eventually our only recourse will be to enlist the help of the 
totalitarian, “who takes the narrow and complacent practicality of common sense and 
elevates it to the role of a complete and exclusive viewpoint.”648 The totalitarian degrades 
all forms of intellectual independence to the status of myths,649 perhaps signifying that he 
is the embodiment of the general bias.  
Lonergan sketches a haunting subsequent course of the longer cycle of decline, 
should it proceed unchecked. One totalitarianism may call forth another until some 
parties decide that war is a better alternative to the present situation. Depending on how 
that war plays out, a variety of conditions will follow, ranging from total destruction to 
the creation of a single world empire that “inherits both the objective stagnation of the 
social surd and the warped mentality of totalitarian practicality.”650 
 While this description of the longer cycle of decline is harrowing, Lonergan 
nevertheless emphasizes that it is not inevitable.651 Briefly, his prescription to combat 
decline is to develop positions and reverse counterpositions. Every human discovery can 
be formulated as either a position or counterposition,652 and conflicts between the two can 
disorient human minds653 and derail one’s efforts to live authentically.654 Both of them 
have to do with the personal development of the subject, most notably whether one is 
intellectually, morally, and religiously converted.655  
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Positions are “statements [that are] compatible with intellectual, moral and 
religious conversion.”656 They express “the dynamic structure of the subject qua 
intelligent and qua reasonable”657 and, as such, they invite further development.658 One of 
the key implications of the positions of intellectual conversion, for example, is “the 
contention that the chief feature of the universe is its dynamism: emergent 
probability.”659 Since positions invite development, they can later be expressed in 
different ways and joined with other positions into more comprehensive unities.660 
Lonergan notes that a perfect expression of a position would be entirely free from any 
taint of counterpositions and that this accomplishment is rare.661  
Counterpositions, on the other hand, “are statements [that are] incompatible with 
intellectual or moral, or religious conversion.”662 They invite reversal because they 
contradict the dynamic structure of the subject. When one expresses a counterposition, 
one is involved in “a queer type of contradiction.”663 The contradiction is not between 
different statements that one makes, but rather between the statements that one makes and 
the subject that one happens to be.664 One strives to be intelligent and reasonable, yet 
one’s counterpositions are deficient in intelligibility and reasonableness. The way to 
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reverse a counterposition is to remove the elements that are incompatible with 
intellectual, moral, or religious conversion.665 
This solution, however, can be difficult to achieve in practice. Various features of 
counterpositions make them resistant to single-stroke reversals. For instance, 
counterpositions can expand by the unfolding of their logical implications. They also 
have a knack for recognizing other counterpositions and uniting with them in a common 
cause. Counterpositions are also known to shift their ground, which deflects reversal 
efforts to their various manifestations instead to their roots.666 As I will argue in the next 
chapter, perhaps the single most important prevailing counterposition leading up to the 
subprime mortgage crisis was the claim that house prices will interminably rise. This 
nagging, recalcitrant counterposition was completely at ease in a horizon informed by 
general bias. 
 
1.11. The Invariant Structure of the Human Good 
 In a 1962 lecture given at Regis College, Lonergan prefaces his discussion of the 
human good by citing how St. Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle both observed that “true 
and false are in the mind, while good and evil are in things.”667 Consequently, when one 
asks about the good, one is asking about the concrete.668 The good is always concrete and 
never an abstraction, just like reality.669 The concreteness of the good applies whether 
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one is considering the good in its total range or, with a narrower focus, simply in terms of 
the human good.670 
In general, the good is human insofar as it is realized through human 
apprehension and decision.671 This is a significant point because it is “with regard to the 
human good that development occurs fundamentally.”672 Human apprehension develops, 
which enables one age to understand things better and to know more than the preceding 
age.673 Human decisions, for their part, are authentic or inauthentic, depending upon the 
subjective circumstances enumerated above.674 The human good, as a result, is a history. 
It is a developing, cumulative process “where there is both advance of apprehension, and 
distortion, aberration, due to evil” or bias.675 
In order to apprehend the human good, Lonergan argues that “one needs 
something in the way of a scheme, something that will suggest to one the great variety of 
questions connected with thinking about the human good.”676 Interestingly, Lonergan 
affirms that if one’s conception of the human good is limited to the definition of “that 
which all men desire,” then one is “finishing the question off a little too briefly.”677 That 
nominal definition of the human good, however accurate, may nevertheless be ineffective 
when it comes to generating further pertinent questions, hence the need for a scheme or 
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structure.678 Lonergan maintains that his scheme or structure of the human good 
“provides topics for exploring different aspects” of it.679 
 The invariant structure of the human good is remarkably rich and flexible, so 
much so that it can be found in any human society680 and is compatible with any sort of 
technological, economic, political, cultural, and religious development.681 It is an open 
structure, one that is large enough “to include both subject and object, to unite the 
subjective and the objective, the individual and the social.”682 The structure has three 
levels that are related to one another in an interlocking fashion.683 Each level features 
individual potentialities and actuations, as well as some sort of social mediation,684 and 
an end or object. Lonergan argues that the structure is based on nature, “on man’s needs 
and abilities, his capacity for development, his native freedom.”685 He writes: 
On a first level one considers the needs and capacities of individuals, their 
 operations which within society become cooperations, and the resultant  
 recurrent instances of the particular good. On a second level, one  
considers their plasticity and perfectability, their training for assuming  
roles and performing tasks within already understood and accepted  
modes and styles of cooperating, and their actual performance which  
results in the functioning or malfunctioning of the good of order. On a 
third level one considers individuals as free and responsible, adverts to 
their basic operations for self-transcendence or for alienation,  
examines their personal relations with other individuals or groups 
within the society, and notes the terminal values they bring about in 
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 themselves and encourage in others.686 
 
Each of the three levels will now be examined in turn. 
 
 On the first level, under the heading of individual potentiality, need is conjoined 
with the capacity for operating.687 Needs are very broadly conceived as “anything anyone 
wants,” not merely what necessity demands.688 Human beings actuate their capacity to 
operate in order to meet their needs. Lonergan argues, though, that the vast majority of 
human beings spend most of their lives cooperating in some way or other, instead of 
operating. Robinson Crusoe, alone and stranded on an island, operated to meet his 
needs.689 Since most human beings live in groups, however, their operating, to a notable 
extent, is socially mediated by cooperating.690 Whether operating or cooperating, what 
these efforts procure are instances of the particular good.  
 According to Lonergan, particular goods are what most people think about when 
they discuss the good.691 Particular goods can be things, events, satisfactions, or 
operations.692 Generally speaking, to the extent that an object or activity meets a human 
want or need on a particular occasion, that object or activity is a particular good.693 
Lonergan writes, “Regarding the particular good, we may say that any good is particular 
insofar as it responds to, or is the good of, this particular appetite. This apple, this dinner, 
this instance of beatific vision, are all instances of the particular good. They are objects of 
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an appetite, a desire.”694 Particular goods can change over time. The breakfast cereal, 
cornflakes, was not a particular good in the nineteenth century, though it came to be a 
particular good in the twentieth century.695 
 What accounts for the shift from the first level of the structure of the human good 
to the second level is the fact that the need for particular goods is recurrent. Human 
intelligence “insists upon some assurance of regularity, recurrence, security.”696 One not 
only wants breakfast, one also wants it every day.697 The individual potentiality on this 
level is the human capacity for development698 that is made possible by our plasticity and 
perfectibility.699 These capacities enable individuals to adapt to changing circumstances, 
accommodate new insights, and to develop the skills necessary to meet the ever-shifting 
demands imposed by institutions.700  
Our plasticity and perfectibility is actuated by way of acquiring habits and 
developing skills. Habits, according to Lonergan, ground the possibility of 
specializations. One is capable of acquiring a specialization “insofar as one’s acquired 
habits are heading towards and fulfilling a very precise function within the social 
mediation of the good.”701 Without habits, specializations and coordinated human 
operations would not be possible.702 With respect to acquiring skills, Lonergan 
emphasizes the importance of the self-correcting process of learning. He writes, “One 
gets an insight, one catches onto something, and then finds that it is not quite the whole 
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story, and catches on to something more, and gradually builds up a whole circle of 
insights that yield a certain mastery of the situation.”703 Strictly speaking, Lonergan 
considers a skill to be a type of habit, a certain dexterity by which one does not have to 
learn how to do something.704 
 The enormous array of habits and skills that human beings are capable of 
developing can potentially be the very ones that are demanded by socially mediated 
institutional roles and tasks.705 Operations become cooperations “inasmuch as members 
assume roles and perform tasks within institutional frameworks, that is, already 
understood and commonly accepted manners of cooperating.”706 Examples of institutions 
include the family, education, the state, the law, the economy, and technology.707 An 
institution should not be conceived as a building. Instead, it is “a set of insights, skills, 
habits, and feelings oriented to the continuous flow of particular things that people 
want.”708 One could argue that an institution is the product or expression of human 
cooperation.709 Matthew Lamb likens institutions to languages in the sense that they “are 
not fixed and immutable entities, but change as the ways in which the modes of human 
cooperation constituting them change.”710 As Lonergan notes, “The family, the state, the 
law, the economy are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to changing 
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circumstances, they can reconceived in the light of new ideas, they can be subjected to 
revolutionary change.”711 
 The end or object of the development of skills and habits, as well as the 
fulfillment of institutional roles and the carrying out of institutional tasks, is the good of 
order.712 In Insight, Lonergan calls the good of order “a new notion of the good”713 or “a 
second meaning of the good,”714 one that is not reducible to the mere presence of 
particular goods. Although the “regular recurrence of particular goods is a fundamental 
aspect of the good of order,”715 the good of order is distinct from that regular 
recurrence.716 To be sure, the good of order “is what gives rise to the constant, regular, 
rhythmic occurrence of the particular goods”717 and it is indeed “an indispensable 
constituent of human living.”718 However, the mere production of particular goods “is an 
instance in which there can be or may not be realized a good of order.”719 Paul Hoyt-
O’Connor brings out this point very well: 
 While particular goods may satisfy some human want or need, the 
regular and recurrent enjoyment and the ordering of human action 
are themselves distinctly valuable. For the attainment of particular goods 
time and time again is conditioned by the cooperation of any number of 
individuals, and breakdowns in this framework spell that the enjoyment 
of these goods will be at best precarious and sporadic. Thus the 
intelligibility and choice-worthiness of goods of order are distinct from 
and not reducible to instances of particular goods.720 
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Particular goods are event-conditioned things in the sense that they would not be 
available unless certain preceding events occurred.721 As Tad Dunne observes, “[T]here 
has to be some setup, some routine, some institution, some scheme of recurrence that 
brings forth a certain kind of particular good regularly.”722 This setup is not the particular 
goods themselves, but rather the good of order:723 a complex, interdependent, dynamic, 
and intelligible pattern of human relationships, which consists of the parceling out of 
tasks, roles, and responsibilities, for the sake of providing instances of the particular good 
for individuals.  
 Kenneth Melchin helpfully articulates why the good of order is not reducible to 
instances of the particular good by calling attention to the nature of the obligations that 
institutionalized patterns of cooperation impose upon people. Melchin writes: 
 What is striking about the patterns of cooperation of a family, a business, 
an economy, or a police force is that often they give rise to 
obligations that are not themselves objects of personal desire… The 
meaning and value of these obligations lies in their contribution to an 
overall pattern that coordinates the diverse contributions of all into a 
functioning whole. The pattern is not in the first instance an object of 
desire or need; it is an intelligible order that must be understood.724 
 
Part of what characterizes the good of order is the underlying order that sustains the 
succession of recurring instances of types of the particular good.725 The concrete 
“goodness” of the good of order, then, simply cannot be equated with mere instances of 
the particular good. 
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The good of order is also not tantamount to institutions.726 Institutions are 
instruments for – or that which should be ordered to – the good of order.727 As opposed to 
equating the good of order with institutions, Lonergan finds it more helpful to accentuate 
the actual functioning or malfunctioning of institutions in his discussion of the good of 
order.728 The institution of the family, for instance, can produce “bliss in one case and 
misery in another.”729 Another example that Lonergan provides is the great Depression of 
the 1930’s. Institutions like the government, along with natural resources, willing 
workers, and entrepreneurs were all present at the time, but the good of order was 
severely defective.730 The important point is that “[t]he desires and effective decisions 
that bring about particular goods do not explain their number and distribution at any point 
in time, and whether the flows of goods are trickles or torrents depends upon actually 
functioning institutions.”731 What constitutes institutional breakdowns like marital 
discord, political decay, and economic breakdown is not the presence or absence of any 
particular good, or even necessarily the presence or absence of a given institution. Rather, 
those institutional disturbances “are the breakdown and decay of the good of order.”732 
Precisely how and how well human beings go about satisfying their needs in relationship 
to how and how well they contribute to satisfying the needs of other people is essentially 
what the good of order is all about. 
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The good of order, then, is not an institution, though it has its basis in 
institutions.733 It is the product of “all of the skill and know-how, all the industry and 
resourcefulness, all the ambition and fellow-feeling of a whole people, adapting to each 
change of circumstance, meeting each new emergency, struggling against every tendency 
to disorder.”734 The good of order exists to the extent that a large set of roles and tasks are 
ordered, and it does not exist to the extent that those activities fail to be ordered.735 
Lonergan affirms, “If X is a good thing and occurs, it will recur when there is a good of 
order.”736 
Nor is the good of order some unrealized ideal, something “that ought to be but is 
not.”737 It is not “some entity dwelling apart from human actions and attainments.”738 The 
good of order is not what the economist thinks that it is, “but what the economist is 
approximately trying to get to know.”739 Furthermore, the good of order is “not some 
design for utopia, some theoretic ideal, some set of ethical precepts, some code of laws, 
or some super-institutions.”740 Instead, it is the concrete and actually functioning way that 
cooperation is working out within institutions.741 Lonergan is quick to point out that the 
concrete and actually functioning way that cooperation within institutions is working out 
is endlessly complex and manifests itself in different ways.742 In economics, for example, 
the key facet of the good of order is interdependence, while in politics it is “preventing 
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evils, protecting people, [and] securing their liberties and rights.”743 Whether in politics, 
economics, education, or any other institutional arrangement, the good of order “depends 
on the efficacy with which people combine within institutions to make the best of 
everything.”744 The elimination of breakdowns in the good of order “takes all the 
knowhow and all the generosity of everyone in the group to make things run well.”745 
A potentially fruitful way to conceive of the good of order is to liken it to an 
ecosystem746 or ecology, or what Lonergan calls “an assembly of assemblies of schemes 
of recurrence.”747 The good of order is characterized by a complex interdependence 
between schemes of recurrence that support one another. Lower, subordinate schemes of 
recurrence underpin higher orders of schemes and higher schemes of recurrence “bring to 
fuller fruition their subordinates.”748 In his Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in 
Circulation Analysis, Lonergan discusses how the economy is characterized by “the 
myriad interlocking recurrences of activities within and between firms, between firms 
and households, and within households.”749 Each one of those interlocking schemes of 
recurrence “is a possibility that occurred to someone at some point of ancient or recent 
human history, that has been combined with other schemes in proposed possibilities, that 
has been chosen with greater or lesser probability and maintained with greater or less 
deliberate choice.”750 As for those existing sets of combinations of schemes of 
recurrence, Lonergan argues that they have “functioned with greater or less success for a 
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longer or shorter period of time.”751 An economy, in brief, “is just part of ongoing human 
history.”752 
Unsurprisingly, to understand the good of order, one “must shift from a common-
sense patterning of knowing into a theoretical perspective.”753 The good of order is an 
invisible,754 “formal intelligibility that is to be discovered only by raising questions, 
grasped only through accumulating insights, formulated only in conceptions.”755 It is 
dynamic, a system on the move,756 rather than the static culmination of mechanist 
planning.757 Lonergan notes that it “consists in an intelligible pattern of relationships that 
condition the fulfilment of each man’s desires by his contributions to the fulfilments of 
the desires of others, and similarly protect each from the object of his fears in the 
measure he contributes to warding off the objects feared by others.”758 The good of order 
“lies totally outside the field of sensitive appetition”759 and is grasped by human 
intelligence.760 
Significantly, like human history, the good of order “does not develop in the 
glorious fashion” of intellectual development, rather it tends to develop “under a bias in 
favor of the powerful, the rich, or the most numerous class.”761 Still, the good of order 
“possesses its own normative line of development, inasmuch as elements of the idea of 
order are grasped by insight into concrete situations, are formulated in proposals, are 
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accepted by explicit or tacit agreements, and are put into execution only to change the 
situation and give rise to still further insights.”762 The good of order is, therefore, 
amenable to the insights yielded by the self-correcting process of learning, but by no 
means inevitably the product of that process. 
The fact that no single good of order, nor any institution or set of institutions, are 
the only ones possible prompts Lonergan to shift his attention from the second level of 
the human good to the third.763 As Lonergan writes, “The existence of a manifold of 
possibilities for the good of order and the institutions that underpin them gives rise to, 
reveals, and brings to light the notion of value.”764 It is by way of “appealing to value or 
values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some 
systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others.”765 When human 
beings are reflective and rational, particular goods, institutions, and goods of order are 
inevitably bound to be considered, evaluated, and criticized.766 Lonergan affirms, “The 
particular good leads man into the good of order, the good of order leads man into 
reflecting on the order and evaluating it and criticizing it. In that evaluation and criticism 
there emerges the notion of value, Is it worthwhile?”767 For instance, the Cold War had 
its basis in the fact that people in the West had “a different idea of the good of order from 
that of the Soviets.”768 
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 The potency on the third level is liberty,769 effective freedom,770 or self-
determination.771 Liberty is experienced as “the active thrust of the subject terminating 
the process of deliberation by settling on one of the possible courses of action and 
proceeding to execute it.”772 Lonergan argues that knowledge does not, of itself, settle a 
course of action. Rather, knowledge “grounds different possible courses of action.”773 
Lonergan approvingly cites Jean-Paul Sartre’s “experiment of liberty” as a way of 
establishing “the fact of freedom.”774 Sartre’s experiment of liberty involves posing the 
question to oneself, “Have you been in the torture chamber with the Nazis and refrained 
from giving your comrades away?”775 One will know what freedom means if one went 
through that experience and refrained from turning one’s friends over to the Nazis.776 By 
freedom, Lonergan means, “Man can do this or that; he can do this or not do it. He can do 
good or evil.” 777 For Lonergan, “man is not only a center of capacities and needs, a 
center of perfectibility, he is a free center.”778 
 The first of two actuations on the third level is orientation, by Lonergan means 
“the direction of the flow of a person’s consciousness.”779 The trajectory of this direction 
heavily depends upon one’s use of liberty or freedom.780 Lonergan writes:  
Human consciousness is not a fully determined function of sensitive 
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impressions and hereditary equipment. Consciousness also depends upon 
an orientation within the subject that is accepted and willed by the  
subject. There is such a thing as freedom of consciousness – principally, 
of course, in the sense that acts of will are free, but also and by way of a 
precondition in the sense that consciousness itself is not something 
determined uniquely by external objects or internal objects, by 
biological or sensitive conditions and determinants.781 
 
One’s consciousness “floats” according to the freely willed orientation of the subject.782 
What one happens to be conscious of at any given moment depends much more upon 
one’s horizon of interests and concerns than upon the presence of things to which one can 
attend.783 
 With respect to one’s orientation, liberty can be exercised either horizontally or 
vertically. Paul Hoyt-O’Connor brings out the distinction between the two exercises of 
liberty by writing, “Horizontal exercises of liberty are made within some determinate 
horizon and on the basis of one’s guiding concerns. Vertical exercises of liberty, on the 
other hand, are decisions about one’s horizon and the orientation of one’s being.”784 
Horizontal exercises of liberty occur within the horizon that one has already attained and 
contribute to what Lonergan calls a horizontal development.785 Vertical development, on 
the other hand, takes place “when one has moved beyond one’s present horizon, when 
someone pulls the rug from underneath your world and you have to move into another 
world.”786 In other words, vertical development is fundamentally about conversion, the 
second actuation on the third level in the structure of the human good.  
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In Method in Theology, Lonergan writes, “As orientation is, so to speak, the 
direction of development, so conversion is a change of direction and, indeed, a change for 
the better.”787 Conversion, on this third level, is “from a self-regarding to a self-
transcending orientation.”788 This powerful experience is vividly described by Lonergan: 
 One frees oneself from the unauthentic. One grows in authenticity. 
Harmful, dangerous, misleading satisfactions are dropped. Fears of 
discomfort, pain, privation, have less power to deflect one from one’s 
course. Values are apprehended where before they were overlooked. 
Scales of preference shift. Errors, rationalizations, ideologies fall and 
shatter to leave open to things as they are and to man as he should be.789 
 
By becoming an existential subject that transcends oneself, one becomes an originating 
value.790 Originating values are “authentic persons achieving self-transcendence by their 
good choices.”791 What the self-transcending, authentic subject decides to do, as an 
originating value, is what Lonergan calls terminal value:792 “true instances of the 
particular good, a true good of order, a true scale of preferences regarding values and 
satisfactions.”793  
Since one’s conversion “regards the very direction of one’s conscious life,” 
becoming an originating value that chooses terminal values is a personal event.794 
Nevertheless, it is not entirely a private event.795 Originating values are “the foundations 
of a transformed social order.”796 As Paul Hoyt-O’Connor writes, “The principles of 
human progress are precisely these originating values who faithfully adhere to the 
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immanent laws of conscious intentionality and who are effectively free to know and do 
the good.”797 Human progress “proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their 
true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be 
reasonable, Be responsible.”798 When the social process is marked by progress, “the 
mistakes of the past are eliminated to some extent, and intelligence is effectively guiding 
another part or aspect of the social process.”799 New and fresh insights reveal and bring to 
light past oversights, while generating creative solutions and possible salubrious courses 
of action.  
Individual liberty is not exercised in a vacuum. The social mediation on the third 
level is personal relations,800 which Lonergan, in Insight, affirms have a “singular 
importance in human living.”801 Personal relations rest upon institutional roles and 
tasks.802 Lonergan declares, “Institutional roles and tasks set up personal relations of all 
sorts, with all the people you meet from morning to night.”803 The extent of an 
individual’s self-regarding or self-transcending orientation is revealed by the way in 
which one participates in these relations. As Fred Lawrence observes, “On Lonergan’s 
analysis of the structure of the human good, the orientation of people is shown in the 
personal relations implicit in their cooperation for the sake of particular goods, and in the 
roles they play and the tasks they fulfill in the different institutional orders of familial, 
educational, technological, economic, legal, political, artistic, and religious schemes of 
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recurrence in society.”804 Lonergan goes so far as to say, “Through personal relations 
there is a concrete, immediate apprehension of what the good of order concretely is… 
[T]he simplest and most effective apprehension of the good of order is in the 
apprehension of personal relations.”805 
Personal relations are typically alive with feeling, as individuals relate to one 
another “by the commitments that they have freely undertaken and by the expectations 
aroused in others by the commitments, by the roles they have assumed and by the tasks 
that they meet to perform.”806 The quality of personal relations can “vary from intimacy 
to ignorance, from love to exploitation, from respect to contempt, from friendliness to 
enmity.”807 Personal relations have the potential to bind a community together or to tear it 
apart.808  
 Lonergan does not conceive of a community as a group of people sharing a 
common zip code. Community is, instead, a matter of common experiences, sharing a 
common understanding, sharing common judgments, and arriving at a common consent 
on values and goals.809 Devoid of these common elements, individuals lose touch with 
one another, misunderstand and distrust each other, live in different worlds, and work at 
cross-purposes.810 For this reason, Lonergan makes a distinction between a community, 
in which those common elements are present, and a mere society.811 Within the confines 
of a community, Lonergan notes, “It is here where man’s freedom reaches its high point, 
                                                 
804 Fred Lawrence, “The Ethics of Authenticity and the Human Good, in Honour of Michael Vertin, an 
Authentic Colleague,” The Importance of Insight, Ed. John J. Liptay Jr. and David S. Liptay (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 2007), 142. 
805 Topics in Education, 41. 
806 Method in Theology, 50. 
807 Ibid., 51. 
808 Ibid. 
809 Bernard Lonergan, “The World Mediated by Meaning,” 110. 
810 Ibid. Please see also: Method in Theology, 356-357. 
811 Method in Theology, 360. 
116 
 
here that his responsibility is greatest, here that there emerges the existential subject who 
discovers for himself that he has to decide for himself what he is to make of himself.”812 
Genuine and sustained human progress is dependent upon “attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible cooperation in ever expanding and complementary networks 
of community,” while the “repression of such cooperation and community” is the key to 
decline.813 In the chapters that follow, especially the ones centering on various parties 
involved in the subprime mortgage crisis, one will encounter a devastating lack of 
community. 
 
1.12. Conclusion 
  In this chapter, I have examined a key set of theoretical tools that will help cast 
light on the contributing factors and causes of the subprime mortgage crisis in the 
chapters that follow. Lonergan’s profound understanding of what it means to be 
authentically human, a self-verifiable enterprise that is of paramount importance, yet 
subject to false-starts, challenges, setbacks, and failures, coupled with his penetrating 
account of human history, can serve as a template for understanding why the subprime 
mortgage crisis came into being. Human beings shape human history by the quality of 
their decisions and actions. The quality of their decisions and actions depends upon their 
antecedent judgments of value, deliberations, evaluations, and judgments of fact. 
Arriving at sound judgments of fact, which are, so to speak, the raw materials for 
evaluating, deliberating, and value judging, require prior and demanding cognitional 
work, including the grasping of reflective insights, marshaling and weighing the 
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evidence, earnestly posing “Is it so?” questions, formulating direct insights, and 
creatively and persistently seeking answers to questions for understanding. Sufficient 
answers to questions for understanding, made possible by grasping direct insights, 
depend upon the raising of the questions themselves. The act of inquiring requires that 
individuals diligently attend to and wonder about their sensible experiences. Individuals 
must also keep vigilant watch over the quality of their feelings - and how those feelings 
may be shaping one’s horizon: the boundary in which one’s cognitional and volitional 
work takes place. A continuous flow of improvements, which Lonergan calls progress, is 
possible if individuals adhere to the transcendental precepts: Be attentive, Be intelligent, 
Be reasonable, Be responsible.814 
 But human beings are subject to bias, and so human history is vulnerable to 
decline. The transcendental precepts can be violated and evaluations “may be biased by 
an egoistic disregard of others, by a loyalty to one’s own group matched by a hostility to 
other groups, by concentrating on short-term benefits and overlooking long-term 
costs.”815 All of those biases are prevalent in the chapters that follow. Regulators and 
regulated alike, in varying degrees and different ways, succumbed to bias, which over 
time introduced a dysfunctional and pernicious element into the good of order. Chapter 
two will provide a general sketch of this argument, while the remaining chapters (three 
through six) will examine it in closer detail.  
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   Chapter Two 
2.0. A Bridge from Theory to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Perhaps the smoothest transition into an analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis 
is to consider the role that general bias played in inciting it. Leading up to the subprime 
mortgage crisis, common sense indicated that house prices would inevitably continue to 
rise. Common sense also grasped that when house prices continually rise, money can be 
made from mortgages that were historically considered below-prime. Under these 
conditions, seemingly all parties involved had something to gain (Figure 1, below): (1) 
borrowers were approved to live in houses that they would otherwise be unable to afford; 
(2) lenders received origination fees from these borrowers; (3) lenders also received fees 
from arrangers for originating mortgage loans, regardless of whether the loan applications 
accurately reflected the borrower’s credit risk or not; (4) arrangers securitized those 
mortgages and the credit rating agencies, for a fee, inflated their ratings of these products; 
(5) AIG was happy to sell, for a fee, excessive credit protection on subprime-related 
securities; (6) arrangers issued, for a fee, those highly rated securities to institutional 
investors; (7) even Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the stalwarts of the secondary mortgage 
market who specialized in prime, conforming mortgages, purchased subprime mortgages 
from lenders for a fee; (8) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitized those mortgages and 
offered them to investors, and guaranteed, for a fee, that borrowers would timely meet 
their mortgage obligations.816 All eight of these group interests spawned group biases 
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which reinforced the general bias about the unmitigated rise in house prices. In other 
words, group and general biases combined to block serious pursuit of questions about 
really long-term trends in house prices. 
Figure 1.817 
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I will argue in this and later chapters that, with so much money to be made, group 
bias easily found a home in various institutional relationships. Federal regulators could 
justify standing out of the way of their regulated institutions. Other institutions could 
compromise the quality of the particular goods that they produced for the community in 
the interest of the particular good of profits for themselves. Over time, a dramatic 
breakdown in the good of order occurred as the biased decisions among individuals 
accumulated and created a distorted social situation. Millions of Americans lost – or are 
still in danger of losing – their homes and accumulated equity. Institutions that had 
flourished for decades collapsed in months. This partial breakdown of the good of order 
will be discussed, in detail, in chapters three through six. 
In order to more effectively examine this deterioration of the good of order, there 
are a few pertinent peripheral issues that will be explored in this chapter as well. In 
section 2.5, the absence of a federally established and recognized definition of the term 
“subprime” created a barrier to effective regulation, for how can one regulate something 
without an account of what that thing is? In section 2.6, I will briefly explain the 
important difference between the primary and secondary market. In section 2.7, I will 
examine some of the key deregulatory preconditions that contributed to the emergence of 
the subprime mortgage market. My discussion of the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 
1980’s, which should have underscored the importance of soundly regulating mortgage 
lenders in the future, illustrates the power of general bias. As Bob Ivry and Jonathan 
Keehner noted in a Bloomberg News article, the Savings and Loan crisis, like the 
subprime mortgage crisis, was triggered by poor real-estate bets and resulted in the 
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government creating “a tax-payer funded enterprise to absorb the fallout” from those 
bets.818 Commonsense practices of many business and political actors in the 1990’s and 
2000’s, however, suggest that there was a failure to achieve an adequate grasp of the risks 
associated with financing homes in a deregulatory environment, such as the one present 
in the 1980’s. The original subprime crisis, occurring in the late 1990’s and explored in 
section 2.8, further substantiates this claim. Far from serving as a warning about the 
volatility and risks associated with subprime mortgages, this crisis was a distant memory 
by the turn of the century. 
 
2.2. A First Approximation of General Bias’ Role in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
In an April 2012 paper, two senior economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston and one research economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta argue that 
overly optimistic beliefs about house prices were at the center of the subprime mortgage 
crisis.819 The authors instructively label this phenomenon “bubble fever” that infected 
borrowers, lenders, arrangers, the credit rating agencies, and investors alike.820 Leading 
up to the subprime mortgage crisis, it was common sense that house prices in the United 
States never go down. As the authors write, “Zero-down loans, subprime mortgages, 
negative amortization, and reduced documentation all make sense if prices are expected 
                                                 
818 Jonathan Keehner and Bob Ivry, “Subprime Devastation Retraces Path of S&L Crisis in U.S. States,” 
Bloomberg News (October 8, 2008), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=axi7wgOziH00&pid=newsarchive. 
819 Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, “Why Did So Many People Make So 
Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: 
Public Policy Discussion Paper, No. 12-2 (April 2012), available at 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1202.pdf, 2; 20-24. 
820 Ibid. 
122 
 
to grow rapidly, since it is the value of the house - not the borrower’s income - that 
guarantees repayment of the loan.”821 
When the value of one’s house goes up, one’s loan-to-value ratio drops, typically 
making one more eligible to refinance. Or, alternately, one could potentially be a position 
to attempt to sell the home for a profit. In either case, under the assumption that house 
prices will inevitably rise, lenders came to expect that there was a high likelihood that 
borrowers would be able to “repay” their loans by way of refinancing or selling their 
homes.822 From the perspective of a borrower, mortgages that required one to put little or 
no money down offered the opportunity to buy a house with little risk. If the price of 
one’s house rose, one could sell at a profit. In the event that house prices dropped and one 
could no longer afford the monthly mortgage payment, one could walk away with 
minimal out-of-pocket expenses. With such an attractive upside and a tolerable downside, 
conditions were fertile for borrowers to fail to take seriously the further pertinent 
questions that could have, and indeed should have, emerged as they were deliberating 
over whether it was worthwhile to purchase a given house. 
The counterposition that house prices will perpetually rise, in other words, 
interfered with a borrower’s ability to deliberate over the question of value, “How much 
should I save for my house down payment?” As articulated in a popular home buying 
book, Insider Secrets to Home-Buying Success, which was published in July of 2007, this 
is a central question of value for a home buyer.823 With house prices perceived to be 
continually rising, the authors highlight how “valuable time is ticking away” for 
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borrowers as they attempt to save for their down payment, which could result in house 
prices and interest rates rising to unaffordable levels.824 This undesirable scenario, the 
two authors note, “could leave you with an even larger monthly payment” than if you 
would have put less than 20% down sooner.825 The authors use the twelve month period 
ending in June of 2005 to substantiate their point. With real estate appreciating between 
8% to 20% during those twelve months and salaries only increasing an average of 3.3% 
over that same period of time, the authors point out that the price of a $300,000 house 
could go up another $60,000 - $100,000 over the next five years. The authors tell us, 
“The little Cape Cod that would have cost you $300,000 will now cost $400,000 – and 
that’s a very conservative estimate.”826 Not only would one be unable to purchase one’s 
dream house by waiting five years to save for a 20% down payment, additionally one 
“will have missed out on the appreciation of the housing market.”827 
I would like to note in passing the possible feelings that could have arisen in such 
a home buying climate. First, there is the fear of missing out on the opportunity to buy 
one’s dream home should one save for a 20% down payment. Then, there is the fear of 
being permanently priced out of the sort of housing one would like to live in. Finally, 
there is the anticipated pain of losing out on the capital gains earned by purchasing one’s 
dream home, miniscule down payment and all. The authors write, “Despite the routine 
and historically predictable market fluctuations, real estate continues to appreciate each 
year. So what if the increase is only 8% next year instead of 20%? If you purchased a 
home today, it would still represent a major appreciation and wise investment of your 
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funds.”828 All of these feelings, I propose, would be intentional responses to disagreeable 
alternatives. 
Investors, for their part, also suffered from mistaken house price expectations 
according to the “bubble fever” thesis. As the authors of the paper note, “[I]f investors 
think that house prices can rise 11 percent per year, expected losses [on their 
investments] are minimal.”829 Gretchen Morgenson nicely captures the spirit of many 
investors of subprime-related securities leading up to the crisis. She writes, “It’s amazing 
how long it can take investors to see that the wheels are coming off a prized investment 
vehicle. Denial, after all, is a powerful thing. But when an imperiled favorite happens to 
be a pool of asset-backed securities - especially those involving home mortgages - denial 
can be compounded by outright blindness to the real risks of that investment.”830 
Morgenson argues that investors “flocked to the mortgage-backed market” because they 
were “chasing the buzz of higher yields.”831 Once again, the counterposition of endlessly 
rising house prices lodged itself into a decision-making horizon, this time in the sense 
that subprime-related investments were portrayed as having huge upsides with little risk 
of any downsides.  
One of the most important questions pertaining to the responsibility of subprime 
investors was the extent to which they understood the risks associated with the products 
in which they were investing. As Dan Fitzpatrick, writing for The Wall Street Journal, 
noticed, “Much of the postmortem debate and legal fights following the financial crisis 
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come down to the question of investor sophistication. Investors say the financial products 
were so complex that they should never have been offered to individuals not savvy 
enough to understand them. Banks routinely say buyers burned by these deals were 
sophisticated enough to know the risks.”832 The technical definition of a “sophisticated 
investor,” according to the Securities Act of 1933, is one who “has such knowledge and 
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits 
and risks of the prospective investment.”833 A key benchmark for assessing whether an 
investor is sophisticated, according to the SEC, is whether one is an “accredited” 
investor. An accredited investor “must have a net worth of $1 million, an annual income 
of $200,000 or control a trust with assets of $5 million.”834 Whether or not this is an 
adequate definition of investor sophistication is debatable. Yet it is clear that a great 
many who invested in subprime securities either directly or indirectly did not satisfy even 
this minimal definition. 
Currently, perhaps the most combative issue centers on the transparency of the 
risks contained in previously issued collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In May of 
2005, then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan “noted the complexity of 
collateralized debt obligations and the challenges they pose to ‘even the most 
sophisticated market participants’.”835 According to some accounts, supposedly 
sophisticated investors were not sophisticated enough to understand subprime CDO’s, so 
in lieu of conducting their own due diligence reviews they carelessly relied on the ratings 
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of the credit rating agencies.836 The key point, however, is that the general bias of 
common sense gave investors in subprime-related products the “luxury” of being able to 
bypass conducting their own due diligence reviews because under the assumption that 
house prices would only go up, the risks of these products vanishes. Further pertinent 
questions were dismissed as not being pertinent when one is deliberating over whether 
one should invest in a given subprime-related security. 
Additionally, one could argue that the arrangers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
and AIG were blinded by the general bias of common sense. Since several arrangers, 
including Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley, were among those that 
suffered the heaviest subprime-related losses, the authors claim that they, too, were swept 
away by the delusion that house prices would unceasingly rise.837 The authors rightly 
note that the arrangers were typically the ones that were “most closely associated with the 
origination and securitization of mortgages.”838 Rather than using this knowledge to 
ultimately pocket the most money or at least incur the smallest losses among the 
participants in the subprime mortgage market, however, many of these arrangers chose to 
hold onto these securitized subprime-related products and endured incredible losses.839 
Many of the arrangers that resisted the allure of the counterposition of continually rising 
house prices still fell victim to the general bias of common sense because they reluctantly 
entered the subprime market out of a panicked desire to remain competitive. I believe that 
Lonergan would classify this as an instance of the longer cycle of decline: 
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Such is the dialectic of decline. Spontaneously it keeps making things 
ever worse. But reflection gives it the seven devils worse than itself. For 
it gives evil the status of fact. That is the way that things are, the way 
that things are done, the only way that one can live, indeed the way that all 
successful and respectable people live. One can swim against the current 
for a while but sooner or later one gives up.840 
 
I will argue in the section on the two housing GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(Chapter 6) that they, too, succumbed to the counterposition of endlessly rising housing 
prices. As long as home prices were going up, they could continue to perform their 
unsustainable juggling act of balancing the demands of a congressionally chartered 
mission with the fiduciary duty to maximize returns to shareholders with little regard for 
long-term consequences. Though this juggling act was unsustainable in the long-term, it 
was able profitable in the short-term. The insurance giant, AIG, was likewise blinded by 
general bias, as its financial products unit sold far more credit protection on subprime-
related products than it could ever hope to cover, should house prices decline and the 
value of those products drop.  
Jack Guttentag, a Professor Emeritus of Finance at the University of 
Pennsylvania, offers a thesis that resembles the “bubble fever” thesis, which he calls 
“disaster myopia.” In short, the disaster myopia thesis involves “basing mortgage prices 
and underwriting rules on the assumption that because house prices had risen for a long 
period, they would continue to rise.”841 Due to the fact that house prices never declined 
year-after-year nationwide until July of 2006,842 all of the parties involved in the crisis 
were carried away by the belief that those prices would never decline, or at least would 
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not decline in the foreseeable future. Guttentag argues that the subprime lenders were 
especially seduced by this mistaken expectation because they stood to make large sums 
of money in a very short time as long as house prices increased.843 
 It is evident that bubble fever or disaster myopia or general bias infected other 
institutions as well. On July 1, 2005, approximately one year before house prices peaked, 
and six months before he was nominated as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben 
Bernanke had the following exchange with an interviewer on CNBC: 
 Interviewer: Tell me, what is the worst-case scenario? We have so  
many economists coming on our air saying ‘Oh, this is a bubble, and it’s 
going to burst, and this is going to be a real issue for the economy.’  
Some say it could even cause a recession at some point. What is the 
worst-case scenario if in fact we were to see prices come down 
substantially across the country? 
 
 Ben Bernanke: Well, I guess I don’t buy your premise. It’s a pretty 
unlikely possibility. We’ve never had a decline in house prices on a 
nationwide basis. So, what I think is more likely is that house 
prices will slow, maybe stabilize, might slow consumption spending a 
bit. I don’t think it’s going to drive the economy too far from its full 
employment path, though.844 
 
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, ended up acknowledging that 
the Federal Reserve, no less, failed to grasp the magnitude of the housing bubble. 
Greenspan proclaimed, “Given history, we believed that any declines in home prices 
would be gradual.”845 The history that Greenspan was referring to was the stock market 
crash of 1987 and the dot-com crash in the early part of 2000. He noted that since those 
crashes resulted in “only modestly negative economic aftermaths” the Fed ended up 
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being “lulled into a sense of complacency.”846 Able to weather those two storms 
reasonably well, Greenspan asserted that the Fed did not believe that “[d]establizing debt 
problems” would arise due to a housing bubble.847 Indeed, about fourteen months before 
house prices declined, on May 20, 2005, Greenspan publicly professed that he saw no 
sign of a nationwide housing bubble, though he expressed concern over potential pockets 
of “froth” or local housing bubbles.848 In March of 2010, Greenspan conceded, “We all 
misjudged the risks involved. Everybody missed it – academia, the Federal Reserve, all 
regulators.”849 
 In the previous chapter, it was noted that counterpositions are singularly resistant 
to reversals that can be achieved in a single stroke. The counterposition of perpetually 
rising house prices is no exception. Aside from the enormous issue of how this 
counterposition can serve as a basis for engaging in operations that are profitable in the 
short-term,850 it also blends in very well with the American Dream of homeownership.851 
I will argue in chapter six that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resisted regulation of risky, 
though profitable activities by appealing to, among other things, the American Dream.  
The climate of this unreasonable expectation of perpetually rising house prices 
took place during a time in which homeownership in America was flourishing. On June 
20, 2000, the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 
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held a hearing to examine proposals to promote affordable housing. At the time of the 
hearing, 70.7 million Americans owned a home, more than any other time in United 
States history.852 Despite this unprecedented growth, the general tenor of the hearing was 
that much more could be done to make housing more affordable.  
For example, Frank Thompson, testifying on behalf of The National Association 
of Home Builders, noted that certain age groups were well “below their peak 
homeownership rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s.”853 He proceeded to declare, 
“When American families are denied the opportunity to purchase a home, the whole 
nation suffers. Homeownership is the cornerstone of family security, stability, and 
prosperity. It strengthens the nation by encouraging civic participation and involvement 
in schools and communities.”854 Cathy Whatley, testifying on behalf of The National 
Association of Realtors, proclaimed that her organization had a “commitment to assure 
that every American has the opportunity to attain a decent, safe and affordable home.”855 
She went on to argue that this commitment had to be addressed “at the highest level of 
national priorities and must include the complete spectrum of the housing ladder - from 
the homeless to the first-time homebuyer.”856 Homeownership, she maintained, “should 
be viewed as a series or ladder of opportunities - the first few rungs represented as steps 
through rental housing, the middle rungs representing first-time homebuyers, and the 
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upper rungs symbolic of repeat homebuyers.”857 What should be ensured is that “every 
citizen has the opportunity to enter the housing arena.”858 The overall message of the 
hearing in June of 2000 was clear: even with an all-time high percentage of 
homeownership in America, more resources and ingenuity should be devoted to enabling 
more Americans to become homeowners. Retrospectively, one can view this hearing as a 
harbinger of the impending housing bubble. 
Another counterposition that was initially comfortable with the one that clung to 
endlessly rising house prices was that the subprime mortgage crisis, once it began to 
unfold, would not be severe. A few months after house prices dropped in July of 2006, 
the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs held a 
hearing on “The Housing Bubble and Its Implications for the Economy.” David Seiders, 
Chief Economist for the National Association of Home Builders, testified that the 
“downswing in home sales and housing production should bottom out around the middle 
of next year [2007] before transitioning to a gradual recovery that will raise housing 
market activity back up toward sustainable trend by the latter part of 2008.”859  
One week later, in front of the same Senate committee, the Chairman of the 
Mortgage Bankers Association, Robert Broeksmit, claimed that the mortgage market’s 
success at making subprime mortgages widely available to borrowers was a “positive 
development, [and] not a cause for alarm.”860 He assured the committee that these 
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mortgages were “being effectively underwritten and managed” by subprime lenders.861 In 
the face of rising subprime defaults and delinquencies, he emphasized that “the private 
market can and does correct for excess risk more quickly than… a regulator who 
necessarily must move at a more deliberate pace.”862 Incredibly, Broeksmit stated that 
“market signals have already addressed many of the concerns” that the Federal Reserve 
and other federal financial regulators raised in their “Proposed Guidance on 
Nontraditional Mortgage Products,” unveiled in December of 2005.863  
As subprime borrower defaults and delinquencies surged and subprime lenders 
began to fail in early 2007, most notably New Century in March of that year, the 
Chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association, John M. Robbins, publicly stated, “For 
years, we have been calling for legislation to create a tough national standard to protect 
consumers against predatory lending.”864 With an influx of “heartbreaking stories of 
people losing their homes,” Robbins noted that the temptation might be to “have more 
regulations” and to “have more laws.”865 The difficulty, from his perspective, was that 
“regulatory or legislative over-reaction” could make mortgage lenders too conservative 
and force “first time low to moderate income borrowers” out of the market.866 The simple 
fact, Robbins stated, was that there remained “a real need for subprime loans.”867 The 
basis of this need stemmed from the fact that the country had not yet reached “the correct 
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homeownership rate,” which could only be achieved “when every borrower who is 
creditworthy throughout the entire risk spectrum has access to credit to buy a house.”868 
Besides, Robbins argued, only “one quarter of one percent [of subprime borrowers] will 
ultimately face foreclosure.”869 The disturbances in the subprime mortgage market were 
not, according to Robbins, macro-economic events. As such, Robbins categorically 
denied that any “seismic financial occurrence” would “overwhelm the U.S. economy.”870 
Five days before this speech, on May 17, 2007, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke spoke at The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition. After acknowledging the likelihood of more subprime 
delinquencies and defaults due to impending interest rate resets, Bernanke affirmed that 
“fundamental factors” were still in place that should continue to support the demand for 
housing.871 One of these factors was that the “vast majority of mortgages, including 
subprime mortgages, continue to perform well.”872 Speaking on behalf of the Fed, 
Bernanke concluded, “[W]e believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector on 
the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant 
spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial 
system.”873 
In sum, general bias afflicted many of the major players in the subprime mortgage 
market leading up to the crisis. Adhering to the counterposition of endlessly rising 
housing prices likely distorted these players’ deliberation efforts, ranging from whether 
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one should make a 20% home down payment to whether one should invest in subprime-
related instruments. Clinging to that counterposition also probably undermined different 
individuals’ judgments of fact, most notably judgments centering on the probability and 
severity of an impending crisis. 
 
2.3. An Introduction to How Group Bias Was Operative Before and During the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
In addition to chronicling how general bias dominated the orientation of central 
players in the subprime mortgage crisis, one should also note that group bias was 
prevalent as well. In the chapters that follow, I will explore five broad relationships 
between parties that were characterized by group bias. These relationships are illustrated 
in Figure 2.  
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With respect to group bias, I will discuss in chapter three how the majority of 
large subprime mortgage lenders “captured” their federal regulators,874 which resulted in 
lax or negligent lending regulations. I will show that these regulations, most notably the 
federal preemption of individual state consumer protection laws, were desirable to the 
lenders, but inimical to the good of order. These federal deregulation efforts enabled 
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lenders to pump hundreds of billions of dollars of toxic mortgages into the financial 
system. A regulatory race to the bottom took place among regulators of subprime lenders, 
one that had its basis in the fact that lenders paid the regulators to be chartered by them. 
Those regulators whose oversight was the lightest were the ones who stood to gain the 
most in lender-paid fees. 
In chapter four, I will explore how the five largest arrangers875 were part of three 
different relationships that were stamped with group bias: one with the lenders, a second 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and a third with the credit rating agencies. 
In the first relationship, arrangers either purchased subprime lenders of their own to 
acquire subprime mortgages or otherwise financed and purchased subprime mortgages 
from lenders.  Incentives were in place for subprime lenders to adopt irresponsible 
lending practices since arrangers placed emphasis on volume and not quality. In the 
section on Morgan Stanley, I will probe this arranger’s relationship with New Century 
Financial, a subprime lender. The second instance of group bias that will be discussed in 
this chapter is the arrangers’ relationship with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). After heavy lobbying from those five arrangers, the SEC adopted the Alternative 
New Capital Rule in 2004, which enabled the arrangers to go on a leverage binge, 
borrowing anywhere from $28 to $35 for every $1 in capital that they held. With this 
borrowed money, the arrangers were in a better position to purchase incredible amounts 
of subprime mortgages to securitize and sell to investors. 
In chapter five, I will look at how the arrangers were part of a third relationship 
that was marked by group bias: their relationship with the credit rating agencies. In this 
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section, I will argue that the three largest credit rating agencies876 were confronted by an 
arranger demand for triple-A-ratings. In an interesting, though problematic twist, the 
primary users of credit ratings, the investors, do not compensate the credit rating agencies 
for their service. Instead, it is the arrangers who pay the credit rating agencies to produce 
their ratings. The credit rating agencies, therefore, were confronted by a dilemma in the 
early 2000’s. Since the arrangers wanted their products to be triple-A-rated, and the credit 
rating agencies were compensated by the arrangers, rating subprime-related products 
lower than triple-A would be tantamount to biting the hands that fed them. Arrangers 
were also able to “shop” for ratings, browsing to see which of the credit rating agencies 
would give the highest rating to their products. Similar to the regulatory race to the 
bottom that characterized the relationship between federal regulators and subprime 
lenders, I will argue that the three largest credit rating agencies competed in a ratings race 
to the bottom: those credit rating agencies that produced the highest, though unjustified, 
ratings stood to make the most money. 
In chapter six, I will argue that the two housing Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also had a relationship with Congress 
that was stained with group bias. Once extraordinarily profitable institutions, in the early 
2000’s Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac progressively ventured into purchasing subprime 
mortgages, as opposed to those of the conforming variety. Congress, which had the 
authority to specify what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could and could not do, was 
hampered in its oversight by a sizable portion of elected members who opposed GSE 
regulation in any form. In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac launched offensive and 
defensive mechanisms to ensure that their risky operations could proceed unfettered. 
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Examples of these activities include advertising campaigns, campaign contributions, and 
lobbying expenditures. One of the most graphic demonstrations of a breakdown in the 
good order in this study is the spectacular collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
which culminated in their being placed into conservatorship in September of 2008. 
 
2.4. How the Invariant Structure of the Human Good Factors into This Study 
 Each party of the financial crisis that will be examined in the following chapters is 
responsible for providing at least two simultaneous particular goods. One of these 
particular goods was profits,877 which, if the institution was a publicly traded company, 
benefited that institution’s shareholders as well as the institution itself. Most of the 
institutions examined in this study were or still are publicly traded companies. In chapter 
three, the majority of the lenders that will be examined in detail, such as Washington 
Mutual, Countrywide, and New Century Financial, were publicly traded companies. 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns, the 
arrangers discussed in chapter four, were all publicly traded companies – with Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley still retaining that status. Of the three largest credit rating 
agencies examined in chapter five, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (whose parent 
company is The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.) are publicly traded companies. Finally, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the focus of chapter six, were also publicly traded 
companies. 
 In the chapters that follow, I will show how these parties were also responsible for 
providing at least one other sort of institutional good, in addition to profits. Lenders 
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originated and frequently financed mortgage loans for qualified borrowers. The arrangers 
purchased mortgage loans from lenders, which helped refresh the lenders’ available pool 
of funds to lend to borrowers. Another institutional good that arrangers provided was the 
creation of investment vehicles for investors. The credit rating agencies were responsible 
for providing the investment community with accurate, reliable credit risk assessments. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, meanwhile, were entrusted by Congress to create a stable 
and liquid secondary mortgage market, as well as to make homeownership more 
affordable.878  
 The good of order involves providing these particular goods, not once or twice, 
but in a recurrent fashion. Institutional roles are assumed, tasks are carried out, 
technology is utilized, and an incredible amount of intelligence and energy is exerted to 
meet this end. What happens, though, if certain conditions pit an institution’s own 
particular goods against one another? For example, what if the eligible pool of qualified 
borrowers – or even marginally risky borrowers – begins to shrink? Should employees 
working within lending institutions haphazardly qualify more undeserved borrowers for 
mortgages in the interest of bonuses, job security, or company profitability? If arrangers 
recognize that part of the responsibility of providing investment instruments to investors 
requires that they hire due diligence firms to scrutinize the quality of the collateral 
backing those instruments (the mortgage loans purchased from lenders), should they pay 
those firms to perform appropriate reviews, even though that course of action will reduce 
their profits? Faced with a potential drop in profitability, should the credit rating agencies 
refuse to rate certain securities, such as subprime collateralized debt obligations, because 
they do not have enough experience and historical data to accurately assess the credit risk 
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of those products? As for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, should they sacrifice the 
institutional good of providing a stable secondary mortgage market in order to generate 
the suddenly opposing institutional good of maximizing returns to shareholders?  
 These are examples of questions of value that individuals working within 
institutions may or may not have faced. Whatever questions of value those individuals 
encountered leading up to and during the subprime mortgage crisis, the quality of their 
eventual answers – their judgments and decisions – depended upon the possession of a 
storehouse of accurate concrete judgments of fact (reflective insights) and reasonable, 
possible courses of action (practical insights). The quality of their judgments and 
decisions was also dependent upon their individual orientations. To what extent were 
their horizons limited to the subjectively satisfying (the immediately profitable) and 
dissatisfying (the immediately unprofitable), or open to the full scale of values? Adequate 
answers to questions of value cannot be satisfactorily answered solely by considering the 
magnitude of instances of the particular good, for these goods can conflict, their duration 
can be short-lived, and their very existence can be contrary to the evaluations by morally 
converted subjects who adhere to the scale of values. 
 Writ large, this study will demonstrate that the subprime mortgage crisis was 
really about a partial, albeit serious, breakdown of the good of order. What accounted for 
this breakdown was the gradual and steady accumulation of biased decisions. Rising 
house prices successfully masked any tensions between particular and institutional goods 
that were being produced. With house prices rising indefinitely, the different parties in 
the crisis that are considered in this study only needed to discern how to provide more of 
one sort of good in order to realize more of the other: profit. For lenders, the more 
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subprime loans they originated, the more money they stood to make via the arrangers. 
The more loans that arrangers purchased from lenders, securitized, and sold to investors, 
the more impressive the profits they and their shareholders stood to gain. Since the three 
largest credit rating agencies were monetarily compensated by volume, they stood to 
make the most money by rating as many subprime securities as they could. By way of 
wading further and further into the business of purchasing and securitizing subprime 
mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac satisfied both Congress and their shareholders. 
If providing certain particular or institutional goods happens to be making money for an 
institution, the general bias of common sense warranted doing so – even though a broader 
intellectual and value perspective would judge this procedure to be indiscriminate and 
careless. 
 Profitability and the fluid flow of other particular goods during this period of 
rising house prices also concealed the deteriorating good of order. The particular goods 
that were not for profit became progressively misleading and destructive. Borrowers were 
steered into inappropriate and unaffordable mortgages. Lenders misrepresented borrower 
loan applications and steered borrowers towards pernicious mortgage loans. Arrangers 
created investment instruments of dubious quality. The three largest credit rating agencies 
grossly over-inflated their ratings of subprime-related securities. Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac sabotaged much of the secondary mortgage market. In a word, once house prices 
dropped and the subprime mortgage crisis reached its crescendo, the operations of these 
institutions seldom functioned as valid forms of cooperation. 
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2.5. A Preliminary Concern: What is the Definition of “Subprime”? 
By now the reader may have wondered what the term “subprime” or “subprime 
mortgage” means. A mortgage is “a loan secured by the collateral of some specified real 
estate property, which obliges the borrower to make a predetermined series of 
payments.”879 Subprime mortgages, as defined by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke in a presentation that he made at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd 
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, are “loans made to borrowers 
who are perceived to have high credit risk, either because they lack a strong credit history 
or have other characteristics that are associated with high probabilities of default.”880 
Here, Bernanke defines subprime loans in terms of borrower characteristics. Another way 
of defining subprime loans would be to examine the features of the loans themselves, 
such as the amount of the loans or the modes of their repayment.  
One of the more disconcerting aspects of the subprime mortgage crisis is that 
there was never an adequate, federally accepted definition of the term “subprime.” To 
enter an investigation of the importance of this difficulty, consider a March 30, 2004 
hearing held by two subcommittees881 in the United States House of Representatives. The 
hearing was titled “Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and its Customers.” At the 
beginning of the hearing, Congressman Robert Ney explained that the purpose of the 
hearing was to “look at the subprime lending market in the United States,”882 because 
                                                 
879 The Handbook of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Ed. Frank J. Fabozzi. (Chicago: Probus, 1995), 9. 
880 Ben S. Bernanke, “Speech At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois,” (May 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm. 
881 The House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, and the House Subcommittee 
on Housing and Community Opportunity. 
882 United States House of Representatives’ Subcommittees on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 
and Housing and Community Opportunity, “Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and its Customers,” 
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during the previous decade “the number of people receiving subprime loans increase[d] 
dramatically.”883 Congressman Ney admitted that the subcommittees did not know 
whether it was primarily a matter of consumers “who had previously not been eligible for 
credit… now getting access to the mortgage market,” or if consumers were now simply 
“paying more for credit.”884 In other words, what was unclear was the extent to which the 
prodigious growth of the subprime mortgage market in the 1990’s was either positive or 
deleterious.  
 Congressman Spencer Bachus echoed this concern, noting further that there was a 
confusion between the terms “predatory lending and subprime lending.”885 Subprime 
lending, according to Congressman Bachus, “is a very legitimate form of financing for 
housing, home improvements, [and] things of that nature” that has enabled many 
Americans to own their own home.886 He argued that subprime lending “is a good thing if 
it is not accompanied by abusive lending practices,”887 but that “Congress first has to 
understand the subprime marketplace” in order to enact effective legislation.888 
 Comments made by two other members of the subcommittees are worth 
mentioning. Congressman Rubén Hinojosa, after revealing that subprime lending 
legislation was an issue of “particular concern” to him, stated that “subprime lending has 
yet to be defined and some claim that it is impossible to define.”889 Congressman 
Hinojosa went on to affirm, “If that is the case, then I wonder if we are chasing our tails 
                                                                                                                                                 
(March 30, 2004), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba94689.000/hba94689_0f.htm, 2. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid. 
885 Ibid., 4. 
886 Ibid. 
887 Ibid. 
888 Ibid. 
889 Ibid., 16. 
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here today. Perhaps we should wait until it is defined.”890 Similarly, Congressman Jeb 
Hensarling expressed dismay over the fact that, in attempting to forge legislation 
pertaining to “the issue of subprime lending and [its] evil cousin predatory lending,” there 
was not “an acceptable definition of what constitutes predatory lending.”891 Congressman 
Hensarling reasonably suggested that “it is going to be very difficult to legislate against 
something that we are having a little trouble defining in the first place.”892 What these 
comments suggest is that as early as 2004, prior to the eruption of the subprime mortgage 
crisis, at least some members of Congress recognized that an established, federally-
approved definition of the term “subprime” was needed in order to understand the nature 
and risks posed by the subprime mortgage market.   
 Over four years before that joint hearing, The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) published a report in September of 1999 that called attention to this 
problem: 
 There is no general agreement on the definition of the subprime market.  
          A narrow definition of subprime lending would include only loans  
 originated for borrowers with blemished credit histories. Even this 
 narrow definition, however, has operational problems because lenders 
   often disagree [over] what constitutes a blemished credit history.893 
 
In other words, if one’s definition of the term “subprime” only includes borrower 
characteristics, then each mortgage lender would have at least a certain amount of 
freedom to determine what qualifies a given borrower as one with a blemished credit 
history and what does not. For instance, one lender could label a mortgage loan subprime 
                                                 
890 Ibid. 
891 Ibid., 60. 
892 Ibid. 
893 Randall M. Scheessele, “1998 HMDA Highlights,” Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Office of Policy Development and Research, (September 1999), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/wp_009.pdf, 5.  
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when a borrower has a FICO score of, say, 660 or less and the borrower is unable to 
completely document his or her past income over a given period of time. Another lender 
may find it advantageous to label a mortgage loan subprime if the borrower is unable to 
provide a 20% down-payment on the house, does not have private mortgage insurance, 
and has a FICO score of 650 or less. The important point is that a definition of subprime 
that only incorporates the characteristics of the borrower is one that is bound to lead to 
operational problems because the multitude of mortgage lenders will determine, at least 
to some extent, the sort of borrowers who are fit for a subprime mortgage.  
One researcher estimated that there were over 20,000 lenders in the United States 
that were originating subprime loans in 1997, which, in theory, could have given rise to 
an incredible variety of interpretations of what constitutes a subprime mortgage, 
borrower, or lender.894 The aforementioned 1999 HUD report identified approximately 
200 lenders that were specializing in subprime and niche lending that year.895 As a March 
9, 2004 report published by Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies makes 
clear, the considerable variation in “the definition of what constitutes ‘a subprime 
mortgage’ hinders precise measurement.”896 Not only does a lack of an authoritative 
definition of the term “subprime” preclude one from knowing exactly how many 
subprime mortgages have been originated, one will also not have a firm grasp of what a 
subprime mortgage, borrower, or lender is. 
                                                 
894 Lew Sichelman, “Bloom Off the Rose on B&C?,” National Mortgage News (March 31, 1997). 
895 Randall M. Scheessele, “1998 HMDA Highlights,” 1.  
896 Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, “Credit, Capital, and Communities: The 
Implications of the Changing Mortgage Banking Industry for Community Based Organizations,” (March 9, 
2004), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/communitydevelopment/ccc04-1.pdf,  
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Particularly revealing is an interagency statement issued by the five most 
important regulators of the United States mortgage market in March of 2007.897 As the 
grave risks posed to the economy by subprime mortgages became more and more evident 
in early 2007, the five regulators released a publication titled, “Proposed Statement on 
Subprime Mortgage Lending.” In this statement, the regulators assert, in a footnote, that 
they defined the term “subprime” in 2001 in a previous publication called “Expanded 
Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs.”898 The regulators expressed concern in the 
2007 statement about a number of issues surrounding subprime mortgages, including (1) 
the lack of understanding on the part of subprime borrowers concerning the risks and 
consequences embedded in the terms of their mortgages, (2) predatory lending issues, (3) 
subprime mortgage underwriting standards, and (4) principles designed to protect 
potential subprime borrowers.899 As regards the crucial character of the subprime 
mortgage market, precisely how the regulators defined “subprime” in their 2001 
publication is critically important. 
Turning to the regulators’ 2001 report, “Expanded Guidance for Subprime 
Lending,”900 the definition of the term “subprime” occurs on the first page: “The term 
‘subprime’ refers to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers.”901 The regulators 
                                                 
897 These regulators are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), and the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). 
898 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union 
Administration, “Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending,” (March 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20070302a1.pdf, 6. 
899 Ibid., 6-8. 
900 Only four of the five regulators published this report. The National Credit Union Administration is not 
listed as a contributor. 
901 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, “Expanded Guidance for 
Subprime Lending Programs,” (January 31, 2001), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/2001/20010131/attachment.pdf, 2. 
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proceed to list several of these credit characteristics and then note that the “list is 
illustrative rather than exhaustive and is not meant to define specific parameters for all 
subprime borrowers.”902 Furthermore, the regulators note that their definition of 
“subprime” may not “match all market or institution specific subprime definitions, but 
should be viewed as a starting point from which the Agencies will expand examination 
efforts.”903 
It is astounding that the regulators’ definition of the term “subprime” in their 2001 
statement, which was intended to serve as a mere “starting point” for their examination of 
the subprime market, did not evolve over the course of six years, as the subprime market 
itself dramatically grew in size and complexity. Although the regulators acknowledged 
the limitations of their definition in 2001, underscoring how it is confined to borrower 
characteristics, such limitations could lead to discrepancies between their conception of a 
subprime mortgage, lender, or borrower, and that of subprime lending institutions. In 
other words, the regulators were aware of the same deficiencies in their 2001 definition 
of subprime that the HUD identified in 1999: the definition is too narrow and invites 
uncontrolled variations in what constitutes a subprime mortgage, borrower, or lender and 
what does not. Unsurprisingly, when the regulators requested comments on all aspects of 
the 2007 proposed statement from the general public, one of the key criticisms of the 
statement was that there was needed a clarification of “the scope of the proposed 
statement and the definition of ‘subprime.’”904 Indeed, how can one understand the scope 
                                                 
902 Ibid., 3. 
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904 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union 
Administration, “Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending,” (June 29, 2007), available at 
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of subprime lending (or borrowing, for that matter) if one does not have a firm grasp of 
what is meant by “subprime”? 
In perhaps recognizing that the term “subprime” persisted in having amorphous 
boundaries all the way up through 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
opted to use the term “nonprime” in their report titled “Characteristics and Performance 
of Nonprime Mortgages” released that year. In an effort to make a distinction between 
two sorts of nonprime mortgages - subprime and Alt-A - the GAO resorted to speaking in 
general terms about both kinds of mortgages, conceding that the categories are “not 
rigidly defined.”905 
The ambiguity of the term “subprime” and the difficulties that accompany it were 
conspicuously evident in an April 2010 report published by one of the most important 
regulators of mortgage lenders in the United States, The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). In this report, the OCC attempts to identify the extent to which different 
types of lending institutions were involved in subprime lending “during the period 
preceding the financial crisis.”906 In respect of the seriousness of the financial crisis, this 
was an investigation of paramount importance. Yet one should note the OCC’s caveat on 
the very first page of the report. After affirming that the number of subprime loans 
originated by national banks “was small relative to the total subprime market,” the OCC 
admits that “analyses by others have reached conflicting conclusions, finding 
                                                 
905 Government Accountability Office, “Characteristics and Performance of Nonprime Mortgages,” (July 
28, 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09848r.pdf, 1. 
906 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Appendix B: Activities of National Banks Related to 
Subprime Lending,” (April 14, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
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significantly higher percentages of overall subprime mortgage lending [by national 
banks].”907 Moreover, the OCC alarmingly declares: 
 To some extent the existence of conflicting [subprime lending] estimates 
 is not surprising. Developing precise estimates of subprime lending 
 activity is difficult because comprehensive data for the market simply 
 do not exist, from either private or public sources. Statements about 
 subprime activity also suffer from lack of agreement at a more basic 
 level regarding how to define “subprime” or other variants of nonprime 
 mortgage loans.908 
 
The fact that there was not an official federally recognized definition of the term 
“subprime” more than a year after the subprime crisis began to unfold is distressing. To 
my knowledge, such a definition still does not exist. How can the OCC ensure “a safe and 
sound national banking system for all Americans,”909 when one of the most serious 
threats to that system’s safety and soundness was not – and is still yet to be – defined in a 
meaningful way? The same concern applies to the other regulators of our financial 
system and it should serve as a backdrop for any discussion that includes subprime 
lenders, brokers, borrowers, or investors. 
 Over the course of my research on the subprime mortgage crisis, I have 
encountered significant variations in the usage of the term “subprime.” In some instances, 
the author or authors using the term offered definitions of it, while in other cases they did 
not. In this study, I will present, or at least cite where one can find, a given source’s 
definition of subprime on those occasions when a definition was offered. Regrettably, 
though unavoidably, my usage of the term subprime will, over the course of this 
dissertation, vary according to how the term is used by the sources to which I refer. 
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909 This slogan is taken from the OCC’s official website, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov. 
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2.6. Historical and General Background Information on the Mortgage Industry 
 
We have to make a key distinction between the primary market and the secondary 
market in order to understand the subprime mortgage crisis. The primary mortgage 
market is one in which lenders originate loans that are typically financed by depositors 
and then distribute these loans to borrowers. In this market, the lenders ordinarily hold on 
to these loans and use the payments made by the borrowers to pay out interest to its 
depositors as well as enable them to withdraw their money at some predetermined period. 
Lenders make a profit in the primary mortgage market by charging borrowers a higher 
interest rate on their home loans than the interest rate that they offer depositors to put 
their money in savings accounts. Up until the late 1980’s to early 1990’s, the American 
mortgage market was largely a primary one, dominated by the thrift industry. The major 
players in this market were thrifts (lenders), borrowers, depositors (who financed the 
mortgage loans), appraisers (who assessed the value of the real estate desired by the 
borrower), and the Federal Reserve System (the system which determined the market 
interest rates). 
 Recurrent problems in the primary mortgage market, which came to a head in the 
Savings and Loan Crisis of the mid-to-late 1980’s, created certain conditions for the 
emergence of a solid secondary mortgage market, in which lenders not only made loans 
to borrowers, but they also sold them to interested buyers. Strictly speaking, the 
secondary market had existed for several decades prior to the early-to-mid 1990’s, as 
thrifts could sell loans to other thrifts as needed, or federally chartered thrifts could sell 
their loans to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae) as long as the 
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loans conformed to Fannie Mae’s standards.910 Nevertheless, the primary mortgage 
market prevailed throughout the twentieth century up until the early 1990’s. 
 As complicated as the primary mortgage market both was and still is, the 
secondary mortgage market adds innumerable further complexities. To be sure, the rise of 
the secondary mortgage market centered on what was perceived to be a desirable transfer 
of risk because of increased efficiency and the influx of extra liquidity. Lenders could 
now sell the loans that they originated to buyers who were looking to invest their money 
in reliable assets. From 1968 through 2006, the median price of houses never fell on a 
year over year basis, which made real estate an attractive investment opportunity. As 
opposed to having depositors place money into interest-bearing savings accounts and 
using that money to finance mortgage loans, it seemed reasonable to allow interested 
investors to somehow put their money directly or indirectly into financing those loans. 
Those who were, in theory, better suited to handle the risks involved in investing in 
mortgage loans would be the ones who would finance the loans. It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that the shift to the secondary mortgage market in the mid-1990’s 
arose because of the assumption that investors could probably manage risk better than 
unsuspecting depositors. As I will show in a moment, the main reason that the secondary 
market exploded after the Savings and Loan Crisis was because of the desperate need for 
liquidity. It is fascinating that the extra step of buying and selling mortgages on the 
secondary market has resulted in the creation of an extraordinarily large and elaborate 
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industry, one whose success, as in all industries, is contingent upon the proper 
functioning of its participants.  
One final note before I begin to map out some of the historical highpoints of the 
mortgage industry in twentieth century America. An additional benefit of the secondary 
market is that it made home mortgages available to more people. Within the primary 
mortgage market, a risky borrower was, generally speaking, denied access to home 
financing, since a failure to repay the loan would disrupt a thrift’s ability to pay interest 
on and return to its customers’ deposits. As mentioned before, the secondary mortgage 
market gave riskier investors the opportunity to invest in riskier products – and these 
products happened to be the loans of riskier borrowers. Riskier borrowers were charged a 
higher interest rate to borrow money, which, from the point of view of investors, opened 
up the possibility for larger returns on investments, assuming that the borrowers repaid 
their debt. The benefits of the secondary market were clear enough: two sets of demands 
would be more adequately met by two sets of supply. Matched with the demand of 
borrowers to have access to home loans was the supply of money provided by investors. 
Similarly, the demand of investors for a seemingly reliable and rich source of potential 
profit was met by a diverse supply of borrowers with varying degrees of risk, who were 
seeking to take out more expensive loans in order to share in the American Dream of 
homeownership.  
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2.7. Historical Preconditions for the Emergence of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 
and the Crisis That General Bias Forgot: The Savings and Loan Crisis 
 
Up until the late 1980’s, thrifts were the clear leaders in mortgage loan 
originations. Thrifts earned their name from their traditional emphasis on savings 
accounts for small depositors. Thrifty customers would make routine savings deposits 
and receive interest on them in exchange for agreeing to only withdraw the money after 
certain specified periods. In turn, the thrift would pool the deposits together and distribute 
home loans to its customers when possible. By lending at a higher interest rate than what 
was to be paid in interest to their depositors, thrifts were able to make a profit. The 
primary task of a thrift was to efficiently bring together people who had extra money with 
those who wanted to borrow.911 
 The American homeownership rate from 1890 to 1930 ranged from 45.6% to 
47.8%, but largely due to the Great Depression, the homeownership rate dropped to 
43.6% by 1940.912 During the Great Depression, over 1,700 thrifts failed, while thrift 
customers lost over $200 million in deposits.913 Aside from causing Americans to lose 
confidence in the thrift industry, its collapse also radically reduced the amount of money 
available to finance home loans. In a remarkable series of decisions, Republican 
President Herbert Hoover and Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt successfully 
worked with Congress to pass three striking pieces of legislation, all with the aim of 
aiding the thrifts to promote homeownership.  
 The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 created a system of twelve regional 
Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB’s) that were permitted to borrow money at low 
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government rates in order to lend it to thrifts at below-market rates.914 The idea was that 
since the thrifts could now pay less to borrow money, they could pay higher interest to 
their depositors. The prospect of higher returns gave depositors an incentive to return to 
the thrifts, which enabled the thrifts to once again use those deposits to finance home 
loans. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act also created the Washington-based Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board for the purposes of overseeing the twelve regional FHLB’s.  
 The second crucial piece of legislation that aimed to reinvigorate American home 
ownership during the 1930’s was the National Housing Act of 1934, which created both 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA). The FSLIC was designed to “provide a deposit insurance system 
for thrifts,” insuring a maximum amount of $5,000 per account.915 By insuring deposits, 
thrifts were able to win back the confidence of depositors and ultimately raise more 
money to finance home loans. The FHA, on the other hand, provided mortgage insurance 
to under-qualified borrowers in an effort to make homeownership more available to a 
larger proportion of the population. In particular, the FHA targeted borrowers who did 
not have enough savings to make the typically required 20% down payment on a house. 
Thrifts were given the incentive to loan to under-qualified borrowers based upon the 
understanding that if any borrower did not pay back his or her loan, the FHA would pay 
back the remaining balance.916 One astute thrift executive at the time discerned the 
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potential for what is now known as moral hazard: when less liabilities are present (in this 
case due to the insurance), there is greater potential for an increase in risky behaviors.917 
  Despite the government’s efforts to make homeownership more available to more 
Americans, the FHA-backed loans in the mid-1930’s were not as popular as they were 
initially expected to be. As a result, in 1938, Roosevelt and Congress worked together to 
create a “quasi-government company” called the Federal National Mortgage Corporation, 
commonly referred to as Fannie Mae. Thrifts or other sorts of lenders that were 
previously reluctant to originate FHA-backed loans were reassured that Fannie Mae 
would agree to buy those loans from them, which provided the originating lender with 
fresh cash to make more FHA-backed loans.918 Thrifts, for the most part, resisted making 
FHA-backed loans, however, and elected instead to finance loans the traditional way: by 
attracting depositors to put their money into interest-bearing savings accounts and 
pooling together those deposits to finance home loans. For present purposes, the 
important point is that the United States government clearly valued the ideal of 
widespread homeownership. 
 By 1945, the number of thrifts fell from a peak of 12,500 to about 6,700.919 
Shortly thereafter, however, there was a remarkable veteran-driven housing boom that 
lasted until about 1965. The thrift industry flourished during this period, with their assets 
doubling every five years.920 “3-6-3” was how the industry was described, meaning that 
thrifts “could take in money at 3 percent interest on deposits; they could lend it out at 6 
percent interest in mortgage loans; and thrift executives could be on the golf course by 
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3:00 in the afternoon.”921 One noteworthy development during this period was the 
creation of the fixed-rated 30 year mortgage. By spacing out predictable and affordable 
payments, millions of Americans were suddenly able to afford homes.922 Over 15 million 
homes were built in the 1950’s, more than twice the amount built in the 1940’s and over 
five times the amount built in the 1930’s. With the economy expanding and incomes 
rising, the American homeownership rate leaped to over 60% by 1965.923 
 As the United States became involved in the Vietnam War in 1965, however, 
government spending increased, which led to a subsequent rise in market interest rates. 
From September of 1964 to September of 1966, the interest rates on three month 
Treasury Bills jumped from 3.53% to 5.36%.924 This increase in market interest rates 
placed many thrifts in a difficult situation. In the previous two decades, low market 
interest rates enabled thrifts to make a reliable profit by consistently offering home loans 
at a higher interest rate than the one that they gave their customers on their savings 
deposits. As the monthly mortgage payments arrived, the interest earned on the principal 
of those loans would be more than the interest paid out on deposits. Now, however, with 
market interest rates rising, thrifts were compelled to raise the interest rates that they 
offered on savings deposits, for if they refused to do so, they would lose customers to 
competing investments, such as higher-yielding Treasury Bills. If they lost customers to 
competing investments, their ability to finance new mortgages would be severely 
crippled. Of course, thrifts could attempt to sell their mortgage loans, which had suddenly 
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become less profitable, but they would have likely had to sell them at a loss.925 This turn 
of events beginning in 1965 exposed a serious flaw in the thrift industry: namely, that 
thrifts borrow money from depositors for the short-term, but they loan that money to 
borrowers for long periods of time.926 Volatile market conditions can make such an 
approach to borrowing and lending profitable when market interest rates are low, but 
when market interest rates are high, this approach is unsustainable.  
 The thrift crisis in 1965-1966 came to be known as the Disintermediation 
Crisis.927 Disintermediation is the process by which depositing institutions, like thrifts, 
lose funds to higher-yielding investments.928 It was viewed as a crisis because not only 
did thrifts have money tied up in older, long-term, low-rate mortgages, they also 
struggled to maintain any incoming cash flow to finance new mortgages. Another issue of 
concern was that thrifts might recklessly raise the interest rates that they would pay on 
deposits with the hope of continuing to finance new home loans at even higher interest 
rates. Should a thrift who adopted such a strategy be unable to overcome the losses of the 
older mortgages and begin to fail, the American population, it was thought, could 
potentially lose confidence in the thrift industry once again, resulting in rampant 
withdraws that the thrifts could not cover. 
 Anticipating such a danger, Congress passed the Interest Rate Control Act (IRCA) 
in September of 1966. The IRCA included Regulation Q, which placed ceilings on the 
interest rates that thrifts could pay on deposits.929 From September of 1966 to December 
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of 1969, the interest rate ceiling that thrifts could pay on deposits was 4.75%; from 
January of 1970 to June 1973, the ceiling was 5.00%; from July of 1973 to June of 1979, 
the ceiling was 5.25%.930 Year over year, the interest rate ceiling on thrift deposits only 
exceeded that of three month Treasury Bills four times, which did not create a strong 
incentive for Americans to deposit their money in thrifts. In an effort to dissuade 
Americans from investing their money in the frequently more profitable Treasury Bills, 
Congress raised the minimum denomination of Treasury Bills from $1,000 to $10,000 in 
1970.931 Since the average deposit in a thrift at this time was $3,045, many Americans 
were unable to invest in the higher rate Treasury Bills and had to resort to depositing their 
money in lower-yielding thrift savings accounts. As Lawrence White notes, Congress’ 
efforts in the mid-to-late 1960’s and well into the 1970’s only served as a “patch” that 
“delayed the day of reckoning for the thrift industry.”932 The tension between borrowing 
short and lending long was not resolved during this period. 
 The drastic increase in market interest rates in the late 1970’s coupled with the 
development of money market mutual funds proved to be devastating changes to the 
thrift industry. In January of 1978, the market interest rate was 6.49%, with thrifts paying 
out 5.25% on deposits. By January of 1981, the market interest rate had risen to an 
astounding 14.72%.933 These conditions gave Americans the incentive to pull their 
money out of the thrifts and invest instead in money market mutual funds, which pooled 
together the moneys of many investors and placed them in, among other things, Treasury 
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Bills.934 Money market mutual funds effectively gave Americans the opportunity to 
invest their money in ways that were previously unavailable to them due to high deposit 
minimums. In 1977, money market mutual funds held only $3 billion, but by 1982 they 
held $233 billion.935 The thrift industry lost approximately $6.9 billion in 1981 and $22.2 
billion in 1982.936 It was the beginning of the Savings and Loan Crisis, which lasted well 
into the middle to the end of the 1980’s. 
 Congress, along with Presidents Carter and Reagan, attempted to avoid the 
impending crisis by passing two pieces of legislation: The Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 (signed by Carter) and The 
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (signed by Reagan). Of the many 
changes that these acts brought about, only four will be considered here. First, thrifts 
were allowed to offer Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) to their customers,937 with no 
loan-to-value ratio limits on them. It is important to note that the government initially 
viewed ARMs as being desirable because of their perceived ability to be more lender-
friendly, as opposed to borrower-friendly. ARMs shift the risk of market interest rate 
changes away from the lender and place it on the borrower. From the lender’s 
perspective, ARMs evade the problem of being locked into low-rate, long-term 
mortgages when market interest rates rise. Offering these loans at 100% home financing, 
however, increased the probability of borrowers failing to repay the entire loan plus 
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interest. Surprisingly, heightened regulation such as the need for “better information, 
higher scrutiny, and higher net worth standards” did not accompany the increased risk.938 
 The second change that these acts brought about was that they permitted thrifts to 
offer products that were traditionally reserved for commercial banks, such as credit cards 
and loans for automobiles.939 This change ended up blurring the previously clear-cut 
distinction between thrifts and commercial banks that had persisted throughout the late 
19th century and the majority of the 20th century. Third, an increase in deposit insurance 
was authorized for a maximum amount of up to $100,000 per savings account. Finally, 
Regulation Q, which was implemented by the IRCA in 1966, was abolished. Regulation 
Q placed interest rate ceilings on the amount that thrifts could offer their depositors. Each 
thrift was now able to adjust its interest rate in response to the market rate, making it 
more competitive with the money market mutual funds.940 
 The combination of being permitted to offer higher interest rates on deposits and 
riskier loans to borrowers, all the while having a $100,000 safety net in the form of 
FSLIC-sponsored deposit insurance on each savings account, was an optimal 
combination for moral hazard. The deposits that financed riskier home loans were 
guaranteed by FSLIC, giving thrifts the incentive to privilege potential gains over 
potential losses. The tax paying public was on the hook for potential losses, while the 
thrifts stood to privatize their profits, should those risks pay off. In an important sense, 
this arrangement resembled the subprime mortgage that erupted roughly twenty years 
later.  
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Astonishing decisions were made over the years following the implementation of 
the DIDMCA and the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act. For example, 
Stanley Adams, manager of Lamar Savings and Loan in Austin, Texas, attempted to use 
deposits to invest in opening a branch on the moon.941 Unreasonable spending on “new 
corporate headquarters, executive salaries, client entertaining, [and] company parties” 
took place at many thrifts.942 Don Dixon, a manager of Vernon Savings and Loan in 
Dallas, Texas, used deposits to buy luxury cars costing $1.8 million, a beach house 
costing $2 million, and flowers for his wife costing $36,760.943 Still, Lawrence White 
argues that the majority of the thrifts’ problems during the Savings and Loan Crisis were 
not the product of such criminal and irresponsible activities. Rather, White claims, the 
thrifts “largely failed because of an amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor 
business judgments, foolish strategies, excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless 
underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real estate markets.”944 White made this 
claim in the early 1990’s, and it is striking how much of this diagnosis can be said to 
apply to the current subprime mortgage crisis. 
 In a ten year span, between 1980 and 1989, approximately 890 thrifts with $347.8 
billion in assets failed, with the smaller thrifts going out of business first, and the larger 
ones failing last. Almost 35% of all thrifts were wiped out by the end of the decade.945 
The total cost to taxpayers to bail out the failed, insolvent thrifts ended up being over 
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$100 billion.946 In 1980, roughly 49.7% of home loan originations were made by thrifts, 
but by 1997, this figure fell to 18.3%,947 due in part to the severe sanctions imposed on 
thrifts by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) 
of 1989. It was under these turbulent conditions that the secondary mortgage market truly 
began to emerge as the main arena for financing mortgages. Any study of the secondary 
market as it developed and functioned in the 1990’s up until the present time, must 
account for conditions that it responded to as well as the degree to which it successfully 
overcame the limitations that the primary market faced. 
 
2.8. The Original Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Also Consigned to Oblivion by 
General Bias  
 
 One of the more disheartening characteristics of the subprime mortgage crisis is 
that it was preceded by a lesser-known, less severe subprime crisis that took place in the 
late 1990’s. This original subprime boom and bust serves as an exemplary instance of 
general bias because it should have served as a clarion call to regulators of and 
participants in the subprime mortgage market in the early 2000’s. Yet, for reasons that 
will be explored in later sections of this study, the original subprime crisis made no such 
impact. It will be helpful to explore this original subprime crisis in some detail. 
 The Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980’s and early 1990’s was undoubtedly one 
of the most serious financial catastrophes in American history. A former Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation chairman admitted that the S&L crisis was instigated “almost 
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uniformly [by]… real estate loans,”948 ultimately resulting in the failure of nearly 3,000 
deposit-taking institutions and costing an estimated $160 billion to offset all of the 
losses.949 Approximately 1,600 deposit-taking institutions that were insured by the FDIC 
either closed down or received its financial assistance.950 More than 1,000 executives at 
those institutions were convicted of felonies.951 Quietly, as the S&L clean-up efforts 
began to wind down in the early 1990’s, the seeds of the next American mortgage crisis, 
one that would begin to unfold in 1998, were already being sown. 
 Beginning in 1994, the number of applications for both conventional mortgages952 
and conventional mortgage refinances dropped precipitously.953 Market interest rates 
increased by more than 2% during the first six months of 1994 alone.954 Someone who 
had recently obtained a mortgage prior to this sudden increase in market interest rates 
would likely now be discouraged from refinancing at a higher rate, while someone who 
was in the market for a mortgage might find the new mortgage rates to be unattractive 
enough to delay purchasing a home. This is borne out by the fact that from 1993 to 1995 
total mortgage originations dropped by a glaring 36%.955 Many mortgage lenders during 
this period were scrambling to find ways to broaden their market base as the conventional 
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mortgage market dried up.956 This was a significant moment for the initial growth of the 
subprime mortgage market in the United States.957 
 Four different articles, all of them written between late-1995 and early-1996, 
serve as an informative window into the mortgage lending industry’s sentiment towards 
subprime mortgages at this time. The first article, written in early 1996, bears the 
headline: “Lenders Told to Get Ready for a Growing Market in Lower-Quality Loans.”958 
The author, Juliana Ratner, reports on what transpired at an early 1996 conference on 
subprime lending, sponsored by the National Real Estate Development Center. The major 
theme of the conference, according to Ratner, was: “Nonconforming loans are losing 
their stigma as the ugly stepchildren of the mortgage family.”959 
 This assessment of subprime mortgages was mirrored in another article that was 
written in September of 1995. Then-President of Quality Mortgage USA,960 Neil 
Kornsweit, is quoted as declaring, “For a long time, most lenders treated borrowers with 
marred credit records as pariahs, but that mindset is changing.”961 Another article, written 
in February of 1996, contains the quote: “Some bankers… are discovering what finance 
companies have known all along: not all customers with bad credit are bad customers. 
They can be the source of far greater yields than the typical borrower in a bank’s 
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customer loan portfolio.”962 A fourth and final article, this one written in December of 
1995, covered the National Home Equity Mortgage Association’s southeastern 
conference. Of particular interest is the discussion of one of the sessions at the conference 
titled: “Untapped Potential in the Home Equity Market.”963 Glen Stein, Vice President of 
asset-backed securities at Prudential Securities Incorporated, argues in the article that 
subprime loans “have several advantages over traditional high-credit-quality loans” 
including the fact that subprime borrowers “are more concerned with making payments 
than on getting the best interest rates.”964 
 The lure of subprime mortgage lending was so powerful that there were about 200 
lenders who were strongly in the subprime business by 1995.965 GE Capital, Chase 
Manhattan and Chemical Bank (which merged in 1995),966 Norwest Mortgage 
Corporation (which merged with Wells Fargo in 1998),967 and General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (which changed its name to Ally Financial in 2010)968 were 
among the largest subprime lenders in 1995.969 In 1996, the five largest subprime 
mortgage lenders970 were, in order, Associates First Capital Corporation (which was 
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purchased by Citigroup in September of 2000),971 The Money Store (which was 
purchased by First Union Corporation972 in June of 1998), ContiMortgage Corporation 
(which was a unit of ContiFinancial, a company that filed for bankruptcy protection in 
May of 2000),973 Beneficial Mortgage Corporation (which was purchased by Household 
International in 1998),974 and Household Financial Services.975 
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) noted 
in an April 2000 report that there was “a monumental growth in subprime lending” from 
1993-1998.976 Subprime refinance loans alone increased nearly 900% over this five year 
span from 80,000 in 1993 to 790,000 in 1998.977 Two months later, HUD issued a joint 
report with the United States Treasury Department titled, “Curbing Predatory Home 
Mortgage Lending.”978 In this report, the two government agencies document that 
subprime mortgage originations totaled around $35 billion in 1994 and rose to $150 
billion by 1998, an increase of 328%.979 The agencies also note that the “securitization of 
subprime mortgages [that] has developed in the past few years… has contributed 
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significantly to the rapid growth of the market.”980 Whereas $11 billion worth of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities were issued in 1994, $83 billion were issued in 
1998, an increase of over 654%.981  
Unquestionably, one of the major factors that accounted for subprime lending’s 
towering growth in the 1990’s was the veritable explosion of outstanding consumer debt 
during this period. According to data provided by the Federal Reserve, at the end of 
January of 1990, outstanding consumer debt in America totaled $797.7 billion.982 
Jumping halfway through the decade, to the end of December of 1994, outstanding 
consumer debt rose to $997.3 billion, an increase of over 25%. By the end of December 
of 1999, the amount of outstanding consumer debt ballooned to $1.53 trillion. Looking at 
the 1990’s as a whole, outstanding consumer debt in America increased nearly 92%.983 
Credit card debt played a significant part in this trend of increasing consumer debt 
in the 1990’s. From the 1994 to 1995, the amount of credit card debt that was 90 days 
past due grew 35%, from $2 billion to $2.7 billion.984 A 1996 article in The Economist 
reported that over that same period, “Americans received a total of five billion direct mail 
credit card solicitations – equivalent to 32 invitations for each citizen between the ages of 
18 and 64.”985 Over the course of just the first eight months of 1995, credit card debt in 
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America increased 13%, while incomes only grew at a rate of 3%.986 In 1996, American 
consumers charged over $1 trillion to their credit cards987 owing approximately $360 
billion by the end of the year.988 Overall credit card delinquencies, a key contributor to a 
borrower being considered “subprime,” were at 3.8% at the end of 1996, an increase of 
over 72% compared to credit delinquencies in 1988.989 
Another troubling trend throughout the 1990’s was the surge in personal 
bankruptcy filings. In 1990, there were 718,107 consumer bankruptcy filings.990 By the 
end of 1999, this figure reached 1,281,581, an increase of over 78%.991  
These figures are important because the increase in subprime lending that took 
place in the 1990’s was not caused by a mere unilateral phenomenon, i.e. by mortgage 
lenders, discouraged by the profit potential in the conventional mortgage market, 
aggressively entering into the subprime market. Instead, these opportunistic lenders were 
“greeted” in their search for profits by a newly minted influx of borrowers with impaired 
credit. In other words, although there was an increase in supply of subprime mortgage 
credit in the 1990’s, this supply “encountered” an ever-growing customer base that could 
not qualify for prime mortgages.  As one journalist, writing for The New York Times, 
observed in 1997, “the relentless growth in the number of Americans with blemishes on 
their credit records, ranging from repeated late payments to outright bankruptcy,” made 
this immense pool of subprime borrowers “too large to ignore.”992 
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A 1997 article in The American Banker provides an interesting glimpse into the 
budding subprime mortgage market at this time. Author Heather Timmons states, 
“Current economic factors promise to funnel more consumers into the [subprime] market. 
Credit-card delinquencies rates are rising, bankruptcies are at record levels, and consumer 
spending has not slowed.”993 Timmons asked an unnamed CEO of a subprime lending 
institution whether he was worried about “those signs of excess,” to which the 
anonymous CEO replied, “Really, rising credit card delinquencies just mean more 
customers for us.”994 
Despite the fact that “Wall Street had been mesmerized by the rapid growth of the 
subprime sector”995 throughout 1995 and 1996, with subprime mortgage lenders 
experiencing “two phenomenal years,”996 critics of this expansion became progressively 
concerned over the stability of the subprime mortgage market by 1997 and early 1998. 
With an annual average unemployment rate under 5% in 1997 and 1998,997 the median 
average household income increasing for the third and fourth consecutive year,998 and 
home prices rising,999 some economists were alarmed by the growth of consumer debt, 
personal bankruptcy filings, and, in 1998, subprime delinquencies.1000 One economist 
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declared, “We’ve got an extraordinary debt problem, especially in what should be 
glowing expansion.”1001 Another warned that “an inevitable recession, with a drop in real 
estate prices, would be fatal for the subprime sector.”1002 A consulting firm, in 1996, 
analyzed the subprime mortgage market and produced a study that predicted that “by 
lowering their credit standards and saturating the market with loans,” many subprime 
lenders “will be unable to avoid potentially enormous delinquencies and write-offs.”1003  
As these portents anticipated, and similar to what occurred in the more recent and 
serious subprime mortgage crisis, the tremendous growth of the subprime mortgage 
market in the mid-1990’s could not be sustained for an extended period of time. Two 
events that culminated and converged in August of 1998, according to The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, an independent, ten-member panel created to “examine the 
causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States,”1004 contributed 
to a market disruption that came to be known as “The Panic of 1998.” The two events 
were The Russian Default Crisis and the near-collapse of the hedge fund firm, Long-
Term Capital Management. The market turmoil that ensued once those events unfolded 
led to a “shakeout” of subprime lenders in late 1998.1005 A brief explanation of these 
events is warranted. 
 On August 17, 1998, Russia was “forced to default on its sovereign debt, devalue 
the ruble, and declare a suspension of payments by [its] commercial banks to foreign 
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creditors.”1006 Three days before those developments, the exchange rate for the Russian 
ruble was 6.29 rubles to the dollar.1007 By September 9, a little over three weeks later, the 
exchange rate reached 21 rubles to the dollar.1008 The Russian government’s inability to 
pay foreign investors in a timely fashion, coupled with the tumbling value of the ruble, 
sent shockwaves through the international economy, eliciting fears of currency 
devaluation in Asia. As one journalist noted, “The importance of events in Russia is that 
they are taking the world financial system yet closer to the edge, and the system is now so 
structured that losses in one country are transmitted to another.”1009 The Russian Default 
Crisis gave rise to a worldwide credit crunch, as frightened investors began to flee from 
riskier investments – like subprime mortgage-backed securities – and turned instead to 
safer ones.1010 Russia’s default also had a disastrous impact on Long-Term Capital 
Management.1011  
 The hedge fund firm, Long-Term Capital Management, was founded in 1993 by a 
former bond trader at Salomon Brothers, John Meriwether.1012 In 1994, ten general 
partners of Long-Term Capital contributed $100 million to a hedge fund that bore the 
same name as the firm. That same year, the partners were able to raise an additional $3.1 
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billion in capital from outside investors.1013 From 1995 to 1997, the hedge fund generated 
impressive returns of 43%, 41%, and 17%, respectively.1014 By December 31, 1997, 
Long-Term Capital borrowed $125 billion on capital of just $4.8 billion, essentially 
borrowing “$25 for every $1 of its equity capital.”1015 As Kathleen Day explains, “The 
fund used that borrowed money to place financial bets on financial instruments around 
the world. All told… the value of the fund’s contracts with other banks and investment 
firms gave the firm a derivatives exposure of $1.2 trillion.”1016 According to Michael 
Lewis, on August 17, 1998, the day that Russia defaulted on its debt, unreasonable fear 
swept through the world’s investing community to such an extent that the investment 
decisions made on that day gave rise to a completely unexpected scenario, one that had “a 
statistical probability” of occurring of “1 in 50 million.”1017 Not only did “the average 
investor” panic, the world’s “biggest financial firms” panicked as well, which created “a 
bank run on a huge, global scale.”1018  
On a single day, August 21, 1998, Long-Term Capital lost $550 million. By the 
end of August that year, the fund lost $2 billion of its invested $4.8 billion.1019 A few 
weeks later, on September 21, the fund lost over $500 million in a single day for the 
second time. It was not until two days later that “a consortium of 14 Wall Street banks 
and brokerage houses gave Long-Term [Capital] $3.6 billion, in exchange for 90 percent 
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of the firm,” effectively rescuing it from complete failure.1020 One journalist from The 
New York Times argued that the near-demise of Long-Term Capital revealed “how little 
regulators, investors and even traders themselves understand the fault lines of risk buried 
in today’s global financial landscape.”1021 
Those two events wrecked havoc on the stock market in general1022 and on the 
subprime lending sector in particular. To get a better sense of the magnitude of subprime 
lending-related losses during this period, it may be useful to examine National Mortgage 
News’ list of publicly traded subprime lending companies before “The Panic of 1998” 
erupted. As of April 21, 1997, there were twenty-three publicly traded companies that 
were devoted to subprime lending.1023 By the end of 1999, four of those companies filed 
for bankruptcy protection,1024 five were acquired by another firm,1025 and two changed 
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their name.1026 One should note that, by the end of 2001, three more of those subprime 
lenders filed for bankruptcy protection,1027 one ceased its subprime lending 
operations,1028 and three were acquired by other companies.1029  
 Four deposit-taking institutions that had “significant involvement in subprime 
lending”1030 also failed in the late-1990’s: BestBank, First National Bank of Keystone, 
Pacific Thrift and Loan Company, and Oceanmark Bank. At a February 8, 2000 hearing 
before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Donna Tanoue, 
testified that subprime lending without prudential lending standards was a leading cause 
of the failure of BestBank, First National Bank of Keystone, and Pacific Thrift and Loan 
                                                                                                                                                 
Green Tree Financial was acquired by Conseco, Inc. in 1998. Jeff Bailey, “Conseco Agrees to Acquire 
Green Tree,” The Wall Street Journal (April 8, 1998). IMC Mortgage was purchased by Citigroup in 
November of 1999. Jeff Harrington, “Mortgage Lender Will be Sold to Citigroup,” The St. Petersburg 
Times, (November 13, 1999). Money Store was acquired by First Union in 1998. Timothy O’Brien, “First 
Union to Acquire Money Store for $2.1 Billion,” The New York Times (March 5, 1998), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/05/business/first-union-to-acquire-money-store-for-2.1-billion.html. 
TransAmerica was acquired by Aegon in 1999. Marianne Curphey, “Aegon Joins Superleague with $ 9.7bn 
US Purchase,” The Times (February 19, 1999). 
1026 Emergent Mortgage changed its name to HomeGold Inc., later renamed HomeGold Financial, Inc., in 
March of 1998. Mego Mortgage changed its name to Altiva Financial in 1999. 
1027 Amresco filed for bankruptcy protection in July of 2001. “In Brief: Bankrupt Amresco Plans to Sell 
Assets,” The American Banker (July 5, 2001). ContiFinancial filed for bankruptcy protection in May of 
2000. Michael Gregory, “Conti Bankrupt, Bonds Look OK,” The New York Times (May 22, 2000). First 
Alliance, after “facing a host of lawsuits accusing it of deceptive sales practices,” filed for bankruptcy 
protection in March of 2000. Diana B. Henriques, “Troubled Lender Seeks Protection,” The New York 
Times (March 24, 2000).  
1028 Altiva, formerly Mego Mortgage, made this announcement in June of 2000. “Westmark, Altiva End 
Subprime Lending Operations,” Origination News, Vol. 9, No. 9, (June 2000), 42. 
1029 Advanta was acquired by Chase Manhattan in February of 2001. Michael Gregory, “Chase Says Fraud; 
Advanta Stunned,” Asset Securitization Report (August 6, 2001). Associates First was acquired by 
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Company.1031 These three bank failures cost the government a total of approximately $1 
billion.1032 At the same hearing, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, Ellen 
Seidman, likewise noted that Oceanmark Bank’s “failed subprime lending strategy” was 
the primary reason behind its failure.1033 
 At one point during the hearing, Tanoue stated that subprime depository 
institutions were “twenty times more likely to become problem institutions” than prime 
lenders.1034 Problem institutions are those that receive a 4 or 5 CAMELS rating on a scale 
of 1 to 5. The acronym “CAMELS” stands for the six aspects of a bank’s condition that 
are assessed by federal regulators: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, 
Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk.1035 The higher a bank’s CAMELS 
rating, the more extreme is the level of supervisory concern. Tanoue added that subprime 
lenders represent nationally just over 1 percent of all insured deposit-taking institutions, 
but account for 20 percent of all problem institutions.1036 
 Chairman James Leach, reflecting upon the failures of the four deposit-taking 
institutions, astutely observed: 
 It strikes me that we are looking at a billion dollars in failure in the 
last year. These have been strikingly strong economic times, and these 
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failures involve very small banks. So we have a billion dollars in failures 
in good times with very, very small banks, and so the question that seems 
to me particularly relevant is, in terms of coordination, do we not 
only have adequate coordination with small banks, but what about 
larger banks and what about situations where instruments at issue may 
be much more sophisticated?1037 
 
Congressman Leach’s concern has proven to be hauntingly prescient. The subprime 
lending debacle at the end of the 1990’s was mostly confined to publicly traded non-
depositories. Only four federally regulated depository institutions that were significantly 
involved in subprime lending failed during this time. What would happen if larger banks 
moved into subprime lending, creating “more sophisticated” subprime products? Was the 
federal regulation structure in place robust enough to oversee larger banks that had 
elected to participate in subprime lending? More generally, should there happen to be a 
severe economic downturn, one that would be even more serious than “The Panic of 
1998,” how well would subprime lenders weather the storm?  
Throughout 1998 and 1999, subprime mortgages were five times more likely to 
be delinquent than prime, conventional mortgages,1038 underscoring the pressing nature of 
these questions. Moreover, as disclosed by an April 5, 1999 report published by the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), subprime lending was already “a target 
for many national banks.”1039 In this alarming report, the OCC revealed that competition 
by non-depositories in the prime lending market, the presence of additional funding that 
was made possible by securitization, and a “growing recognition of business 
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opportunities available in previously underserved or unserved markets” made subprime 
lending an attractive avenue for many banks.1040  
The OCC also presented the results of their 1998 examination of national banks 
engaging in subprime lending. According to the report, the OCC examination “uncovered 
a number of serious weaknesses in the business and control processes used to manage the 
risks associated with [the national banks’] subprime lending activities.”1041 These 
“deficiencies,” the report continued, “were more pronounced in two types of banks: those 
that knowingly engaged in subprime lending activities without an adequate understanding 
of the risks involved and those that unwittingly entered the market by relaxing 
underwriting standards or loosening credit-grading criteria in response to 
competition.”1042 The OCC advised that national banks should not engage in subprime 
lending “without a clear understanding of the business and its inherent risks and a well-
conceived business plan” because anything less exposes them to “unacceptable and 
unnecessary risk of loss.”1043 
Even though the dangers of subprime lending became progressively apparent in 
the late 1990’s, a Commercial Lending Review article published in the summer of 1999 
revealed that approximately 150 deposit-taking institutions had “subprime portfolios 
exceeding 20% of their capital.”1044 After mentioning that those subprime portfolios had 
a total value of only $25 billion, the two authors of the article recall that deposit-taking 
institutions had “virtually no presence in the subprime market five years ago.”1045  
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A few months later, in November of 1999, an article in National Mortgage News 
intimated that a “commercial bank invasion of the subprime sector” had been unleashed, 
a sector that had been “historically controlled by non-depositories.”1046 In the third 
quarter of 1999, five of the top ten, and ten of the top twenty-five subprime lenders were 
owned by commercial banks. These banks included Bank of America, Citigroup, New 
Century, Chase Manhattan, and Washington Mutual.1047 About six months later, at the 
end of the first quarter of 2000, eight of the top ten subprime lenders were commercial 
banks.1048 
Between 1993 and 1998, “the number of subprime mortgage loans originated by 
banks and thrifts” increased by 551%, while “the number of subprime loans originated by 
affiliates of banks and thrifts” increased nearly 7,000%.1049 By the end of 1998, “banks, 
thrifts and their affiliates accounted for approximately one quarter of all subprime 
mortgage originations.”1050 
The aggressive entrance of commercial banks, thrifts, and their affiliates into the 
subprime sector at the end of the 1990’s and early 2000’s was an unusual development. 
Commercial banks and thrifts were, traditionally, “the staid elder statesmen of the 
financial world” that would charge “fair prices for a broad array of products,” while 
“keeping an arm’s length from overly trendy financial products.”1051 Non-depositories, 
conversely, tended to “specialize in customers with credit problems, operating from 
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nondescript strip malls or with veteran sports celebrities as TV spokesmen” and would 
charge “higher rates to customers who could not qualify for loans from banks.”1052 
Historically, depositories and non-depositories “rarely crossed paths,” but the profit 
potential of subprime lending proved to be too enticing for the former to ignore.1053 In the 
next chapter, I will discuss how large depositories and non-depositories alike flooded the 
subprime market, blinded by general bias, in some cases bolstered by group bias, eager to 
make immense sums of money even if it was at other people’s expense. It is to a 
consideration of the subprime lenders that I will now turn. 
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Chapter Three 
3.0. The Lenders 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss how subprime lenders contributed to the subprime 
mortgage crisis. A central part of my argument is that the largest subprime lenders were 
the beneficiaries, at least in the short-term, of an inadequate regulatory apparatus. This 
chapter will chronicle two distinct failures: the failure of lenders to resist the temptation 
to recklessly engage in myopic profit-seeking behaviors, and the failure of regulators to 
curtail those behaviors in a timely fashion.  
In order to bring clarity to this discussion, I will identify the ten different types of 
mortgage lenders and underscore the six types of lenders that will be explored in this 
chapter. I will then establish how an inadequate, fragmented regulatory framework was in 
place that was not suitable for overseeing large, diverse, and complicated lenders. Since 
this piecemeal regulatory framework is predicated on differences in types of lenders, I 
will explore whether thrifts, national banks, and non-depository mortgage lending 
subsidiaries are legitimately distinct enough to warrant this regulatory arrangement. Next, 
I will peruse different estimates of how involved each type of lender was in the subprime 
market. Once this background information is established, I will provide a survey of 
preconditions that made the subprime lending boom possible. Of these preconditions, the 
invention of securitization was particularly crucial. Deregulatory preconditions will also 
be investigated, including the ever-important federal preemption of state consumer 
protection laws. I will argue that these laws created a consumer protection void for 
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borrowers that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS) were unable or unwilling to fill before the subprime crisis. I 
will then raise the question of how well the OCC and OTS were able to ensure the safety 
and soundness of their regulated lenders. To answer that question, I will provide a 
snapshot of the OCC’s regulatory relationship with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and 
Chase Home Finance, and then a longer, more detailed account of the OTS’ relationship 
with one of its regulated lenders, Washington Mutual.  
After providing a summary assessment of the work of those two regulators, I will 
turn to a third federal regulator, the Federal Reserve. I will point out how the Federal 
Reserve had the authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive lending practices, but it refused 
to do so until July 30, 2008. I will examine the Federal Reserve’s regulatory posture 
toward non-depository mortgage lending affiliates and then provide a brief examination 
of one of its regulated lenders, Countrywide Home Loans. The final portion of this 
chapter will consist of an examination of the relationship between non-depository 
independent mortgage lenders and state regulators. The evidence suggests that the vast 
majority of the individual state regulators were underfunded and ill-equipped for 
overseeing large non-depository independent mortgage lenders, such as Ameriquest and 
New Century Financial. 
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3.2. The Ten Different Types of Mortgage Lenders 
Mortgage banking regulation in the United States is both complicated and 
fragmented. There are four main federal mortgage banking regulators,1054 each of which 
has “jurisdiction over a different type of [mortgage] lender,”1055 in addition to fifty state 
regulators. In a 2008 report, The United States Department of the Treasury observed that 
the “jurisdictional boundaries” among the four regulators “often blur” and their 
responsibilities “significantly overlap.”1056 
The coexistence of federal and state banking regulators in the United States, 
known as “the dual banking system,” has been justified on the grounds that competition 
between the two types of regulators fosters innovation and reduces “unnecessary and 
burdensome regulations” for lenders.1057 As I agree with the claim that “[t]he subprime 
crisis was the direct result of not policing the market,”1058 it is necessary to examine this 
assumption, as well as identify which regulator oversaw each sort of mortgage lender. 
Furthermore, I will explore each regulator/lender relationship and, by way of presenting 
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the losses endured by a few of the largest subprime lenders, I will argue that the federal 
and state regulatory oversight was entirely inadequate prior to the outbreak of the 
subprime mortgage crisis. 
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of mortgage lenders: depository institutions 
and non-depository institutions. Depository institutions accept deposits from customers, 
while non-depository institutions typically fund their lending activities by borrowing 
money from commercial or investment banks.1059 The source of funding for extending 
credit to the public, therefore, determines whether a lender is classified as a depository or 
non-depository. 
 Within the category of depositories, there is a further distinction, one that hinges 
on the depository’s charter.1060 If a depository chooses to receive a federal charter under 
the National Bank Act (passed in 1864), it is known as a national bank and the OCC 
serves as its regulator. One can “usually recognize a national bank because the word 
National appears in its name or the term National Association (N.A.) is at the end.”1061 
As of February 28, 2011, there were 1441 national banks in the United States.1062  
A depository could also elect to receive a charter under The Home Owners Loan 
Act (passed in 1933), which would designate it a federally chartered thrift institution. 
Thrifts are supervised by The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and frequently have the 
                                                 
1059 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the 
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word “Federal” in their name.1063 As of March 31, 2010, the OTS was regulating 757 
thrifts.1064 
A third option for depositories is to choose to receive a charter from one of the 
fifty state bank commissions. Depositories opting to be chartered by a state are known as 
state national banks or state thrifts.1065 State-chartered national banks have the further 
option of choosing to be a member of the Federal Reserve System. If a state-chartered 
national bank is part of this system, it is known as a state member bank and is regulated 
by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) as well as by its state regulator. Conversely, if a 
state-chartered bank is not part of the system, it is called a state nonmember bank and is 
regulated by The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and its state regulator. 
State-chartered thrifts do not have the option of being part of the Federal Reserve System 
and they are regulated by the OTS and their state regulator.1066 
So far, then, there are five types of depository lenders: (1) federally-chartered 
national banks (regulated by the OCC), (2) federally-chartered thrifts (regulated by the 
OTS), (3) state-chartered member national banks (regulated by the Fed and a state 
regulator), (4) state-charted nonmember national banks (regulated by the FDIC and a 
state regulator), and (5) state-chartered thrifts (regulated by the OTS and a state 
regulator). Assuming that a depository can meet certain requirements, which vary for 
each regulator, it can choose its charter and, consequently, its regulator. Of these types of 
depositories, only federally chartered national banks and thrifts will be discussed in this 
study. 
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The regulatory landscape for non-depositories is, likewise, complex and 
fragmented. There are five different kinds of non-depository lenders. First, there are non-
depository mortgage lending subsidiaries of national banks (6) that are regulated by the 
OCC, while there are also non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries of thrifts (7) that 
are regulated by the OTS. Subsidiaries in this case are owned by the parent national bank 
or thrift. For instance, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., a national bank, owns a non-
depository mortgage lending subsidiary named Chase Home Finance, both of which are 
regulated by the OCC. Before it failed, Independent National Mortgage Bancorp 
(IndyMac), a thrift, owned a non-depository mortgage lending subsidiary called IndyMac 
Bank, both of which were regulated by the OTS. Non-depository mortgage lending 
subsidiaries share the same regulator as their parent national bank or thrift.1067 
Second, there are non-depository mortgage lending affiliates (8) that are regulated 
by the Fed and there are non-depository mortgage lending affiliates (9) that are regulated 
by the OTS. In this case, an affiliate’s regulator is determined by the sort of holding 
company to which it belongs. Non-depository mortgage lending affiliates that belong to a 
bank or financial holding company are regulated by the Fed, while those that belong to a 
savings and loan holding company are regulated by the OTS.1068 In this study, only non-
depository mortgage lending affiliates that belong to bank or financial holding companies 
will be examined. 
Finally, there are non-depository independent mortgage lenders (10) that are 
supervised by a state regulator.1069 These lenders are “independent” by way of being 
neither affiliates nor subsidiaries of national banks and thrifts within a holding 
                                                 
1067 Ibid., 170-177. 
1068 Ibid., 153. 
1069 Ibid. 
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company.1070 They are independent of the holding company structure. Two of the largest 
non-depository independent mortgage lenders prior to the outbreak of the subprime 
mortgage crisis were New Century Financial Corporation and Ameriquest Mortgage. I 
will examine both of these lenders in a later section. 
In this study, I am going to focus on six of these ten types of lenders since they 
were responsible for the majority of subprime loan originations leading up to the collapse 
of the housing market.1071 These six lenders are: (1) federally chartered national banks, 
(6) non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries of national banks, (2) federally 
chartered thrifts, (7) non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries of thrifts, (8) non-
depository mortgage lending affiliates that are part of a bank or financial holding 
company, and (10) non-depository independent mortgage lenders. As I will mention 
below, non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries’ (6, 7) assets and liabilities are, for 
accounting and regulatory reporting purposes, indistinguishable from those of their parent 
national bank or thrift. Consequently, unless otherwise noted, when I speak of a federally 
chartered national bank (1) or thrift (2), I am also tacitly referring to its operating 
subsidiaries (6, 7) as well.  State-chartered member (3) and nonmember national banks 
(4), state-chartered thrifts (5), and non-depository mortgage lending affiliates belonging 
to a thrift holding company (9) are not going to be examined in this study.  Figures 1 
through 3 summarize this complex regulatory arrangement. 
 
 
                                                 
1070 Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B.Canner, “The 2007 HMDA Data,” Federal 
Reserve Bulletin (December 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/pdf/hmda07final.pdf, A109. 
1071 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 205. 
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Figure 11072 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1072 This chart is borrowed from an appendix published by The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Please see: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Appendix B: Activities of National Banks 
Related to Subprime Lending,” (April 14, 2010), available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-39d.pdf, 1. 
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3.3. Why This Fragmented Regulatory Framework Was Inhospitable to Effective, 
Timely Oversight of Subprime Mortgage Lenders 
 
The piecemeal nature of mortgage banking regulation in the United States, along 
with the daunting number of types of mortgage lenders, was “a matter of historical 
accident and definitely not planning.”1073 For the purposes of this study, one of the most 
important reasons why mortgage banking regulation became so fragmented and 
sophisticated was the existence of bank and, later, financial holding companies.1074 A 
bank holding company is “a corporation that holds stock in one or more banks and other 
financial service organizations.”1075 They are umbrella organizations that envelope 
national banks and other firms that are involved in federally approved activities that 
happen to be “closely related” to banking, such as “making and servicing loans, 
conducting certain leasing activities,  [and] providing investment and financial 
advice.”1076 The bank holding company structure gives the parent corporation several real 
advantages, including “flexibility of management, improved access to financial resources, 
and greater freedom from state and federal restrictions on the scope of activities of banks 
and geographic location of banking offices.”1077  
Up until 1994, bank holding companies that were “headquartered in one state 
could not acquire banks in other states,” but that restriction was removed under the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.1078 Another 
                                                 
1073 Ibid., 152. 
1074 There are also thrift holding companies, but since they and their holdings are all regulated by the OTS, 
I did not include them in this discussion. 
1075 Benton E. Gup and James W. Kolari, Commercial Banking: The Management of Risk (Hoboken: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2004), 45. 
1076 Ibid. 
1077 Samuel B. Chase and John J. Mingo, “The Regulation of Bank Holding Companies,” The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 30, No. 2, (May 1975), 281. 
1078 Commercial Banking: The Management of Risk, 45. 
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watershed moment for banking holding companies was the passing of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA). GLBA created financial holding companies, entities that are 
permitted to “engage in a wide range of financial activities including underwriting and 
selling insurance and securities, commercial and merchant banking, [and] investing in 
and developing real estate.”1079 GLBA authorized the Fed to serve as the principle 
regulator of financial holding companies.1080 Unfortunately, as I will discuss later, GLBA 
never designated the Fed as the enforcer of its regulations for non-depository mortgage 
lending affiliates within a bank or financial holding company, an oversight that led to an 
enormous regulatory blind-spot that permitted certain large lenders, like Countrywide 
Home Loans, to recklessly originate hundreds of billions of dollars worth of risky 
mortgages. 
The bank and financial holding company structure, along with their permitted 
activities, pose substantial challenges to federal and state regulators.1081 This is especially 
true because holding companies “reorganize their holdings on a relatively frequent 
                                                 
1079 Ibid., 43. 
1080 Mark Jickling and Edward V. Murphy, “Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of U.S. Financial 
Supervision,” CRS Report for Congress (December 14, 2009), available at 
www.fbiic.gov/public/2010/jan/CRS_Report7-5700.pdf, 14. 
1081 Mortgage banking is only one part of the financial services industry, which includes other sectors like 
securities, futures, and insurance. As a United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 
explains, the responsibilities for “overseeing the financial services industry are shared among almost a 
dozen federal banking, securities, futures, and other regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory 
organizations, and hundreds of state financial regulatory agencies.” In this dissertation, the concerns that I 
raise about the adequacy of federal regulation are limited to the oversight of mortgage lenders that engaged 
in subprime lending. However, as the same GAO report argues, financial regulation in general has become 
“outdated” in the United States because it “has not kept pace with the major developments that have 
occurred in financial markets and products in recent decades.” I would contend that the existence of 
financial holding companies lends credence to this assertion. Please see: The United States Government 
Accountability Office, “Financial Regulation: A Framework for Crafting and Assessing Proposals to 
Modernize the Outdated U.S. Financial Regulatory System,” Report to Congressional Addressees (January 
2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09216.pdf, 1. 
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basis.”1082 In an effort to examine the challenges that pertain to this article, I will briefly 
and partially dissect Bank of America Corporation, the largest financial holding company 
as of December 31, 2010. 
Worldwide, Bank of America Corporation is the parent of an astonishing 3,075 
firms ranging from other holding companies, national banks, industrial banks, insurance 
companies, non-depository trust companies and other types of organizations. Altogether, 
the corporation has over $2.2 trillion worth of assets.1083 Bank of America published a 
truncated organizational tree diagram of the corporation, one that only included “select” 
firms as of December 31, 2010. Perusing just this trimmed down representation of the 
corporation reveals that it houses 23 holding companies and 17 “major operating 
subsidiaries.”1084 Thus, a financial holding company can house other holding companies. 
As a financial holding company, Bank of America Corporation is regulated by the 
Fed. Yet, one of its holdings is Bank of America, N.A., a national bank. As such, the 
OCC is its regulator. Bank of America, N.A., has seven operating subsidiaries of its own, 
including Nexstar Financial Corporation, CWB Mortgage Ventures, and Independence 
One Mortgage Corporation.1085 These are non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries 
of a national bank, which means that they, too, are regulated by the OCC. Finally, an 
affiliate of Bank of America Corporation is Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. As a non-
                                                 
1082 Julia Patterson Forrester, “Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and 
Federally Supported Lenders,” University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 74, (2005-2006), available at 
http://www.law.uc.edu/current-student/practical-experiences/publications/docs/082906forrester.pdf, 1370. 
1083 United States Federal Reserve System, “National Information Center: Top 50 BHCs,” available at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx. 
1084 Bank of America Corporation, “Select Major Subsidiaries,” (2011), available at 
http://investor.bankofamerica.com. 
1085 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “National Bank Operating Subsidiary List,” (December 
31, 2009), available at http://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national_banks/subsidiaries.html. 
192 
 
depository mortgage lending affiliate within a financial holding company, Countrywide is 
regulated by the Fed. 
These observations are not intended to serve as a thorough analysis of Bank of 
America’s corporate structure. Rather, their purpose is to underscore the elaborate nature 
of the structure as well as the regulatory obstacles that it presents. A bank or financial 
holding company can house different types of mortgage lenders with names that are 
distinct from one another and their parent, while being simultaneously supervised by 
different regulators. As Sheila Bair stated in January of 2010, “The increasing size, span, 
and complexity of financial institutions have… made regulation and supervision 
remarkably difficult.”1086 
On top of this difficulty, federal regulators were further challenged by having to 
adopt a “silo approach” to mortgage banking regulation after GLBA was passed in 
1999.1087 The “silo approach” to federal regulation legally “wedged” the different federal 
regulators into different silos, “keeping each regulator’s silo off limits to other 
regulators.”1088 As “the super-regulator of financial holding companies”1089 under GLBA, 
one may be tempted to assume that the Fed was authorized to oversee all of the firms 
contained within a given holding company, not just the parent corporation and its non-
depository mortgage lending affiliates. Perhaps true in theory, this was clearly not the 
case in practice. Congress told the Fed to rely upon “bank and thrift examination reports 
by other state and federal banking regulators to the fullest extent possible” instead of 
                                                 
1086 Sheila C. Bair, “Statement Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,” (January 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan1410.html. 
1087 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 204. 
1088 Ibid. 
1089 Ibid. 
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examining “those banks and thrifts itself.”1090 This created a “catch-22” situation in the 
sense that the Fed needed to make a case that certain lenders were posing risks to the 
financial system before they could get access to the very reports that could confirm that 
these companies were, in fact, posing those risks.1091 One could make the case that 
federal regulation of depository and non-depository mortgage lenders was plagued by 
“too many consonants” and “not enough consonance.”1092 
Returning to the discussion of Bank of America Corporation’s structure may be 
helpful here. GLBA authorized the Fed to directly oversee the financial holding 
company, Bank of America Corporation. Imagine, however, that there were allegations 
that Bank of America, N.A. or one of its operating subsidiaries (such as Nexstar) was 
involved in predatory or otherwise unsafe lending practices. In this hypothetical scenario, 
the Fed would not be able to directly obtain the information it needed to assess the risks 
that Bank of America, N.A. or its operating subsidiaries were creating. Instead, the Fed 
would have to rely upon examination reports issued by the OCC. This places a 
considerable burden on the OCC to conduct timely, rigorous, and effective examinations 
of the accused lender. I will argue in a later section that the OCC (as well as the OTS) 
were unable or unwilling to conduct such examinations on many of their chartered 
lenders that were participating in subprime lending. I will also contend that the Fed was 
unwilling to oversee non-depository mortgage lending affiliates that were part of bank or 
                                                 
1090 Ibid. 
1091 Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, made a similar point in a different context when she claimed that 
the OTS resisted efforts by the FDIC to examine the ailing thrift holding company, Washington Mutual, 
before its collapse. The FDIC was the so-called secondary regulator of Washington Mutual, while the OTS 
was its primary regulator. Please see: The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
“Hearing on Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Bank Regulators,” (April 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57320/html/CHRG-111shrg57320.htm. 
1092 Lucia J. Mandarino, “Too Many Consonants and Not Enough Consonance: The Development of the 
S&L Regulatory Framework,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 59 (1990-1991). 
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financial holding companies, a type of lender that was similarly “off limits” to the 
oversight of the OCC, OTS, and the states.  
For now, the crucial point is that this regulatory arrangement “allowed federal 
regulators to slough off moral responsibility for their contribution to the crisis.”1093 In the 
absence of a concerted federal regulation effort, each federal regulator could “shrug” at 
the subprime regulatory lapses of their counterparts.1094 In addition to being responsible 
for overseeing different parts of an extraordinarily large and diverse type of corporation 
(whether a bank, thrift, or financial holding company, along with any combination of 
affiliates, national banks, thrifts, and operating subsidiaries), the federal regulators were 
obligated to attempt to regulate these firms in their own “silos.” It is highly questionable 
whether compartmentalized regulation, which made possible a diffusion of regulatory 
responsibility, was the most effective approach to supervising corporations as large and 
diverse as bank and financial holding companies. 
 
3.4. Why Is There a Distinction Between Thrifts and National Banks? 
One may wonder why there is a distinction between thrifts and national banks, 
upon which the distinction between OTS-regulated lenders and OCC-regulated lenders is 
predicated. Are thrifts so different from national banks that they warrant a completely 
separate federal regulator? In order to adequately answer this question, it will be helpful 
to explore part of the history of the OTS. 
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was created by Congress in 1989. In 
response to a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the thrift industry during the 
                                                 
1093 Ibid. 
1094 Ibid. 
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Savings and Loan Crisis, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989, which supplanted the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the 
previous federal regulator of thrifts, with the OTS.1095 The year that Congress founded 
the OTS, there were over 3,000 chartered thrifts.1096 
 Historically, thrifts were unique financial institutions because unlike national 
banks, which also had their own regulator (the OCC) and charter, the former additionally 
had their own lending requirements.1097 In order to be chartered as a federal thrift, a 
financial institution had to meet the qualified thrift lender (QTL) test, which required it to 
“devote 65% of its business to originating mortgages and some other forms of consumer 
debt” including student and credit card loans.1098 The authors of a 2009 paper published 
by The Center for Responsible Lending noted that this federally mandated concentration 
in residential lending made thrifts particularly “vulnerable to the housing market’s 
historical boom-and-bust cycle,” for it inhibited “their ability to diversify their loan 
portfolios.”1099 At the end of 2002, for example, residential mortgages comprised 67.5 
percent of thrift assets compared to only 27.3 percent of national banks’ assets.1100  
 Perhaps in an effort to help federally chartered thrifts reach their homeownership-
centered lending goals, Congress granted them a number of significant privileges. For the 
sake of brevity, I will only examine two of them. First, the Home Owners Loan Act 
                                                 
1095 Robert Cooper, “Note: Office of Thrift Supervision,” Fordham Law Review, Vol. 59 (May 1991), 
S366. 
1096 Michael Hudson and Jim Overton, “Special Supplement: The Second S&L Crisis,” The Center for 
Responsible Lending (January 2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/policy-legislation/regulators/the-second-s-l-scandal.pdf, 16. 
1097 Dain C. Donelson and David Zaring, “Charter Switching and the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the 
Office of Thrift Supervision,” Paper for Illinois Corporate Law Colloquium (October 13, 2009), available 
at http://www.law.uiuc.edu/_shared/pdfs/thrift%20chartering%20draft%2010%20dz.docx, 12. 
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Michael Hudson and Jim Overton, “The Second S&L Crisis,” The Center for Responsible Lending 
(January 2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-
legislation/regulators/the-second-s-l-scandal.pdf, 12. 
1100 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 175. 
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(HOLA), enacted by Congress in 1933, preempted state anti-branching laws for federally 
chartered thrifts. Previously, these anti-branching laws prohibited depositories from 
branching across state lines.1101 HOLA permitted federally chartered thrifts to participate 
in interstate branching, but it did not confer the same benefit to national banks. Financial 
institutions that were “interested in building a national market of retail depositors were 
incentivized to choose thrift charters, which permitted interstate branching,” over national 
bank charters.1102 
Second, HOLA endowed thrifts with “strong federal preemption powers” that 
were “less obviously” granted to national banks.1103 HOLA provided for “the plenary and 
exclusive authority of the [OTS] to regulate all aspects of the operations of Federal 
savings associations… This exercise of the Office's authority is preemptive of any state 
law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a Federal savings 
association.”1104 The obvious advantage of this expansive federal preemption was that 
thrifts enjoyed less state supervision than national banks.1105 Federally chartered national 
banks, under the National Banking Act of 1864, also enjoyed federal preemption of state 
laws, but only in those instances when the federal laws conflicted with the state laws. 
Thus, the scope of federal preemption was broader for federally chartered thrifts than it 
was for federally chartered national banks.1106 
The reason for mentioning these privileges, along with the aforementioned thrift 
lending requirements, is to provide at least a partial justification for the charter and 
                                                 
1101 Michael Hudson and Jim Overton, “The Second S&L Crisis,” 13. 
1102 Ibid. 
1103 Ibid., 14. 
1104 Ibid. Italics mine. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2. 
1105 Ibid. 
1106 Ibid. 
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regulator-based distinction between federal thrifts and national banks. One could argue 
that the regulatory environment for thrifts differs from that of national banks to the extent 
that the two types of lenders needed to have different federal regulators. Acknowledging 
that there were 3,000 chartered thrifts in 1989, one could maintain that Congress’ 
decision to create a new federal regulator, one that could be especially responsive to the 
needs of thrifts, was a reasonable one. Having two different federal regulators overseeing 
depositories going into the 1990’s was, therefore, an understandable situation. 
However much merit this argument has, one should note that the marked 
distinctions between federally chartered thrifts and national banks began to collapse 
shortly after the creation of the OTS in 1989. Just five years after the advent of the OTS, 
Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994, which “amended the limitations on interstate branching by [national] banks, 
making such branching essentially as easy as branching via thrifts.”1107 National banks 
could now “open interstate branches without having to create a separate banking 
corporation in each state.”1108 In this sense, national banks came to resemble more closely 
federally chartered thrifts. 
Interestingly, perhaps in response to the diminished value of their interstate 
branching privileges, the OTS finalized “sweeping” preemption regulations in 1996.1109 
First, the OTS put forth a rule in the fall of that year that asserted that “with certain 
narrow exceptions, any state laws that purport to affect the lending operations of federal 
                                                 
1107 Ibid., 16. 
1108 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States from the Age of Derivatives into the 
Millennium: 1970-2001, Volume 3 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 241. 
1109 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” National Consumer Law Center White Paper (September 2009), available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/restore-the-role-of-states-2009.pdf, 9. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2. 
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savings associations are preempted.”1110 Then, a few months later, the OTS issued 
another rule that concluded that “state law is preempted for [thrift] operating subsidiaries 
to the same extent that it is for the parent federal savings association… because an 
operating subsidiary is treated as the equivalent of a department of the federal thrift for 
regulatory and reporting purposes.”1111  
This was a pivotal moment in federal and state mortgage banking regulation 
history because non-depository mortgage lending operating subsidiaries of thrifts were 
“creatures of state law,” devoid of a federal charter. The regulations issued by the OTS in 
late 1996 suddenly dictated that operating subsidiaries of thrifts could “ignore state law” 
to the same extent as their thrift parents.1112 Importantly, as subprime lending-related 
abuses became more and more prevalent in the late 1990’s, individual states began 
issuing anti-predatory lending laws to protect their citizens. The 1996 OTS regulations 
predated many of these and other consumer protection laws and eventually permitted 
federally chartered thrifts and their operating subsidiaries to uniformly disregard 
them.1113 In order to draw out the importance of this development, it will be useful to 
explain both what non-depository mortgage lending operating subsidiaries are, as well as 
why they exist in the first place. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1110 Ibid. Italics theirs. 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (September 30, 1996). 
1111 Julie L. Williams, Savings Institutions: Mergers, Regulations, and Conversions (New York: Law 
Journal Press, 2006), 17-6. 61 Fed. Reg. 66,563 (December 18, 1996). 
1112 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” 9. 
1113 Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart, “The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional 
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3.5. What Are Non-Depository Mortgage Lending Subsidiaries? 
On the surface, non-depository mortgage lending operating subsidiaries of 
federally chartered thrifts and national banks are peculiar entities. One may wonder why 
they exist in the first place since federally chartered thrifts and national banks can 
originate mortgages themselves. These operating subsidiaries are permitted to “engage in 
virtually the same scope of activities” that are permissible for their federally chartered 
parents, with the obvious exception of taking deposits.1114 Significantly, since they do not 
accept deposits, however, non-depository operating subsidiaries are not “subject to the 
safety and soundness regulations” that are applicable to their parent depository, such as 
capital requirements.1115 In fact, non-depository mortgage lending operating subsidiaries 
enjoy a number of regulatory advantages that are not available to depository parents.1116 
An example of one of these advantages is that they can “obtain unlimited funds from 
parent banks on terms and conditions [that are] favorable to the operating subsidiaries” 
themselves.1117 
Still, a non-depository mortgage lending operating subsidiary resembles its parent 
so closely that, for accounting and regulatory reporting purposes, the former’s assets and 
liabilities are indistinguishable from the latter’s.1118 In terms of determining “their power 
and status under Federal law,” the courts “have consistently treated operating subsidiaries 
                                                 
1114 Wookbai Kim, “Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: The OCC’s Operating 
Subsidiaries Regulations and Watters v. Wachovia Bank,” Loyola Consumer Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, 
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as equivalent to national banks” and thrifts.1119 In essence, non-depository operating 
subsidiaries are “no more than incorporated departments” of their parent thrift or national 
bank.1120  
Despite all of these striking similarities, non-depository operating subsidiaries 
differ from their parent federally chartered thrift or national bank in at least one more 
crucial respect: they have a separate legal status as state-chartered corporations.1121 
Several important implications follow from the legal separation that accompanies the 
parent-operating subsidiary relationship. First, since non-depository operating 
subsidiaries are legally distinct entities from their parents, “the fundamental principles of 
corporate law that limit liability” apply to the relationship.1122 In other words, in the event 
that one of its operating subsidiaries fails, the parent depository’s losses can potentially 
be limited to its investment in the subsidiary. As a November 27, 1996 entry in the 
Federal Register notes, “the use of a separate subsidiary structure can enhance the safety 
and soundness of conducting new activities by distinguishing the subsidiary’s activities 
from those of the parent bank.”1123 A second benefit of the parent-subsidiary relationship 
then, in addition to the one involving certain funding advantages for the subsidiary, is that 
it can promote safety and soundness. Should a non-depository operating subsidiary 
become insolvent, the parent company could potentially be shielded from any of its 
“child’s” liabilities. 
Additionally, since a federally chartered parent thrift or national bank is legally 
distinct from its non-depository operating subsidiaries, they are required to either have 
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different names or, should they have similar names, they must take “appropriate steps to 
minimize the risk of customer confusion.”1124 As Wookbai Kim astutely notes, this 
requirement distances the parent national bank or thrift from the business operations of its 
operating subsidiaries in the eyes of the public. The parent company can outsource 
unseemly, though profitable, lending activities to its operating subsidiaries, while 
protecting itself from reputational damage that could result from those activities.1125 This 
arrangement enables the parent to appear to the public as the “good depository,” while 
opaquely funding and receiving some of the profits from the operations of its “bad non-
depository subsidiary.”  
An excellent example of federally chartered depositories minimizing reputational 
threats and preserving its safety and soundness by outsourcing part of its subprime 
operations to a subsidiary can be discerned in the case of National City Bank, N.A. (a 
federally chartered national bank), Merrill Lynch & Trust Co., FSB (a federally chartered 
thrift), and First Franklin Financial Corporation (a non-depository operating subsidiary). 
In late 2006, well after analysts and officials had begun “ringing warning bells about 
exotic mortgages” and housing data indicated that the risks associated with subprime 
mortgages was rising, Merrill Lynch, an arranger, announced that they would purchase 
First Franklin from its parent, National City, for $1.3 billion.1126  
First Franklin was a trailblazer in the subprime lending industry. They were one 
of the first subprime lenders to issue interest-only mortgages, which enabled borrowers to 
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avoid paying any of their mortgage loans’ principal for a certain period of time.1127 They 
were also heavily “into low-doc and no-doc loans.”1128 Published reports indicate that 
First Franklin was originating more than 650 subprime loans a day to consumers in 
2005.1129 By 2006, they were the eighth largest subprime lender in the country.1130 
For roughly the previous seven years, from 1999-2006, First Franklin was a non-
depository operating subsidiary of National City. Part of the reasoning behind Merrill 
Lynch’s decision to purchase First Franklin in late 2006 was that the latter provided the 
former with “a cheaper and more direct path to reaping the proceeds of [subprime] 
securitization.”1131 Merrill Lynch apparently had some reservations about their purchase, 
however, because they required National City to “retain $10 billion of First Franklin’s old 
‘non-prime’ loans,” a provision that eventually contributed to National City’s demise in 
2008.1132 Shortly after the transaction was completed, then-President and CEO of First 
Franklin, L. Andrew Pollock, testified in front of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, affirming that his company employs “underwriting 
standards that assure the quality” of the loans that they originate and that those standards 
are “designed to ensure that borrowers can afford to repay the mortgages” that they 
originate, both currently and in recent years.1133 
                                                 
1127 Ibid. 
1128 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 169. 
1129 “Lawsuit Against First Franklin Financial Corp, a Subprime Lender, Alleges Violations of Fair 
Business Practices Act, Says Plaintiff, Allison Morris,” Market Wire (April 4, 2007). 
1130 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 205. 
1131 Allison Pyburn, “Merrill Lynch to Boost HEL ABS Business with First Franklin Buy,” Asset 
Securitization Report (September 11, 2006). 
1132 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 169.  
1133 L. Andrew Pollock, “Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs: Hearing on the Subprime Mortgage Market,” (March 22, 2007), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov, 2. 
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Merrill Lynch’s concerns about the quality of First Franklin’s past subprime loan 
originations turned out to be well-founded. Within months after their purchase, it 
eliminated First Franklin’s line of 2/28 subprime loan offerings due to the product’s 
excessive risk.1134 By the end of the first half of 2007, First Franklin posted losses of 
$111 million.1135 On March 5, 2008, Merrill Lynch publicly announced that First 
Franklin would cease originating mortgages altogether.1136  
Later that year, the OCC published a report in November titled “The Worst Ten in 
the Worst Ten,” which referred to the top ten metropolitan areas “experiencing the 
highest rates of foreclosure” coupled with the top ten subprime originators who had 
experienced the largest number of subprime mortgage foreclosures in each of those 
areas.1137 First Franklin was one of only four companies that qualified as being a “Worst 
Ten” originator in all ten of the metropolitan areas that were hit the hardest by subprime 
mortgage foreclosures in 2008. Nearly a year and a half later, in March of 2010, the OCC 
repeated its study and discovered that, once again, First Franklin was a “Worst Ten” 
originator in all ten metropolitan areas that endured the most subprime mortgage 
foreclosures, this time over the course of 2009.1138 In a 2009 report, The Center for Public 
Integrity noted that in just three years, from 2005 to 2007, First Franklin was responsible 
                                                 
1134 James R. Hagerty, “Subprime Staple is Phased Out,” The Wall Street Journal (July 18, 2007). 
1135 Joseph A. Giannone and Tim McLaughlin, “Lifting the Lid: Merrill Could Face Big Subprime Write 
Down,” Reuters News (August 24, 2007). 
1136 Paul Muolo, “First Franklin Closed,” National Mortgage News, Vol. 32, No. 23 (March 10, 2008). 
1137 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Activities of National Banks Related to Subprime 
Lending: Attachment 1,” (November 13, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-39d.pdf. 
1138 Ibid., ““Activities of National Banks Related to Subprime Lending: Attachment 2,” (March 31, 2010), 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-39d.pdf. 
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for originating over $68 billion worth of subprime loans, earning it a ranking of the fourth 
largest subprime lender over that period of time.1139   
The important point is that the parent-operating subsidiary relationship can 
mislead the general public into thinking that the operating subsidiary is entirely distinct 
from and unrelated to its parent. Originating subprime mortgage loans without 
“reviewing the borrowers’ repayment ability” and then foreclosing on their homes would 
ordinarily impair the reputations of all parties involved, leaving them vulnerable to 
“litigations, financial loss, or a decline in their customer base.”1140 However, when the 
operating subsidiary acts in irresponsible ways, the parent-operating subsidiary 
relationship tends to deflect attention and legal culpability away from the parent and, 
instead, invites the public to exclusively place blame on the operating subsidiary.  
For instance, in March of 2006, Marielite Hardy, a lab assistant from Revere, 
Massachusetts, received $670,000 in loans from First Franklin to purchase a multi-family 
home. First Franklin approved her loan application, which listed her monthly income as 
$12,000, and then sold the first loan on the property to the London-based bank HSBC. 
Hardy did not make a single payment on the mortgage, so HSBC demanded that First 
Franklin buy the loan back from them. First Franklin agreed and ultimately sold the loan 
in a distressed sale, absorbing a $295,908 loss. Soon after these events, it surfaced that 
Hardy’s income was overstated by about $9,000 a month on her loan application.1141 
Regardless of whether this is an exceptional example, the point that I would like 
to emphasize is that First Franklin’s parent company at the time, National City, was 
                                                 
1139 The Center for Public Integrity, Who’s Behind the Financial Meltdown: The Top 25 Subprime Lenders 
and Their Wall Street Backers (May 2009), 14. 
1140 Wookbai Kim, “A Study on How Regulatory Capture Caused the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and What 
to Do for Robust Consumer Protection,” (December 2009), 58. 
1141 Tim McLaughlin, “Merrill Lynch’s Painful Lesson in Subprime,” Reuters News (August 16, 2007). 
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completely absent from the media coverage of the story. Similarly, in September of 2007, 
when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a 
lawsuit against First Franklin and ten other mortgage lenders for “singling out African-
Americans for costly subprime loans,” First Franklin’s parent at the time, Merrill Lynch, 
was not listed as one of the accused.1142  
As separate legal entities, parent companies can use their resources in assisting 
non-depository subsidiaries to take risks, without having to attach their name, image, 
financial health, or reputation to those risks. In short, the parent-operating subsidiary 
relationship encourages the perception that the parent plays no part in the subprime 
lending activities of its operating subsidiary. It provides legal, financial, and reputational 
protections to the parent, shielding it, at least to some extent, from the negative 
consequences that could accompany subprime lending operations. As Ronald Silverman 
notes, this curious relationship enabled parent depositories to participate in the subprime 
mortgage market in a “veiled capacity.”1143 Keeping this discussion of non-depository 
operating subsidiaries in mind, one can be in a better position to understand the serious 
consequences that eventually resulted from the widespread federal preemption of state 
consumer protection laws that occurred in the early 2000’s. As I will discuss below, 
federally chartered thrifts and national banks as well as their non-depository operating 
subsidiaries enjoyed federal preemption privileges. 
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3.6. How Involved Was Each Type of Lender in the Subprime Mortgage 
       Market? 
 
 Pinning down the precise amounts of subprime mortgage loans originated by each 
type of lender in the early 2000’s is a formidable task mainly because of the absence of a 
federally-recognized definition of the term “subprime.” Nevertheless, at least two 
different organizations, the Fed and the OCC, attempted to determine the extent to which 
national banks, thrifts, their non-depository operating subsidiaries, non-depository 
mortgage lending affiliates of holding companies, and independent lenders were involved 
in subprime lending at that time. Both sets of findings are worth exploring. 
 Let us begin with the Fed. In their December of 2010 report, “The 2009 HDMA 
Data: The Mortgage Market in a Time of Low Interest Rates and Economic Distress,” 
they looked at the amount of “higher-priced” loans that were originated by each type of 
lender from 2006 to 2009.1144 Non-depository, independent, state-regulated mortgage 
lenders originated 45.7% of higher-priced loans in 2006, 21.1% in 2007, 18.2% in 2008, 
and 20.8% in 2009.1145 Depositories, including national banks and thrifts, originated 
28.4% of higher-priced loans in 2006, 45.3% in 2007, 60.8% in 2008, and 70.6% in 
2009.1146 Finally, non-depository mortgage lending affiliates of holding companies, along 
with non-depository subsidiaries of national banks and thrifts, originated 25.9% of 
                                                 
1144 Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner, “The 2009 HDMA Data: 
The Mortgage Market in a Time of Low Interest Rates and Economic Distress,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(December 2010), available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2010/pdf/2009_HMDA_final.pdf. 
The Fed’s rationale for using the term “higher-priced loans” stems from their effort to include both 
subprime and Alt-A loans in their analysis, both of which tend to be more expensive for – and pose greater 
risks to – borrowers, when compared to prime loans. For the Fed’s definition of a “higher-priced loan” 
please see: Robert B. Avery, Neil Bhutta, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner, “The 2009 HDMA 
Data: The Mortgage Market in a Time of Low Interest Rates and Economic Distress,” A50. 
1145 Ibid., A65. 
1146 Ibid. 
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higher-priced loans in 2006, 33.6% in 2007, 21.0% in 2008, and 8.6% in 2009.1147 Over 
that four year span, non-depository independent mortgage companies originated 
1,791,462 higher-priced loans (33.9% of the total), national banks and thrifts originated 
2,107,087 higher-priced loans (39.8% of the total), and non-depository subsidiaries and 
non-depository mortgage lending affiliates originated 1,390,118 higher-priced loans 
(26.3% of the total).1148 Figures 4 and 5 summarize the Fed’s findings. 
 
Figure 4: Yearly Percentage of Higher-Priced Loans Originated By Each Type of 
Mortgage Lender from 2006-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1147 Ibid. 
1148 Ibid. 
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Figure 5: Overall Percentage of Higher-Priced Loans Originated by Each Type of 
Mortgage Lender Over the Course of 2006-2009 
 
 
 The OCC, for its part, “acquired a database developed and marketed by Loan 
Performance Corp.,” which it claims is “the premier data source on nonprime (that is, 
both subprime or B/C and Alt-A) mortgage activity.”1149 It is significant that, prior to 
unveiling the data gathered by Loan Performance Corp. (LPC), then-Comptroller of the 
Currency, John C. Dugan, warned that the actual identities of the lenders that originated 
the subprime and Alt-A mortgages under examination was “captured and presented 
inconsistently in the database.”1150 Nearly 43% of the loans examined by LPC had “no 
originator information,” while others had “ambiguous names,” and still others did not 
“adequately distinguish among affiliated entities with similar names.”1151 Dugan even 
conceded that some “significant subprime originators had a large number of loans in LPC 
for which it was difficult to determine whether the loans were originated by [a national] 
                                                 
1149 John C. Dugan, “Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Appendix B,” (April 8, 
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bank or by an affiliate within the larger holding company.”1152 Although “it was clear” to 
Dugan that, in each case, the subprime and Alt-A loans were originated somewhere 
within a given holding company, in many cases the exact originator of those loans could 
not be identified.1153 The LPC was able to “reliably” identify the originator of 
approximately five million subprime and Alt-A loans out of an undisclosed sample 
size.1154 
 These troubling preliminary qualifications aside, the OCC estimates that, from 
2005-2007, lenders regulated by the Fed originated 520,225 subprime and Alt-A loans 
(5.9% of the total),1155 lenders regulated exclusively by state governments originated 
5,241,481 subprime and Alt-A loans (60.0% of the total), lenders regulated by the FDIC 
(and state governments) originated 755,777 subprime and Alt-A loans (8.7% of the total), 
lenders regulated by the OTS originated 1,223,207 subprime and Alt-A loans (14.0% of 
the total), and lenders regulated by the OCC originated 999,262 subprime and Alt-A 
loans (11.4% of the total).1156  
 As a way of supplementing this discussion, one should consider the findings 
contained within a 2009 report published by The National Consumer Law Center 
(NCLC).1157 The NCLC, in an effort to dispel claims that federally chartered thrifts, 
national banks, and their non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries played a minimal 
                                                 
1152 Ibid. 
1153 Ibid.  
1154 Ibid., 4. 
1155 The LPC data does not differentiate between loans originated by affiliates of holding companies 
(exclusively regulated by the Fed) and those originated by state chartered national banks (regulated by the 
Fed and a state regulator). 
1156 John C. Dugan, “Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Appendix B,” 4. 
1157 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” National Consumer Law Center White Paper (September 2009), available at 
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role in originating subprime mortgages, focused on the number of “risky”1158 loans that 
these lenders originated in 2006, the peak year for subprime lending. The NCLC limited 
the scope of their investigation to a single year and did not compare their results to other 
types of lenders, like non-depository mortgage lending affiliates. These limitations aside, 
the NCLC found that federally chartered thrifts, national banks, and their non-depository 
mortgage lending subsidiaries were responsible for originating over $700 billion worth of 
the riskiest mortgages in 2006.1159 Those lenders originated 31.5% of all subprime loans, 
40.1% of all Alt-A loans, and 51% of all Option ARMS that year.1160 Having explored 
the extent to which each sort of lender was involved in originating risky mortgage loans, 
it is now necessary to examine these regulators’ relationships with one another as well as 
with their supervised lenders.  
 
3.7. Securitization: Creating Conditions for the Emergence of the Subprime 
       Mortgage Market 
 
Over the past three decades, there has been a major structural shift within the 
mortgage banking industry. For most of the twentieth century, “the bulk of mortgages” in 
America were originated by “deposit-taking institutions, such as thrifts and commercial 
banks.”1161 As recently as 1980, nearly three out of four home mortgages were funded by 
                                                 
1158 Subprime loans, Alt-A loans, and Option ARMs were all considered “risky” by the NCLC in their 
report. 
1159 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” 13. An Option ARM is a type of adjustable-rate mortgage that grants borrowers some 
temporary loan repayment options. When the first mortgage payment is due, a borrower has the option of 
paying an amount equal to the monthly principle and interest, interest-only, or a minimum monthly 
payment. Please see: Eric M. Thorson, “Statement Before the United States Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations,” (April 16, 2010), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov, 4. 
1160 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
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1161 The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, “Credit, Capital, and Communities: The 
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customer deposits.1162 As mortgage lenders, thrifts and national banks would “borrow” 
money from their depositors and then loan those funds to qualified mortgage borrowers 
for the sake of purchasing a home.1163 The mortgages that these depositories originated 
were typically of the 30 year, fixed-rated variety and were held on their own books until 
the loans were repaid in full through refinance, sale of the property, or loan 
amortization.1164 Depositories were able to make a profit as mortgage lenders if they 
could consistently pull off the difficult juggling act of lending the customer-deposited 
funds to mortgage borrowers at a higher rate of interest than what they agreed to pay in 
interest to the depositors themselves. As intermediaries between investors (the 
depositors) and borrowers, depositories had to offer a competitive rate of return to their 
investors in exchange for borrowing their money and a competitive interest rate on the 
mortgages that they offered to potential borrowers. 
 As Lewis Renieri explains, however, in the “mid to late 1970’s, people started to 
worry about whether… [thrifts] would be able to fund the growing demand for 
housing.”1165 Housing economists “were forecasting a tremendous demand for funds for 
shelter” because “the baby boomers were reaching home-buying ages.”1166 This 
anticipated baby-boomer demand, complemented by the serious problems that were 
plaguing thrifts in the 1960’s and 1970’s, raised doubts about “the ability of thrifts to 
                                                 
1162 Ibid. 
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fund housing,”1167 and paved the way for “one of the most important and abiding 
innovations to emerge in [the] financial markets since the 1930’s”1168: securitization. 
 Securitization, a term that The Wall Street Journal did not even consider to be a 
real word in 1977,1169 is “[the] process of packaging individual loans and other debt 
instruments, converting the package into a security or securities, and enhancing their 
credit status or rating to further their sale to third-party investors.”1170 It “converts illiquid 
individual loans or debt instruments which cannot be sold readily to third party investors 
into liquid, marketable securities.”1171 Another broad, potentially helpful definition of 
securitization is “the substitution of more efficient public capital markets for less 
efficient, high cost, financial intermediaries in the funding of debt instruments.”1172 
 Briefly, the process of securitization begins with a mortgage lender bundling its 
loans and selling them to “a separately incorporated affiliate or an investment bank.”1173 
The buyer of this bundle, the arranger, then sells it to “second legally separate entity, 
which is known as a ‘special purpose vehicle’ or ‘SPV’,” which is typically a trust.1174 
The two main justifications for selling pools of mortgages to a SPV are that it “shields the 
loans from seizure under U.S. bankruptcy laws in case the lender goes bankrupt” and it 
serves as a form of credit enhancement. By selling pools of mortgages to a separate legal 
entity, it distances the pool from the possibility of lender bankruptcy, which helps it 
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“qualify for a higher credit rating from the rating agencies.”1175 Once the bundles are 
“ensconced in a trust” or SPV, the arranger “repackages the monthly principal and 
interest payments from the loans into bonds, parcels out the bonds to an array of tranches 
with different credit risks, and sells the bonds to investors.”1176 These bonds are known as 
mortgage-backed securities “because they are backed by collateral in the form of the 
mortgages on the borrowers’ homes.”1177 
It is far beyond the scope of this work to provide a thorough exploration of the 
history of securitization and the important changes in the mortgage banking industry that 
it helped eventuate.1178 For the purposes of the present study though, one should note that 
the advent of securitization in the late 1970’s increasingly reduced “the need to hold 
deposits (or other sources of cash) to fund mortgage loans because investors… replace[d] 
deposits as the source of funds” for mortgages.1179 In essence, securitization created new 
“channels” of funding, linking a previously untapped national and, eventually, global 
pool of investors to borrowers who were interested in attaining a home mortgage loan.  
The primary reason that securitization did a superior job “connecting” lenders to 
investors was that it helped ameliorate the problem of adverse selection. Prior to the 
advent of securitization, investors “were afraid that banks, who knew their mortgages 
better, would sell only the bad mortgages and keep the better mortgages on their own 
                                                 
1175 Ibid. 
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1178 For an excellent treatment of these subjects, please see the previously cited: A Primer on Securitization. 
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balance sheets.”1180 The suboptimal result due to this information asymmetry1181 was that 
there was a latent pool of investor funds that was not flowing towards the financing of 
home mortgages. By securitizing mortgages, bundling them together into securities, and 
then having the riskiness of those securities evaluated by a third party (the credit rating 
agencies), lenders and investment banks were able to make mortgage loans a more 
attractive investment opportunity. 
In addition to benefitting the good of homeownership in this way, securitization 
also addressed two severe disadvantages that accompanied the way in which depositories 
served as mortgage lenders. When depositories were the predominant mortgage lenders 
up until the 1980’s, their depositors were the “investors” whose capital was used to fund 
their mortgage loans. One of the main drawbacks of this method of financing mortgages 
was that the investor pool was overwhelmingly local. A thrift or commercial bank’s 
standard customer was primarily an individual who lived near one of their branch 
locations. From the perspective of mortgage lenders, securitization refreshed their supply 
of lending capital in previously unavailable ways because investments banks now had 
access to a much larger set of investors, each with their own tastes for risk, desires for 
short or long term debt, and appetites for fixed or adjustable interest rate payments. With 
a wider and more varied source of investor funds, investment banks could purchase a 
more diverse array of loans from mortgage lenders. These lenders could now, in turn, 
offer a more variegated set of mortgage products to better meet the needs of 
                                                 
1180 David G. Tarr, “The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures that Caused the U.S. Financial Crisis: 
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borrowers.1182 Subsequently, securitization buffeted investors with an unprecedented set 
of mortgage investment opportunities, while increasing the probability that a borrower in 
America could attain a home mortgage loan.  
A second disadvantage to depositories funding mortgages through the deposits of 
their customers centers on the issue of risk. As former Freddie Mac CEO Leland 
Brendsel observed in 1996, “The history of housing finance in the United States has been 
punctuated with a series of cataclysmic failures brought by excessive exposure to 
interest-rate and credit risks.”1183 Interest rate risk is the “exposure to possible losses and 
changes in value” brought about by changes in market interest rates, while credit risk is 
“the risk of loss that arises when borrowers fail to repay their loans, other parties fail to 
meet their obligations to administer or guarantee loans, or both.”1184 
Prior to the advent and growth of securitization, depositories that were funding 
mortgage loans had to assume both of those forms of risk themselves. With respect to 
interest rate risk, depositories were vulnerable to hikes in market interest rates, which 
could potentially cause them to be funding long-term, fixed-rate mortgages with an 
interest rate that was suddenly lower than the one that they were impelled to offer on 
customer deposits. An example may be helpful here. If the market interest rate at a given 
time is 4%, a depository would want to offer its customers an interest rate on their 
deposits circulating around 4% in order to attract their business. Then, the depository 
could aspire to lend money to prospective home buyers at, say, 5%. Obviously, the 
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depository’s goal is to lend money to home buyers at a higher rate of interest than the one 
at which they are paying out to their depositors.  
The two principle dangers inherent in this lending and borrowing strategy were 
that depositories were not able to predict or control the market interest rates and, 
furthermore, they were “lending long” and “borrowing short.” The latter danger is a form 
of “duration mismatch,” which is a situation that occurs when one has asset durations that 
are greater than one’s liability durations.1185 As Catherine England makes clear, the 
success of depositories acting as mortgage lenders in this way depends upon stable 
market interest rates over a long period of time.1186 The undesirable effects of this form of 
duration mismatch, namely that one is paying customers more money in interest on their 
deposits than one is receiving from borrowers on their mortgage payments, can be 
somewhat minimized if market interest rates are unstable, for borrowers may potentially 
sell or refinance their homes before the thirty years have elapsed.1187 Nevertheless, 
interest-rate risk persists even if it can be camouflaged by stable interest rates for a 
particular period of time. 
One of the most important common assumptions about mortgage securitization, 
prior to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, was that it was a superior allocator 
of the burdens of credit and interest rate risk. For instance, mortgage securitization 
enabled the “interest-rate risk of mortgages [to be] borne by thousands of investors,”1188 
disbursing it among a wide array of parties. When depositories were the largest mortgage 
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lenders before the creation of securitization, interest rate risk was “concentrated in a few 
institutions or one industry, as it was for decades in the thrift industry.”1189 As for credit 
risk, securitization permitted mortgage lenders to diversify it “across the nation” and 
eventually internationally, rather than confine it “in local markets” like regions and cities, 
which depositories were prone to do.1190 Not only did mortgage securitization diversify 
the credit and interest rate risks posed by lending funds for mortgages, it also diffused 
those risks among individuals who were supposedly better equipped to manage them. 
In more general terms, securitization “unbundled” the mortgage loan process, 
enabling different types of companies to specialize in separate functions.1191 
Traditionally, depositories would manage the financing, originating, servicing, and risk-
taking functions that were part of providing mortgage loans to borrowers. Securitization, 
conversely, allowed: investors to specialize in mortgage-related investments; investment 
banks and the government-sponsored enterprises to specialize in bundling and 
securitizing disparate mortgages, thereby creating investment opportunities and 
replenishing capital for mortgage loans; credit rating agencies to specialize in assessing 
the credit risks of the securitized mortgage products; lenders to specialize in originating 
mortgages; brokers to specialize in assisting borrowers with the loan application and loan 
approval processes; and servicers to specialize in managing and collecting mortgage 
payments from borrowers.1192 
The purpose of this small section was not to illustrate how securitization converts 
illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities. Instead, the objective was to provide a brief 
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explanation of why mortgage securitization supplanted deposit-taking/deposit-loaning as 
the primary method of financing home mortgages. Mortgage securitization diluted 
interest rate and credit risk, the key risks accompanying mortgage lending, while opening 
up new avenues for mortgage investing and borrowing. Additionally, securitization 
created conditions for the division of the mortgage loan process into separate functional 
areas that afforded opportunities for each participant in the process to specialize in a 
particular segment of it. Much of the core argument of this section can summarized this 
way: 
The securitization process has allowed Wall Street to more efficiently 
finance Main Street, bringing capital from securities markets to loan  
originators, relieving them of the need to finance and maintain loans on 
their balance sheets. Further, by effectively splitting the ownership of loans  
into many smaller units – through the sale of securities – the [securitization]  
process was thought to diversify credit risk more widely across national and, 
indeed, global capital markets rather than concentrate that risk on the balance 
sheets of the institutions that originated the loans.1193 
 
By 1994, 55.8% of all mortgages in the United States were securitized, a figure that 
jumped to 74.2% by 2007.1194 It is now necessary to examine other preconditions that set 
the stage for the subprime lending boom. 
 
3.8. Deregulatory Preconditions for the Explosion in Subprime Lending 
 
 Since the establishment of national banks in 1864 by the National Bank Act 
(NBA), the existence of federally chartered and regulated depository institutions has 
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posed an important regulatory problem. Due to the fact that these institutions have to 
conduct business within state lines, what happens if their business operations conflict 
with a state law, but are in compliance with the requirements that are enforced by their 
federal regulator? In the event of a conflict, should individual state laws trump the 
regulations of the OCC and OTS? Or should the federal regulations preempt the laws of 
the states?  
 According to the Supremacy Clause that is found in Article VI, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution, federal law is the supreme law of the land and supersedes 
state laws, should the two conflict with one another.1195 Somewhat surprisingly, from the 
time the NBA was enacted in 1864 up until 1978, “state laws governing contracts, 
property rights and transfers, consumer protection, and other laws” applied to the 
activities of depositories. During this time, federal conflict preemption was “a narrow 
exception to the general rule that national banks were expected to follow state laws.”1196 
To substantiate this claim, consider part of an 1869 Supreme Court ruling in the case 
National Bank v. Commonwealth: 
 [National banks] are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in 
their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the 
nation. All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their 
acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts, and 
their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law. It is only when 
            the State law incapacitates the banks from discharging their duties 
            to the government that it becomes unconstitutional.1197 
 
Federally chartered depositories had “rarely been permitted to ignore state law” and only 
then if the state laws had “prevented or significantly interfered with… [the] exercise of 
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their powers.”1198 One could argue that this trend had its roots in the tenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”1199 Beginning in 1978, however, a landmark Supreme Court decision, 
followed a few years later by the passing of two congressional laws, began to chip away 
at the tenth amendment bulwark that had been previously protecting state laws from 
federal preemption, particularly those of the consumer protection variety. Coincidentally, 
this same series of developments paved the way for subprime mortgage lending decades 
later.  
 The first important event was the 1978 Supreme Court ruling in the case 
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp. In their seminal ruling, the 
Supreme Court interpreted “the National Bank Act to hold that the applicable state 
interest rate cap governing lending by national banks was the interest rate law of the 
bank’s home state, even for loans made to consumers in other states.”1200 The ruling 
focused on credit card lending, but “it was not limited to any credit product type.”1201 
 This Supreme Court decision enabled national banks to “establish their 
headquarters in states with high usury limits – or none at all – and charge the high interest 
rates permitted by the bank’s home state to borrowers located in any other state.”1202 The 
ruling was dubbed “the exportation doctrine” because a national bank could “export” its 
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“own home state laws governing interest rates” to other states.1203 Two prominent 
examples of states taking advantage of this ruling were South Dakota and Delaware, both 
of which eliminated their state usury caps altogether. In 8 years, from 1980 to 1987, 
South Dakota’s revenues from its banks increased 750%, while Delaware’s increased 
over 1,500%.1204 
 Far from only being a boon for national banks whose headquarters were in 
Delaware and South Dakota, the ruling empowered national banks across the nation, 
profoundly increasing their negotiating leverage with their own state legislatures. 
National banks began putting pressure on state governments to ease or eliminate 
consumer protection laws on the grounds that complying with those laws “put them at a 
competitive disadvantage with out-of-state banks.”1205 With the precedent being set in 
South Dakota and Delaware, national banks could now threaten to move their 
headquarters to another state, depriving their current state of taxable revenue and jobs. 
Ultimately, national banks with credit card operations eventually “either moved to states 
with no interest rate caps, or convinced their home state to deregulate.”1206 
 The second important development came in 1980, when Congress passed The 
Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA) in response to the 
sharp increase in 30 year, fixed-rate conventional mortgage interest rates that reached as 
high as 13.77% that year.1207 DIDA “completely removed state interest rate caps” for 
                                                 
1203 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” 6. 
1204 Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart, “The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional 
Home Mortgages,” 6. 
1205 Ibid., 5. 
1206 National Consumer Law Center, “Preemption and Regulatory Reform: Restore the States’ Role as 
‘First Responder’,” 6. 
1207 Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart, “The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional 
Home Mortgages,” 5. 
222 
 
national banks, federal credit unions, and thrifts “issuing loans secured by first mortgages 
on homes.”1208 The law also “preempted state limitations on a lender’s ability to assess 
‘points,’ ‘finance charges,’ or ‘other charges.’”1209 Furthermore, DIDA “gave all 
federally chartered or federally insured depository lenders – not just national banks – the 
right to export their home-state interest rates when lending to consumers in other 
states.”1210 The third development occurred in 1982, when Congress passed The 
Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA). This act primarily addressed 
the structure of mortgage loan products. AMPTA “removed states’ abilities to limit terms 
on ‘alternative’ mortgages”1211 including negative amortization loans as well as those 
with variable interest rates or containing balloon payments.1212  
Taken together, along with the revolutionary invention of securitization, these 
developments “set the legal stage for the emergence of the subprime mortgage market” in 
the 1990’s because they liberalized “the permissible features of loan products” and 
facilitated “differential pricing according to risk.”1213 Federally chartered national banks 
and thrifts offering loans secured by first mortgages suddenly had the freedom to offer 
riskier products to an expanded pool of borrowers because the features and interest rates 
of these products were determined by one state, their headquartered state, instead of by 
all of the separate states in which they conducted business. As Souphala Chomsisengphet 
and Anthony Pennington-Cross observe, “Many factors have contributed to the growth 
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of subprime lending. Most fundamentally, it became legal.”1214 It is now necessary to 
discuss perhaps the most important deregulatory precondition for the explosion of 
subprime lending: widespread federal preemption of state consumer protection laws. 
 
3.9. OTS and OCC Federal Preemption: A Boon for Subprime Lenders, A Liability 
for Borrowers 
 
Although the OTS issued its pervasive federal preemption regulations in 1996, the 
agency preempted a minimal amount of state laws for seven subsequent years.1215 Thus, 
despite being the first agency to adopt federal preemption, the latent dangers of this 
power managed to remain largely undetected during the nascent stages of the subprime 
boom in the early 2000’s.1216 One could argue that, in 2003, those dangers, along with the 
others that accompanied the federal deregulation efforts over the previous two decades, 
finally began to materialize. 
 In 2001, subprime lenders originated $180 billion worth of subprime mortgages, a 
number that increased nearly 34% to $241 billion in 2002,1217 which was more than the 
entire gross domestic product of Sweden.1218 As subprime loan originations increased, so 
too did the number of consumer complaints about - and state responses to - predatory 
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lending practices.1219 One notable state government reaction to the surge in predatory 
lending accusations was in the state of Georgia. In 2002, Georgia’s state government 
passed The Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), which “imposed unlimited, unconditional 
assignee liability on anyone who became an assignee or a holder of a mortgage loan.”1220 
Provocatively, GFLA allowed borrowers in Georgia who believed that they had been 
“victims of predatory lending to sue not only the original lender but also anyone who 
later buys the mortgage.”1221 This provision virtually shut down the subprime mortgage 
market in Georgia because the major credit rating agencies refused to rate mortgage-
backed securities containing high risk loans. Without credit ratings, many investors were 
prohibited from investing in these mortgage-backed securities, which eliminated the 
securities’ liquidity.1222 In short, investors ceased investing in subprime mortgage-backed 
securities that contained loans that were originated in Georgia, so lenders in the state cut 
back on originating them. Early the next year, the New York state government passed 
predatory lending laws of its own that became effective on April 1, 2003. 
 As Donald C. Lampe observes, these and other state anti-predatory lending laws 
gave rise to an important question: “Do state and local high-cost home loan or ‘predatory 
lending’ laws interfere with or obstruct basic banking and lending functions and/or the 
dominion of federal regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
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(OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)?”1223 Lampe’s question resists a simple 
answer because DIDA and AMPTA legalized many of the features of loans that are 
considered to be predatory. Moreover, as Diana McMonagle makes clear, in order to 
know whether a loan is predatory or not, one needs to grasp the lender’s intent behind 
originating the loan, a piece of information that can be difficult to attain.1224 A predatory 
loan, for example, could be one in which a lender is attempting to “profit from 
intentionally and systematically taking advantage of unsophisticated borrowers,” and 
purposefully structuring loans to “cause economic harm to the borrower – at a significant 
profit to the lender.”1225 Defining the term “predatory lending” or a “predatory loan” in a 
way that is neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive is essential to discerning whether a 
state anti-predatory law or group of laws interferes with the legitimate business 
operations of federally chartered depositories and the activities of their regulators within 
state lines.1226 
 This caveat aside, the OTS announced in 2003 that they were going to preempt 
both Georgia’s and New York’s state predatory lending laws for federally chartered 
thrifts and their operating subsidiaries.1227 A few months later, the director of the OTS at 
the time, James Gilleran, along with three other federal banking regulators, “posed for 
photographers behind a stack of papers wrapped in red tape.”1228 While the other 
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regulators held garden shears, Gilleran “hefted a chain saw.”1229 The message was clear: 
the OTS would imminently serve as a “safe zone” for federal thrifts against the panoply 
of state lending laws.1230 
To put this decision in perspective, one should note that, in 2002, the OTS was 
left “reeling” from the embarrassing failure of one of its chartered thrifts, Superior Bank. 
This failure was mostly due to the thrift’s large scale origination and securitization of 
subprime loans.1231 Soon after this failure, rumors began to circulate that the OTS “might 
be ripe for abolition.”1232 The OTS, therefore, had a compelling reason to issue its 
preemption pronouncement in 2003. By easing state regulatory restraints on its chartered 
thrifts and their non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries, the OTS could entice 
national and state banks to switch their charter and become federally chartered thrifts. 
The more federally chartered thrifts that the OTS had under its watch, the more relevant 
and vital the agency would seem in the eyes of the federal government.1233 
In response to the OTS preemption pronouncement, national banks and their 
mortgage lending subsidiaries began lobbying their federal regulator, the OCC, “to afford 
them the same relief as thrifts.”1234 Burdened by “a patchwork of different and sometimes 
demanding states laws,” the national banks and their mortgage lending subsidiaries 
contended that they were now at a competitive disadvantage and the victims of uneven 
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regulation.1235 They were subjected to onerous “compliance costs and litigation risks” 
from which federally chartered thrifts and their subsidiaries were exempt.1236 For 
instance, a California state law that mandated a minimum payment warning to borrowers 
imposed $44 million in start-up costs on six national banks, costs that OTS-regulated 
lenders could now ignore.1237 Another example can be found in 2002 when 38 states 
settled with the national bank, Household Finance, for $484 million over the bank’s 
“predatory, deceptive and fraudulent practices.”1238 As explained by Colin Provost, the 
director of the OCC, John D. Hawke, knew that if state consumer protection laws 
continued to apply to national banks and their subsidiaries, then “the OCC might lose 
some of its banks to the more relaxed thrift charter.”1239 
 Within months of the OTS announcement, the OCC determined, in August of 
2003, that the National Bank Act “preempted the GFLA as applied to national banks and 
their subsidiaries.”1240 At the same time, the OCC proposed another regulation that 
eventually went into effect on January 7, 2004. This regulation preempted “all state 
predatory lending laws… as applied to national banks” and their operating 
subsidiaries.1241 Although the OCC adopted a rule later in 2004 that banned “unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices and mortgages made without regard to borrower’s ability to 
repay,” perhaps in an effort to fill the consumer protection void created by its widespread 
federal preemption, the rule nevertheless did not “explicate what constituted an unfair or 
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deceptive lending act or practice.”1242 Furthermore, the rule “allowed national banks to 
‘use any reasonable method to determine a borrower’s ability to repay, including, for 
example… credit history, or other relevant factors.’”1243 As Patricia McCoy and Kathleen 
Engel argue, this provision created a space for OCC-regulated lenders to construe 
“qualifying borrowers solely based on their credit scores for low-doc and no-doc loans” 
as a “reasonable” practice.1244 As for the OTS, they never adopted any “binding rules on 
sound loan underwriting” for their regulated thrifts and mortgage lending subsidiaries to 
replace those state lending laws that they preempted.1245 
Collectively, the OTS and OCC regulations permitted federally chartered thrifts, 
national banks, and their respective mortgage lending subsidiaries to originate mortgage 
loans without regard to a host of state laws including: 
 [L]icensing, registration, or reporting by creditors; the ability of a creditor 
to require or obtain insurance for collateral or other credit enhancement 
or risk mitigant; loan-to-value ratios; the terms of credit, including the 
schedule for repayment of principal and interest, amortization of loans, 
balance, payments due, minimum payments, term to maturity of the  
loan, or the ability to call the loan due and payable upon the passage of 
time or a specified event external to the loan; escrow or similar accounts; 
security property; access to and use of credit reports; disclosure and 
advertising requirements in credit application forms, credit solicitations, 
billing statement, credit contracts, or other related documents;  
disbursements and repayments; rates of interest; the aggregate amount 
of funds that can be loaned upon the security of real estate; 
processing, origination, servicing, sale, or purchase of, investment 
in, or participation in mortgages… and covenants and restrictions that 
must be contained in a lease to make it qualify as acceptable security 
for a real estate loan.1246 
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This newly established reach of OCC preemption elicited “pronounced public outcry,” 
especially among state enforcement authorities and consumer advocates, because for over 
a century individual states had jurisdiction over consumer protection issues.1247 A 
statement published by the NCLC in October of 2003 pointed out that Congress expressly 
“delegated to the OCC the task of supervising national banks and protecting their 
viability by making sure that they do not engage in unsafe and unsound practices.”1248 
Similarly, Congress “created the OTS exclusively for the purpose of regulating the thrift 
industry, and expected the strong hand of the OTS to provide stability for the thrifts.”1249  
Ensuring the safety and soundness of national banks and thrifts, protecting them 
from failure, was the original, congressionally-granted responsibility assigned, 
respectively, to the OCC and the OTS. Congress never authorized either of the federal 
regulators to serve as consumer protection agencies.1250 Even if the OCC and OTS 
happened to be better suited for protecting consumers from predatory lending practices 
than individual state governments,1251 protecting consumers can be costly to national 
banks, thrifts, and their mortgage lending subsidiaries.1252 As a result, if the OCC or OTS 
“took actions simply for the protection of the customers,” and those actions had a 
negative impact on the profitability of their national banks or thrifts, the two federal 
regulators could potentially violate their statutory authority to the ensure safety and 
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soundness of their national banks and thrifts.1253 Paradoxically, while fostering the 
profitability of national banks and thrifts is an integral part of ensuring their safety and 
soundness, safeguarding sufficient consumer protections can be costly to those same 
lenders, thus impinging upon their profitability and, potentially, increasing the likelihood 
of their failure. If the OCC and OTS’ primary regulatory objective is to ensure the safety 
and soundness of their national banks and thrifts, then, first and foremost, this entails 
protecting their profitability.1254 
This tension between two conceivably conflicting objectives, ensuring the safety 
and soundness of their chartered institutions and protecting consumers, was heightened 
by an additional factor: the “customers” of the OCC and OTS are their chartered 
institutions. The OCC and OTS “pay for their operations from the chartering, annual, and 
examination fees” that they collect from their chartered national banks and thrifts.1255 The 
larger and more numerous their chartered institutions are, the more revenue the OTS and 
OCC receive. One result of this arrangement was that the two federal regulators had to 
compete against one another – and the individual state regulators – for their charters.1256 
In general, depositories face relatively low charter-switching costs. This put them 
in a position to “exploit differences in [federal] agency policy by seeking to be chartered 
by the agency with the most relaxed regulations,”1257 a technique that Sheila Bair, 
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Chairman of the FDIC, called “regulatory arbitrage.”1258 On average, both the OTS and 
OCC charge their chartered institutions higher fees than individual state regulators1259 
because the latter are subsidized by the FDIC and the Fed.1260 Unable to compete with 
state governments on the amount that they charged their “customers” in fees, the OTS 
and OCC established their competitive advantage by making their regulations uniform 
(applicable in all states) and expanding the scope of their chartered institutions’ permitted 
activities.1261 Federal preemption engendered both of those advantages, which appealed 
to large depositories with “coast-to-coast operations that found it inconvenient to comply 
with fifty state laws.”1262 
Competition between the OTS and OCC was exacerbated by the way in which the 
banking industry in general, and the subprime lending industry in particular, became 
progressively concentrated in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. From 1993 to 1997, 21% of 
depositories were acquired in a merger or acquisition.1263 Between 1990 and 2005, “74 
‘megamergers’ occurred involving banks with assets of more than $10 billion each… 
[and] the largest [depositories] jumped from owning 25% of the industry’s assets to 
55%.”1264 In terms of the subprime lending industry, “the market share of the top 25 firms 
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making subprime loans grew from 39.3 percent in 1995 to over 90 percent in 2003.”1265 
With increasingly less depositories to charter, and many depositories growing in size, 
acute pressure was placed on the OCC and OTS to win over as many depositories to their 
respective charters as they could manage. The best way to accomplish this goal was to 
offer depositories “a bigger menu of legally permissible banking activities and gentler 
regulation and laws.”1266  
The effects of the OCC preemption regulations were immediate. As a 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states, “the share of assets divided 
among federally chartered and state-chartered banks remained relatively steady for [the] 
decade” preceding the OCC preemption regulations.1267 National banks during this time 
held an average of 56% of all bank assets, while state banks held an average of 44%.1268 
Beginning in 2004, however, “the share of assets of banks with a federal charter 
increased to 67 percent, and the share of bank assets of banks with state charters 
decreased to 33 percent.”1269 Two of the largest depositories to switch from a state to 
federal charter soon after the OCC preemption regulations took effect were JPMorgan 
Chase and HSBC. After those two depositories changed their charters, one state regulator 
instantaneously lost approximately 30% of its revenue.1270  
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This loss prompted the GAO to analyze the funding information of two other 
states to “estimate how a change to the federal charter by the largest state bank in each 
state” would affect those state regulators’ budgets.1271 The results of their investigation 
were unsettling: the first state’s revenue would decrease by 43 percent if its largest 
chartered ban switched to a federal charter, while the second state’s revenue would 
decrease by 39 percent.1272 As the majority of the largest state-chartered depositories 
operated in multiple states, many state officials feared that those institutions would be 
tempted to switch to a federal charter, for it would make it easier and less costly for them 
to conduct business.1273 Even if state regulators maintained their “predatory lending laws 
in the face of preemption,” only state-chartered institutions would bear the costs, creating 
a powerful incentive for those institutions to change to an OCC or OTS federal 
charter.1274 
Accordingly, in order to remain competitive with the OCC and OTS, 46 states 
adopted parity laws that granted “state-chartered banks the same powers given to national 
banks.”1275 This surprising decision resulted in those states repealing their “own stringent 
consumer protection laws against state-based subprime mortgage lenders.”1276 As odd as 
it might seem, since national banks were permitted to ignore state consumer protection 
laws, and 46 states chose to recognize their chartered banks as legally equivalent to 
national banks, those state-chartered banks could now disregard their own state’s 
consumer protection laws. As Kevin Stein, the associate director of the California 
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Reinvestment Coalition observed, “It was a legislative and regulatory race to the 
bottom.”1277 
As one could easily predict, this deregulatory chain-reaction had a devastating 
impact on subprime borrowers that had been the victims of predatory lending abuses. As 
Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel explain, federal preemption “prevented borrowers 
who received loans from national banks, federal savings associations, or their subsidiaries 
from suing their lenders for lending abuses under state laws.”1278 Numerous borrowers 
who contacted federal call centers to voice their complaints about the lending activities of 
a national bank, thrift, or mortgage lending subsidiary were frequently met with 
indifference. The OCC handled “all consumer complaints filed against national banks 
through a single call center,” one whose staff represented “less than two percent of the 
OCC’s total workforce.”1279 The federal regulator set aside a little over one percent of its 
operating budget in 2005 to fund all of the call center’s operations.1280 Aggrieved 
borrowers who called the center were told that “only a court of law can resolve ‘factual or 
contractual disputes between the bank and the customer.’”1281 As a result, the call center 
advised consumers that if “your case involves such a dispute… you [should] consult an 
attorney for assistance.”1282 That same year, in 2005, the OCC reported that its 
“‘customer assistance group’ employed a grand total of three people whose job primarily 
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involved investigating and resolving consumer complaints.”1283 As Arthur Wilmarth, Jr. 
concludes, the OCC did not view itself as “a vigorous defender of consumer rights” and 
had a supervisory and examination process that did not “establish any formal procedures 
for granting relief to injured borrowers.”1284 As for the OTS, it did not have a centralized 
consumer protection branch as late as 2005 and perhaps even later than that.1285 
In the absence of robust consumer protection laws, by default “the law” became 
the terms and conditions that were contained in the mortgage loan contracts between 
lenders and borrowers.1286 These contracts were “contracts of adhesion, meaning the 
consumer cannot negotiate the printed terms.”1287 They were crafted exclusively by the 
lenders, with no borrower input. The lone borrower “protection” in this case was the 
borrowers’ diligence in scrutinizing their loan contracts. The unspoken notion of “caveat 
emptor,” then, was essentially the last remaining subprime borrower protection in place 
by 2004.1288 The National Consumer Law Center argued that even if this form of 
protection happened to be adequate, it was still “inappropriate” because its core message 
to borrowers is “assume that all business people are out to cheat you until proven 
otherwise.”1289 
One of the other main weaknesses of relying too heavily upon the “buyer beware” 
form of subprime borrower protection is that it tends to discount the fact that the 
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subprime mortgage market is mostly a “push market,” one in which “armies of 
telemarketers, brokers, and loan officers target borrowers and solicit business.”1290 In 
2006, the GAO gathered information from a variety of sources, including “federal and 
state banking regulators, consumer groups, and the mortgage industry,” in order to 
conduct an examination on alternative mortgage product (AMP) trends and their risks to 
lenders and borrowers.1291 The GAO reviewed a pool of marketing materials issued by 
subprime lenders and asserted that “they may not clearly provide information to inform 
consumers about the potential risks” of the mortgage products.1292 The GAO offered a 
few examples to support their claim: 
For example, one advertisement we reviewed promoted a low initial                 
interest rate and low monthly mortgage payments without clarifying that             
the low interest rate would not last the full term of the loan. In other cases, 
promotional materials emphasized the benefits of AMPs without            
effectively explaining the associated risks. Some advertising, for example, 
emphasized loans with low monthly payment options without effectively 
disclosing the possibility of interest rate changes or mortgage payment     
increases. One print advertisement we reviewed for a payment-option ARM 
emphasized the benefit of a low initial interest rate but noted in small print         
on its second page that the low initial rate applied only to the first month              
of the loan and could increase or decrease thereafter.1293 
The GAO further discovered that, in general, the mortgage disclosures that they reviewed 
“did not conform to leading practices in the federal government, such as key ‘plain 
English’ principles for readability or design.”1294 In fact, the GAO found that the 
disclosures were primarily “written with language too complex for many adults to fully 
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understand.”1295 Finally, the GAO argued that the majority of the disclosures “used small, 
hard-to-read typeface, which when combined with an ineffective use of white space and 
headings, made them even more difficult to read and buried key information.”1296 
 The “caveat emptor” form of borrower protection also discounts the fact that 
subprime lenders could falsify the borrower’s loan applications by forging signatures, 
backdating documents, misstating the borrower’s income level, and implementing a 
variety of other techniques.1297 Lenders servicing their mortgages after closing could also 
prey upon borrowers by soliciting multiple and detrimental refinancings, charging 
excessive late fees, and subjecting them to abusive collection practices.1298 
 Overall, the deterioration of consumer protection laws for borrowers obtaining 
subprime mortgages came at the most inopportune time. Angelo Mozilo, former CEO of 
what ended up being the largest subprime lender,1299 Countrywide Financial, looked back 
on the climate of the mortgage lending market in the early 2000’s and characterized it as 
being dominated by a “gold rush mentality.”1300 In a moment of profound clarity, Mozilo 
stated, “Housing suddenly went from being part of the American dream to house my 
family… [and then] it became a commodity. That was a change in the culture… It was 
sudden, unexpected.”1301 This commoditizing of housing was present, for example, in 
Countrywide’s decision to partner with other firms, like American Airlines and Hilton 
Hotels, to offer borrowers reward points or airline miles that could be redeemed for free 
                                                 
1295 Ibid., 9. 
1296 Ibid. 
1297 National Consumer Law Center, “Comments on Behalf of Low Income Clients Regarding Petition for 
Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Laws.” 
1298 Ibid. 
1299 The Center for Public Integrity, Who’s Behind the Financial Meltdown: The Top 25 Subprime Lenders 
and Their Wall Street Backers, 51. 
1300 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 5. 
1301 Ibid., 6. Italics mine. 
238 
 
hotel stays or flights, in exchange for taking out a home equity line of credit loan.1302 
Countrywide even had a promotion in which they offered “double rewards” for a limited 
time.1303 Another example can be found in Countrywide’s decision to offer borrowers 
home equity lines of credit worth up to 100 percent of the value of their home, a product 
“with the same conveniences of a credit card, but with a much lower interest rate.”1304 In 
a later section, Countrywide’s lending practices will be examined in greater detail. 
To summarize, when state consumer protection laws were displaced by federal 
preemption, the subprime lending market became a financial minefield for many 
borrowers. This sentiment was stated succinctly by attorney Irv Ackelsberg in 2007: 
The subprime mortgage market has, for the last decade, grown at an 
astronomical rate. This growth has been fueled in large part by a 
collapse in underwriting practices and responsible lending principles; 
by a sales-pressured, get-rich-quick environment that has infected the 
market with blatant fraud and abuse, and a regulatory apparatus that has 
abdicated its traditional role to protect the American consumer from 
exploitive lending practices… To put it bluntly, mortgage origination 
practices have been run over by the pursuit of profits at any cost.1305 
 
The rampant federal preemption measures that the OCC and OTS initiated were never 
supplemented by rigorous consumer protection regulations,1306 a turn of events that left 
borrowers particularly susceptible to deceptive and pernicious lending practices 
employed by thrifts, national banks, and their operating subsidiaries. 
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3.10. The OCC and OTS: The Question of Safety and Soundness 
Turning away from the question of how well the OCC and OTS were able to 
serve as consumer protection agencies during the early 2000’s, one may be curious about 
the extent to which the two regulators were able to ensure the safety and soundness of the 
lenders under their supervision that were originating subprime mortgages. With a 
plethora of depositories and mortgage lending subsidiaries under their regulatory 
oversight, some of which switched charters during this time, the scope of this question is 
unmanageably vast. Still, one can acquire at least a sense of the quality of the two 
regulators’ safety and soundness regulation by briefly looking at the deregulatory 
environment that they created and a few of the decisions that were made by some of their 
largest subprime lenders right before the crisis began to unfold in 2007. 
 As federally chartered depositories and their operating subsidiaries began 
originating more and more risky subprime mortgage loans in the early 2000’s, both the 
OCC and OTS made the curious decision to address this risk by issuing “advisory 
guidances… [instead of] binding regulations.”1307 It is a puzzling fact that both federal 
regulators had an aversion to “dictating underwriting standards to lenders,” despite the 
fact that those standards were clearly slipping.1308 Interagency guidance on nontraditional 
mortgage loans, which was created by the OCC, OTS, and three other federal regulators, 
did not appear until September 2006, well after the housing bubble had become over-
inflated. Moreover, the guidance itself “did not cover subprime loans generally,” only 
Option ARMs.1309 With respect to Option ARMS, the guidance failed to place “firm 
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limits on low-doc and no-doc underwriting.”1310 John Reich, Director of the OTS when 
the guidance was released, refused to defend it, claiming that it was “extremely 
controversial” and added that it was something that the OTS never would “have issued on 
[its] own.”1311 As for the OCC, the Comptroller of the Currency at the time, John Dugan 
emphasized “the need for careful underwriting” to its regulated national banks, but 
simultaneously reassured them that the regulator would only use enforcement “as a last 
resort.”1312 
 The OCC, OTS, and the three other federal banking regulators did not actually 
issue the subprime guidance until early 2007, which was approximately at the same time 
that the mortgage market began to fall apart.1313 The federal agencies maintained that 
they issued the guidance because they were “concerned that subprime borrowers may not 
fully understand the risks and consequences of obtaining certain adjustable-rate mortgage 
(ARM) products.”1314 In particular, the agencies expressed concern over subprime Option 
ARMs and NINA (No Income No Asset documentation) loans.1315  
The tardiness of the guidance was not overlooked by Congressman Brad Sherman 
during a September 2007 hearing conducted by the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services. Congressman Sherman highlighted the 
fact that the OCC could have banned its national banks and their operating subsidiaries 
from originating NINA loans ten years earlier, well-before the financial “hurricane” 
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struck, and then he asked then-Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan, why the OCC 
had not done so.1316 Dugan’s rather bizarre answer was that the OCC believed that NINA 
loans somehow reduced the risk of borrowers pretending “they made more income than 
they actually made in order to get a loan that they could not repay.”1317 Congressman 
Sherman rebutted that NINA loans actually facilitated borrower-related fraud and asked 
Dugan whether the OCC ever attempted to prohibit NINA loans. Dugan’s response was 
that the OCC had not done so because the growth of those loans “developed over a period 
of time” and they “began to creep into the mortgage underwriting practice as a more and 
more standard practice.” In light of this gradual growth, Dugan affirmed that the OCC 
began “issuing stronger and stronger directives” against originating NINA loans.1318 
Aside from the late emergence of the subprime guidance, the federal agencies did 
not even require their lenders to conform to their recommendations. In fact, their form of 
guidance was non-binding, which created space for lenders to interpret the agencies’ 
remarks as mere recommendations.1319 For example, after the OTS met with Washington 
Mutual, one of its chartered thrifts, to discuss the subprime guidance, one Washington 
Mutual official wrote an internal memo that stated, “They specifically pointed out that the 
language in the guidance says ‘should,’ vs. ‘must’ in most cases and they are looking to 
WaMu to establish our own position of how the guidance impacts our business 
processes.”1320 Another response to the guidance came from a Senior Vice President of 
                                                 
1316 United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, “Recent Events in the Credit 
and Mortgage Markets and Possible Implications for U.S. Consumers and the Global Economy,” 
(September 5, 2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg39537/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg39537.pdf, 46. 
1317 Ibid., 46-47. 
1318 Ibid., 47. 
1319 Dina ElBoghdady, “Regulators Say Banks Should Better Judge Creditworthiness,” The Washington 
Post (June 30, 2007). 
1320 Floyd Norris, “Eyes Open, WaMu Still Failed,” The New York Times (March 25, 2011). 
242 
 
the Mortgage Bankers Association, who claimed that the regulators made a “key error” 
by asking “lenders to make sure they qualify borrowers at higher rates that kick in when 
the loans reset” because such an approach to lending would “limit the ability of some 
borrowers to obtain credit.”1321 Suggesting that lenders qualify borrowers at the fully 
indexed rate would also eat into those lenders’ profits, for they would be forced to 
approve fewer loan applications.  
One has to wonder how much compliance a federal regulator is going to receive 
from its regulated lenders when it is merely suggesting that those lenders act in 
immediately less profitable ways. This consideration, in turn, prompts one to reflect upon 
whether the OCC and OTS could have ever ensured the safety and soundness of their 
regulated lenders without imposing binding regulations on them. The evidence suggests 
that they severely struggled with this task and I will briefly examine two OCC-regulated 
lenders (Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and Chase Home Finance) and one OTS-regulated 
lender (Washington Mutual) to support this claim. 
 
3.11. A Snapshot of the OCC’s Safety and Soundness Regulation: Wells 
         Fargo Home Mortgage and Chase Home Finance 
 
At the end of 2006, the peak year for subprime lending, two of the OCC’s largest 
subprime lenders under its watch were Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (a subsidiary of 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) and Chase Home Finance (a subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A.).1322 Beginning with Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, a revealing 2007 
prospectus of one of their Alt-A securitizations provides a unique window into the firm’s 
regulatory relationship with the OCC. In this prospectus, which is a public document, 
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Wells Fargo admitted that it had “loosened its underwriting standards… with knowledge 
that delinquencies and foreclosures could increase.”1323 Also contained in the prospectus 
is the disclosure that “over 75 percent of the loans in the loan pool” were either “low-doc 
or no-doc loans.”1324 Incredibly, Wells Fargo proceeded to state that it had financed loans 
in the pool through third parties, even though those parties had not complied with their 
own underwriting standards.1325 This last admission was a “blatant violation of an OCC 
bulletin that required Wells Fargo to ‘implement an ongoing oversight program over’ 
mortgage brokers’ activities.”1326 Ultimately, Wells Fargo financed nearly $52 billion 
worth of subprime and Alt-A mortgages.1327 In October of 2008, they received a $25 
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program injection.1328  
Approximately four years later, on October 9, 2012, the United States filed a civil 
mortgage fraud lawsuit against Wells Fargo. As the lawsuit notes, Wells Fargo had been 
a participant in the Direct Endorsement Lender (DSL) program since 1986. As an 
authorized DSL, Wells Fargo had “the authority to originate, underwrite, and certify 
mortgages for FHA insurance.”1329 The lawsuit alleges that between May 2001 and 
October 2005, Wells Fargo “certified that over 100,000 retail FHA loans met HUD’s 
requirements and therefore were eligible for FHA insurance,” while knowing that “a very 
substantial percentage of those loans – nearly half in certain months – had not been 
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properly underwritten, contained unacceptable risk, did not meet HUD’s requirements, 
and were ineligible for FHA insurance.”1330  
The lawsuit claims that “the extremely poor quality” of Wells Fargo’s loans “was 
a function of [its] management’s nearly singular focus on increasing the volume of FHA 
originations – and the bank’s profits – rather than on the quality of the loans being 
originated.”1331 The United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
declared, “As the complaint alleges, yet another major bank has engaged in a 
longstanding and reckless trifecta of deficient training, deficient underwriting and 
deficient disclosure, all while relying on the convenient backstop of government 
insurance. As also alleged, Wells Fargo’s bonus incentive plan – rewarding employees 
based on the sheer number of loans approved – was an accelerant to a fire already 
burning, as quality repeatedly took a back seat to quantity.”1332 The United States is 
seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages as of October of 2012. 
 A second large subprime lender that the OCC oversaw was Chase Home Finance, 
a lender that eventually financed over $30 billion worth of subprime and Alt-A loans.1333 
A sense of JPMorgan Chase Bank’s relationship with the OCC can be gleaned from two 
instructive examples. First, on September 15, 2006, the OCC approved an application by 
Chase to “acquire certain assets and assume certain deposits from The Bank of New 
York.”1334 Eleven different community organizations objected to Chase’s acquisition of 
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these assets and deposits, most notably because of “certain products” that Chase was 
offering at the time.1335 Two of these products are worth mentioning. 
The first of these objectionable Chase products was the piggyback mortgage, 
which is a simultaneous second mortgage with a high interest rate that is designed for 
borrowers whose first mortgage cannot cover all their initial home buying costs.1336 The 
community organizations voiced concern that Chase was using piggyback mortgages to 
leverage low- and middle-income, first-time homebuyers “into financing that is 
unaffordable” and to “sell properties that are intentionally over-appraised.”1337 The OCC 
responded to this concern by noting that Chase “does not view [piggyback mortgages] as 
presenting increased risk to the bank or to borrowers” because the firm uses “a variety of 
screens” and applies “appraisal methods and standards [that] are the same” as the ones 
that they apply to “traditional products.”1338 
The second product was Chase’s NINA loans.1339 A former regional vice 
president at Chase Home Finance confessed, “If you had some old bag lady walking 
down the street and she had a decent credit score, she got a loan” at Chase.1340 With 
respect to this second product, the community organizations argued that NINA loans can 
be “easily used to put lower income borrowers into unaffordable loans, which place them 
at high risk of default and foreclosure.”1341 The same former regional vice president at 
Chase Home Finance conceded that certain account executives received commissions that 
were up to seven times higher from subprime mortgages, when compared to prime 
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mortgages.1342 As a result, an incentive structure was in place at Chase Home Finance for 
executives to look for “less savvy borrowers - those with less education, without previous 
mortgage experience, or without fluent English” and nudge them toward subprime 
loans.1343 This orientation towards lending resulted in these vulnerable borrowers, who 
were “disproportionately blacks and Latinos,” being stuck with more expensive 
mortgages, increasing the probability that they would eventually lose their homes.1344 
The community organizations expressed a similar concern. They argued that 
many of Chase Home Finance’s NINA loans were “arranged by mortgage brokers whose 
only incentive is to close the loan,” as opposed to ensuring that the borrowers could 
actually repay the loan in full.1345 In response to these concerns, the OCC affirmed that it 
had “previously determined that the system of checks and balances, fraud detection, and 
audit procedures” in place at Chase were “satisfactory and provide an adequate level of 
protection to the bank with regard to this product.”1346 By the end of 2007, Chase 
announced that they would no longer finance any NINA loans as part of their effort to 
tighten their underwriting standards, having suffered losses totaling $1.2 billion from 
non-performing mortgages that year.1347  
To get an even better feel for the regulatory relationship between Chase and the 
OCC, one can examine a March 2008 article written in The Oregonian, which exposed a 
leaked memo that was in circulation for an unknown period of time.1348 The memo was 
titled “Zippy Cheats & Tricks” and was “a primer on how to get [NINA] loans approved 
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by Zippy, Chase’s in-house automated loan underwriting system.”1349 The “cheats” and 
“tricks” listed in the memo are telling. According to the memo, borrowers “MUST have a 
mid credit score of 700,” and if they are first time homebuyers, they “require a 720 credit 
score.”1350 In terms of the borrower’s employment history, the memo recommends that 
borrowers reporting a salary “must have 2 years time on [the] job with current 
employer.”1351 The memo also instructs those underwriting the loan application to avoid 
mentioning any assistance a borrower may be receiving on his or her down payment.1352 
If all else fails, the memo suggests that one should resubmit the loan application with 
“slightly higher income.”1353 As the memo states, “Inch it up $500 to see if you can get 
the findings you want. Do the same for assets.”1354 The memo concludes with the 
following words of encouragement: “It’s super easy! Give it a try! If you get stuck, call 
me… I am happy to help!”1355  
At the end of the article, author Jeff Manning calls attention to how the Oregon 
state regulator “did not have jurisdiction over the federally chartered Chase,” even though 
the memo was sent by a Chase employee working in a Portland, Oregon.1356 David 
Tatman, head of Oregon’s Division of Finance and Corporate Securities, affirmed, “It 
boggles my mind that any federally chartered organization would invite this kind of 
activity in such a flagrant way.”1357 JPMorgan Chase, like Wells Fargo, ultimately ended 
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up receiving a $25 billion bailout from the Troubled Asset Relief Program in October of 
2008.1358  
 
3.12. A Brief Case Study of the Largest Depository Failure in United States 
        History: Washington Mutual 
 
 Washington Mutual, FSB, originally incorporated as Washington National 
Building Loan and Investment Association in 1889, was part of the thrift holding 
company, Washington Mutual, Inc., prior to the OTS’ decision to place the thrift into 
receivership. The OTS, Washington Mutual’s primary regulator, made this decision on 
September 25, 2008. Washington Mutual, Inc. was the seventh largest holding company 
in the United States at the end of 2007, whose holdings included 2,239 retail bank offices. 
Washington Mutual, FSB had $307 billion in assets,1359 $188 billion in deposits, and over 
43,000 employees before its failure.1360 The thrift heavily relied upon its non-depository 
mortgage lending subsidiary, Long Beach Mortgage Corporation, for the bulk of its 
subprime originations from 1999 to 2006.1361 All told, Washington Mutual (along with 
Long Beach Mortgage Corporation) ended up financing over $65.2 billion worth of 
subprime loans.1362 
 Although Washington Mutual was modestly involved in subprime mortgage 
lending throughout most of the 1990’s, the thrift did not move heavily into the market 
                                                 
1358 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 170. 
1359 John E. Bowman, “Statement Before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Investigations,” (April 
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1360 Senator Carl Levin, “Statement Before the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
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Anatomy of a Financial Collapse (April 13, 2011), available at 
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until the early 2000’s. Over the course of just the first three months of 2001, Washington 
Mutual originated over $2 billion worth of subprime loans.1363 Washington Mutual 
projected that its subprime originations would reach $8 billion in 2002 and $9 billion in 
2003, an indication of how devoted the thrift was to entrenching itself in the subprime 
market.1364 Its retail unit expanded 70%, “reaching 2,200 [branches] across 38 states,” in 
just four years from 2000 to 2003.1365 
 Looking at Washington Mutual’s profit performance, the thrift made $3.11 billion 
in profits in 2001 and, just one year later, its profits leaped to $3.9 billion.1366 Washington 
Mutual’s profits in 2002 were never surpassed over the remaining course of the thrift’s 
existence, but it still posted strong profits of $3.88 billion in 2003.1367 In 2004, 
Washington Mutual’s year over year profits dropped by nearly 26% to $2.88 billion,1368 
which arguably incited the thrift to enter into the subprime mortgage market more 
aggressively.1369 It is important to note that, in 2003, 64% of Washington Mutual’s loan 
originations were of the fixed-rate, prime variety. By 2006, the percentage of their 
originations of these safer loans tumbled to only 25%.1370 
                                                 
1363 Laura Mandaro, “Wamu Primed for More Subprime,” The American Banker, Vol. 166, No. 160 
(August 20, 2001). 
1364 Karen Sibayan, “Better Quality Collateral in Subprime Mortgage Pools,” Asset Securitization Report 
(October 7, 2002). 
1365 Peter S. Goodman and Gretchen Morgenson, “Saying Yes, Wamu Built Empire on Shaky Loans,” The 
New York Times (December 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/28wamu.html. 
1366 “Washington Mutual 4th-Quarter Net Jumps 15%,” Dow Jones Business News (January 21, 2003). 
1367 “Washington Mutual’s 4Q Net Fell 21%,” Dow Jones Business News (January 19, 2005). 
1368 Ibid. 
1369 According to Eric M. Thorson, Inspector General of the United States Treasury Department, 
Washington Mutual was eventually undone by a flawed business strategy that started in 2005 when the 
thrift began originating a heavier volume of Option Adjustable Rate Mortgages. Senator Levin asserted that 
Washington Mutual adopted this business strategy because the thrift anticipated higher earnings and needed 
to compete with Countrywide. Please see: Eric M. Thorson, “Statement Before the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,” 4. 
1370 United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, 48. 
250 
 
The thrift’s profits increased 19% to $3.43 billion in 2005,1371 and then increased 
about 4% in 2006 to $3.56 billion.1372 In 2007, due to massive losses stemming from their 
subprime mortgage originations, Washington Mutual posted a $67 million loss for the 
year.1373 Over the course of the first three months of 2008, Washington Mutual lost $1.1 
billion and had over $9.2 billion worth of nonperforming loans on its books.1374 Three 
months later, Washington Mutual recorded a loss of an additional $3.2 billion.1375 About 
two months later, in September of 2008, the thrift was closed down by the OTS. I will 
explore some of the ways in which Washington Mutual attempted to present itself to the 
public as well as examine a few of its subprime lending practices in an effort to provide 
at least a partial account of why the thrift failed. 
 In 2003, Kerry Killinger, CEO of Washington Mutual at the time, made a bold 
announcement: “We hope to do to this industry, what Wal-Mart did to theirs, Starbucks 
did to theirs, Costco did to theirs… And I think if we’ve done our job, five years from 
now you’re not going to call us a bank.”1376 Washington Mutual began marketing itself as 
an “unbank,” striving to send the message: “We’re here, we’re different, we’re not 
banking as usual.”1377 The thrift elected to call its branches “stores” and outfitted them 
“with funky décor and music.”1378 It launched lighthearted advertising campaigns 
designed to differentiate itself from other depositories. For instance, in an effort to show 
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how customers “loved” their loan officers, Washington Mutual showed an advertisement 
that “featured an ‘action-teller’ doll, a Ken-like figure complete with [a] cell phone and 
teller tote bag.”1379 Another advertisement depicted “untrustworthy big banks” stripping 
“their clients down to their underwear,” only to have “their clothes magically snap back 
on at Washington Mutual.”1380 Yet another advertisement “showed a bunch of old 
bankers in pinstripes getting penned up in a corral” by a “hipster guy in a blue work shirt 
and khakis” because the bankers had “rigid, old-school ideas.”1381 Washington Mutual 
even considered airing a controversial advertisement invoking suicide, which showed 
“bankers poised atop a building as if about to jump.”1382 According to one journalist at 
The Washington Post, Washington Mutual’s advertisements during this time conveyed 
the idea that the thrift was “selling bank services like others were selling beer or fast 
food.”1383 
 Other advertisements served as harbingers of Washington Mutual’s 
“unconventional” approach to mortgage lending. A 2002 advertisement featured a 
character named “Paul” who was “scowling” because the uncertainty of bank loans put 
him in an irritable mood.1384 However, as the advertisement continues, the viewer learns 
that “thanks to the ‘flexible lending’ rules on a loan from Washington Mutual, the 
grumpy Paul can deal with a boot on his car and a bowling ball in the groin and still 
smile.”1385 The advertisement ends with an announcer stating, “Enjoy your new home, 
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Paul.”1386 One has to wonder whether this type of advertising was appropriate for 
promoting adjustable rate mortgages, a product that is complicated and could potentially 
pose serious repayment risks to borrowers.  
The “Paul” advertisement was part of Washington Mutual’s “The Power of Yes” 
campaign, underscoring the thrift’s zeal for approving mortgage loan applications. James 
Vanasek, risk manager at Washington Mutual from 1999 to 2005, stated that the 
campaign suggested to prospective borrowers that the thrift “would find some way to 
make a loan.”1387 Fittingly, one advertisement that aired during an Academy Awards’ 
commercial break on March 23, 2003 showed “customers so confident after their loan 
applications are approved” that they are willing to order day-old sushi.1388  
In addition to traditional media advertisements, the campaign also included the 
construction and display of three edifices, each standing alone for three months at a time, 
in downtown Chicago. For the first three months, passersby would see a cave, for the 
second three months a log cabin, and for the third three months a “modern home.”1389 
The media director for the advertising agency that Washington Mutual hired to build the 
edifices stated, “We wanted to convey that WaMu could bring any dream you had to a 
reality.”1390  
 Another memorable Washington Mutual advertising campaign, with respect to the 
way in which it wanted the public to perceive its approach to residential mortgage 
lending, was its “Whoo hoo!” campaign that it launched in February of 2008, just months 
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before its failure. The idea behind this campaign, featuring a trademarked “freedom yell 
straight out of the Simpsons,”1391 according to the Chief Marketing Officer at 
Washington Mutual at the time, was to help transform the thrift into “an iconic brand that 
people love” and to demonstrate that it was unsurpassed “when it comes to being 
emotionally relevant to people.”1392   
 Due to a first-rate investigation conducted by the United States Senate 
Subcommittee on Investigations, the results of which were initially unveiled in April of 
2010, and later revised in an April 2011 report, one can be privy to a significant portion 
of what transpired within the walls of Washington Mutual leading up to its 2008 collapse.  
The Senate subcommittee’s work painted a vivid picture of both the excessive risks that 
Washington Mutual assumed before its demise as well as the depository’s dubious 
relationship with its federal regulator, the OTS. 
From 2003 to 2007, “Option ARMs represented nearly half of all of WaMu loan 
originations” and totaled “approximately $59 billion, or 47 percent, of the home loans on 
WaMu’s balance sheet at the end of 2007.”1393 In 2006 alone, Washington Mutual 
“originated more than $42.6 billion in Option ARM loans and sold or securitized at least 
$115 billion to investors.”1394 Option ARMs, with their various loan repayment options, 
were nicknamed “pick-a-payment” loans.1395 In the event that a borrower chooses to pay 
the minimum monthly payment, an option that is only available for a short period of time 
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until the loan principle reaches a certain designated threshold, the unpaid interest on the 
loan is added to the principal, making the loan balance larger.1396 Thus, a borrower who 
receives an Option ARM and elects to only pay the minimum payment will, so long as 
those reduced payments continue, have a negatively amortizing loan. From 1999 to 2006, 
Washington Mutual’s “Option ARM borrowers selected the minimum monthly payment 
more than 95% of the time.”1397 At the end of 2007, an astounding 84% of Washington 
Mutual’s Option ARMs were negatively amortizing.1398  
Remarkably, Washington Mutual was permitted to qualify borrowers for Option 
ARMs based upon their ability to pay merely the minimum monthly payment, as opposed 
to their ability to make their mortgage payments at the fully indexed rate.1399 As an 
adjustable-rate mortgage, an Option ARM possesses an interest rate that eventually 
adjusts in relation to a particular index. The fully indexed rate is the rate of the index that 
the lender chooses plus the percent of the margin that it may add to that index. By adding 
a margin to their loans, lenders make those loans more profitable for them.1400 Failing to 
qualify borrowers for their mortgages based upon their ability to repay their loans at the 
fully indexed rate can result in substantially misrepresenting a borrower’s actual 
repayment ability. After all, for the majority of the repayment period, the borrower will 
be making monthly loan payments at the fully indexed rate. 
Taken alone, Option ARMs are risky mortgage products because of the danger 
that they can reset at a significantly higher rate. Compounding this risk to an 
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extraordinary degree is the fact that 73% of the Option ARMs that Washington Mutual 
originated from 2003 to 2007 were NINA loans, a type of loan that allows borrowers “to 
simply write-in their income on the loan application without providing supporting 
documentation.”1401 NINA loans were originally created for self-employed, “high-income 
individuals who had income that was hard to document through a W-2,”1402 but somehow 
were judged by Washington Mutual to be an appropriate loan product for many subprime 
borrowers. A former Washington Mutual loan consultant conceded that “the big saying” 
at the company was: “A skinny file is a good file.”1403 At a September 2007 
Congressional hearing, Congressman Gary Ackerman nicely brought out the absurdity of 
mixing subprime loans with NINA loans:  
If we had allowed State motor vehicle bureaus to operate and have an 
independent system of basically unregulated originators of driver’s 
licenses, and they went out and had advertising to potential drivers who 
wanted licenses that said, ‘Need a driver’s license, cannot drive? No 
problem. No test needed. Road rage convictions? Legally blind? Do not 
worry.’ Then we were shocked to see accidents up and down the  
highway, most of them involving a lot of good drivers, all caught up in 
a catastrophic situation.1404 
The acceptability of NINA loans created conditions that were ripe for fraud. For example, 
one prospective borrower claimed that he had an annual income of six-figures as a 
mariachi singer. A Washington Mutual supervisor at one of their mortgage processing 
centers could not verify the applicant’s income, so he requested that the applicant be 
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photographed in front of his home dressed in his mariachi outfit. The loan was 
approved.1405  
A third factor that heightened the risk of Washington Mutual’s lending practices, 
in addition to offering incredibly risky mortgage products, is the fact that, from 2003 to 
2007, between 48% to 70% of their single family loans were purchased from brokers.1406 
One would think that since the majority of their risky loans were initially being processed 
by an outside third party, Washington Mutual would have taken special precautions to 
ensure that those parties were handling their duties in responsible ways. Yet, in 2007, 
Washington Mutual devoted only 14 of their employees to oversee more than 34,000 
brokers, “an oversight ratio of over 2,400 third party brokers to [every] 1 WaMu 
employee.”1407 The thrift provided their third-party brokers “with little guidance or 
training,” other than giving them “daily ‘rate sheets’ explaining the terms of the loans 
that WaMu was willing to accept and the available commissions.”1408 Long Beach 
Mortgage Corporation, Washington Mutual’s primary subprime lending operating 
subsidiary, did not have a single loan officer and obtained all of their subprime 
mortgages from third-party brokers.1409 At the end of 2007, Washington Mutual 
announced that they had endured $51 million worth of subprime losses related to fraud 
committed by third party brokers.1410 The thrift’s Chief Risk Officer in 2004 and 2005, 
James Vanasek, attributed the rampant loan fraud to “compensation incentives that 
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rewarded loan personnel and mortgage brokers according to the volume of loans they 
processed rather than the quality of the loans they produced.”1411 
At this point, one may wonder why Washington Mutual chose to offer Option 
ARMs and NINA loans, and allow third-party brokers to manage the loan applications for 
the bulk of their subprime originations. The fundamental answer is that these decisions 
were, at least for the short-term, profitable. Washington Mutual estimated in 2006 that 
originating Option ARMs was approximately six times more profitable than originating 
traditional, thirty-year, fixed rate mortgages.1412 Originating NINA loans enabled 
Washington Mutual to earn higher margins of profit, especially when Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac began purchasing them for their retained portfolios in the mid-2000’s.1413 
Finally, it was roughly 66% cheaper, a savings of nearly $3,500 per loan, for Washington 
Mutual to close a loan through a third-broker than it was to close the same loan in-
house.1414 In January 2005, a proposal was presented to Washington Mutual’s Board of 
Directors titled “Higher Risk Lending Strategy ‘Asset Allocation Initiative’,” which 
endorsed a more vigorous subprime lending effort. The executives ultimately adopted the 
strategy because “high risk home loans were more profitable than low risk loans.”1415 
Washington Mutual’s chief legal officer from 1997 to 2007 later noted that then-CEO 
Kerry Killinger’s “view of himself was tied to a constant increase in [WaMu’s] stock 
price.”1416 
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One can easily overlook, however, the fact that Option ARMs were not products 
that “sold themselves” to borrowers and, interestingly enough, were not initially 
appealing products to loan personnel or mortgage brokers either. As part of Washington 
Mutual’s Higher Risk Lending Strategy, the thrift had to overcome the difficult challenge 
of convincing borrowers “to forego a simple, low risk conventional loan in favor of the 
complex and higher risk Option ARM.”1417 This objective implies that the thrift intended 
to “steer” qualified, prime borrowers away from a fixed-rate, conventional 30-year 
mortgage to an Option ARM instead. To assist them with this formidable task, 
Washington Mutual conducted two focus groups in late 2003 to “explore ways to 
increase sales of Option ARMs” because those loans were the thrift’s “most profitable 
mortgage loan products.”1418  
Among the many findings that were generated by the two focus groups, 
Washington Mutual learned that “Option ARMs are sold to customers and few walk 
through the door and ask for them.”1419 Furthermore, the thrift claimed that the majority 
of the participants did not fully understand the Option ARM, though they found that the 
mortgage product’s “best selling point… was being shown how much lower their 
monthly payment would be” when one compared the Option ARM to a fixed-rate 
mortgage loan.1420 Washington Mutual also discovered that many of their own 
salespeople could not understand Option ARMs and, moreover, they had little motivation 
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to learn more about the mortgage product since it was easier and quicker to sell 
conventional, fixed-rate loans.1421 
Washington Mutual’s solution was to better compensate its loan personnel and 
third-party brokers for swaying borrowers to Option ARMs. Using an internal alert e-
mail system known as “e-Flash,” Washington Mutual would routinely send out messages 
to its retail sales team announcing “increased compensation incentives for selling Option 
ARMs.”1422 One October 12, 2006 “e-Flash” is particularly worth mentioning. The 
message announced that a “Fall Kickoff Contest” was now underway. For each of the 
thirteen weeks of the fourth quarter, “the loan consultant who scored the most points 
would receive a $100 gift card.”1423 At the end of the quarter, the message continued, the 
top five point winners would receive a $1,000 gift card.1424 Every Option ARM sale was 
counted as “a touchdown” or seven points, while other types of high-risk, subprime 
mortgages were only “field goals” worth three points.1425 Drew DeSilver, writing for The 
Seattle Times, noted that, in 2007, a Washington Mutual loan officer would earn a 
commission of $1,200 for closing a $300,000 Option ARM, but only earn $960 for 
closing a traditional fixed-rate loan of the same amount.1426 
Washington Mutual was successful in its effort to originate more Option ARMs. 
In 2003, the lender originated $32.3 billion worth of the loan product, a number that 
exploded to $68.0 billion in 2004. In 2005, Washington Mutual originated another $64.1 
billion worth of Option ARMs, followed by $42.6 billion worth Option ARM loan 
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originations in 2006. One Washington Mutual employee who worked for the lender for 
over 20 years looked back on this period of time and stated, “I always felt like I worked 
for a really honest industry that cared for the borrowers they dealt with… [but] the 
corporate culture changed to: ‘We just want to do the most we can to make money for the 
bank’.”1427 
Washington Mutual’s endeavor to take on progressively more risks in pursuit of 
greater profits was accompanied by the marginalization of their own risk managers. An 
internal newsletter dated October 31, 2005 informed the lender’s risk managers that they 
needed to “shift (their) ways of thinking” away from acting as a “regulatory burden” on 
its lending operations and toward being a “customer service” that supported its aggressive 
growth strategy.1428 James Vanasek, Washington Mutual’s Chief Risk Manager in 2004 
and 2005, conceded that the executive management team “very seldom” listened to his 
calls for a more conservative approach to lending.1429 In an April 2010 hearing, Senator 
Tom Coburn asked Vanasek whether he ever felt that his opinions were “unwelcomed” at 
Washington Mutual, to which he responded in the affirmative and stated:  
I used to use a phrase. It was a bit of humor or attempted humor. I 
used to say the world was a very dark and ugly place in reference to 
subprime loans. I cautioned about subprime loans consistently.1430 
 
Vanasek sent out a memorandum to Washington Mutual’s Executive Committee on 
February 24, 2005 declaring, “I fear that the timing of further expansion into higher risk 
lending… most especially certain new products being considered is ill-timed given the 
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overheated market and the risk [of] higher interest rates.”1431 In another memorandum, 
sent on September 2, 2004, Vanasek warned, “There have been so many warnings of a 
Housing Bubble that we all tend now to ignore them because thus far it has not 
happened.”1432 After admitting that he was not “in the business of forecasting,” he 
affirmed that he had “a healthy respect for the underlying data,” which indicated that the 
current lending environment had become “no longer sustainable.”1433 At the end of the 
memorandum, he stated, “If the economy stalls, the combination of low FICOs, high 
LTVs and inordinate numbers of exceptions will come back to haunt us.”1434 In a later 
interview, Vanasek revealed that because of his predictions of a collapse in the housing 
market, his Washington Mutual colleagues gave him the derisive nickname “Dr. 
Doom.”1435 
Vanasek retired from Washington Mutual in December of 2005 at least partly 
because the management support for his risk policies and the corporate culture itself was 
lacking.1436 Ronald Cathcart, Vanasek’s replacement, stated that when he arrived at 
Washington Mutual in early 2006, he “inherited a Risk Department that was isolated 
from the rest of the bank and was struggling to be effective at a time when the mortgage 
industry was experiencing unprecedented demand for residential mortgage assets.”1437 In 
2008, Cathcart was fired after he took his concerns “about weak controls and rising losses 
to both the board and to regulators from the Office of Thrift Supervision.”1438 
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3.13. Washington Mutual’s Cozy Relationship With the OTS 
 While Washington Mutual’s Risk Management Department was unable to 
effectively mitigate the risks that the thrift felt inclined to take before its failure, its 
primary federal regulator, the OTS, similarly proved to be unwilling or unable to prevent 
it from engaging in unsafe and unsound lending practices.1439 The goal of this section is 
to provide an account of the OTS’ regulatory relationship with Washington Mutual. I will 
argue that the OTS was, in effect, captured by Washington Mutual, a mortgage lender 
that became “too big to regulate.”1440 At the outset of this discussion, one should note 
that, from 2003 and 2007, the OTS spent between 17,000 to 31,000 examination hours at 
Washington Mutual each year, the equivalent of 8 to 15 full-time employees per year.1441 
The deficiencies in their oversight of Washington Mutual were not due to their staff being 
shorthanded or underfunded. 
 As a 2011 Senate Subcommittee on Investigations report notes, part of the OTS’ 
stated mission was “[t]o supervise savings associations and their holding companies in 
order to maintain their safety and soundness and compliance with consumer laws.”1442 
The same report also points out that the “OTS Examination Handbook required 
‘[p]roactive regulatory supervision’ with a focus on evaluation of ‘future needs and 
potential risks to ensure the success of the thrift system in the long term.’”1443 One of the 
principal tools that the OTS would use to evaluate its thrifts was the CAMELS rating 
system, a guide that scrutinizes the strength or weakness of depositories in terms of their 
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“(C) capital adequacy, (A) asset quality, (M) management, (E) earnings, (L) liquidity, 
and (S) sensitivity to market risk.”1444 The OTS would periodically give each of its thrifts 
a numerical score for each of those six areas as well as a composite numerical score that 
was to serve as a representation of their overall safety and soundness. A CAMELS rating 
of a 1 was the best score, while a 5 was the worst.1445 The OTS would perform these 
evaluations on their regulated thrifts every 12 to 18 months.1446 
From 2004 to February of 2008, as Washington Mutual engaged in progressively 
riskier lending practices, the OTS gave the thrift an overall CAMELS score of a 2, which 
meant that it was “fundamentally sound,” had “satisfactory risk management,” and had 
“only moderate weaknesses that [were] within the board’s and management’s capability 
and willingness to correct.”1447 As early as 2004, the United States Treasury Department 
and the FDIC publicly declared that they felt the rating was inaccurate and 
inappropriate,1448 and information that was gathered by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations supports their judgment. For instance, the Senate subcommittee discovered 
that, from 2004 to 2008, the OTS identified “over 500 serious operational deficiencies” at 
Washington Mutual and Long Beach Mortgage Corporation.1449 These deficiencies at 
Washington Mutual included weak lending standards, weak risk management, poor 
appraisal practices, and poor quality of loans.1450 Despite these observations, the OTS 
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never once held internal discussions about taking an enforcement action against 
Washington Mutual until 2008, around the same time that the regulator decided to finally 
lower the thrift’s CAMELS rating from a 2 to a 3.1451 A number of factors contributed to 
the OTS’ inaction prior to the failure of Washington Mutual. 
First, from 2004 to 2008, the OTS’ biggest “customer,” by far, was Washington 
Mutual. The thrift paid the OTS an average over $30 million annually, which represented 
“nearly 15% of the fees per year that paid for [the] OTS’ operating expenses.”1452 If 
Washington Mutual decided to switch charters, a considerable portion of the OTS’ 
revenue would have been lost. Arguably, Washington Mutual, therefore, had leverage 
over the OTS, an example of the type of relationship known as “regulatory capture.”1453 
When a regulator gets captured by its regulated corporation, the former tends to privilege 
the short-term interests of the latter over those of the general public.1454  
The Senate subcommittee gathered considerable evidence to substantiate the 
claim that the OTS was “captured” by Washington Mutual. First, they discovered that the 
OTS displayed an inappropriate level of deference to the management at Washington 
Mutual. One OTS regulator publicly stated that his agency provided “by far the softest” 
oversight of any federal bank regulator.1455 An example of this deference was discovered 
in a January 2006 e-mail sent by the OTS Examiner-in-Charge, Lawrence Carter, who 
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claimed that the OTS would have to rely on their relationship with Washington Mutual in 
order to get the firm to act in a way that they deemed prudent.1456  
Later that same year, Carter sent out an e-mail that discussed the OTS’ upcoming 
examination of Washington Mutual. In this e-mail, he stated that the OTS could 
potentially “run the risk of losing some credibility” if they “pushed too hard on certain 
reforms.”1457 Most telling of all, however, is the OTS’ astonishing decision to allow 
Washington Mutual to “track its own compliance” with OTS requirements. Using their 
Enterprise Risk Issue Control System, Washington Mutual was permitted to self-monitor 
how well they implemented any corrective actions that the OTS prescribed. Washington 
Mutual was the lone recipient of this OTS-endorsed privilege.1458 
The second piece of evidence that the Senate subcommittee supplied in their 
report, suggesting that the OTS was captured by Washington Mutual, was the fact that the 
former excused many of the risks that the latter was taking because those risks were, at 
the time, generating profits.1459 A revealing 2005 e-mail, once again sent by Lawrence 
Carter, disclosed that it was hard for the OTS “to justify doing much more than 
constantly nagging” Washington Mutual about their excessive risks because the thrift had 
“not been really adversely impacted in terms of losses.”1460  This is precisely the 
regulatory attitude that the Inspector General of the United States Department of the 
Treasury, Eric Thorson, uncovered during his review of the OTS and Washington Mutual 
that ended in 2010. According to Thorson, OTS examiners were aware that Washington 
Mutual’s “underwriting and risk management practices were less than satisfactory,” but 
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they did not lower their rating of the thrift’s asset quality because it “was making money 
and loans were performing.”1461   
The Senate subcommittee report calls attention, however, to the fact that the OTS 
handbook explicitly states that “profits should not be used to overlook or excuse high-risk 
activities.”1462 The same report rightly notes that the role of a regulator is “to enforce 
rules that ensure the risks an institution undertakes do not unfairly transfer that risk to 
others or threaten the safety and soundness of the economy, despite any short term 
profits.”1463 Yet, even as it became more apparent to the OTS that Washington Mutual’s 
excessive risks were posing grave threats to the thrift’s survival, the OTS did not 
downgrade its CAMELS rating from a 2 to a 3 until February of 2008.1464 The OTS 
decided to issue the downgrade shortly after Washington Mutual posted a $1 billion loss 
in a single quarter, over the course the last three months of 2007.1465 Just before the 
beginning of that quarter, on September 10, 2007, then-CEO Kerry Killinger declared at a 
Lehman Brothers conference, “This frankly may be one of the best times I have ever seen 
for taking on new loans into our portfolio.”1466 
It is a testament to the OTS’ unflappable commitment to deregulation that, after 
the CAMELS rating downgrade was issued, the regulator did not follow up with any 
meaningful enforcement actions. Instead, the OTS permitted Washington Mutual to put 
together its own “nonpublic Board Resolution,” in which the thrift was left to its own 
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devices to specify how it would “address various problems.”1467 Ultimately, Washington 
Mutual did not provide the OTS with “any specific actions or deadlines.”1468 On June 11, 
2008, Washington Mutual boasted to its investors that it was not “the target of regulatory 
actions,” nor was it “‘currently in such discussions with any regulatory agency,’ 
including the OTS.”1469 
In the first half of 2008, Washington Mutual hemorrhaged over $4 billion in 
losses, which incited the OTS in August of that year to write a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) to the thrift. In the MOU, the OTS suggested that the thrift 
improve its lending practices, “develop a capital contingency plan…, submit a 3-year 
business plan, and engage a consultant to review its underwriting, risk management, 
[general] management, and board oversight.”1470 Astonishingly, three days after 
Washington Mutual received the proposed MOU, the thrift had the temerity to ask the 
OTS “to drop the requirement that the consultant review the Board’s oversight efforts,” a 
request that the OTS inexplicably granted.1471 The final, agreed-upon MOU was released 
on September 8 of that year, a little over two weeks before Washington Mutual’s failure. 
In the MOU, the thrift agreed that it would provide the OTS with “an updated, multi-year 
business plan and forecast for its earnings, asset quality, capital and business segment 
performance,” but they would not “raise capital, increase liquidity or make changes to the 
products and services it provide[d] to customers.”1472 The OTS agreed to those terms.1473 
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Three days later, on September 11, the credit rating agency, Moody’s, 
downgraded the entire Washington Mutual holding company to “junk bond status,” and 
Standard and Poor’s followed suit within days.1474 On September 15, Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy, an event that helped fuel Washington Mutual depositors to withdraw 
approximately $17 billion worth of deposits from the thrift in just eight days.1475 On 
September 18, the OTS reluctantly agreed to downgrade Washington Mutual’s CAMELS 
rating from a 3 to a 4, indicating, at last, that the thrift was in an unsafe and unsound 
condition. The fear was so palpable over the ensuing days that the OTS was forced to 
close down Washington Mutual on Thursday, September 25, unable to wait for Friday, 
the day of the week on which most banks are closed.1476 The FDIC then orchestrated the 
immediate sale of Washington Mutual to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion.1477 Two days 
later, on September 27, the bank holding company, Washington Mutual, Inc., filed for 
bankruptcy protection, effectively eliminating the existence of a 119 year old lender that 
had survived two world wars and the Great Depression.1478 Senator Carl Levin’s final 
assessment of Washington Mutual was that it was “a model of corporate ineptitude, 
greed, and wrongdoing.”1479 One former senior executive at Washington Mutual noted 
that Killinger “created an atmosphere in which doing the easy thing rather than the hard 
thing was OK.”1480 
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JPMorgan and Chase, after analyzing the quality of the $178 billion worth of 
Washington Mutual mortgage loans that they inherited, “promptly concluded that about 
two-thirds of them were impaired.”1481 Initially, Chase had to write-down $30 billion 
worth of Washington Mutual loan-related losses. As of April 2011, the firm had to write-
down another $5 billion in losses from the same body of Washington Mutual loans.1482 
In March of 2011, the FDIC announced that it was filing a lawsuit against three 
former Washington Mutual officials: Chief Executive Officer Kerry Killinger, Chief 
Operating Officer Stephen Rotella, and the Home Loans Division President David 
Schneider.1483 In a complaint filed in a Washington federal court, the FDIC accused the 
three officials of showing “reckless disregard” for the thrift’s safety and soundness and 
instead focusing “on short-term gains to increase their compensation.”1484 The three 
officials received over $95 million in compensation from January of 2005 to September 
of 2008.1485 The FDIC is seeking unspecified damages.1486 Killinger’s lawyers called the 
suit “baseless and unworthy of the government.”1487 
John Reich, the former Director of the OTS, resigned in late 2008, and stated that 
his biggest regret was the agency’s inability to curb the origination of NINA loans.1488 
Reich, a former banker, conceded that the influx of NINA loan originations at the thrifts 
that were regulated by the OTS during his tenure had been “abhorrent” to him since he 
was “raised believing in the fundamental five C's of credit and fully documented loan 
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files.”1489 The OTS, at least in part because of the quality of its regulation of Washington 
Mutual, was abolished by the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, effective July of 2011.1490 
 
3.14. A Capsule of the OCC and OTS’ Regulatory Failure 
As the examples of Wells Fargo, Chase Home Finance, and Washington Mutual 
suggest, “the OCC and OTS were in a state of denial about the grave nature of bank and 
thrift involvement in reckless lending and the equally grave nature of their own failure to 
supervise.”1491 All five of the largest national banks under the OCC’s supervision 
participated in high-risk mortgage lending and weakened the financial condition of their 
respective parent companies: Bank of America, N.A., JPMorgan Chase, N.A., Citibank, 
N.A., Wachovia Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.1492 According to the 
Congressional Oversight Panel, Bank of America ended up receiving $336.1 billion in 
cash and guarantees from the federal government.1493 According to the same 
congressional report, JPMorgan Chase ultimately received a federal bailout of $129.6 
billion in cash and guarantees.1494 The financial holding company Citigroup, which has 
Citibank as one of its holdings, ultimately received $476.2 billion in cash and guarantees 
from the federal government.1495 Company representatives at Citibank later told the SEC 
that, as they were “conducting risk analyses” of their lending activities and assets, they 
“had not taken into account the possibility that [their] subprime mortgages would 
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default.”1496 Wachovia was so overwhelmed by the losses caused by its risky 
nonperforming loans that it was only rescued by “a shotgun marriage” with Wells Fargo 
near the end of the third quarter of 2008.1497 Finally, Wells Fargo received $107.2 billion 
in cash and guarantees from the federal government.1498  
In July of 2011, the GAO released a report that summarized their findings after 
conducting a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve during the period of December 1, 
2007 through July 21, 2010. Among the shocking discoveries that were disclosed in the 
report, the GAO noted that the Federal Reserve lent Citigroup $2.513 trillion, Bank of 
America $1.344 trillion, JPMorgan Chase $391 billion, Wells Fargo $159 billion, and 
Wachovia $142 billion during that period of time.1499 The amount of those loans provides 
an indication of the depths of the institutional and regulatory failure that came to 
characterize the OCC/lender relationship.1500  
The OTS fared even worse than the OCC in terms of ensuring the safety and 
soundness of its regulated thrifts. In 2008 alone, five thrifts with assets totaling over $354 
billion failed under the OTS’ watch.1501 The next year, in 2009, another twenty OTS-
regulated thrifts failed with assets totaling over $50 billion.1502 Among the largest of 
these thrift failures, aside from Washington Mutual ($307.02 in assets), was IndyMac, 
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FSB ($30.7 billion in assets) and Downey Savings and Loan ($12.78 billion in assets).1503 
Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel contend that the OTS created a “[regulatory] climate 
of laxity [that was] unmatched by any other federal banking agency.”1504 The two authors 
note that the irony of the OTS’ failure as a regulator is that the agency was created in 
1989 to “clean up” the savings and loan crisis that emerged earlier in that decade.1505 We 
now turn to an examination of the quality of the regulation provided by the other major 
federal banking regulator, the Fed. 
 
 
3.15. The Failure of HOEPA and the Federal Reserve to Sufficiently Regulate 
Subprime Lenders 
 
In 1994, Congress “gave the Federal Reserve Board the power to curb unfair or 
deceptive loans for virtually every mortgage originator in the country.”1506 This authority 
came from the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), an act that 
was created in response to the “fledging subprime market” that was emerging in the early 
1990’s.1507 Prior to enacting HOEPA, Congress noticed that its existing legislation was 
inadequately addressing a new array of “abusive terms [and] practices in home 
mortgages” that subprime lenders were introducing.1508  
Broadly speaking, HOEPA consisted of two parts. The first part was designed to 
regulate certain “high-cost” residential mortgages, a responsibility that was bestowed to 
the Fed.1509 Once a mortgage loan exceeded certain set interest rates or fees, which the 
Fed established, that loan would be classified as a “high-cost” loan and the lender would 
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be subjected to numerous restrictions.1510 The second part of HOEPA came to be known 
as the UDAP component, which stood for “Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices.”1511 
This portion of the law designated the Fed as the arbiter of what constituted an unfair or 
deceptive mortgage practice.1512  
However well-intentioned Congress was in enacting HOEPA, the act was plagued 
with at least two crucial weaknesses that eventually undermined its effectiveness in 
regulating subprime lenders. First, once the Fed determined the parameters of what would 
be considered a high-cost loan, subprime lenders soon found it easy to avoid having their 
loans labeled as such by simply charging interest rates and fees that were just below the 
high-cost threshold.1513 Case in point, “the number of subprime loans issued increased 
after the enactment of HOEPA.”1514 After predatory lending abuses became increasingly 
prevalent in the late 1990’s, the Fed decided in 2001 to revise and expand the reach of 
their high-cost loan provisions.1515 Even after their revised definition of a high-cost loan 
took effect, approximately 99% of originated subprime loans evaded the high-cost 
designation.1516 
The second flaw of HOEPA pertained to the UDAP provision in that it was not 
self-executing.1517 In order for the UDAP provision to take effect, for specific types of 
unfair and deceptive lending practices to be prohibited, the Fed had to issue a rule or 
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order to activate it.1518 Yet, the Chairman of the Fed at the time, Alan Greenspan, 
categorically refused to implement the UDAP provision.1519 Greenspan elected to address 
subprime abuses by “speeches, consumer literacy, bank examinations, and guidance 
without binding effect.”1520 The Fed was particularly fond of requiring lenders to merely 
provide borrowers with disclosures about the risks and features of their subprime 
products, instead of prohibiting lenders from offering certain loan products altogether. 
Randall Kroszner, part of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, noted during a 
2007 hearing before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial 
Services that the Fed chose “to focus primarily on addressing potentially unfair and 
deceptive practices through case-by-case determinations rather than through rulemaking” 
because properly framed rules are difficult to craft and, moreover, they can potentially 
prevent legitimate subprime borrowers from having access to mortgage credit.1521 
At another hearing before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform on October 23, 2008, Congressman John Tierney 
asked Greenspan why he never activated the UDAP provision.1522 Greenspan responded, 
“[L]et’s take the issue of unfair and deceptive practices… The staff of the Federal 
Reserve… looks at that statement and then says how do they determine as a regulatory 
group what is unfair and deceptive?”1523 Greenspan estimated that “maybe 10 percent or 
so” of the practices would be “self-evidently unfair and deceptive,” but the “vast majority 
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would require a jury trial or other means to deal with it.”1524 Congressman Tierney then 
interrupted his response, but presumably Greenspan meant that it would be difficult to 
formulate rules that would restrict unfair and deceptive lending practices and, moreover, 
the effectiveness of those rules, if implemented, would be highly suspect. 
In any event, so unwavering was the Fed’s opposition to activating the UDAP 
provision that it was not until July 30, 2008, when Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke, Greenspan’s successor, finally did so.1525 This rule finally prohibited a lender 
from “making a loan without regard to borrowers’ ability to repay,” required lenders to 
“verify the income and assets they rely upon to determine repayment ability,” and 
established “additional advertising standards,” stipulating that lenders must provide 
“additional information about rates, monthly payments, and other loan features” in their 
advertisements.1526  
When this rule was initially proposed in April of 2008, the Fed was bombarded by 
over 5,000 comments from lenders “who said the proposals could affect loans that have 
not presented problems,” thus limiting their ability to legitimately originate home loans 
for certain qualified borrowers.1527 Three of the housing industry’s most influential trade 
groups, the American Bankers Association, the Mortgage Bankers Association and the 
Independent Community Bankers of America, also criticized the rule when it was 
proposed.1528 Even as the housing market was falling apart in 2008, participants in the 
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industry were loath to have federal regulators place stricter limits on mortgage lending 
practices. 
 
3.16. The Federal Reserve’s Refusal to Regulate Non-Depository Mortgage  
        Lending Affiliates1529 
 
In 1999, the GAO called attention to the alarming fact that non-depository 
mortgage lending affiliates within bank holding companies were “not subject to routine 
examinations by federal regulators for compliance with fair lending and other consumer 
protection laws and regulations.”1530 In this same report, the GAO noted that consumer 
and community groups had voiced their concerns over the subprime lending activities of 
certain non-depository affiliates, particularly how they had “steered” minority loan 
applicants to more expensive loans.1531 Apprehensive over the growth of non-depository 
lending affiliates, which “out-paced” every other type of mortgage lender in 1997, the 
GAO affirmed that the Fed was “uniquely situated to monitor developments in operating 
relationships among holding company entities that could effect fair lending.”1532 The 
GAO further stated that the Fed’s role “could be especially valuable in monitoring the 
lending activity” of non-depository lending affiliates.1533 
Legitimately or not, the GAO noted that the Fed had a long-standing policy of 
“not routinely conducting consumer compliance examinations” of non-depository lending 
affiliates that was anchored by three main justifications. First, the Fed correctly noted that 
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while it was the regulator of non-depository lending affiliates, it was not the federal 
enforcer of violations of fair lending laws.1534 The Chairman of the Federal Reserve at 
the time, Alan Greenspan, put the matter this way: “[I]n January of 1998 the [Federal 
Reserve] Board concluded that while we have the general legal authority to examine 
these entities, we have neither the clear enforcement jurisdiction nor the legal 
responsibility for engaging in such activities.”1535 The Fed further announced in January 
of 1998 that they would not even investigate consumer complaints relating to non-
depository lending affiliates.1536 The actual enforcement of fair lending violations 
committed by non-depository lending affiliates was congressionally granted to the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).1537  
The second reason that the Fed gave to the GAO for not performing routine 
examinations of non-depository lending affiliates was that it was expensive.1538 The third 
reason was that, if the Fed began to routinely examine non-depository lending affiliates, 
it would place those lenders at a competitive disadvantage. Non-depository independent 
mortgage lenders, which were not part of a holding company, would have a competitive 
edge over the more heavily regulated non-depository lending affiliates.1539 
Since the Fed was the regulator of non-depository lending affiliates, but 
simultaneously lacked the legal authority to impose sanctions on those lenders, the 
relationship between the Fed and the FTC took on a special importance before the 
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subprime mortgage crisis. Unfortunately, in 1999, when the GAO investigated how well 
the two agencies communicated with one another, they found that the Fed did not 
typically contact the FTC about whether the agency had any ongoing investigations 
involving non-depository lending affiliates.1540 The GAO further discovered that the FTC 
did not examine or routinely investigate non-depository lending affiliates either, nor did 
they undertake a single enforcement action against non-depository lending affiliates over 
the course of the previous three years.1541 The GAO concluded that the poor coordination 
between the two agencies resulted in a lack of regulatory oversight of non-depository 
lending affiliates.1542 
This lack of regulatory oversight of non-depository lending affiliates became 
more serious after the turn of the century. Over four years after their initial report that 
accentuated this concern, the GAO brought the matter to light once again in January of 
2004. At this point, the GAO noted that non-depository lending affiliates were 
conducting “a significant amount of subprime mortgage lending.”1543 Over the course of 
the first six months of 2003, the GAO found that non-depository lending affiliates 
originated over 24% of all of the subprime mortgages that were originated by the Top 25 
subprime lenders over that time.1544 The GAO examined the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s 2001 subprime lender list and discovered that one-fifth of all 
subprime lenders were non-depository lending affiliates.1545 The agency also mentioned 
how non-depository lending affiliates were increasingly becoming targets of “federal and 
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state enforcement actions involving abusive lending.”1546 Nevertheless, the GAO stated 
that the Fed apparently still did not have the authority to conduct routine examinations of 
non-depository lending affiliates “with regard to compliance with consumer protection 
laws.”1547 The GAO concluded their report by asserting that was “a need for additional 
scrutiny and monitoring” of non-depository lending affiliates because of their 
involvement in subprime lending, and that the Fed was in “an optimal position to play a 
larger role in such monitoring.”1548 
The Fed’s response to the GAO’s observations is significant. Edward Gramlich, 
writing on behalf of the Fed, noted that however much merit the GAO’s prescriptions 
have, the existing regulatory structure “has not been a barrier to Federal Reserve 
oversight.”1549 Furthermore, Gramlich reiterated the same argument that Greenspan 
presented in 1999: if federal law expressly permitted the Federal Reserve to have 
exclusive or joint enforcement authority over non-depository lending affiliates, those 
lenders would be burdened by uneven regulation.1550 That arrangement, in turn, would 
favor non-depository independent mortgage lenders.1551 At the end of his statement, 
Gramlich warned the GAO that increasing the Fed’s regulatory responsibilities would 
increase costs to the taxpayer.1552 
At the end of 2006, the peak year for subprime lending, one of the largest 
subprime lenders that year was “regulated,” in the sense just described, by the Fed: 
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Countrywide Home Loans.1553 According to one source, Countrywide originated over 
$97 billion worth of subprime loans from 2005 to 2007.1554 A few points about this lender 
are worth mentioning. 
 
 
3.17. A Brief Examination of Countrywide, the Largest Subprime Lender, and Its 
         Relationship with the Federal Reserve 
 
One can begin to get a sense of the quality of the Fed’s “regulation” of non-
depository mortgage lending affiliates by examining its relationship with Countrywide 
Home Loans.1555 The Fed was the regulator of this non-depository lending affiliate 
beginning in 2001 when the parent holding company, Countrywide Financial 
Corporation, was approved by the Fed to become a bank holding company.1556 In 2001, 
Countrywide did not offer subprime borrowers loans larger than $400,000 and the 
maximum loan-to-value ratio of their subprime mortgages was 90%.1557 The non-
depository lending affiliate did not feature any interest-only ARMs in its product line at 
that time and only 13% of their originated loans were of the NINA variety.1558 The only 
potential recipients of Countrywide NINA loans in 2001 were those borrowers who were 
self-employed.1559 Still, a journalist writing for The American Banker considered 
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Countrywide to be a “big player” in the subprime mortgage market in 2001,1560 while a 
U.S. Banker article published that same year noted that Countrywide announced that it 
wanted “to become the dominant player in the subprime business.”1561 
One should note that Countrywide, in 2003, was “regarded with awe in the 
business world.”1562 In September of that year, Fortune published an article titled, “Meet 
the 23,000% Stock,” which emphasized how Countrywide was the best performing 
“financial services company in the Fortune 500” over the previous twenty-one years.1563 
That same year, then-CEO of Countrywide, Angelo Mozilo, gave a lecture hosted by 
Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies entitled, “The American Dream of 
Homeownership: From Cliché to Mission.”1564 In this speech, Mozilo “complained that a 
‘regulatory mania’ was hurting Countrywide and other ‘reputable’ lenders,” and that 
overreaching “predatory lending laws… were threatening [to] shut the door to 
homeownership for hard-working low-income and minority families.”1565 
By 2004, Countrywide forecast that it would have over 325% more “financial 
centers” and would increase its assets by nearly 250% by the end of 2008.1566 It ended up 
originating $363 billion worth of mortgages in 2004.1567 Around the beginning of that 
year, however, Countrywide decided to “make a bigger splash” in the subprime mortgage 
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market.1568 As a former Countrywide executive vice president of wholesale lending stated 
at the time, “[When] you think about Countrywide, you think about fixed-rate loans.”1569 
However, he noted that Countrywide was now striving to “redefine” the company’s brand 
to the point “where when you think Countrywide, you think ARMs.”1570 Later that year, 
Countrywide launched an advertising campaign that promoted adjustable-rate mortgages. 
One advertisement consisted of a woman chiding her husband for protesting that they 
would be unable to afford their home. After the husband admits his mistake, the narrator 
affirms, “You can count on us.”1571 Other Countrywide slogans included, “No One Can 
Do What Countrywide Can Do,”1572 “Countrywide Can Show You the Way Home,”1573 
and “A Lender That Actually Finds Ways to Make Loans.”1574 Between 2004 and 2006, 
Countrywide “mailed between six and eight million targeted solicitations each month 
along with tens of thousands of phone calls.”1575 One individual even received a 
solicitation from Countrywide through the mail that offered to refinance his post office 
box.1576 
By June of 2004, Countrywide was offering a bewildering array of 180 loan 
products.1577 A journalist writing for the publication The American Banker, covered a 
Countrywide investor presentation that month and likened the company’s CEO, Angelo 
Mozilo, to a “carnival barker,” one who was enthusiastically rattling off the names of 
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their loans.1578 The article quoted Mozilo as proclaiming, “We have ARMs, one-year 
ARMs, three-year, five-year, seven- and 10-year. We have interest-only loans, pay-option 
loans, zero-down programs, low-, no-doc programs, fast-and-easy programs, and 
subprime loans.”1579 When financial analysts began issuing warnings that the housing 
market was becoming overheated, Mozilo stated in 2004, “I don’t believe there’s any 
bubble out there.”1580 
To place Countrywide on a more even footing with their subprime competitors, 
the company changed the compensation structure for its loan officers.1581 Rather than 
receive a flat, annual salary, Countrywide’s loan officers “began earning commissions 
based on [the] volume” of the loans that they brought in to the company.1582 The same 
American Banker journalist in another article noted that Countrywide previously shunned 
this form of compensation.1583 Countrywide loan officers were suddenly required to 
memorize the following script to help bring in more subprime mortgages: “Which would 
you rather have, a long-term fixed payment or a short-term one that may allow you to 
realize several hundred dollars a month in savings? I am able to help many of my clients 
lower their monthly payments and it only takes a few minutes over the phone to get 
started.”1584 Countrywide’s trademarked low-doc loan product was called “Fast and 
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Easy” because the lender could “issue loan approvals without having to wait for pay stubs 
or income tax returns from applicants.”1585 
In November of 2004, The Los Angeles Times reported that the regional vice-
president of Countrywide’s subprime lending unit, Shane Pew, sent an e-mail to his team 
of eighty-five employees that exhorted them to originate more subprime loans. In the e-
mail, Pew wrote, “[W]e will not make money if we don’t do Subprime PERIOD.”1586 
Pew lamented that his team only brought in 56 subprime mortgages during the previous 
month. He then proceeded to list ways of steering borrowers, even those with good credit, 
into subprime loans. These ways included downgrading a borrower’s credit score, “listing 
only one income when there are two wage earners, increasing the amount of the loan and 
not listing any of a borrower’s assets.”1587 The e-mail concluded by noting that those 
were “just a few examples” that the team could use to bring in more subprime loans and 
that they needed to “think outside the box to make this happen.”1588  
By 2005, Countrywide was also firmly committed to originating Option ARMs. 
Angelo Mozilo admitted in October of that year that Option ARMs had “recently been 
portrayed negatively,” but he stated that the product enabled them to “better serve 
qualified customers looking for a more efficient and flexible way to manage their 
obligations.”1589 In the third quarter of 2005 alone, Countrywide originated an astounding 
$29 billion worth of Option ARMs.1590 Incredibly, from 2004 to 2007, the lender 
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originated nearly $750 billion worth of the loan product.1591 By 2007, Countrywide alone 
was responsible for originating 25% of all the option ARM loans in the country.1592 
Around this same time, however, the dangers of Countrywide’s aggressive, high-
risk lending strategy became increasingly difficult to ignore. The lender’s chief risk 
officer, John McMurray, sent out an e-mail to the chief operating officer of the home 
loans division, stating, “As a consequence of [Countrywide’s] strategy to have the widest 
product line in the industry, we are clearly out on the ‘frontier’ in many areas.”1593 By 
this, McMurray meant that the company now potentially faced “high expected default 
rates and losses.”1594 
On December 20, 2005, the Fed, OCC, OTS, FDIC, and NCUA issued “proposed 
interagency guidance on nontraditional mortgage products” in response to their concern 
that certain loan products, such as Option ARMs and NINA loans, contained elevated 
risks.1595 In this guidance, the federal regulators made several recommendations, 
including some that involved the terms of the loans that lenders should offer as well as 
underwriting standards that lenders should employ.1596  
About three months after the guidance was released, Countrywide sent a letter to 
the Fed, offering its comments about the regulators’ recommendations. In this letter, 
Mary Jane Seebach, writing on behalf of Countrywide, asserted that all of the guidance 
pertaining to loan terms and underwriting standards was unnecessary since federal 
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interagency guidance “already exists for managing real estate lending risk.”1597 
Moreover, Seebach maintained that additional regulation of Option ARMs would be 
excessive because the loan product had “been tested in previous economic cycles” and 
had proven to be a “fundamentally sound” product.1598  As for NINA loans, Seebach 
reassured the Fed that Countrywide had sufficient “counterbalancing pricing and 
underwriting requirements” to ensure the “solid performance” of those loans.1599 
Countrywide’s overall resistance to federal regulation was memorably captured by CEO 
Angelo Mozilo’s bold declaration, “No regulator is going to tell me what kind of 
products I can offer.”1600 
By 2006, Countrywide “was one of the nation’s biggest originators of pay-option 
ARMs, the second-largest originator of interest-only loans, and the third-largest 
originator of low-doc and no-doc loans.”1601 The lender now offered subprime loans in 
amounts as large as $1 million.1602 They were offering NINA loans to borrowers who 
classified themselves as “wage earners” and could process their loan applications “in as 
little as thirty minutes.”1603 Countrywide also offered interest-only loans to borrowers 
with FICO scores as low as 560.1604 As Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera write, it was 
“hard to imagine anyone who wouldn’t qualify for a Countrywide subprime loan during 
the final throes of the housing bubble.”1605 One lawsuit filed by the Mortgage Guaranty 
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Insurance Company, a firm that had insured a large portion of Countrywide’s risky loans, 
revealed that Countrywide’s risk officers were aware that their company was overstating 
the income of its borrowers by over 50% on at least a third of their mortgage 
applications.1606 
Countrywide’s collapse was swift. By the end of 2007, one out of three of their 
subprime loans were delinquent and the lender posted an annual loss of $704 million, its 
first annual loss in over thirty years.1607 Perhaps out of a concern of impending lawsuits, 
the lender agreed to help borrowers restructure an astonishing $16 billion worth of 
Countrywide-originated mortgages.1608 Earlier that year, Countrywide CEO Angelo 
Mozilo attempted to persuade executives of large investment banks in New York to 
continue financing their risky loans, but they refused.1609 In a panic, Countrywide 
contacted over forty banks and tapped into $11.5 billion worth of loans from pre-
established lines of credit to stay afloat.1610 In December of 2007, Mozilo considered 
selling the company. On January 11, 2008, Bank of America announced that it would 
purchase Countrywide for $4 billion, a fraction of the amount of the company’s market 
value before the subprime crisis erupted.1611 Countrywide ceased originating subprime 
mortgages altogether by that time.1612 From January 26, 2007 to January 31, 2008, 
Countrywide’s stock price went from $45.26 to $6.96, a decline in value of 84.6%.1613 A 
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few months later, Countrywide ended up posting a loss of $893 million over the first 
quarter of 2008.1614 An analyst later asked Mozilo if, in hindsight, he would have handled 
the company differently now that the dangers of subprime mortgages are more readily 
apparent. In an extraordinary confession of regret, Mozilo replied that “theoretically” he 
would have made different decisions, but he added, “Our volumes, our whole place in the 
industry, would have changed dramatically, because we would have arbitrarily made a 
decision that was contrary to what everything appeared to be… It would have been an 
insight that only, I think, a superior spirit could have had at the time.”1615  
 In the summer of 2008, an imbroglio erupted when reports surfaced that 
Countrywide had placed certain “high profile figures” in what the lender called “The 
Friends of Angelo” program.1616 The program gave these select men, including Senators 
Christopher Dodd and Kent Conrad, as well as former Fannie Mae CEO’s Franklin 
Raines and Jim Johnson, V.I.P. loans that contained favorable rates that were not 
available to other customers.1617 Congressman Darrell Issa, Chairman of the House 
Oversight Committee, issued a subpoena to Bank of America to acquire all materials 
related to the Friends of Angelo program, claiming that Countrywide “orchestrated a 
deliberate and calculated effort to use relationships with people in high places in order to 
manipulate public policy and further their bottom line.”1618 That same summer, Mozilo 
accidentally replied to an e-mail from a borrower who requested that his loan be modified 
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in order to avoid foreclosure. Mozilo inadvertently sent an e-mail to the borrower that 
indicated that he found the request to be “disgusting” and “unbelievable.”1619 
 Mozilo’s image was tarnished even further when, in the summer of 2009, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged him with committing fraud and 
“insider trading for alleged stock sales” before Countrywide collapsed.1620 In particular, 
the SEC alleged that Mozilo “unloaded his [Countrywide] stock while knowing the risks 
facing the company, resulting in proceeds of $140 million.”1621 The SEC eventually 
dropped the suit in March of 2011 when Mozilo agreed to pay $22.5 million in penalties 
“without admitting or denying the accusations.”1622 To put this number in perspective, 
one should note that Mozilo received $23.6 million in compensation in 2003 alone.1623 
After the collapse of his company, Mozilo told Congressional examiners in September of 
2010 that “Countrywide was one of the greatest companies in the history of this 
country.”1624  
 As for Bank of America, its acquisition of Countrywide continues to haunt the 
bank. In October of 2008, Bank of America promised Countrywide borrowers that it 
would modify over $8 billion worth of their loans.1625 The next year, in February of 2009, 
Bank of America announced that it was changing Countrywide’s name to “Bank of 
America Home Loans” because it was concerned that “the brand image of 
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Countrywide… would be less appealing to customers.”1626 In June of 2010, the bank 
agreed to pay the Federal Trade Commission $108 million “to cover foreclosure-related 
servicing abuses by Countrywide.”1627 At the end of 2010, Bank of America paid Fannie 
Mae $1.52 billion and Freddie Mac $1.28 billion to end claims related to mortgages that 
Countrywide originated between 2004 and 2008.1628 A few months later, the bank arrived 
at a $1.6 billion settlement with Assured Guaranty to resolve claims stemming from 
Countrywide’s poor lending standards.1629 In an effort to distance itself from the fallout 
of the mortgage crisis, Bank of America chose to create an entity known as “Legacy 
Asset Servicing,” which it will use to handle over 1.3 million troubled mortgage loans, 
the majority of which were originated by Countrywide.1630  
As of May of 2011, Bank of America’s home loan division has suffered losses of 
over $15 billion since it acquired Countrywide.1631 According to Dan Fitzpatrick, writing 
for The Wall Street Journal, as of July of 2012 the Countrywide acquisition has cost 
Bank of America over “$40 billion in real-estate losses, legal expenses and settlements 
with state and federal agencies.”1632 In late June of 2011, Bank of America agreed to 
settle with 22 investment companies that were holding a combined 530 soured mortgage 
pools that were issued by Countrywide. The unpaid principal amount of the mortgage 
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pools involved in the settlement was an astounding $174 billion, though Bank of America 
agreed to settle for $8.5 billion. A final hearing to approve the settlement was scheduled 
for November 17, 2011.1633  
On October 24, 2012, the United States Justice Department filed a lawsuit against 
Bank of America “to recover damages and penalties arising from a scheme to defraud” 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.1634 According to the lawsuit, as mortgage defaults surged 
across the country in 2007, Countrywide unveiled a new “streamlined” loan origination 
model that it named the “Hustle” or “HSSL,” which stood for “high speed swim lane.”1635 
This new model was designed to have loans “move forward and never backward” and to 
“remove unnecessary ‘toll gates’ [that were] slowing down the loan origination 
process.”1636 The lawsuit alleges that Countrywide’s Hustle “eliminated underwriter 
review [for] even many high risk loans.”1637 Critical underwriting tasks were assigned to 
“loan processors who were previously considered underqualified even to answer 
borrower questions.”1638 Instructions on how to perform underwriting tasks were 
eliminated under the Hustle model and “considered nothing more than unnecessary forms 
that would slow down the swim lane.”1639 Furthermore, the lawsuit accuses Countrywide 
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of revamping “the compensation structure of those involved in loan origination, basing 
performance bonuses solely on volume.”1640  
The Justice Department claims that Countrywide’s own quality control reports on 
Hustle loans found material defects, such as fraud and other qualities that would make 
loans ineligible for sale to investors, as high as 40% during certain months, which was 
ten-times higher than the industry standard defect rate.1641 Not only did Countrywide fail 
to discontinue the Hustle program in light of this information, the Justice Department 
maintains that it elected to offer one-time bonuses to their quality control employees to 
“rebut” the defect findings for the sake of making the defect rates “appear lower to 
investors.”1642 The Justice Department “seeks the maximum amount of damages and the 
maximum amount of civil penalties allowed by law.”1643 
Leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, no mortgage lender originated more 
risky loans than Countrywide.1644 From 2003 to 2007, Countrywide was consistently 
ranked in the Top 4 of National Mortgage News’ annual “Top Subprime Lenders” list. As 
Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel ask, “While Countrywide was spewing out hundreds 
of billions of dollars in toxic loans, where was the Fed?”1645 Interestingly, the Fed’s 
“oversight of Countrywide was confidential and thus hidden from view.”1646 However, 
given that the Fed had a “formal policy” that relieved them from both “routinely 
conducting consumer compliance examinations” of non-depository lending affiliates of 
                                                 
1640 Ibid., 4. 
1641 Ibid. 
1642 Ibid., 5. 
1643 Ibid. 
1644 The Center for Public Integrity, Who’s Behind the Financial Meltdown: The Top 25 Subprime Lenders 
and Their Wall Street Backers (May 2009), 14. 
1645 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 201. 
1646 Ibid. 
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bank holding companies1647 as well as “investigating consumer complaints” relating to 
those lenders,1648 one may reasonably cast doubt on whether it ever examined 
Countrywide at all.1649 Even if the Fed did in fact regularly examine Countrywide, it is 
important to note that in this case, the Fed did not bring the company’s “disastrous 
lending” to a halt.1650 An additional significant point about the Fed’s “regulation” of 
Countrywide is that the former never once took formal enforcement action against the 
latter.1651 Indeed, the Fed never took a single enforcement action against any non-
depository mortgage lending affiliate between 2003 and 2007, true to its established 
policy.1652 
Prior to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan was “philosophically opposed to heavy-handed intervention of 
rule making,”1653 adhering to the belief that “government regulation squelches private 
responsibility and initiative.”1654 Instead, Greenspan felt that lenders would avoid taking 
excessive risks “in the interest of self-preservation.”1655 Federal Reserve officials, in 
general, agreed with Greenspan on this issue, noting further that “over-zealous regulation 
might cut off credit to people who need it most.”1656 Richmond Fed President, Jeffrey 
Lacker, once asserted, “There is going to be a fraction of people that get the wrong [loan] 
product and that is regrettable,” but if the Fed did something to “limit that probability,” 
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1648 Ibid. 
1649 The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps, 201. 
1650 Ibid. 
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1652 Patricia A. McCoy, Andrey D. Pavlov, and Susan M. Wachter, “Systemic Risk Through Securitization: 
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they could potentially be limiting “credit to people for whom that is the right 
product.”1657 
During a hearing before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform on October 23, 2008, Congressman Henry 
Waxman questioned Greenspan’s underlying belief that “free, competitive markets are by 
far the unrivaled way to organize economies” and that no regulation has ever 
“meaningfully worked” in the past.1658 When pressed by Congressman Waxman to 
consider whether the havoc that the subprime mortgage crisis wrecked on the economy 
casted doubt on the accuracy of that opinion, Greenspan memorably admitted that the 
crisis caused him to find a flaw in his belief system, one that he held on to “for over 40 
years,” and that he was “very distressed by that fact.”1659 Congressman Waxman then 
asked Greenspan to clarify what he meant by “a flaw,” to which Greenspan responded 
that he found a flaw in the model that he perceived was the “critical functioning structure 
that defines how the world works.”1660 He stated that he was “in a state of shocked 
disbelief” that the self-interest of mortgage lending institutions did not have the efficacy 
to “protect shareholders equity.”1661 Finally, as much as he “would have preferred 
otherwise,” Greenspan uncharacteristically called for a number of “regulatory changes,” 
which he believed would ultimately contribute to America reemerging “with a far 
sounder financial system.”1662 
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3.18. Non-depository Independent Mortgage Lenders and State Banking  
         Regulators 
 
 Thus far, three lender/regulator relationships have been examined: the OCC and 
their federally chartered national banks (and their non-depository mortgage lending 
subsidiaries), the OTS and their federally chartered thrifts (and their non-depository 
mortgage lending subsidiaries), and the Fed and their non-depository mortgage lending 
affiliates. The fourth and final regulatory relationship that needs to be explored, along 
with its bearing on the subprime mortgage crisis, is the relationship between individual 
state banking regulators and non-depository independent mortgage lenders, those 
companies that are not part of a holding company. 
 Since there are fifty state banking regulators, each with their own laws and 
licensing requirements for non-depository independent mortgage lenders, I am forced to 
discuss this regulatory relationship in general terms. By and large, non-depository 
independent mortgage lenders escape federal banking regulation, but they have to 
“comply with state laws, except for state provisions preempted by the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA) and the Alternative 
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (AMTPA).”1663 Non-depository independent mortgage 
lenders are not regularly examined by any federal agency,1664 which entails that they are 
not subject to fair lending, soundness and soundness, and other types of federal 
                                                 
1663 Patricia A. McCoy, Elizabeth Renuart, “The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional Home 
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assessments.1665 In addition, these independent lenders do not have to meet federally-
established minimum risk-based capital requirements and reserve requirements.1666 
 Instead, non-depository independent mortgage lenders need to meet individual 
state requirements in order to lawfully conduct business within that state. For instance, 
state licensing requirements generally demand that non-depository independent mortgage 
lenders meet certain experience, education, and operations requirements in order to 
engage in mortgage activities.1667 States may also examine independent lenders “to 
ensure compliance with licensing requirements, review their lending… functions, and 
look for unfair or unethical business practices.”1668 In the event that a state regulator 
discovers that an independent lender has been engaging in those latter practices, some 
state attorneys general “may pursue actions that include license suspension or revocation, 
monetary fines, and lawsuits.”1669  
All fifty states additionally have their own UDAP laws.1670 State UDAP laws 
“contain a variety of restrictions on public enforcement,” and the limits themselves “vary 
widely among the states.”1671  Some states, for instance, forbid their attorneys general 
from bringing any actions against mortgage lenders.1672 Other states “prevent attorney 
general actions if the target of the action is an entity regulated by another state or federal 
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agency.”1673 How well a non-depository independent lender is regulated in any given 
state depends upon the reach of the state’s lending laws as well as its ability to enforce 
those laws.1674 According to Prentiss Cox, a former Assistant Attorney General in 
Minnesota, states with a “central UDAP focus were the only regulators or organizations 
that made substantial efforts to identify and address rampantly imprudent mortgage 
lending practices” during the explosion of the subprime market.1675  
 Nevertheless, leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, state regulatory 
enforcement of mortgage lending and consumer law violations committed by independent 
leaders was generally “very weak.”1676 One study explored the strength of state subprime 
lending regulations in Florida, California, Minnesota, and Oregon. The author of the 
study concluded, “Overall, none of these states have subprime loan regulations in place 
that adequately protect borrowers.”1677 Furthermore, compared to their federal regulator 
counterparts, state regulators tended to be ill-equipped and underfunded for performing 
time-consuming, costly examinations of independent lenders that were operating in their 
state lines.1678 The widely-publicized $325 million predatory lending settlement with 
Ameriquest in 2006, for instance, was the product of a two-year investigation conducted 
by 49 states, and a one-year negotiation on the terms of the agreement.1679 
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The FTC was the only federal agency that was authorized to assist state regulators 
with their examination efforts, but it, too, lacked sufficient staff and enforcement 
capacity.1680 Prentiss Cox maintains that federal regulators like the Fed and OCC “were 
totally uninterested in looking on the ground at what was happening to actual human 
beings.”1681 In terms of overseeing non-depository independent mortgage lenders, Cox 
noted that the individual state attorneys general “were the only cops on the beat.”1682  
To provide a sense of the inability of state regulators to effectively oversee the 
independent mortgage lenders that were operating within their state lines, one should 
consider the fact that 169 of those lenders failed in 2007 alone.1683 According to data 
provided by The Center for Public Integrity, the second and third largest subprime 
originators from 2005 to 2007 were non-depository independent mortgage lenders: 
Ameriquest1684 (#2) and New Century Financial Corporation (#3).1685 Given the extent of 
their involvement in subprime mortgage lending leading up to the crisis, it is important to 
provide a brief sketch of both of these lenders as well as examine some of the key 
decisions that they made before the subprime market collapsed. 
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3.19. Ameriquest: The Second Largest Subprime Mortgage Lender 
 Ameriquest Capital, founded in 1979 as Long Beach Savings and Loan,1686 was 
the largest originator of subprime loans in 2003,1687 an accomplishment that the company 
once again enjoyed in 20041688 and 20051689 as well. It is noteworthy that one of the main 
reasons that the lender changed its name from Long Beach Mortgage to Ameriquest was 
because, in 1996, the United States Justice Department accused it of gouging elderly, 
female, and minority borrowers, charging them fees as high as 12% of the loan amount. 
The lender ended up settling with the Justice Department for $4 million.1690 
  Leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, Ameriquest attempted to restore its 
reputation by publicly announcing in 2000 that it would adhere to an “innovative” list of 
“best practices.” Ameriquest executives declared that its “procedures and internal 
controls” were now designed to ensure that their “underwriting standards, pricing 
policies, and property valuations [were] fair and accurate.”1691 The executives also 
maintained that Ameriquest held itself “to the highest standards” and would “not tolerate 
unethical or improper behavior” by its employees.1692 
Another way that Ameriquest attempted to repair its reputation in 2000 was by 
forming an alliance with the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now 
(ACORN). The lender arrived at an agreement with ACORN that involved the creation of 
a $360 million, three-year residential pilot program in 10 cities, designed to “provide 
potential homebuyers in low-income neighborhoods with counseling and access to 
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loans.”1693 An executive of Ameriquest at the time, Kirk Langs, assured the public that 
Ameriquest was not using the alliance “as a sales tool” or as a way “to pump up business 
in any way.”1694 One should note that ACORN later revealed that Ameriquest “made only 
a small fraction of those loans” because the group located other lenders that were 
“offering better terms for [its] community residents.”1695 
 Striving to put their image problems behind them, Ameriquest “embarked on an 
all-out marketing offensive” in the early 2000’s that included the purchase of two blimps 
that hovered over major sporting events.1696 In a press release, the vice chairman of 
Ameriquest at the time, Adam Bass, stated that the blimps served “as highly visible 
symbols our desire to help every American fulfill their dream of homeownership.”1697 
Ameriquest also reached an agreement with the Texas Rangers to have the team’s home 
baseball stadium renamed “Ameriquest Field,” in exchange for $75 million to be paid out 
over the course of thirty years.1698 Included in the agreement was the provision that the 
lender’s logo, the Liberty Bell, would “clang” every time a Ranger’s player hit a 
homerun.1699 Soon after the naming-rights announcement was made, Bass stated that the 
agreement matched “the American dream for homeownership with the American 
pastime.”1700 He added, “Baseball is a game for the entire family, and homeownership is 
the ultimate family occurrence.”1701  
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 In February of 2005, Ameriquest paid roughly $15 million to sponsor the Super 
Bowl halftime show that featured a performance by Paul McCartney.1702 The lender also 
paid approximately $4 million later that year to sponsor The Rolling Stone’s “On Stage 
Tour” that launched in August. Part of the promotion of the tour included the slogan: 
“Ameriquest: Not your average mortgage company. Rolling Stones? Not your average 
garage band.”1703 At one point, Ameriquest was the official mortgage sponsor of both the 
National Football League and Major League Baseball.1704 The lender even went so far as 
to dub itself: “A proud sponsor of the American Dream.”1705  
 As Ameriquest was rehabilitating its image in the early 2000’s, the lender 
simultaneously experienced phenomenal growth. In just four years, from 2001 to 2004, 
Ameriquest’s subprime loan production grew more than twelvefold, reaching as high as 
$82.7 billion in 2004.1706 By 2005, the lender had over 12,000 employees working at 298 
branches in 38 states.1707  
 Throughout this period of time, however, Ameriquest was embroiled in a number 
of state lawsuits and entangled in several investigations. On January 22, 2004, 
Ameriquest agreed to a settlement of over $600,000 with the state of Connecticut for 
resoliciting “customers too soon for refinancing.”1708 When the same problems resurfaced 
just months after the settlement, the state of Connecticut threatened to take away 
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Ameriquest’s license.1709 At the same time, Ameriquest was in the midst of settling a 
four-state lawsuit in California centering on its lending abuses and a two-state lawsuit in 
Florida.1710 
 From 2000 to 2004, Ameriquest customers filed over four times the amount of 
complaints with the FTC than the customers of Countrywide over that period of time.1711 
The majority of those complaints accused Ameriquest of inflating the values of homes, 
encouraging borrowers to misrepresent their income or employment status, and 
misleading borrowers about the fees imbedded in their loans.1712 Mark Bomchill, a loan 
officer at Ameriquest from 2002 to 2003, admitted that his employee training program 
centered on promoting the idea that their loans were providing benefits to the customer, 
“which in reality didn't exist in the long run.”1713 Bomchill further conceded that they 
were trained how to coach borrowers into believing that higher loan readjustments were 
not forthcoming, and to omit mentioning “the tremendously high fees” that were 
accompanying their loans.1714  
Ameriquest was also notorious for employing bait-and-switch techniques, 
promising certain interest rates and fees to borrowers, but then changing them at the time 
of closing.1715 One former Ameriquest employee asserted that the lender did not “have 
the customer’s best interest in mind at all” and that its dominant approach to mortgage 
lending was “all about making the dollar and dealing with the consequences later.”1716 
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Another former employee confessed that she “witnessed documents being altered… [by 
way of] co-workers using a brightly lighted Coke machine as a tracing board, copying 
borrowers' signatures on an unsigned piece of paper.”1717 
 After a two year investigation of Ameriquest, orchestrated by a committee of five 
states, the lender agreed to a $325 million settlement in January of 2006 without 
admitting any wrongdoing.1718 According to the committee, Ameriquest created a “hyper-
aggressive, high pressure” sales culture that “encouraged its sales personnel to engage in 
deceptive and fraudulent conduct.”1719 The committee discovered that Ameriquest 
concealed interest rate and loan costs from borrowers during the application process, 
provided inaccurate good faith estimates to borrowers, falsified loan documents to push 
through loans, and charged “thousands of dollars in discount points that resulted in higher 
commissions for sales personnel but failed to yield a lower interest rate for 
borrowers.”1720 One should note that the settlement did not include the placement of any 
restrictions or limitations on Ameriquest’s state licenses.1721 
 Five months after the settlement was reached, Ameriquest elected to close down 
all of its retail branches and eliminate 3,800 jobs.1722 Its new business strategy was to 
conduct all of its operations in four large regional call centers.1723 The lender announced 
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that it anticipated “that its retail origination volume will fall dramatically for three to six 
months,” but then it expected its “production volumes to rise significantly.”1724 
 As Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera observe, however, “Ameriquest never really 
recovered from the settlement.”1725 By the end of 2006, Ameriquest was experiencing a 
dramatic decrease in earnings and was searching for a buyer.1726 Massachusetts governor 
Deval Patrick, a former director of Ameriquest’s board, made a call on February 20, 2007 
to Citigroup, personally vouching for “the current management and the character of the 
company.”1727 Eight days later, on February 28, Ameriquest reached an agreement with 
Citigroup that put fresh working capital into the ailing lender.1728  
In September of 2007, the OCC approved the purchase of Ameriquest’s subprime 
lending unit, Argent Mortgage, by Citibank, N.A.1729 Citibank immediately renamed the 
acquired lending unit “Citi Residential Lending” to distance itself from Ameriquest’s 
tarnished reputation.1730 In just eight months, in May of 2008, Citi Residential Lending 
had to shut down its operations due in large part to the overwhelmingly poor quality of 
Argent’s subprime loans.1731 By the fall of 2008, Ameriquest completely closed down 
and Citigroup “took over the $45 billion portfolio of loans that needed to be serviced.”1732 
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It is in this context that Citigroup received $476.2 billion in cash and guarantees from the 
federal government.1733 
 
3.20. The Rise and Collapse of New Century Financial 
New Century Financial Corporation was one of a handful of publicly traded 
subprime lenders that survived the first subprime crisis that erupted in 1998. After 
posting annual losses in 1999 and 2000, New Century turned a significant corner and 
posted a profit of $48 million in 2001.1734 The New Century Chairman and CEO at the 
time, Robert Cole, gave credit to its loan origination system, Fastqual, for contributing to 
much of the lender’s recent success.1735 Fastqual could approve loan applications in 
twelve seconds.1736 
  After the 2001 earnings announcement, Cole underscored how twenty other 
subprime lenders were unable to pull through the subprime crisis of 19981737 and he 
enthusiastically revealed that the lender’s message in 2002 would be “The Quest for 
Stockholder Value.”1738 Despite early warning signs that the booming economy was 
potentially headed for trouble, Cole optimistically stated that an economic downtown 
would simply create “new and more customers” each passing day for “New Century’s 
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subprime products.”1739 In anticipation of higher, subprime-generated profits, New 
Century began hiring additional salespeople and expanding its operations.1740 
In the early 2000’s, New Century discovered that its sweet spot was originating 
mortgage loans with borrower FICO scores ranging from 500 to 680 and the lender began 
to grow at a rapid pace.1741 Compared to 1995, when New Century had 300 employees 
and originated $350 million worth of subprime mortgage loans, the lender had 
approximately 3,700 employees and originated $27 billion worth of subprime mortgage 
loans by the end of 2003. Three years later, at the end of 2006, New Century had more 
than 5,000 employees and originated more than $50 billion in subprime mortgage loans 
that year.1742 
New Century’s spectacular growth during this time was accompanied by an 
equally impressive year-over-year profit performance. Whereas the lender made $48 
million in 2001, its profits jumped 274% to $179.7 million in 2002.1743 Then, in 2003, 
New Century posted annual profits of $245.5 million, an increase of 36%.1744 The next 
year, New Century’s profits ballooned to $375.6 million, an increase of nearly another 
53%.1745 In 2005, New Century’s profits reached $411 million, an increase of almost 
                                                 
1739 Ibid. 
1740 Erick Bergquist, “No. 2 in Subprime, New Century Aims Even Higher.” 
1741 Ibid. 
1742 Michael J. Missal and Lisa M. Richman, “New Century Financial: Lessons Learned,” Mortgage 
Banking, Vol. 69, No. 1 (October 2008). 
1743 Brad Finkelstein, “New Century Thrives in 2002 with Record Earnings.” 
1744 “Subprime Lenders Report Earnings,” Origination News, Vol. 13, No. 7 (March 2004). 
1745 Brad Finkelstein, “New Century Earnings Rose Year-to-Year in 4Q,” National Mortgage News, Vol. 
29, No. 21 (February 14, 2005). 
307 
 
another 10%.1746 Finally, over the course of the first nine months of 2006, New Century 
posted profits of $276 million.1747  
From a stockholder’s perspective, there was indeed value in investing in shares of 
New Century during this time. An investor that purchased New Century stock in June of 
1997 and then sold his or her shares in December of 2004 would have been rewarded 
with a handsome return of approximately 560%.1748 In the midst of these returns, New 
Century used a new branding initiative in 2005, one in which it labeled itself as “a new 
shade of blue chip.”1749 One should consider part of the press release that unveiled this 
initiative: 
‘Blue chip’ is synonymous with companies known as quality investments 
that deliver long-term value for stockholders and are entrenched leaders in 
their industries. In addition, ‘blue chip’ connotes strong performance and 
stability. Like traditional blue chip companies, New Century Financial has 
outperformed its competitors with consistent and strong financial 
performance. As a ‘New Shade of Blue Chip,” New Century will update 
the traditional view of a ‘blue chip’ company by emphasizing not only  
strong results, but also how those results are achieved.1750 
 
 
 With an incredible five-year profit performance behind them, New Century stunned 
the global investment community on February 7, 2007 with an announcement that it had 
to restate its financial statements for the first three quarters of 2006.1751 Right after the 
announcement, New Century’s stock price dropped precipitously.1752 About one month 
                                                 
1746 Michael J. Missal, “Final Report for the District of Delaware, United States Bankruptcy Court: New 
Century TRS Holdings,” (February 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.klgates.com/FCWSite/Final_Report_New_Century.pdf, 1. 
1747 Ibid. 
1748 “New Century Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,” CNNMoney (April 3, 2007), available at 
http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/02/news/companies/new_century_bankruptcy. 
1749 James Surowiecki, “Subprime Homesick Blues,” The New Yorker, Vol. 83, No. 7 (April 9, 2007). 
1750 Michael J. Missal, “Final Report for the District of Delaware, United States Bankruptcy Court: New 
Century TRS Holdings,” 49-50. Italics mine. 
1751 Michael J. Missal and Lisa M. Richman, “New Century Financial: Lessons Learned.” 
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later, on March 2, 2007, New Century admitted that they would be unable to issue its 
2006 Annual Report on time, an announcement that incited investment and commercial 
banks to cease lending the distressed company any more money to originate subprime 
loans.1753 Six days later, on March 8, 2007, New Century stopped accepting loan 
applications from subprime borrowers.1754 Shortly after that fact became evident, the 
New York Stock Exchange delisted New Century’s securities.1755 On April 7, 2007, New 
Century filed for bankruptcy protection.1756  
 
3.21. Why Did New Century Financial Fail? 
 In June of 2007, The United States Bankruptcy Court for the State of Delaware 
“issued an order granting the U.S. trustee's motion for authorization to appoint an 
examiner in the New Century bankruptcy proceeding.”1757 The trustee appointed Michael 
Missal to conduct the investigation of New Century, which ending up taking nine months 
to complete. During the investigation, Missal reviewed thousands of New Century 
documents and conducted 110 interviews with 85 witnesses. His efforts culminated in the 
publication of an illuminating 551 page report that was publicly released on March 26, 
2008. Missal’s report is perhaps the single most thorough examination of a subprime 
lender that is available to the public. It would be helpful to explore some of Missal’s 
major findings. 
  First, Missal affirmed that New Century “had a brazen obsession with increasing 
loan originations, without due regard to the risks associated with that business 
                                                 
1753 Ibid. 
1754 Ibid. 
1755 Ibid. 
1756 Ibid. 
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strategy.”1758 Missal also noted that “New Century measured loan quality primarily in 
terms of whether it was successful in selling loans to investors,” not in terms of whether 
the loans could be repaid by borrowers.1759 In fact, employees in New Century’s loan 
production department were exclusively compensated by the volume of the loans that 
they originated.1760  
 Missal additionally disclosed that New Century originated the majority of their 
subprime loans by using mortgage brokers, who, in turn, were trained in a program that 
the lender called “CloseMore University.”1761 New Century eventually formed 
relationships with over 50,000 mortgage brokers and the lender was able to fund more 
than $200 million worth of loans every business day in most months from April 2005 
through December 2006.1762 It is doubtful that individual state regulators could ever 
provide effective oversight of a subprime lender that had a scale of operations as vast as 
New Century.  
 Missal also discovered that over 70% of New Century’s originated loans had low 
initial teaser rates and over 40% of all of their originated loans were of the NINA 
variety.1763 Moreover, he learned that the lender “made frequent exceptions to its 
underwriting guidelines for borrowers who might not otherwise qualify for a particular 
loan.”1764 One particular type of exception that New Century would occasionally make 
for its borrowers was called “the pride of ownership” exception, which would raise 
                                                 
1758 Michael J. Missal, “Final Report for the District of Delaware, United States Bankruptcy Court: New 
Century TRS Holdings,” 2; 55. 
1759 Ibid., 114. 
1760 Michael J. Missal and Lisa M. Richman, “New Century Financial: Lessons Learned.” 
1761 Michael J. Missal, “Final Report for the District of Delaware, United States Bankruptcy Court: New 
Century TRS Holdings,” 114. 
1762 Ibid., 116. 
1763 Ibid., 3. 
1764 Ibid. 
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borrowers’ credit limits by as much as 15% depending upon how well they “maintained 
their homes relative to their neighbors.”1765 
 Finally, Missal determined that one of the key reasons why New Century failed 
was that its senior management “did not set an appropriate tone ‘at the top.’”1766 Among 
their many shortcomings, Missal found that they “did not invest in the necessary 
technologies, systems, or personnel to meet its growing business and expanding 
challenges.”1767 Missal further stated that New Century’s management team “turned a 
blind eye to the increasing risks” of their subprime originations and “did not take 
appropriate steps to manage those risks.”1768 Even though there was an obvious 
emergence of “troubling loan quality trends” as early as 2004, Missal discovered that “no 
member of Senior Management was directed to be responsible and accountable for 
improving loan quality.”1769  
In his effort to formulate reasons why the senior management team at New 
Century failed to make the quality of their loan originations a top priority, Missal 
concluded that “certain comparative data” suggested that their loans on average “were 
performing better than those of its competitors.”1770 Also, Missal contended that “Senior 
Management appeared to believe that regardless of day-to-day market conditions… New 
Century would survive, just as it had survived the downturn of 1998-2001.”1771 A former 
appraiser at New Century, Maggie Hardiman, later asserted that she “was not surprised 
                                                 
1765 Vikas Bajaj and Jenny Anderson, “Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans,” The New York 
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1766 Michael J. Missal, “Final Report for the District of Delaware, United States Bankruptcy Court: New 
Century TRS Holdings,” 5. 
1767 Ibid. 
1768 Ibid., 4. 
1769 Ibid., 111. 
1770 Ibid., 114. 
1771 Ibid. 
311 
 
by the company’s downfall” because few people “seemed to be thinking long-term.”1772 
Instead, the predominant message that she heard from her superiors was to “approve 
more loans.”1773 According to Hardiman, “[N]o one, from the top levels down to the 
lower levels of the office, didn’t want those [subprime] loans to go through.”1774 
 Although a considerable number of consumer complaints about New Century’s 
lending practices were filed with both the FTC and individual state agencies before the 
subprime mortgage crisis exploded,1775 regulatory oversight of this non-depository 
independent lender was entirely inadequate. For instance, on January 31, 2007, a little 
over two months before New Century filed for bankruptcy protection, representatives 
from the company firmly opposed “the adoption of responsible underwriting standards 
for their lending activities” during a hearing before the California Senate Banking 
Committee.1776 It is worth noting that the lender had a heavy subprime lending presence 
in California, with its headquarters stationed in the city of Irvine. New Century’s 2005 
Annual Report indicated that 37% of its business that year was conducted in 
California.1777  
Nevertheless, the New Century representatives testified in front of the California 
Senate Banking Committee that their adjustable-rate mortgages “needed no additional 
regulations or scrutiny.”1778 In response to the proposal that the subprime guidance that 
was adopted by the Fed, OCC, and OTS in September of 2006 be applied to non-
                                                 
1772 David Cho, “Pressure at Mortgage Firm Led to Mass Approval of Bad Loans,” The Washington Post 
(May 7, 2007). 
1773 Ibid. 
1774 Ibid. 
1775 Mike Hudson and E. Scott Reckard, “Workers Say Lender Ran ‘Boiler Rooms’.” 
1776 Paul Leonard, “Testimony Before the California Senate Banking Committee,” (March 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/california/ca-mortgage/policy-legislation/leonard-ca-
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depository independent mortgage lenders in the state of California, the New Century 
representatives stated, “The history and features of hybrid ARMs do not warrant 
inclusion in the guidance and to do so would cause severe, negative consequences for 
consumers, the real estate market and the economy.”1779 As New Century was preparing 
to file for bankruptcy, the Director of the California office of the Center for Responsible 
Lending observed, “Unfortunately, it now appears that these negative consequences are 
mounting from the failure to have just those kinds of standards in place.”1780 It is a 
testament to the power and complexity of large non-depository independent mortgage 
lenders like New Century that comprehensive subprime lending guidance was not in 
place, even as late as 2007, in a state that was a hotbed for those types of loans. 
 
3.22. Conclusion 
 The elaborate and fragmented banking regulation system in the United States, 
leading up the subprime mortgage crisis, was not structured in a way that could bring 
about timely and effective oversight of many of the nation’s largest subprime mortgage 
lenders. The OCC and OTS’ federal preemption of state lending laws gave rise to a 
regulatory “race to the bottom” in the sense that their oversight synchronously became 
both more accommodating and wider in scope. The OTS and OCC generally failed to 
ensure the safety and soundness of many of the largest subprime lenders that they 
supervised, including Bank of America, N.A., JPMorgan Chase, N.A., Citibank, N.A., 
Wachovia Bank, N.A., and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., WMC Mortgage Corporation, 
Option One Mortgage Corporation, First Franklin Financial, Washington Mutual, and 
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GMAC.1781 The two federal regulators also never adequately addressed the consumer 
protection void created by their opportunistic preemption of state lending laws. In 
response to this sweeping federal preemption, Congressman Barney Frank maintained 
that the federal regulators had “bitten off fifty heads,” but did not “have the brainpower… 
to replace them.”1782 Their federal preemption, furthermore, encouraged 46 state 
regulators to develop parity laws that defanged their own consumer protection laws. 
 The Fed, for its part, was unwilling to supervise non-depository mortgage lending 
affiliates that belonged to a holding company, most notably large subprime lenders like 
Countrywide, HSBC Finance, and CitiFinancial.1783 In addition, the Fed obstinately 
refused to activate the UDAP component of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act of 1994, electing instead to require lenders to disclose information about the 
particular risks and features of their subprime loans to borrowers.1784 Even though the 
Fed was “keenly aware that disclosures and financial education” were not always 
“sufficient to combat abusive practices,” it nevertheless was reluctant to actually prohibit 
particular unfair or deceptive lending practices by way of issuing rules.1785 Reasons for 
this reluctance include their belief that whether a given lending practice “is unfair or 
deceptive depends heavily on the facts and circumstances” of individual cases, as well as 
their concern that prohibiting certain lending practices would “limit consumers’ options” 
in shopping for subprime mortgages.1786 
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 Finally, in general, state regulators were unable to provide effective oversight of 
enormous non-depository independent subprime mortgage lenders like Ameriquest and 
New Century. The sheer size and complexity of these lenders, along with their proclivity 
for allocating large sums of money for campaign contributions and lobbying 
expenditures,1787 made this breed of subprime lender especially difficult to regulate by 
individual states. Although each state had predatory lending laws of varying strength1788 
as well as UDAP laws at their disposal to combat the origination of risky subprime loans 
by non-depository independent lenders in their state lines, I would argue that the 
pervasive failure of those lenders suggests that they were too large to be sufficiently 
supervised by fifty different state banking regulators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1787 For example, from 1994 to 2008, Ameriquest made nearly $4 million in campaign contributions and 
reported over $1 million in lobbying expenditures. New Century, during the same period of time, made 
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      Chapter Four 
 
                              4.0. The Arrangers 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 In March of 2010, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Alan Greenspan, argued that “the global proliferation of securitized, toxic U.S. subprime 
mortgages” was the “immediate trigger” of the financial crisis.1789 In chapter six, I will 
examine the role that two of the largest arrangers and issuers of securitized subprime 
mortgages played in creating conditions for the emergence of the subprime mortgage 
crisis: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Presently, I will provide a sketch of how arrangers 
and issuers of non-GSE, or private label, subprime securities contributed to the subprime 
mortgage crisis. I will refer to arrangers and issuers of non-agency subprime securities as 
simply “arrangers.” Due to the complexity of the securitization process, my use of the 
term “arranger” will broadly include “[any] party that puts together securitization 
deals.”1790 
Leading up to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, the five largest 
arrangers were the prominent, independent investment banks on Wall Street: Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch. At the end of 
2007, these five arrangers had a combined $280 billion in revenue and $30 billion in 
                                                 
1789 Alan Greenspan, “The Crisis,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2010), 202. 
1790 Kathleen C. Engel and Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, “False Security: How Securitization Failed to Protect 
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profits.1791 By the end of 2008, due to the havoc caused by the subprime mortgage crisis, 
all five of those arrangers were no longer independent investment banks. Bear Stearns 
was acquired by JPMorgan in March of 2008, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of 
America in September of 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection in 
September of 2008, and Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became bank holding 
companies in September of 2008. As acknowledged in a sober September 22, 2008 article 
in The Wall Street Journal, those steps effectively marked “the end of Wall Street as it’s 
been known for decades.”1792  
In July of 2011, The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report that examined “the emergency actions taken by the Federal Reserve Board 
from December 1, 2007 through July 21, 2010.”1793 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act permitted GAO to conduct “a one-time audit” of the Fed’s 
actions during that time period.1794  Astonishingly, the report revealed that the Fed made 
$16.1 trillion worth of loans to financial institutions over that period of time.1795 Among 
the largest recipients of these loans were the five arrangers that will be explored in this 
section. The Fed’s loans during that period included $2.041 trillion to Morgan Stanley, 
$1.949 trillion to Merrill Lynch, $853 billion to Bear Stearns, $814 billion to Goldman 
Sachs, and $183 billion to Lehman Brothers.1796 In light of the audit, Senator Bernie 
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Sanders affirmed, “This is a clear case of socialism for the rich and rugged, you’re-on-
your-own individualism for everyone else.”1797 
I will begin this chapter with a brief discussion of how at least part of the 
subprime mortgage crisis was instigated by a supply-side phenomenon: arrangers 
aggressively attempting to attain exorbitant amounts of subprime loans for the sake of 
securitizing and selling them to investors. I will supplement this discussion with an 
exploration of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Then, I will explore the various roles that 
arrangers played in an effort to show how they served as a conduit for subprime-related 
investments. Equally important, I will show how arrangers had “their tentacles in almost 
every corner” of the subprime mortgage market leading up to the crisis.1798  
Next, I will define the term “collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),” which is a 
financial instrument that was a crucial part of the subprime mortgage crisis. Merrill 
Lynch’s collapse in 2008, for example, was abetted by their deep involvement with that 
troubled product. An understanding of three other terms is vital to this discussion of the 
subprime crisis: the alternative net capital rule, leverage, and repurchase agreements or 
“repos.” The importance of these terms will be accentuated by a brief account of the 
collapse of Bear Stearns.  
I will then explain how credit-default swaps (CDSs) were a part of the subprime 
mortgage crisis, inasmuch as arrangers were attracted to them and they formed a doomed 
link between arrangers and the insurance company, AIG. I will argue that this link was 
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characterized by the latter selling irresponsible amounts of CDSs to the former. Finally, I 
will conclude this section by examining how the two most prestigious arrangers, 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, participated in and contributed to the subprime 
mortgage crisis.  
 
4.2. The Supply-Side Angle of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 Depository and non-depository lenders originated hundreds of billions of dollars 
worth of subprime loans leading up to the eruption of the subprime mortgage crisis. As 
Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel observe, “[i]f lenders had kept their subprime loans 
on their books, they probably would have made fewer loans and taken greater care with 
the ones they made.”1799 However, because many of the largest subprime lenders 
participated in an originate-to-distribute model of lending, one in which they sold their 
mortgages to third parties, those lenders had a compelling incentive to focus primarily on 
the number of loans that they originated, rather than on the quality of those loans.1800 A 
few words of elaboration are needed here. 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the subprime mortgage crisis is that it was 
instigated, at least in part, by a supply-side phenomenon.1801 By 2003, there was already 
evidence that subprime lenders were running out of eligible borrowers to which to extend 
mortgage credit.1802 Large financial firms on Wall Street, the arrangers, nevertheless had 
a fierce appetite for subprime mortgages because there was a persistent “clamoring of 
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investors for high-yield mortgage-backed securities.”1803 In an important sense, subprime 
lenders created or refined exotic mortgage products, such as NINA loans and Option 
ARMs, in response to an ever-increasing arranger demand for risky mortgage loans. 
Arrangers needed a constant influx of subprime loans from lenders in order to meet 
investor demand for products that could generate attractive returns.1804 Subprime lenders, 
for their part, could originate risky mortgages, extract healthy commissions and fees from 
borrowers, and then sell the loans to eager arrangers. The incoming flow of money from 
arrangers refreshed the pool of funds that a lender could use to originate additional loans, 
enabling the latter to repeat the cycle of acquiring more commissions and fees from 
subprime borrowers.  
Subsequently, the impetus for the irresponsible lending practices of many of the 
largest subprime lenders was the supply-side demand for subprime mortgages from 
arrangers. In this sense, subprime lenders became “too willing” to extend mortgage credit 
to borrowers1805 because they were frequently making money “up front” rather than 
having to wait for the borrowers to repay the balance of their loans over time. Frank 
Partnoy inimitably summarized this phenomenon in this way:  
The driving force behind the explosion of subprime mortgage lending 
in the U.S. was neither lenders nor borrowers. It was the arrangers…  
They were the ones supplying the cocaine. The lenders and borrowers 
were just mice pushing the button.1806 
 
A vivid example that supports Partnoy’s claim can be found in a piece in The New York 
Times that was written on May 8, 2007. In this article, William Dallas, the founder and 
                                                 
1803 Ibid. 
1804 Ibid., 45. 
1805 Richard M. Hynes, “Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis,” Virginia Law & Business 
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former CEO of Ownit Mortgage Solutions, a failed subprime lender, accused the arranger 
Merrill Lynch of putting pressure on his firm to loosen its underwriting standards and 
originate more NINA loans. According to Dallas, the message that he received from 
Merrill Lynch about his reluctance to originate more NINA loans was: “You are leaving 
money on the table – do more of them.”1807 Although Dallas stated that he initially 
disagreed with Merrill Lynch’s injunction, eventually he acquiesced to their demands on 
the grounds that he could sell the risky loans at a profit.1808 In an effort to explore and 
expand upon this important point, I will now examine the extraordinary collapse of 
Lehman Brothers.  
 
4.3. The Fall of Lehman Brothers 
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., originally founded by three brothers in 1850 as a 
cotton brokerage in Montgomery, Alabama,1809 was the first investment bank to embrace 
all aspects of the mortgage business, from origination to servicing.1810 Lehman Brothers’ 
history in the subprime sector stretches back to 1995, when the investment bank sent one 
of its vice presidents, Eric Hibbert, to California to inspect First Alliance Mortgage 
Company, a subprime lender.1811 After his visit, Hibbert wrote a memo that described 
First Alliance as a financial “sweat shop” that specialized in “high pressure sales for 
people who are in a weak state,” and whose employees leave their “ethics at the 
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door.”1812 Hibbert additionally observed that although First Alliance was clearly making 
loans to borrowers that have “no capacity for repayment,” there was “little risk for fraud 
or impropriety” at the lender.1813 It is worth mentioning that First Alliance was already 
notorious for its predatory practices in 1995, reputed for “targeting elderly people and 
other vulnerable borrowers for extremely costly loans.”1814 Nevertheless, Lehman 
Brothers determined that First Alliance was not breaking any laws, so they proceeded to 
open up a $500 million warehouse line of credit to the subprime lender, which ultimately 
financed the issuance of $700 million worth of mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 
backed by First Alliance loans.1815  
Two years later, in 1997, Lehman Brothers bought a stake in Aurora Loan 
Services, a lender and servicer that specialized in Alt-A loans.1816 Soon after, in 1999, 
                                                 
1812 Ibid. 
1813 Ibid. 
1814 Kevin Connor, “Wall Street and the Making of the Subprime Disaster,” (November 2007), available at 
http://northwestbronx.org/wallstreet_subprime.pdf, 16. 
1815 Michael Hudson, “Debt Bomb - Lending a Hand: How Wall Street Stoked The Mortgage Meltdown - 
Lehman and Others Transformed the Market For Riskiest Borrowers.” When an arranger extends a 
warehouse line of credit to a lender, the former typically gives the latter funds on a day-to-day basis for the 
sake of originating a desired amount and type of mortgage loans. Lenders draw on that line of credit until 
the arranger has determined that the number and quality of loans are sufficient for being securitized. This is 
a significant point because arrangers that offer warehouse lines of credit to lenders most likely have a better 
conception of those lenders’ daily operations – and the quality of their loans – than those arrangers that 
merely buy loans in bulk and securitize them. As one anonymous source said about Lehman Brothers’ 
warehouse lines of credit to lenders, “The argument would go that Lehman, as warehouse lender, would 
have reason to have a much greater level of knowledge about what the substance of those loans was 
actually like… You're giving [lenders] money basically to go out and buy assets, as opposed to merely 
packaging them as an agent, and selling them as bonds on the Street.” Indeed, when a San Francisco-based 
law firm, Jenkins & Mulligan, filed a lawsuit against First Alliance in 2000 for its predatory lending 
practices, Lehman Brothers was listed as a co-defendant, in part because it extended a $150 million 
warehouse line of credit to the lender. As a result of this relationship, Lehman Brothers was accused of 
“having knowledge of First Alliance's fraudulent practices, and thereby tacitly or expressly approving those 
practices in its financing of the lending operations.” Please see: Michael Gregory, “Lehman to Take Fall for 
Predatory Lender,” Asset Sales Report (May 8, 2000); Ibid., “The Predatory Lending Fracas: Wall Street 
Comes Under Scrutiny in the Subprime Market as Liquidity Suffers and Regulation Looms,” Investment 
Dealers Digest (June 26, 2000). 
1816 Mark T. Williams, Uncontrolled Risk: The Lessons of Lehman Brothers and How Systemic Risk Can 
Still Bring Down the World Financial System (New York: McGraw Hill, 2010), 129. As late as October 17, 
2007, Lehman Brothers considered Alt-A loans suitable products for borrowers who had a minimum FICO 
score of 640 and “a greater need for flexibility specific to documentation types, asset verification, equity 
322 
 
Lehman Brothers started operating its own subprime lending unit, Finance America, 
which was part of a joint venture with the struggling subprime lender, Amresco 
Corporation. Lehman Brothers agreed to extend a warehouse line of credit to Amresco in 
order to originate, purchase, and securitize subprime home equity loans.1817  
During this time, allegations surfaced that First Alliance loan officers were using 
deceptive sales practices in order to steer borrowers into harmful loans that had 
excessively high fees. Seven states, along with a group of federal regulators, began 
investigating the subprime lender’s operations. Tellingly, a 1999 memo revealed that 
Lehman Brothers was both aware of the government probes and concerned that its 
relationship with First Alliance could potentially damage its reputation. However, the 
memo recommended that Lehman Brothers continue its funding of First Alliance loans 
because their “borrowers rarely defaulted on their loans and… Lehman stood to earn 
millions in fees by managing the lender’s mortgage-backed securities deals.”1818 First 
Alliance eventually collapsed in March of 2000 under the weight of increasingly 
formidable lawsuits and investigations.1819 
Undeterred from its commitment to financing and securitizing subprime loans, 
Lehman Brothers purchased a small ownership stake in another subprime lender in 2000, 
BNC Mortgage Corporation.1820 By the end of that year, Lehman Brothers issued $8.942 
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billion worth of subprime MBSs, second to only Bear Stearns among all arrangers.1821 
Lehman Brothers, churning out loans through BNC Mortgage and Aurora Loan 
Servicing, ended up securitizing $10.702 billion, $10.213 billion, and $8.774 billion 
worth of subprime MBSs in 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively.1822 
 One should note that, in 2003, after nearly a four-year legal battle, a federal jury 
in California fined First Alliance for $50.1 million for fraud. The jury ruled that Lehman 
Brothers “substantially assisted” First Alliance in its fraudulent activities and fined the 
arranger $5.1 million.1823 That same year, Lehman Brothers also settled a lawsuit in 
Florida, one in which it was accused for being “an accomplice” to First Alliance. The 
arranger settled for $400,000 without admitting any wrongdoing.1824 
 As Kevin Connor convincingly argues, these paltry settlements sent a momentous 
and resounding message to the other large arrangers on Wall Street: those firms that 
securitize risky loans of questionable integrity will, at best, be held minimally liable for 
funding subprime lenders. In other words, the settlements gave at least a temporary 
answer to the pointed question that HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo raised at a hearing in 
May of 2000: “What is [an arranger’s] affirmative obligation to go deeper than just the 
surface? What is their affirmative obligation to know what mortgage they’re securitizing 
and to know what type of business they’re actually financing?”1825 In light of the meager 
                                                 
1821 Compass Point Research & Trading LLC, Mortgage Finance: Mortgage Repurchases Part II: Private 
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fines levied against Lehman Brothers in 2003, the previously uncertain obligations of 
arrangers that Cuomo underscored could now be perceived as loose or negligible.  
Supporting his case that the settlements emboldened other Wall Street arrangers 
to expand their subprime securitization operations, Connor provocatively notes that the 
total value of all subprime securitizations jumped from $202 billion in 2003 to $401 
billion in 2004, an increase of nearly 100%, which was the single largest year-over-year 
surge in the history of subprime mortgage securitization.1826 The astronomical increase of 
Goldman Sachs’ subprime MBS securitizations from 2003 to 2004 is a case in point. In 
2003, Goldman Sachs securitized $2.538 billion worth of subprime MBSs, a figure that 
jumped to $9.506 billion in 2004, an astounding 274% increase.1827 
 By the end of 2003, Lehman Brothers gained complete ownership of Aurora Loan 
Servicing and then, in 2004, the arranger purchased BNC Mortgage in its entirety.1828 
Both companies came to be part of Lehman Brothers’ Mortgage Capital Division.1829 
Over the course of 2004 and 2005, Lehman Brothers, aided by its subprime subsidiaries, 
securitized approximately $27.083 billion worth of subprime MBSs.1830 However, 
competitive pressures from other large arrangers like Countrywide ($82.790 billion worth 
of subprime securitizations in 2004 and 2005 combined), Bear Stearns ($25.949 billion 
worth of subprime securitizations in 2004 and 2005 combined), and Goldman Sachs 
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($20.813 billion worth of subprime securitizations in 2004 and 2005 combined)1831 
contributed to Lehman Brothers’ decision to make a significant change in its business 
strategy in 2006.1832 Anton R. Valukas’ magisterial nine-volume, 2,200 page report on 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers describes this shift in business strategy in detail. The 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan appointed Valukas to conduct the investigation of 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse in January of 2009.1833 Approximately fourteen months later, 
in March of 2010, the report was released.  
 According to Valukas’ report, Lehman Brothers historically considered itself to 
be “primarily in the moving business, not the storage business.”1834 As the report 
explains, this meant that, traditionally, one of Lehman Brothers’ strengths was 
securitizing residential mortgages and moving them to third party investors.1835 In 2006, 
however, Lehman Brothers’ management “decided to emphasize the storage business,” 
which entailed acquiring real estate assets, including subprime MBSs, and holding on to 
them, treating them as long-term investments.1836 The Lehman Brothers management 
team determined that that these investments “were highly profitable relative to their risk” 
in the booming economic environment, and that they were “missing out on significant 
opportunities” that other arrangers were already exploiting.1837 
In the late part of 2006, the subprime mortgage market began to show signs of 
weakness as housing prices began to decline and increasingly more subprime loans 
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became delinquent.1838 As the report makes clear, Lehman Brothers’ management team 
was aware of this downturn. The arranger discovered that investors were becoming 
progressively risk-averse, making it difficult to find clients who were interested in its 
subprime MBSs.1839 Due to these troubling trends, Lehman Brothers decided to tighten 
BNC’s subprime origination standards.1840 Nevertheless, according to data provided by 
Inside Mortgage Finance, Lehman Brothers was responsible for generating $52 billion 
worth of subprime securitizations in 2006.1841 
Paradoxically, over this same period of time, Lehman Brothers decided to 
increase its Alt-A originations through Aurora Loan Servicing.1842 While these loans 
were not as risky as BNC’s subprime loans, Lehman Brothers’ risk managers considered 
them to be riskier than their Alt-A designation suggested, occasionally dubbing them 
“Alt-B loans.”1843 In late January 2007, a Lehman Brothers’ mortgage analyst, after 
examining Aurora’s loan originations over the previous four months, noticed that those 
loans were the lender’s “riskiest loans ever, with every month being riskier than the one 
before.”1844 Valukas’ report reveals that Aurora’s Alt-A loans “came more and more to 
resemble the subprime loans that Lehman was supposedly exiting by tightening 
origination standards at BNC.”1845 Despite these warnings, Lehman Brothers’ stock price 
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reached an all-time high of $86.18 per share in February of 2007.1846 
By the spring of 2007, the subprime crisis had advanced to the point that twenty 
of the major subprime lenders had either gone bankrupt or had been acquired by stronger 
partners.1847 Crucially, Lehman Brothers’ management “saw the subprime crisis as an 
opportunity to pick up ground on its competitors,” so they elected to adopt a 
“countercyclical growth strategy.”1848 The strategy was unveiled on March 20, 2007, 
when Lehman Brothers’ Mortgage Capital and Fixed Income Divisions gave a 
presentation to the arranger’s board of directors. According to Valukas’ report, Lana 
Franks Harber, Chief Administrative Officer of the Mortgage Capital Division, e-mailed 
one of her colleagues prior to the presentation, explaining that she had spoke with Joseph 
Gregory, Lehman Brothers’ President, about the meeting. In the e-mail, she states: 
[The] Board is not sophisticated around subprime market – Joe doesn’t  
want too much detail. He wants to candidly talk about the risks to Lehman 
but be optimistic and constructive – talk about the opportunities that 
this market creates and how we are uniquely positioned to take 
advantage of them.1849 
 
Consistent with Harber’s advice, the presentation emphasized that the recent downturn in 
the subprime mortgage market presented “substantial opportunities” to Lehman Brothers, 
noting that if they kept a strong presence in the market, they would be “better positioned 
for profitable growth once the industry cycle turned.”1850  This optimism was anchored by 
several key assumptions, such as the belief that a “substantial part of [the] subprime 
market is here to stay” and that “[p]rofitability will return when [the] environment 
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improves.”1851 Strikingly, the presentation did not discuss Aurora’s alarming Alt-A 
originations at all, but instead lumped the loans into a category listed as “Prime/Alt-A 
Mortgages.”1852 One slide maintained that the loans’ “credit performance [was] not 
problematic.”1853 Valukas’ report notes that the loans were labeled “Alt-A/Alt-B 
Mortgages” in an earlier draft of the presentation and were similarly presented as having 
an unproblematic credit performance.1854 
 In August of 2007, when both Countrywide and Ameriquest failed, Lehman 
Brothers decided to immediately cease BNC’s subprime lending operations.1855 However, 
the arranger continued to originate risky Alt-A/Alt-B loans through Aurora all the way up 
until January of 2008.1856 As Valukas’ report explains, once the subprime mortgage 
market progressively deteriorated in 2008, Lehman Brothers discovered that it had 
accumulated mortgage assets that it could no longer sell, except at a loss.1857 These 
illiquid mortgage assets,1858 Valukas’ report concludes, “played a significant role in 
Lehman’s ultimate financial failure.”1859 
 During the second quarter of 2008, in the wake of the collapse of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers frantically sold about $16 billion worth, or about one-fifth, of its 
mortgage assets. The arranger suffered huge losses on those sales and ended up 
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announcing a quarterly loss of $2.8 billion on June 9, 2008.1860 By the end of July of 
2008, Lehman Brothers’ stock price had fallen to around $18 per share,1861 a decrease of 
nearly 80%. By mid-August of that year, Lehman Brothers’ stock price had plummeted to 
less than $14 a share.1862 According to Mark T. Williams, in his book Uncontrolled Risk, 
the fate of Lehman Brothers at this point in time hinged upon the Korea Development 
Bank (KDB) purchasing the firm.1863 
 On Tuesday September 9, 2008, KDB announced that it would not purchase 
Lehman Brothers for even $8 a share, contributing to another 45% decrease in the 
arranger’s stock price.1864 The following day, Lehman Brothers’ CFO Ian Lowitt 
disclosed that the arranger had lost a total of $3.9 billion over the course of the third 
quarter, stemming largely from $5.6 billion in real estate-related losses.1865 JPMorgan 
revealed on Thursday September 11 that it had now cut off its credit to the distressed 
arranger. Lehman Brothers’ stock price fell to $4.22 a share that day.1866  
After a tumultuous weekend of negotiations on September 13 and 14, it became 
evident that Lehman Brothers was not going to be rescued by the Fed or purchased by 
another firm. By Sunday afternoon, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox contacted Lehman 
Brothers’ Board of Directors and made the unprecedented recommendation that the 
arranger file for bankruptcy. The Board unanimously voted in support of Cox’s 
recommendation that same day. Early in the morning on Monday September 15, 2008, 
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Lowitt signed the bankruptcy documents and instantly “the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history was official.”1867  Later that same morning, before the opening bell, a “158 year 
old company that had weathered many a storm” with over 25,000 employees had its LEH 
ticker quietly removed from the New York Stock Exchange.1868 
 
4.4. The Multiple Roles of Arrangers in the Subprime Securitization Process 
As the description of Lehman Brothers’ collapse reveals, arrangers were heavily 
involved in the subprime mortgage pipeline. Securitization revolutionized the way in 
which many residential mortgages came to be funded, which is a central reason why 
arrangers became part of the mortgage financing process. Securitization “unbundled”1869 
or “atomized”1870 the mortgage loan process, supposedly enabling different parties to 
specialize in each part of the process. In particular, securitization linked investors that 
were interested in high-yield investment products to borrowers that were seeking to 
receive a mortgage-related loan.1871 One of the parties that helped link investors to 
borrowers was the subprime lenders, a party that is examined in another section of this 
study. Another party that was a crucial part in bridging the gap between investors and 
borrowers was the arrangers. What roles did arrangers play in connecting investors to 
borrowers? 
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First, arrangers purchased subprime mortgage loans from lenders, or even 
purchased subprime lenders of their own.1872 One should note that a disturbing lack of 
transparency characterized the majority of the arranger/lender transactions. Typically, 
arrangers would strive to delineate clear boundaries between themselves and the lenders 
from which they purchased subprime loans.1873 These precautions were taken because 
arrangers did not want to be held legally responsible for any of the potential misdeeds 
that could have been performed as the lenders were in the act of originating the loans.1874 
Prior to the completion of the sale, arrangers would usually require lenders “to 
provide them with representations (reps) and warranties” about the quality of the loans 
and the characteristics of the borrowers who had received them.1875 Reps and warranties 
“included assurances that the loans complied with state and federal laws and satisfied [the 
lender’s] stated underwriting criteria.”1876 Most arranger/lender subprime mortgage 
purchase agreements included provisions that entitled arrangers to force lenders to 
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repurchase misrepresented loans.1877 Indeed, as the subprime mortgage crisis intensified 
in severity, many subprime lenders were doomed by their repurchase agreements.1878 
New Century Financial, for instance, was forced to repurchase over $5 billion worth of 
flawed subprime loans from arrangers in 2006 alone.1879 
In addition to reps and warranties, arrangers would hire due diligence firms to 
confirm that the loans met the lenders’ underwriting standards and procedures.1880 The 
due diligence firms were also commissioned to verify the accuracy of the information on 
borrowers’ applications and to ensure that all the loan documents were in order.1881 
Remarkably, due diligence reviews were the only occasions that “individual loan files 
normally received outside scrutiny during the securitization process.”1882 When subprime 
mortgage lending reached its peak in 2006, the three largest due diligence firms were 
Clayton Holdings, Bohan Group, and Opus Capital.1883 
One would think that the rapid expansion of the subprime mortgage market in the 
early 2000’s, accompanied by the proliferation of novel and complex mortgage products 
during this time, would have been sufficient for inciting arrangers to pay due diligence 
firms larger sums of money in order to more thoroughly scrutinize lenders’ loan 
portfolios and borrowers’ loan applications. A striking 2008 article in The New York 
Times, however, revealed that due diligence firms’ reviews of mortgage loans declined an 
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average of over 80% from 1995 to 2005.1884 Arrangers had to pay due diligence firms 
roughly $350 for each loan that they inspected, so commissioning the firms to review less 
loans saved the arrangers significant sums of money.1885 The drastic reduction of due 
diligence reviews in the early 2000’s was likely fueled by the arrangers’ desire to cut 
costs.1886 
One should also note that the effectiveness of due diligence reviews was 
undermined by the dramatic increase of low- and no-doc loan originations. Without 
paystubs or tax returns on hand to verify a given borrower’s stated income or 
employment history, due diligence firms could not assess that borrower’s actual ability to 
repay the loan and, hence, whether that borrower should have been approved for the loan 
in the first place.1887 Irma Aninger, who performed due diligence reviews for both 
Clayton Holdings and the Bohan Group, stated, “You can’t tell me a Kmart or a Wal-
Mart or a Target floor worker is making $5,000 a month, or a house cleaner is making 
$10,000… [but my supervisors] would say, ‘You can’t do that. You can’t call these 
people liars’.”1888 
 The concept of due diligence underwent a fundamental transformation leading up 
to the subprime mortgage crisis. Whereas due diligence reviews in the past tended to 
focus on the quality of loans, performing due diligence eventually morphed into an 
impoverished examination of whether a loan merely conformed to the arranger’s 
guidelines, even if those guidelines were vague, unreasonable, or permitted 
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exceptions.1889 The president Clayton Holdings, Keith Johnson, stated, “In some cases we 
felt that we were potted plants.”1890 A former managing director for Bear Stearns 
observed, “Bear didn’t really care about quality. They wanted volume.”1891 From the 
perspective of due diligence firms, their primary, if not exclusive, responsibility was to 
provide the arrangers with the kind of review that they requested.1892 A chief executive of 
a due diligence firm looked back on this transformation and quipped, “Common sense 
was sacrificed on the altar of materialism.”1893  
A July 2011 lawsuit filed against the arranger Morgan Stanley provided a 
memorable example of this phenomenon. According to the lawsuit, Morgan Stanley 
knew that lenders such as New Century “routinely flouted the law and disregarded basic 
underwriting standards.”1894 One of the primary sources of this information was the due 
diligence firm that the arranger hired, Clayton Holdings. As the lawsuit reveals, Clayton 
Holdings would assign each of the loans that were part of its due diligence reviews a 
number. Assigning a “1” to a given loan indicated that it conformed to the lender’s 
underwriting standards, while assigning a “2” signified that the loan contained multiple 
exceptions to those standards. The worst rating was a “3”, which signaled that the loan 
did not comply with the lender’s underwriting standards at all.1895  
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It is noteworthy that Morgan Stanley was privy to that rating scale because the 
arranger was supposed to only receive a “yes” or a “no” from Clayton Holdings regarding 
the quality of a given loan. Instead, Morgan Stanley would routinely use the loans that 
earned a rating of a “3” as leverage for negotiation with the various lenders.1896 Rather 
than reject the loans rated a “3” and refuse to purchase them for securitization, Morgan 
Stanley habitually elected to use that information to insist that the defective loans receive 
a better price.1897  
As disclosed by the former vice-president of Morgan Stanley’s due diligence 
department, Tony Peterson, the arranger unquestionably compromised the independence 
and integrity of Clayton Holdings’ assessments. Peterson noted that his department would 
determine which loans Clayton Holdings could sample and, as a matter of course, could 
reject or even reassign the due diligence firm’s ratings of the loans.1898 At one point, 
Peterson confessed in an interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: 
During the diligence process, if Clayton elevated something as a 3,  
regardless of the reason… our team would take a look at that and, at their 
first review of the issues of the overall loan, they could make a decision 
at that point that it was acceptable and change the grade to a 2W…. And 
then when our process was complete, we sent the reports up to New York  
indicating which loans were still a 3, which loans we had changed to a 2W. 
And then that was the end of our diligence process.1899 
 
Clayton Holdings found that, from 2006 to the middle part of 2007, over one-third of the 
loans that the firm reviewed for Morgan Stanley earned the rating of a “3”, but ultimately 
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56% of those defective loans were waived by the arranger, securitized into MBSs, and 
then sold to investors.1900 
Paying for due diligence reviews, requiring lenders to supply them with reps and 
warranties, and purchasing lender-originated subprime mortgages were just three of the 
basic activities that arrangers could carry out in order to obtain the “raw materials” for 
creating subprime securitizations. Having obtained a pool of disparate subprime 
mortgages from lenders, arrangers would then proceed to sell the loans to a bankruptcy-
remote trust known as a special-purpose vehicle (SPV).1901 SPVs are “essentially robot 
firms that have no employees, make no substantive economic decisions, have no physical 
location, and cannot go bankrupt.”1902  
Housing the loans in a SPV had the advantage of protecting both the arranger and 
lender from any losses that could arise from borrower delinquencies or defaults.1903 
Moreover, this bankruptcy protection also increased the probability that the NRSRO’s 
would later provide higher ratings to the securities that were backed by the mortgages in 
a SPV.1904 Arrangers were enamored with triple-A ratings because once one of the “big 
three” NRSRO’s gave that rating to their securities, they typically did not need to pay the 
other two NRSRO’s to rate those same securities.1905 Arrangers tended to be ratings-
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sensitive, showing little regard for which of the three largest NRSRO’s actually provided 
those ratings. 
 With the pools of mortgages couched in a SPV, arrangers would then divide “the 
principal and interest payments from borrowers into tranches” or slices.1906 Each tranche 
“had its own bond, with its own yield, maturity date, and level of risk.”1907 Some of these 
structured products had over twenty tranches.1908 As Patricia McCoy and Kathleen Engel 
explain: 
The top tranche was the safest, with the lowest interest rate, and was paid 
off first. The tranche right below the senior tranche was paid off next and 
had a slightly higher risk with a slightly higher interest rate. And so it 
went down the line to the last tranche, the junior tranche or equity tranche. 
The equity tranche was the last to be paid, offered the highest interest, and  
was the first to absorb losses if borrowers defaulted.1909 
 
Similar to the rationale behind selling the pools of loans to a SPV, one of the main 
purposes of creating tranches was to ensure that at least one tranche would receive a high 
investment-grade rating from one of the three largest NRSRO’s.1910 If a NRSRO ended 
up giving an investment-grade rating to a particular mortgage-backed security,1911 it 
would legally permit large investors, like pension plans, insurance companies, and 
municipalities to invest in that security.1912  
Once the loans were situated in a SPV, arrangers would hire a NRSRO to grade 
each tranche based on the credit risk that the product contained.1913 Arrangers would send 
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their hired NRSRO information about the prospective mortgage-backed security as well 
as data about loans in the pool that were backing the security.1914 In a separate section of 
this study, I examined how the arranger-pays compensation structure put pressure on 
Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s to inflate their credit ratings. Furthermore, I 
also noted how the three NRSRO’s relied upon the arrangers to supply accurate 
information about the characteristics of the loans and borrowers. The three NRSRO’s 
emphatically stated that they were not responsible for conducting due diligence 
assessments of the accuracy of the underlying information upon which they were basing 
their credit ratings. Essentially, it was up to each arranger to ensure that critical pieces of 
loan-level information were accurate, including “borrowers’ credit scores, loan-to-value 
ratios, whether the borrowers documented their incomes, whether the properties were 
owner-occupied, and whether the loans were used to refinance an existing home or to buy 
a home.”1915 With subprime lending standards deteriorating at the level of loan 
origination, and the quality of due diligence reports diminishing at the level of the 
arrangers, one has to question the extent to which the three NRSRO’s could accurately 
assess the credit risk that any given mortgage-backed security contained, even if one 
operates under the generous assumption that they were utilizing flawless risk models. 
Investors, for their part, were attracted to highly rated mortgage-backed securities 
for at least three reasons. First, the products were perceived to be well-diversified, 
typically backed by hundreds or even thousands of mortgage loans that were originated in 
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geographically distinct regions.1916 Second, mortgage-backed securities buffeted 
investors with an array of investment choices that suited their individual tastes for risk, 
anticipated rate of return, and preferred duration.1917 Finally, mortgage-backed securities, 
in many instances, featured yields that exceeded those offered by “conventional 
government and corporate bonds.”1918 Large institutional investors, therefore, ended up 
taking “to subprime mortgage-backed securities like fish to water”1919 because many of 
the securities were sufficiently diverse, customizable, and complemented by a compelling 
risk/reward ratio.  
In the early 2000’s, arrangers responded to this investor-demand for subprime 
mortgage-backed securities by progressively issuing more of them. In 2001, arrangers 
issued $87 billion worth of subprime mortgage-backed securities. Just four years later, in 
2005, arrangers issued $465 billion of those securities, an increase of over 434%.1920 
From 2004 to 2008, arrangers issued a breathtaking $2.5 trillion worth of mortgage-
backed securities.1921  
In addition to the roles mentioned above, arrangers could also serve as an 
underwriter or a placement agent for their issued mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).1922 Generally, arrangers chose to serve as 
underwriters for their issued mortgage-backed securities, while opting to serve as 
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placement agents for their issued CDOs.1923 As underwriters, arrangers would issue their 
mortgage-backed securities to the public, after registering the securities with the SEC.1924 
Arrangers would also be responsible for releasing registration statements or prospectuses 
that contained information about their operations and management, as well as “key 
financial data, and other important facts to investors.”1925 On average, arrangers charged 
anywhere from $1 million to $8 million to act as the underwriter of a securitization 
involving mortgage-backed securities.1926  
In the event that arrangers elected not to issue a new security to the public, which 
was frequently the case for their newly securitized CDOs, they could offer them to 
investors through a private placement.1927 In this case, arrangers would act as a placement 
agent, which involved designing, marketing, and selling the CDO to particular, private 
investors.1928 Typically, arrangers charged $5 million to $10 million to act as a placement 
agent of a CDO securitization.1929 Regardless of whether arrangers served as underwriters 
or placement agents, they were potentially “liable for any material misrepresentations or 
omissions of material facts made in connection with a solicitation or sale of a security to 
an investor.”1930 
Finally, arrangers could also serve as market makers or engage in proprietary 
trading. Instead of simply arranging for a public or private offering of a mortgage-backed 
security or CDO, arrangers could also assume the role of a market maker, which involved 
                                                 
1923 Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, 33. 
1924 Ibid. 
1925 Ibid. 
1926 Ibid. 
1927 Ibid. 
1928 Ibid. 
1929 Ibid. 
1930 Ibid. 
341 
 
buying and selling financial products to their clients and other market participants.1931 
Arrangers would acquire an inventory of mortgage-backed securities and CDOs, slightly 
mark up the price of those securities, and then fill, buy, and sell orders for investors. 
Serving as market makers, arrangers contributed to making the market for mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs more liquid.1932  
As for the option of participating in proprietary trading, arrangers could, likewise, 
buy and sell mortgage-backed securities and CDOs. The key difference between 
engaging in proprietary trading and acting as a market maker is that in the former case, 
arrangers buy and sell securities for their own accounts, as opposed to filling buy and sell 
orders for clients and other market participants.1933 It is worth noting that arrangers could 
simultaneously act as market makers and engage in proprietary trading, while often using 
“the same inventory of financial products” to carry out both tasks.1934 
As a way of concluding this discussion on the multiple roles of arrangers, I will 
briefly examine how Goldman Sachs went about securitizing a particular pool of 
subprime loans. In the spring of 2006, Goldman Sachs bundled together 8,274 subprime 
mortgage loans that it had purchased from a variety of lenders, including Fremont 
Investment & Loan and Long Beach Mortgage Company. Goldman Sachs placed the 
loans into a trust known as GSAMP Trust 2006-S3. The loans in the trust possessed a 
total value of $494 million and had an average loan-to-value ratio of 99.29%, meaning 
that the borrowers who obtained the loans had an average equity in their homes of just 
0.71%. A full 58% of the loans were either low- or no-documentation loans. Goldman 
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Sachs proceeded to slice the pool into thirteen tranches and submitted them to two 
NRSRO’s, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, for a credit rating evaluation. Both of the 
NRSRO’s rated 68% of the tranches AAA (Aaa) and 25% of the tranches AA (Aa) to 
BBB (Bbb). Less than a year after the securities were issued, both Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s downgraded the triple-A rated securities to BBB (Bbb). A few months later, 
nearly one out of five loans in the pool had defaulted and investors in the six lowest rated 
tranches were completely wiped out. Nicholas Weill, Moody’s chief credit officer for 
their structured finance division, conceded that “in hindsight” the NRSRO “would not 
have rated” the tranches because they did not have enough information about the quality 
of the underlying loans.1935 
 
4.5. A Thumbnail Sketch of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
Despite the fact that arrangers issued an extraordinary amount of mortgage-
backed securities shortly before the eruption of the subprime mortgage crisis, investors 
tended primarily to prefer only those tranches that were rated triple-A by one of the three 
largest NRSRO’s.1936 This trend became especially prevalent around 2003.1937 Arrangers 
began to realize that the other investment-grade tranches of their subprime 
securitizations, known as the mezzanine tranches, were difficult to sell, so they started to 
repackage the unwanted tranches into a type of security that was created in 1987 by 
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Michael Milken’s Drexel Burnham Lambert: the collateralized debt obligation (CDO).1938 
From 2004 to 2008, arrangers issued over $1.4 trillion worth of CDOs.1939 
Originally, a CDO was a security that consisted of “a collection of just about 
anything that generate[d] a yield – bank loans, junk bonds, emerging market debt” and 
other types of financial products.1940 One of the most important differences between 
mortgage-backed securities and CDOs is that the former is backed by mortgages, whereas 
the latter is backed by different kinds of securities, including mortgage-backed 
securities.1941 CDOs are the product of “second level” securitizations, that is, those that 
invest in previous securitizations.1942 
Arrangers had the insight that CDOs could serve as “the investor” for less popular 
mezzanine tranches of their mortgage-backed securities.1943 In a process that mirrored the 
securitization of pools of subprime mortgages, arrangers would initially aggregate 
hundreds or even thousands of their issued mortgage-backed securities that featured 
lower investment-grade tranches, many of which were rated A or BBB (Bbb).1944 Next, 
they would re-tranche the pool of securities and then submit them once again to one of 
the three largest NRSRO’s for a credit rating evaluation.  
In an extraordinary case of legerdemain, the NRSRO’s ultimately rated 
approximately 70% to 80% of these new CDO tranches triple-A, despite the fact that they 
were, in general, comprised of previously lower-rated tranches of mortgage-backed 
                                                 
1938 Ibid., 129. 
1939 Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, 318. 
1940 Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis, 
120. 
1941 John Crawford, “CDO Ratings and Systemic Instability: Causes and Cure,” New York University 
Journal of Law and Business, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 2008), 8. 
1942 Ibid., 4. 
1943 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, 127. 
1944 Ibid. 
344 
 
securities.1945 According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the apparent 
diversification of the new CDO tranches was the driving force behind many of the 
NRSRO’s CDO credit rating decisions.1946 Due to the fact that there were more, say, 
previously BBB-rated tranches in given CDO than there were in a given mortgage-
backed security, the tranches in the CDO deserved a higher credit rating than those in the 
mortgage-backed security, since the sheer number of the former posed a lesser overall 
threat of borrower default than the latter.1947  
Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera argue that this process was “a deeply perverse” 
sort of “alchemy.”1948 The two authors describe this transformation as “ratings 
laundering,” a process by which the origins of previously unpopular, lower-rated tranches 
of mortgage-backed securities were concealed by newly bestowed, though unjustified, 
triple-A CDO ratings.1949 One unnamed Wall Street executive likened CDOs to 
“purifying uranium until you get to the stuff that’s the most toxic.”1950 Patricia McCoy 
and Kathleen Engel conclude that “CDOs purported to make steak out of chicken.”1951  
One should not overlook the crucial fact that arrangers wanted to have as many of 
their CDO tranches rated triple-A as possible.1952 Compared to riskier CDO tranches, 
triple-A-rated, senior tranches carried a lower interest rate since they were perceived to 
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be safer investments. Subprime mortgages tended to have compellingly higher interest 
rates than those that arrangers would have to pay out to investors in a senior tranche of 
one of their CDOs. Triple-A-rated tranches were attractive, therefore, not only to 
investors, but also to arrangers, for the latter could keep the spread between the incoming 
mortgage payments received from borrowers and the (lower) interest payments provided 
to investors in those tranches.1953 
An illustrative, though overly-simplistic, example may be germane here.1954 
Imagine that an arranger purchases two separate pools of subprime loans from a lender, 
one having a total value of $60 million (what will become MBS A), the other having a 
total value of $40 million (what will become MBS B). Separately, the arranger slices both 
pools into tranches, and then places them into a SPV. Suppose that one of the three 
largest NRSRO’s then gives a triple-A rating to the highest or senior tranche of both 
MBS A and B. The triple-A-rated senior tranche of MBS A is backed by $40 million of 
its pool’s $60 million worth of subprime loans, while the triple-A-rated senior tranche of 
MBS B is backed by $20 million of its pool’s $40 million worth of subprime loans. 
Impressively, this securitization has produced two separate “safe” investment 
opportunities worth a total of $60 million out of $100 million worth of risky subprime 
mortgages.  
Unfortunately, the arranger still has $40 million worth of “residuals” or 
mezzanine tranches of subprime mortgage-backed securities that are too risky to 
satisfactorily attract the capital of investors. Anxious to securitize those unwanted, risky 
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tranches a second time into a CDO, the arranger combines the leftover $20 million worth 
of subprime tranches from MBS A with the $20 million from MBS B. The arranger re-
tranches this combined $40 million pool of risky subprime securities and submits them 
once again to one of the three largest NRSRO’s. This time, the highest rated tranche of 
the CDO earns a triple-A rating and is backed by $30 million worth of risky subprime 
mortgage-backed securities, which, in turn, are backed by $30 million worth of risky 
subprime mortgages. The arranger is now only left with $10 million worth of unattractive 
CDO tranches and has produced $90 million worth of triple-A-rated securities from $100 
million worth of risky subprime mortgages.  
This example is not intended to remotely serve as an exhaustive or even realistic 
depiction of a CDO securitization. For the purposes of this study, however, the example 
hopefully helps clarify how arrangers, with the invaluable assistance of the three largest 
NRSRO’s, were able to create the perception that risky subprime mortgages were 
reasonable and safe investments. Incredibly, arrangers eventually also created CDOs² and 
CDOs³. CDOs² were created out of pooled and tranched CDOs, while CDOs³ were 
structured out of pooled and tranched CDOs².1955 Aaron Unterman maintains that 
ultimately 85% of the tranches of securitized CDOs² received a triple-A rating.1956 I will 
now examine Wall Street’s leading CDO underwriter from 2004 to 2007, Merrill Lynch, 
to make this discussion more explicit. 
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4.6. The Spectacular Decline of Merrill Lynch  
 Merrill Lynch, an arranger that is perhaps best known for its symbol of the bull 
and its enormous “thundering herd” of “16,000 brokers pitching stocks to retail 
investors,”1957 was internally known around the turn of the twenty-first century as 
“Mother Merrill.”1958 The derisive nickname stemmed from the perception that the 
arranger “was willing to accept lower profit margins in order to keep longtime loyal 
employees on the payroll.”1959 At least part of the arranger’s corporate culture at this time 
emerged from the original vision of its founder, Charlie Merrill. In 1914, when Merrill 
Lynch was founded, Merrill had a “notion of how to succeed on Wall Street [that] was 
completely different from anyone else’s at the time.”1960 He made it “his lifelong 
crusade” to bring “Wall Street to Main Street” by generating profits through selling 
stocks and bonds to the American middle class.1961 One of Merrill Lynch’s slogans was 
that the arranger was “Bullish on America.”1962 
In 2002, Stanley O’Neal was appointed CEO of Merrill Lynch and he 
immediately sought to eradicate this “Mother Merrill” culture, which he believed resisted 
change and protected underachievers.1963 As Greg Farrell explains, “O’Neal wanted 
Merrill Lynch to be a lean and mean profit-oriented bank, along the lines of Goldman 
Sachs.1964 Joe Nocera and Bethany McLean note that, prior to O’Neal’s appointment as 
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CEO, Merrill Lynch “was never held in the same esteem as Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs.”1965 The two authors further observe that Goldman Sachs was able to 
make more money with fewer employees than Merrill Lynch, all the while dealing with 
“sexy hedge funds and counterparties rather than middle-class Americans.”1966 Due to a 
combination of these factors, the two authors argue, “there was no firm suffering from a 
worse case of Goldman envy than Merrill Lynch” in the early 2000’s.1967 
Newly minted as the CEO of Merrill Lynch, O’Neal immediately aspired to 
match the trajectory of Goldman Sachs’ growth. Part of his strategy was to establish a 
stronghold in the CDO market.1968 In 2002, Merrill Lynch was the 15th largest 
underwriter of CDOs, arranging $2.22 billion worth of CDO deals.1969 The next year, the 
arranger hired Christopher Ricciardi, who liked to be called “the grandfather of CDOs,” 
to help transform the company into “the Wal-Mart of the CDO industry.”1970 By 2004, 
Merrill Lynch became the largest arranger of CDOs on Wall Street, having arranged $19 
billion worth of CDO deals that year.1971 In 2005, Merrill Lynch once again secured the 
top spot on Wall Street as the largest arranger of CDO deals, completing an incredible 
$35 billion worth of them. Of those $35 billion worth of CDOs, $14 billion were backed 
by subprime MBSs.1972 
It is important to note that arranging CDO deals was a profitable endeavor leading 
up to the subprime mortgage crisis, so much so that the arranger found the enterprise to 
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be “too lucrative to give up.”1973 For each CDO that it underwrote, Merrill Lynch would 
earn fees ranging anywhere between 1% and 1.5% of the deal’s total size. A typical $1 
billion CDO deal, for instance, would generate $15 million in fees for the arranger.1974 
According to one estimate, Ricciardi’s team earned $400 million in profits for the 
arranger in 2005.1975 Merrill Lynch also acquired revenue by keeping large volumes of 
triple-A rated CDOs on its books, “thinking they were low-risk assets because of their top 
credit ratings.”1976 
Near the end of 2005, many investors began to feel that they had invested enough 
money in subprime MBSs and tranches of CDOs.1977 Moreover, AIG made the troubling 
announcement that it would no longer sell credit protection on tranches of subprime 
CDOs. This was arguably the pivotal moment for Merrill Lynch. As an insightful article 
in The Wall Street Journal notes, “Merrill was used to having to keep lots of mortgage 
bonds and pieces of CDOs on its books temporarily before selling them. But without a 
firm like AIG providing credit insurance, Merrill had to bear the risk of default itself.”1978  
 In a later section, I will examine AIG’s relationship with the various arrangers in 
more detail. For now, one should note that Merrill Lynch was confronted by a question of 
paramount importance at the end of 2005: Should it continue aggressively pressing 
ahead, arranging increasingly more profitable subprime CDO deals, or should it instead 
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construe AIG’s decision as a warning to scale back on those operations? One potential 
pitfall of preserving its imposing presence in the CDO market was that the arranger 
would have to assume, at least temporarily, the credit risk on future tranches of subprime 
CDOs that it underwrote.  
In an effort to examine this dilemma more closely, one should consider the 
following example. In August of 2006, Merrill Lynch underwrote a $1.5 billion CDO 
called “Octans.” Although the arranger successfully found investors to take on the risk of 
the $525 million worth of mezzanine tranches, it could not sell or insure the remaining 
$975 million worth of super-senior tranches. As a result, a Merrill Lynch trader was 
confronted by the question of whether the arranger should take on the credit risk of the 
$975 million super-senior tranches, or let the deal fall through. Merrill Lynch’s CDO co-
chief, Harin De Silva, urged the trader to accept the tranches and their accompanying 
credit risk because otherwise the arranger would take on the credit risk of all of the 
tranches since the deal would not be completed. Even though the trader admitted that he 
was not comfortable taking on the credit risk of the super-senior tranches because “he 
didn’t know enough about the CDO,” Merrill Lynch ultimately accepted the tranches, 
closed the deal, and earned $15 million in fee revenue.1979 
In the end, the fees generated by arranging CDO deals were simply too seductive 
for Merrill Lynch to resist. It is likely that, before the subprime mortgage crises began to 
unfold in 2007, the arranger could have sold off billions of dollars worth of subprime 
MBSs that it intended to later package into CDOs for a cumulative loss of $1.5 to $3 
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billion. Instead of choosing to endure those short-terms losses, however, Merrill Lynch 
elected to put its CDO business into “overdrive.”1980  
In 2006, a year in which the term “CDO” did not once appear in its annual 
report,1981 Merrill Lynch issued an astounding $52.4 billion worth of CDOs,1982 $44 
billion of which were tranches of CDOs backed by subprime MBSs.1983 Arranging these 
CDO deals generated fee revenues of approximately $700 million for the arranger.1984 
Merrill Lynch went further by eventually dismissing Jeffrey Kronthal, a CDO risk 
manager, in the middle of the year for reportedly imposing “informal limits on the 
amount of CDO exposure the firm could keep on its books ($3bn to $4bn) and on its risk 
of possible CDO losses (about $75m a day).”1985 In his place, Merrill Lynch appointed a 
senior trader, Ranodeb Roy, who did not have “much experience in mortgage 
securities.”1986 As reported by The Wall Street Journal: 
CDO holdings on Merrill’s books were soon piling up at a rate of $5bn to 
$6bn per quarter. This led to an inside joke at Merrill. Roy is known as  
Ronnie. Some employees took to saying that if they couldn’t find a  
specialized bond insurer, known as a “monoline,” to take Merrill’s risk on 
the deal, they could resort to a “Ronoline.”1987 
 
By September of 2006, the arranger had on its own books $17 billion in tranches of 
subprime CDOs, $18 billion of subprime MBSs ready to be packaged into CDOs, and 
$14 billion of subprime loans waiting to be securitized into MBSs. Additionally, Merrill 
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Lynch was simultaneously in the process of making arrangements with lenders to finance 
another $22 billion worth of subprime loans. That month, the arranger’s “investments and 
financing related to subprime mortgages and CDOs” exceeded its total stock market 
value.1988 Risks of this sort paid off for Merrill Lynch for about four years, as its annual 
profits from 2003 to 2006 more than doubled to an average of $5 billion.1989 Yet, as one 
observer notes, the arranger was playing “a terrible game of musical chairs.”1990 This 
gambit only worked as long as investor demand for subprime-related securities persisted. 
David Faber nicely captures the sentiment surrounding Merrill Lynch as 2006 
came to a close:  
As Merrill headed into 2007, it had record earnings, a strong stock price, 
well-paid executives, a confident board of directors, and a mission to 
get even bigger in the one area that had been so instrumental to all its 
success: mortgages. It wanted to originate more mortgages, buy more 
mortgages, package more mortgages into securities, and package more 
of those securities into CDOs. And of course, it wanted to sell those 
securities and CDOs as fast as it possibly could, because that’s where the 
money was. It was also happy to keep increasing the leverage on its 
balance sheet as its assets ballooned past $1 trillion, driven by the 
addition of all those mortgages.1991 
 
As late as the end of the second quarter of 2007, with the subprime mortgage market 
already buckling under the weight of borrower delinquencies and defaults, Merrill Lynch 
posted impressive earnings.1992 Right around the time of this earnings announcement, 
however, the financial condition of the arranger swiftly deteriorated. In mid-July of 2007, 
Merrill Lynch’s board of directors was alerted that it may end up suffering losses of $500 
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million from poorly performing mortgage-related assets. In response to this news, Stanley 
O’Neal sent a memo out at the end of the month to the 62,000 Merrill Lynch employees 
that said, “We’re very comfortable with our current exposure to this asset class.”1993 
Around the same time, Merrill Lynch’s Chief Financial Officer, Jeff Edwards, stated in a 
conference call with investors that the arranger’s exposure to subprime mortgages was 
“limited, contained, and appropriate.”1994  
On August 9, 2007, the board received a memo that estimated the arranger would 
now suffer $1 billion of losses from mortgage-related assets. Roughly two months later, 
on October 5, Merrill Lynch announced that it would actually lose $5 billion from those 
assets. Ultimately, on October 24, Merrill Lynch revealed that it suffered massive losses 
totaling $8.4 billion from those assets and other write-downs. At the time, it was the 
single largest known Wall Street loss.1995 On October 30, Stanley O’Neal resigned and 
was expected to receive approximately $160 million in severance and retirement 
payments.1996 The next month, on November 15, 2007, Merrill Lynch announced the 
hiring of John Thain as its new CEO, which, according to The Wall Street Journal, 
signaled “that after years of inner turmoil and risky expansion, the beleaguered financial 
giant want[ed] a pair of steady hands at the helm.”1997 
It later surfaced that, as the subprime mortgage market was imploding, Merrill 
Lynch audaciously issued $30 billion worth of CDOs that were backed by risky 
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mortgages over the first seven months of 2007.1998 The arranger was also a pioneer in 
issuing CDOs² and CDOs³. It is interesting to see how a late-2007 article written in The 
Wall Street Journal attempted to describe what Merrill Lynch was doing before the terms 
“CDOs²” and “CDOs³” became more popular. As the authors of the article note, “[T]he 
bulk of the middle-rated pieces of CDOs underwritten by Merrill were purchased by 
other CDOs that the investment bank arranged... Each CDO sold some of its riskier slices 
to the next CDO, which then sold its own slices to the next deal, and so on.”1999 The 
authors proceed to perceptively call attention to how this strategy was artificially 
propping up the prices of CDOs.2000 
 The troubled arranger ultimately ended up issuing $144.95 billion worth of 
CDOs from 2003-2007.2001 Isolating the losses stemming directly from Merrill Lynch’s 
buying, packaging, and selling financial products made from subprime mortgages, the 
arranger lost an astonishing $23.2 billion by the end of 2007.2002 To provide a sense of 
the extent of the risks that Merrill Lynch bore during this time, the arranger had $1.02 
trillion worth of assets with equity of only $31.566 billion. Thus, a mere 3% drop in the 
value of those assets would have completely wiped out the arranger’s equity capital.2003 
In the next section, I will explore why Merrill Lynch and the other large arrangers were 
able to take on such dangerously high levels of leverage.  
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Over the course of the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, Merrill 
Lynch raised approximately $13 billion by issuing shares of common and preferred 
stock.2004 Complementing his efforts to raise capital, Thain also adopted certain cost 
cutting measures, such as replacing “fresh flowers on a Merrill floor used by nine or so 
executives – an estimated annual expense of $200,000 – with fakes.”2005 The CEO also 
cut 15% of its workforce in early 2008.2006 These efforts, however, proved to be far from 
sufficient and were partially undermined by Thain’s decision to spend over $1.22 million 
on remodeling expenses, including the purchase of an $87,000 area rug for his office.2007 
By July of 2008, the arranger was compelled to acknowledge that $30.6 billion of 
its CDOs were “worth barely a fifth of their original price.”2008 As a result, Merrill Lynch 
sold those CDOs to Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion, or for about 22 cents on the 
dollar.2009 That same month, Merrill Lynch posted a loss of $4.65 billion for the second 
quarter,2010 its third straight quarter of losses, which kept alive its longest and worst 
losing streak in its 94-year history.2011 To keep afloat, Merrill Lynch issued $8.5 billion 
worth of common stock, which diluted existing shareholders by about 38%.2012 The 
arranger also began selling valuable assets to raise capital, such as its 20% stake in 
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Bloomberg LP. Describing the perilous situation at Merrill Lynch, one analyst observed, 
“Revenue is going down, expenses can’t go down fast enough, and [it] is now selling the 
sofa to pay the rent -- and next month it will be the dining-room table.”2013 
By August of 2008, Merrill Lynch’s losses over the previous 18 months had 
equaled approximately 25% of the profits that the arranger had enjoyed over the previous 
36 years.2014 As late as September 10 of that year, Thain was “still out promoting Merrill 
in public and assuring employees that things would work out well.”2015 Three days later, 
Thain and the CEO of Bank of America, Kenneth Lewis, began discussing the possibility 
of the bank acquiring the arranger.2016 On September 15, 2008, the day of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, Bank of America agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch for a little over 
$50 billion.2017 In response to the acquisition, Thain declared, “We have over 60,000 
people working every day. All the efforts of these people were overwhelmed by the 
write-downs in the mortgage-related assets.”2018  
In the middle of October of 2008, well-before the acquisition was finalized, the 
arranger posted another crushing quarterly loss of $5.15 billion.2019 About two months 
later, on December 5, 2008, both Merrill Lynch and Bank of America shareholders 
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approved the acquisition,2020 which was eventually finalized on January 1, 2009.2021 After 
roughly a year and a half of severe mortgage-related losses, Merrill Lynch’s “storied but 
tarnished 94-year history as an independent company” came to an abrupt close.2022  
 Soon after the acquisition was completed, it was revealed that Merrill Lynch 
endured a stunning $15.31 billion fourth quarter 2008 loss.2023 Coincidentally or not, this 
news broke on the same day that the United States Treasury Department and the Fed 
announced that they were lending “$20 billion in fresh capital” to Bank of America and 
guaranteeing an incredible $118 billion worth of Merrill Lynch’s weakest assets.2024 Bank 
of America had just recently, on November 26, 2008, secretly borrowed $86 billion from 
the Federal Reserve.2025 Eliciting intense public outcry, it was unveiled in February of 
2009 that Merrill Lynch, after losing a total of $27 billion in 2008, paid nearly 700 of its 
employees year-end bonuses of $1 million or more.2026  
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4.7. The SEC’s Adoption of the Alternative Net Capital Rule and the 
       Explosion of Leverage 
 
One may wonder how the large arrangers, such as Merrill Lynch, were able to 
irresponsibly take on such risks in the first place. In a groundbreaking article, Stephen 
Labaton, writing for The Washington Post shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
and Washington Mutual, the rescue of AIG, and the placement of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac into conservatorship, provided a huge piece of the puzzle. Labaton wrote in 
October of 2008:  
Many events in Washington, on Wall Street and elsewhere around the  
country have led to what has been called the most serious financial crisis 
since the 1930s. But decisions made at a brief meeting on April 28, 2004, 
explain why the problems could spin out of control. The [SEC’s] failure 
to follow through on those decisions also explains why Washington  
regulators did not see what was coming.2027  
 
At that sparsely attended proceeding, one that was not even covered by any of the major 
media outlets, five members of the SEC met to discuss “an urgent plea” that had been 
made by the five largest arrangers: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns.2028  
As explained by Labaton, at the time of the meeting, the European Union (EU) 
was about to impose additional, stricter regulatory burdens on the foreign subsidiaries of 
United States investment banks. These regulations were part of the EU’s Financial 
Conglomerates Directive of 2002, and they included the implementation of higher capital 
requirements that the five arrangers wanted to avoid.2029 The EU maintained, however, 
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that if the SEC regulated the parent companies of those foreign subsidiaries, then those 
subsidiaries would be exempt from their forthcoming regulations.2030  
This loophole was obstructed by the fact that the SEC did not have explicit 
authority to oversee the parent companies. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 gave 
the SEC the authority to supervise only the securities and brokerage units of holding 
companies, not the parent companies themselves.2031 The solution to this quandary was 
settled in 55 minutes at the April 28, 2004 meeting, when the SEC unanimously approved 
the awkwardly titled “consolidated supervised entities” program,2032 one that was 
accompanied by the adoption of the “alternative net capital rule.”2033  
In order to qualify as a consolidated supervised entity, the SEC stipulated that a 
holding company had to have at least $5 billion in assets. As Patricia McCoy and 
Kathleen Engel note, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
and Bear Stearns were the only independent arrangers that were able to meet that 
requirement.2034 Disturbingly, all five of them heavily lobbied for the creation of the 
program.2035  
Under the 2004 program, the SEC agreed to implement the alternative net capital 
rule, which removed the previous leverage ratio of fifteen for the five consolidated 
supervised entities’ brokerage units.2036 Before the program was approved, the five 
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arrangers’ brokerage houses were subjected to a leverage ratio that allowed them to 
borrow only $15 for every $1 in capital that they held.2037 The alternative capital rule 
exclusively permitted the five arrangers to “set their own leverage ceilings, using their 
[own] internal mathematical models.”2038 In return for this benefit, the five arrangers 
agreed to submit their parent holding company and all of their unregulated affiliates “to 
voluntary SEC examination and supervision.”2039 Among the many important 
consequences that followed from this arrangement, one should especially note that the 
SEC could not require the five arrangers to raise additional capital should the former 
determine that the latter were taking excessive risks. For instance, it was eventually 
revealed that the SEC was well-aware of the troubling risks that Bear Stearns was taking 
before its collapse, but the regulatory body simply inquired whether the arranger was 
intending to raise capital. The SEC did not have the authority to force Bear Stearns to do 
so.2040 It is necessary to briefly examine the power and perils of leverage and then explore 
how this questionable quid pro quo ultimately played out. 
Simply put, leverage is attractive because it can amplify returns.2041 Patricia 
McCoy and Kathleen Engel’s example of the buying and selling of a home is a helpful 
illustration of the power of leverage. Imagine Homebuyer A has $200,000 in cash and 
decides to purchase a home for that amount. A few years later, the house appreciates and 
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he is able to sell the house for $220,000. In this case, his return on the “leverage-less” 
investment of the house is 10% or $20,000. However, suppose that Homebuyer B only 
has $20,000 in cash and elects to take out a zero-percent, no-cost mortgage in the amount 
of $180,000 to purchase the same $200,000 house. Homebuyer B would have a leverage 
ratio of nine. A few years later, like Homebuyer A, he is able to sell the house for 
$220,000. In this second scenario, his return on the leveraged investment of the house is 
100%, a $20,000 return on his $20,000 investment.2042  
If Homebuyer A and B’s houses decrease in value, one can also discern part of the 
danger of leveraged investments. This time, suppose both Homebuyer A and B’s houses 
lose 20% of their purchase price and necessity demands that they both sell their houses 
for a loss. Homebuyer A, though absorbing a loss of $40,000, is still able to walk away 
with $160,000 of his investment. Homebuyer B with his leverage ratio of nine, on the 
other hand, has not only lost 100% of his investment, but he is also on the hook for 
another $20,000 that he still owes his mortgage lender.  
Returning to the impact of the 2004 SEC program, the five arrangers, having had 
the caps on their leverage ratios removed by the alternative net capital rule, proceeded to 
go on a leverage binge, borrowing billions of dollars to purchase subprime MBSs, CDSs, 
and other exotic instruments.2043 In 2007, Morgan Stanley had an astonishing leverage 
ratio of 35, with the leverage ratios of Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs close behind at 
31.9 and 28, respectively. Bear Stearns, during the week that it collapsed in the middle of 
March of 2008, had a leverage ratio of 35. Later that same month, the soon-to-be-
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bankrupt Lehman Brothers had a leverage ratio of 31.7.2044 On September 26, 2008, SEC 
Chairman Christopher Cox terminated the consolidated supervised entities program, 
while publicly announcing that the program was “fundamentally flawed from the 
beginning.”2045 The chief flaw of the program, according to Cox, was that the five 
arrangers “could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily.”2046 
 
4.8. Repurchase Agreements Compounded the Risks Posed by Leverage 
It is important to note that these five consolidated supervised entities were able to 
borrow significant sums of money, and hence boost their leverage, by using the MBSs 
and tranches of CDOs on their books as collateral. They were able to borrow money this 
way by making repurchase agreements or “repos” with willing lenders, who were 
frequently their fellow arrangers. As Peter Wallison explains, in a repo transaction, a 
borrower “sells a security to a lender with an option to repurchase it at a price that 
provides the lender with a return appropriate for a secured loan.”2047 Typically, these 
loans were over-collateralized, meaning that the loan amounts were less than the full 
value of the collateral that secured them.2048 Should the borrower be unable to repurchase 
the security at a future time, the lender could presumably sell the security to recover the 
lost money that it had lent and pocket the difference. To give one a sense of the size of 
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the repo market once the subprime crisis began to unfold, the average daily volume of 
this market was $2.4 trillion in 2007.2049  
Leading up to the outbreak of the crisis, the repo market was “a decades-old, 
plain-vanilla market [that was] critical to the smooth functioning of capital markets.”2050 
However, the dangers of using MBSs and tranches of CDOs as collateral in order to 
obtain short-term funding, which, in turn, would be promptly employed to finance one’s 
day-to-day business operations, were overshadowed by a sector-wide overconfidence in 
the strength of the residential mortgage market. When housing prices began to decline in 
2007, and mortgage delinquencies subsequently surged, a key funding source for the five 
arrangers and other participants in the financial sector began to dry up.2051 As FDIC chair 
Sheila Bair observed: 
As home prices fell, recently originated subprime and  
non-traditional mortgage loans began to default at record rates. These 
developments led to growing concerns about the value of financial 
positions in mortgage-backed securities and related derivative 
instruments held by major financial institutions in the U.S. and around 
the world. The difficulty in determining the value of mortgage-related 
assets and, therefore, the balance-sheet strength of large banks and 
non-bank financial institutions ultimately led these institutions to 
become wary of lending to one another, even on a short-term basis.2052 
 
A snapshot of this phenomenon can be discerned in the swift and dramatic collapse of 
Bear Stearns in March of 2008.  
Of the five arrangers, Bear Stearns had the most exposure to subprime loans.2053 
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The investment bank issued $10.097 billion worth of subprime MBSs in 2000, followed 
by $6.748 billion in 2001, $9.336 billion in 2002, $10.783 billion in 2003, $13.095 
billion in 2004, $12.854 billion in 2005, $11.169 billion in 2006, and $13.360 billion in 
2007.2054 Leading to the eruption of the subprime mortgage crisis, the arranger had a 
“longstanding” relationship with the notorious subprime lender, New Century Financial, 
which consisted of the former financing and purchasing risky mortgage loans from the 
latter.2055 Bear Stearns also owned and operated a residential mortgage loan subsidiary, 
EMC Mortgage, to assist with accelerating its subprime securitizations. In October of 
2006, the arranger purchased another subprime lender, Encore Credit Corporation. Jeff 
Verschleiser, a senior managing director in Bear Stearns’ mortgage department, affirmed 
that the acquisition would enable the investment bank to have “a substantial stake in the 
subprime lending business.”2056 
In early autumn of 2007, Bear Stearns owned a stockpile of mortgages and 
mortgage-related securities valued at approximately $56 billion.2057 On December 20 of 
that year, the arranger, burdened by losses in its mortgage inventory, announced its first 
quarterly loss in 85 years of existence.2058 Nearly three months later, on March 10, 2008, 
Moody’s downgraded fifteen MBSs underwritten by Bear Stearns, announcing that the 
downgrades were based on “higher-than-anticipated rates of delinquency [and] 
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foreclosure… in the underlying collateral.”2059 The next day, on March 11, the Dutch 
bank ING Group announced that it was eliminating $500 million in short-term financing 
to Bear Stearns.2060 On March 13, it surfaced that Bear Stearns had exhausted nearly 89% 
of its liquid assets in just three days, while additional lenders, such as Fidelity 
Investments, refused to enter into further repo transactions with the distressed investment 
bank.2061  
At this point, the situation was so dire for Bear Stearns that if it failed to obtain 
new financing before the markets opened on March 14, it would have to file for 
bankruptcy protection. That night, one Bear Stearns executive described the situation as 
“end of the world bad.”2062 Bear Stearns’ CEO, Alan Schwartz, contacted JPMorgan 
seeking an emergency $25 billion line of credit. With the assistance of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, JPMorgan crafted an overnight emergency loan. As Richard 
Kolb explains, “The exact terms of the loan were not immediately disclosed, but they 
boiled down to the Fed extending a line of credit of about $30 billion [to Bear Stearns] 
for 28 days.”2063 Interestingly, the deal stipulated that JPMorgan would not actually lend 
Bear Stearns any money. Instead, it would serve as a conduit through which the Fed 
would funnel funds to Bear Stearns. At this stage in the crisis, “the Fed believed that it 
did not have the power to lend directly to an investment bank.”2064 
The next day, Friday, March 14, Bear Stearns’ stock price precipitously dropped 
47%, closing at $30.00 per share. To put this share price in perspective, shares of Bear 
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Stearns stock closed at $70.08 per share just one week earlier, and reached as high as 
$171.51 in 2007.2065 According to Kate Kelly, writing for The Wall Street Journal, then-
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and then-President of the New York Fed Timothy 
Geithner contacted Schwartz that night, informing him that he needed “to have a deal by 
Sunday night.”2066 One person who was involved in the deliberations that weekend stated, 
“We thought [the Fed] gave us 28 days. Then they gave us 24 hours.”2067  
After a hectic series of weekend negotiations between JPMorgan and Bear 
Stearns, the former offered the latter a purchase price of $2 a share on Sunday March 
16.2068 After reading about the details of the offer in The Wall Street Journal, Morgan 
Stanley’s CEO at the time, John Mack, reportedly wondered aloud whether the $2 per 
share asking price was a typo that should have read $20.2069 Within a week, on Monday, 
March 24, JPMorgan raised its offer to $10 a share, accompanied by the condition that it 
would only have to absorb the first $1 billion of losses that could potentially result from 
$30 billion of Bear Stearns’ riskiest assets. As part of its effort to close the deal, the Fed 
agreed that it would guarantee the remaining $29 billion of those assets,2070 which 
Stephen Labaton aptly characterized as “a $29 billion taxpayer dowry.”2071  
In the end, Bear Stearns failed for a variety of reasons. Among the most 
prominent of those reasons were its excessive subprime exposure, alarmingly high 
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leverage ratio (as high as 35 to 1), and an overdependence on MBSs and tranches of 
CDOs to serve as collateral for acquiring short-term financing.2072 In September of 2008, 
the SEC’s Inspector General conceded in a report that the SEC “became aware of 
numerous potential red flags prior to Bear Stearns’ collapse,” including the arranger’s 
“concentration of mortgage securities, high leverage, [and] shortcomings of risk 
management,” but nevertheless the regulator “did not take actions to limit these 
factors.”2073 I will now examine how another essential ingredient in the subprime 
mortgage crisis, credit-default swaps, greatly boosted the arrangers’ ability to securitize 
subprime MBSs and CDOs.  
 
4.9. A Brief Introduction to Derivatives, Credit Derivatives, and Credit- 
       Default Swaps (CDSs) 
 
Derivatives have been around for over 4,000 years.2074 Yet, despite their 
resilience, they resist a simple definition due to the fact that “they vary widely in content 
and application.”2075 In general terms, derivatives are contracts “whose structures and 
values refer to financially meaningful external items.”2076 The basis for their name stems 
from how they derive their content and value from certain external, more substantive 
things, commonly called “underlyings.”2077 Broadly speaking, underlyings “can be 
anything that interests markets,” ranging from cash instruments (such as stocks and 
bonds) to tangibles (such as commodities) to even intangibles (such an interest rates, 
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currency rates, or the credit quality of institutions).2078 A fluctuation in the value of a 
given derivative’s underlyings will reverberate “up” to the level of that derivative, 
causing its value to likewise change. A derivative shorn of its underlyings would have no 
value at all.2079  
 One of the fundamental functions of derivatives is to reallocate risk.  As Norman 
Menachem Feder explains: 
 [D]erivatives contracts isolate certain risks and move them from one party  
            to another. By engineering a contract whose value reflects in some way  
            the value or change in value of an underlying, parties can shift the risk 
            inherent in exposure to that underlying. Via judicious selection of 
            underlyings and thoughtful arrangement of relevant obligations,  
            parties to derivatives arrangements unbundle specific risks and place each 
            of these risks where they are most welcome.2080 
 
It is important to mention that derivatives do not eliminate underlying risks. Instead, they 
simply shift or reposition certain risks from one party who does not want to be burdened 
by them to another party who is willing to assume them.2081 One should further note that 
derivatives enable investors to “place bets on the direction of markets, without ever 
needing to actually own tangible assets in that market.”2082 Long-recognized types of 
derivatives include: options (the right to buy or sell something at a set price in the future), 
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forwards (the obligation to buy or sell something at a set price in the future), and swaps 
(an agreement between two parties to exchange cash flows, or future cash payments, at 
specified intervals).2083 
 One strain of derivatives that is especially pertinent to this study is credit 
derivatives, which are “privately negotiated contracts that allow a party to transfer the 
risk of default on a bond or loan to another party without transferring ownership [of that 
bond or loan].”2084 The express purpose of credit derivatives is to transfer credit risk, the 
risk that a borrower will default on its payments of principal and interest, from one party 
to another.2085 Although the buying and selling of credit risk protection was not a new 
development when credit derivatives began to emerge in the mid-1990’s,2086 what 
distinguished the product from preceding forms of credit protection was that it effectively 
delinked the credit protection from the underlying instrument to which it referred.2087  
This innovation enabled market participants to trade credit risk separately from 
the underlying instruments that were creating that risk, thus affording them with 
unprecedented opportunities to customize their exposure to those risks.2088 Credit 
derivatives permitted investors to unbundle the credit risk accompanying their 
investments from the other risks that those investments may have posed to them.2089 
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Simply stated, credit derivatives separated the interest on a debt from the risk that it 
would not be paid back.2090  
In theory, the invention of credit derivatives assisted investors with their risk 
management efforts.2091 Indeed, this was the sentiment of then-Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman Alan Greenspan in 2005. Greenspan publicly praised the virtues of credit 
derivatives by affirming that their development had “contributed to the stability of the 
banking system by allowing banks, especially the largest, systemically important banks, 
to measure and manage their credit risks more effectively.”2092  
 Since the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, the most common form of 
credit derivatives has been under intense media and regulatory scrutiny: credit-default 
swaps (CDSs). As derivatives, CDSs are contracts whose structures and values are 
derived from underlyings. As credit derivatives, CDSs are contracts in which two parties, 
a “protection buyer” and a “protection seller,” isolate and place a value on the credit risk 
that self-selected, referenced underlyings carry with them.2093 The relevant underlyings 
referred to in a CDS transaction are typically debt obligations, commonly called 
“reference obligations,” incurred by a company or companies. The company or 
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companies responsible for the reference obligation contained within a CDS contract are 
usually known as “reference entities.”2094  
As part of a CDS contract, the protection buyer is purchasing credit protection 
from the protection seller. In exchange for a periodic fee, the protection buyer is able to 
offload the credit risk that accompanies a given reference obligation and transfer it to the 
protection seller. What is being swapped in a CDS contract, then, is money in exchange 
for credit risk protection. Should a predetermined credit event occur, typically if the 
reference entity files for bankruptcy protection or otherwise defaults on its reference 
obligation, the protection seller is contractually committed to compensate the protection 
buyer.2095 An example may be helpful here.2096 
Suppose that Company X purchases $100 million worth of bonds issued by 
Company Y, and the bonds mature in five years. Shortly after the purchase, Company X 
decides that it wants to hedge its credit risk exposure on the bonds. Hedging is 
tantamount to protecting. Company X wants to put itself in a position where it will profit 
under future circumstances that, bereft of the credit protection, would otherwise cause it 
to sustain a loss.2097 Consequently, Company X enters into a five-year, $100 million CDS 
with Company Z. In this example, Company X is the protection buyer, Company Z is the 
protection seller, Company Y is the reference entity, and the $100 million worth of bonds 
is the reference obligation.2098 
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After some negotiating, Company X and Company Z agree that what constitutes a 
credit event in this CDS is if Company Y either files for bankruptcy protection or defaults 
on its bond payments.2099 Company X and Company Z also agree upon the premiums that 
the former will pay the latter over the life of the CDS: Company X will pay Company Z 
$250,000 per quarter during the five-year term of the CDS. Finally, Company X and 
Company Z establish how the latter will compensate the former, should a credit event 
occur: Company Z will pay Company X $100 million, or the par value of the bonds, even 
though the credit event will likely cause the value of those bonds to drop well below $100 
million.2100 
After five years, a credit event never occurs. Company Z earned $5 million over 
the term of the CDS in exchange for taking on the credit risk accompanying the reference 
obligation. One can be reasonably sure that Company X, despite paying out the $5 
million to Company Z, nevertheless earned more than that sum from the interest 
payments made by Company Y on its bonds. Thus, Company X enjoyed a profit from its 
purchase of Company Y’s bonds, though its net gain obviously would have been higher 
had it not purchased credit protection from Company Z. Still, Company X was able to 
customize its credit risk exposure by purchasing the CDS, in effect, enhancing the 
likelihood that it would receive its invested principal back with interest from Company Y. 
As this example hopefully makes clear, CDSs resemble insurance contracts. 
Analogous to traditional insurance, CDSs hone in on certain events that are fraught with 
risk, and give a protection buyer the opportunity to shield itself from that risk. One could 
purchase health insurance, protecting oneself from the risk of illness or injury, just as one 
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could purchase a CDS, protecting oneself from the risk of a counterparty default. As 
Georgette Phillips points out, the analogy ultimately breaks down, however, because 
traditional insurance contracts typically only involve two parties: the insurer and the 
insured. CDSs involve at least three parties.2101 Furthermore, the protection buyer of a 
CDS does not need to own the reference obligation, an important point that is not 
apparent in the example above.  
Company X does not actually have to buy Company Y’s bonds in order to 
purchase a CDS with Company Z, one that would shield it from the credit risk that 
Company Y poses to its creditors. In many cases, reference entities are not even aware of 
the fact that protection buyers are purchasing CDSs that include their debt obligations.2102 
Unbeknownst to Company Y, Company X could buy a CDS on its bonds, simply as a 
way of speculating that Company Y’s credit condition will decline over the term of the 
CDS.2103 A CDS that offers a protection buyer credit protection on a reference obligation 
in which it does not own or have an insurable interest is known as a naked CDS.2104  
Reflecting on the nature of naked swaps, Michael Greenberger, a law professor at 
the University of Maryland, noted, “It’s sort of like I think you’re a bad driver and you’re 
going to crash your car… [s]o I go to an insurance company and get collision insurance 
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on your car because I think it’ll crash and I’ll collect on it.”2105 As much as 80% of the 
CDS market is traded by investors who do not have an insurable interest in the 
underlying reference obligations.2106 In addition to creating conditions rife for speculation 
on the performance on subprime MBSs and CDOs, naked swaps also created “daisy 
chains of liability,” which eventually magnified the losses caused by those financial 
products.2107 Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy provide a helpful example to illustrate 
this point.  
Imagine Company A purchases a subprime MBS and then, in an effort to protect 
itself from the credit risk that the bond poses, it elects to purchase a CDS from Company 
B. Once this transaction is completed, Company B decides that it wants to protect itself 
from the risk that it will have to compensate Company A should a credit event occur. 
Worried over this prospect, Company B purchases a CDS from Company C, protecting 
itself from the risk of having to compensate Company A. Then, Company C determines 
that it would like to purchase a CDS from Company D, one that would protect it from the 
risk of having to compensate Company B.  One should note that only Company A has an 
actual insurable interest in the subprime MBS from which all of this credit protection 
proliferated. 
If a credit event would happen to occur, Company A would demand 
compensation from Company B, Company B would demand compensation from 
Company C, and Company C would demand compensation from Company D.  As the 
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backstop protection seller, Company D’s inability to compensate Company C because the 
liability was too large could give rise to a domino effect of failures down the line. 
Company C, which was relying upon Company D to meet the obligations outlined in the 
CDS, is now on the hook to compensate Company B. If Company C defaults on its 
obligations to Company B, the latter would then be responsible for compensating 
Company A without the benefit of the compensation that it expected. This could cause 
Company B to default on its obligations to Company A, which could likewise doom the 
latter.2108 As Peter Wallison makes clear, these daisy chains of liability did not 
intrinsically magnify the risks posed by subprime MBSs and CDOs.2109 However, one 
could argue that they did dramatically heighten the importance of backstop CDS 
protection sellers making circumspect decisions. In a later section, the grave failings of 
the most important backstop CDS protection seller, AIG, will be explored. Michael 
Lewis labeled AIG the “subprime risk-taker of last resort.”2110 
A second key difference between traditional insurance and the CDS market is that 
the latter is largely unregulated. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA) amended 
existing securities statutes and ended up exempting CDSs “from most aspects of federal 
securities law apart from the antifraud provisions.”2111 Senator Phil Gramm added a 
clause to GLBA that “prohibited states from regulating swaps under their laws 
proscribing gambling and fake exchanges.”2112 About one year later, on December 15, 
2000, Congress unanimously passed, without debate, the Commodities Futures 
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Modernization Act of 2000 (CMFA). President Clinton quickly signed it into law before 
his second term came to a close. Senator Gramm announced in a press release shortly 
after CMFA became a law that it “protects financial institutions from over-regulation... 
and it guarantees that the United States will maintain its global dominance of financial 
markets.”2113 
Up until the passing of CMFA, the prevailing opinion was that CDSs were, in 
fact, securities under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.2114 As such, there was at least the possibility that the SEC could have regulated 
various aspects of the budding CDS market if the regulatory agency deemed it necessary 
to do so. Remarkably, CMFA amended both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to henceforth exclude “any security-based swap agreement” from 
the definition of the term “security” contained in the two acts.2115 CMFA recognized 
CDSs as “security-based swap agreements,” which meant that they were no longer 
considered “securities” for the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Subsequently, beyond being subject to antifraud provisions under 
the two acts, CDSs were from that point on exempt from SEC regulation.2116 
Insofar as CDSs resemble insurance contracts, one may wonder about the extent 
to which they were subjected to individual state insurance regulations.2117 After all, with 
respect to the insurance sector, states normally have the authority to issue “licensing 
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requirements, regulate policy terms, review rates, and conduct financial examinations of 
insurers.”2118 For any number of reasons, however, CDSs “generally have not been 
considered insurance for purposes of state insurance regulations and, therefore, have not 
been subject to these regulations.”2119 In 2004, New York amended its insurance laws to 
specifically omit CDSs from coverage.2120 Several states followed suit.2121 One of the 
primary reasons that many states have intentionally avoided including CDSs in their 
insurance regulations is that those regulations are meant “to protect American 
consumers.”2122 As William Sjostrom, Jr. explains, “Because the CDS market is 
comprised entirely of institutional investors, the thinking went that there is no consumer 
interest with respect to CDSs in need of protection.”2123 
Part of the aftermath of these deregulatory measures was that CDS transactions 
began to take place in a “shadow market,” an over-the-counter market in which CDSs 
were privately negotiated, went through no exchange, and were completely 
undocumented.2124 Synchronously, the CDS market grew exponentially, ballooning from 
a total market value of $100 billion in 2000 to $6.4 trillion in 2004.2125 Despite any 
positive outcomes that emerged from this prodigious growth, eventually the legal, 
technological, and paperwork-handling infrastructure could not keep pace with it.2126 In 
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2008, then-Chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, summarized this development in this 
way: 
The market for CDS is barely 10 years old. It has doubled in size 
since just two years ago… It has grown between the gaps and seams 
of the current regulatory system, where neither the commission 
nor any other government agency can reach it. No one has 
regulatory authority over credit-default swaps -- not even to 
require basic reporting or disclosure.2127 
 
Disturbingly, CDS deals began to be routinely and hurriedly completed in one-minute 
phone conversations2128 without the benefit of producing detailed confirmations.2129 By 
September of 2005, the fourteen largest participants in the CDS market had a total of 
97,000 CDS trade confirmations that were more than 30 days outstanding.2130 David 
Wessel, writing for The Wall Street Journal at the peak of the housing boom in 2006, 
affirmed the following about the CDS market: “Record-keeping, documentation and 
other practices have been so sloppy that no firm could be sure how much risk it was 
taking or with whom it had a deal. That’s a particularly embarrassing problem for an 
industry that has resisted regulation of derivatives by arguing that big firms would police 
each other.”2131 One hedge fund manager stated that CDSs had become “essentially the 
dark matter of the financial universe.”2132 In October 2008, Christopher Cox declared, 
“The regulatory black hole for credit-default swaps is one of the most significant issues 
we are confronting in the current credit crisis and it requires immediate legislative 
action.”2133 Even former Federal Reserve Chairman and deregulation champion, Alan 
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Greenspan, conceded during a congressional hearing in October of 2008 that CDSs “have 
serious problems” and needed to be subjected to stricter oversight.2134 By 2009, no 
authoritative information about the actual size of the CDS market was even available.2135 
The CDS market not only experienced dramatic growth after the turn of the 
century, it also became extraordinarily concentrated. By 2007, the ten largest participants 
accounted for 90% of the market.2136 Throughout the decade, leading up to the subprime 
crisis, some of the largest CDS counterparties were the five consolidated supervised 
entities.2137  
 
4.10. An Additional, Crucial Reason Why Arrangers Were Attracted to CDSs 
 Based upon this discussion of CDSs, one may be left with the impression that the 
prodigious growth of this market was exclusively due to the desire of arrangers to 
customize their risk exposure to subprime MBSs and CDOs. In other words, one may be 
tempted to conclude that the principal selling point of CDSs, one that spurred the 
explosive growth of the CDS market leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, was that 
they afforded arrangers the opportunity to more efficiently allocate their risk exposure to 
subprime financial products. While this is certainly one reason why large arrangers 
aggressively purchased CDSs on their subprime MBSs and CDOs, it is arguably not the 
chief reason.  
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 As discussed below, the largest CDS protection seller, by a wide margin, was 
AIG. By the end of 2007, AIG had sold $527 billion worth of CDSs,2138 an amount which 
the firm was far from being able to pay out, should the requisite number of credit events 
occur. In light of this fact, John Carney, writing for The American Conservative, raised a 
penetrating and oft-overlooked question: If one can assume that large, sophisticated 
arrangers knew that AIG was selling far too much credit protection, why did arrangers 
continue purchasing CDSs from AIG? If one knew that a certain car insurance company 
had insured so many automobiles that it would never be able to even come close to 
compensating its clients should several of them file legitimate insurance claims, why 
would one ever choose to have that company insure one’s car? Carney argues that many 
of these arrangers shared AIG’s overly confident outlook on the subprime mortgage 
market and never seriously believed that they would collect on their CDS contracts.2139 
This consideration, however, merely raises another pertinent question: Why did 
these same arrangers continue to purchase subprime-related credit protection from AIG, 
if they were reasonably confident that this protection was, in all likelihood, largely 
unnecessary?2140 To return to the car insurance analogy, if one earnestly believed that 
one’s car would never be damaged or stolen, why would one eagerly pay insurance 
premiums on that car? Carney persuasively argues that many arrangers were attracted to 
AIG’s CDSs not so much because of the customizable credit protection that those 
contracts afforded, but instead because CDSs enabled them to hold risky, and potentially 
                                                 
2138 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 955. 
2139 John Carney, “Insuring Disaster: Why Are We Bailing Out AIG -- Again?,” The American 
Conservative, Vol. 8, No. 9 (March 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/2009/mar/23/00009. Evidence suggests, however, that 
Goldman Sachs would be an exception to this claim. 
2140 Ibid. 
381 
 
extremely profitable, subprime mortgage assets with lower capital requirements.2141 
Arnold Kling describes this process as “regulatory capital arbitrage,” one in which 
arrangers purchased CDSs on risky mortgage products for the sake of being legally 
permitted to then set aside less capital to shield themselves from possible losses on those 
assets.2142  
To phrase this important point differently, risk-based capital requirements leading 
up to the subprime mortgage crisis rewarded arrangers for purchasing CDSs on subprime 
MBSs and CDOs by way of legally freeing up more of their capital to invest in other 
opportunities, while simultaneously enabling them to reap any of the financial gains 
yielded by those MBSs and CDOs.2143 As John Carney succinctly notes, “Credit default 
swaps were more like regulatory compliance policies than insurance policies.”2144 It is 
worth pointing out that many arrangers stationed in Europe labeled their CDS purchases 
as “regulatory capital forbearance” trades.2145  
A seminal Bloomberg Businessweek article, written in 2008, supports this 
argument.2146 European banks purchased a staggering $426 billion worth of CDSs from 
AIG in 2007. Ordinarily, those banks were obligated to hold 8% of the amount of the 
value of their subprime securities in reserve to protect them against potential declines in 
the value of those securities. However, by purchasing a CDS on a subprime MBS or 
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CDO from AIG, those banks were legally allowed to hold 80% less capital (only 1.6% of 
the amount of the value of their subprime securities) in reserve on those securities. 
Purchasing CDSs from AIG, then, freed up more capital for those banks to purchase and 
securitize more subprime loans.2147 Many regulators around the world eventually adopted 
this rule.2148 
The key point is that at least part of the strong arranger demand for subprime 
loans, especially in Europe, was made possible by risk-based capital requirements. By 
purchasing CDSs on subprime MBSs and CDOs from AIG, arrangers were relieved from 
much of the capital reserve burden that those requirements would have otherwise 
imposed on them. With subsequently more capital at their disposal, arrangers could invest 
more heavily in the subprime mortgage market. As John Carney observes, “Basically, 
banking regulations encouraged companies to buy cheap swaps so that they could treat 
risky investments as almost risk-free. This, in turn, allowed them to take money out of 
their reserves and buy more risky assets, which they then covered up with more credit 
default swaps.”2149 Eric Dinallo, former superintendent of the New York State Insurance 
Department, nicely summarized the matter by affirming, “[A]n essentially unregulated 
institution, AIG Financial Products, sold unregulated securities, credit default swaps, 
which were used to help regulated banks evade regulation and hold less capital in reserve 
than necessary.”2150 It is now necessary to examine in more detail AIG’s relationship with 
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the arrangers as well as how the insurance titan contributed to the subprime mortgage 
crisis. 
 
4.11. The Dramatic Collapse of AIG 
 American International Group, Inc. (AIG), with its Shanghai-based roots 
stretching back to 1919,2151 is “a holding company which, through its subsidiaries, is 
engaged in a broad range of insurance and insurance-related activities in the United 
States and abroad.”2152 The company is incorporated in Delaware, and its common stock 
is listed on the New York Stock Exchange.2153 AIG has operations “in more than 130 
countries with about half of its revenues derived from its foreign operations.”2154 These 
operations include underwriting “commercial property, casualty, workers’ compensation, 
and mortgage guarantee insurance,” activities that take place in its General Insurance 
unit.2155 AIG also provides “individual and group life, payout annuities, endowment, and 
accident and health insurance policies” through its Life Insurance and Retirement Service 
unit.2156 Furthermore, AIG offers “a wide variety of investment-related services and 
investment products to individuals, pension funds, and institutions” through its Asset 
Management unit.2157 Finally, through its Financial Services unit, AIG “engages in 
aircraft equipment leasing, capital market transactions (including CDS transactions), 
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consumer finance, and insurance premium finance.”2158 A Wall Street Journal article 
touched upon the singularity and diversity of AIG’s operations, colorfully citing how the 
company “sells annuities to teachers in West Virginia, liability insurance to the biggest 
American corporations, workers’ compensation coverage to restaurants and policies 
covering cows in dusty Jhalawar, India.”2159 
At the end of December of 2007, AIG had assets totaling $1.06 trillion.2160 The 
company ranked tenth in the 2007 Fortune 500 and twenty-third in the 2007 Global 
500.2161 Before its collapse, AIG had over 116,000 employees.2162 As an article in The 
Wall Street Journal noted, “AIG’s size and complexity meant that its tentacles were 
spread throughout the financial system,” which made it “almost impossible to be certain 
about the impact of a collapse -- other than to know it was potentially catastrophic.”2163 
The seeds of AIG’s collapse, which were predominately sown by its Financial Services 
unit, will now be explored. 
AIG Financial Products Corporation, AIG Trading Group, and their respective 
subsidiaries (collectively, AIGFP) are all parts of AIG’s Financial Services unit. AIGFP, 
which had major operations in London, was founded in 1987 and handled AIG’s CDS 
business. In 1998, JPMorgan Chase approached AIGFP and suggested that it should try 
to write insurance on tranches of its CDOs.2164 The Chief Financial Officer of AIGFP at 
the time, Joseph Cassano, looked back on this invitation and claimed that it was “a 
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watershed event” for the unit.2165 That same year, AIGFP wrote its first CDS. At this 
time, the tranches of CDOs for which AIGFP offered credit protection were typically 
composed of highly rated corporate bonds and a small minority of MBSs.2166 
One should note that AIG “contractually guarantees ‘all present and future 
payment obligations and liabilities of AIGFP arising from transactions entered into by 
AIGFP.’”2167 Before AIG’s fall, the company’s guarantees provided AIGFP with a 
profound competitive advantage over many of the credit protection sellers in the CDS 
market.2168 AIG’s sterling triple-A credit rating instilled confidence in many protection 
buyers that AIGFP’s CDS contracts would be honored should a credit event occur. To 
phrase this point differently, from the perception of credit protection buyers, AIG’s triple-
A rating enhanced the quality of AIGFP’s credit protection.2169 Presumably, other things 
being equal, protection buyers were willing to pay AIGFP more for their credit protection 
than they would from a competitor that was offering the same protection, but backed by a 
parent company with a lower credit rating.2170  
AIG’s triple-A rating made AIGFP’s CDS business attractive for another reason 
aside from serving as a magnet for protection buyers: AIGFP was initially relieved from 
having to post collateral on its CDSs by its protection buyer counterparties.2171 
Ordinarily, a protection buyer requires a protection seller to post collateral “equal to a 
                                                 
2165 Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis, “A Crack in the System,” The Washington Post (December 30, 
2008). 
2166 Ibid. 
2167 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 952. 
2168 Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis, “Downgrades and Downfall.” 
2169 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 958. 
2170 Ibid. See also: Antuilio N. Bomfim, Understanding Credit Derivatives and Related Instruments (San 
Diego: Elsevier Academic Press, 2005), 10. 
2171 Gretchen Morgenson, “Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk.” 
386 
 
specified percentage of the notional amount of the CDS.”2172 The required collateral 
posting, typically made in cash, is a way in which a protection buyer can address the 
counterparty credit risk that accompanies a CDS contract: the risk that “a protection seller 
will be unable or unwilling to make the payment due under a CDS following a credit 
event.”2173 The higher a protection seller’s credit rating, the lower the collateral 
percentage a protection buyer usually demands because a higher credit rating signals a 
lower probability of protection seller default.2174 All the way up until September of 2007, 
AIGFP did not post any collateral on its CDSs, due in large part to the triple-A rating of 
AIG.2175 
Negligible initial collateral posting requirements on their CDSs made this line of 
business all the more profitable for AIGFP.2176 Whereas AIGFP had $737 million in 
revenue in 1999, it generated over $3.26 billion in revenue by 2005, an increase of over 
340%.2177 This growth was accompanied by increasingly enviable profit margins. In 
2002, AIGFP’s operating income was 44% of its revenue, a number that rose to 83% by 
2005.2178 On June 1, 2007, AIG enjoyed its highest stock price of $72.65 per share.2179 
 AIGFP’s profitability was made possible by computer models developed by Gary 
Gorton, a professor at Yale University’s School of Management. Gorton collected vast 
amounts of historical loan performance data and then built models that were designed to 
                                                 
2172 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 950-951. 
2173 Ibid., 950. 
2174 Ibid., 951. 
2175 The Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “Factors Affecting 
Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties,” Report: SIGTARP-10-003 (November 17, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Factors_Affecting_Efforts_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counte
rparties.pdf, 7. 
2176 Gretchen Morgenson, “Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk.” 
2177 Ibid. 
2178 Ibid. 
2179 The Financial Crisis of Our Time, 120. 
387 
 
forecast losses on tranches of CDOs.2180 These CDOs were extraordinarily complex, 
some of them involving “more than 100 securities, each backed by multiple mortgages, 
auto loans or credit-card receivables.”2181 CDOs of this variety were named multi-sector 
CDOs,2182 and they were the primary vehicle through which AIGFP exposed itself to the 
subprime mortgage market.2183  
The disparate nature and daunting number of the loans made it difficult to value 
and assess the credit risk of these CDOs.2184 Gorton’s models were intended to assess the 
amount of credit risk that particular CDO tranches contained, specifically the safest, 
super-senior tranches.2185 Armed with this knowledge, AIGFP believed that it could 
prudently enter into CDS contracts with counterparties that wanted to purchase credit risk 
protection on various tranches of CDOs. These counterparties included “banks and 
investment banks, pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance companies, hedge 
funds, money managers, high-net-worth individuals, municipalities and sovereigns and 
supranationals.”2186 
AIGFP’s top officials became so confident in the models’ ability to assess credit 
risk that they eventually claimed that their CDS deals would generate millions of dollars 
in fees “for taking on infinitesimal risk.”2187 In 2007, AIGFP’s Chief Financial Officer, 
Joseph Cassano, memorably stated about the unit’s CDS deals, “It is hard for us, without 
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being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm of reason that would see 
us losing $1 in any of those transactions.”2188 Michael Lewis noted that the people 
working at AIGFP felt that Cassano was “a guy with a crude feel for financial risk but a 
real talent for bullying people who doubted him.”2189 AIGFP’s Chief Executive Officer, 
Tom Savage, agreed with Cassano, however, and declared, “The models suggested that 
the risk was so remote that the fees were almost free money.”2190  
Reinforcing this confidence was the fact that AIGFP’s CDSs were mainly written 
on super senior CDO tranches, which provided an innate “credit event buffer,” since the 
holders of the lower, mezzanine tranches would suffer the first losses should a requisite 
number of loans backing the CDO go into default.2191 Gorton’s models supposedly 
revealed that, for certain CDS deals, there was a 99.85% chance that AIGFP would not 
have to pay out a single dollar to its protection buyers.2192 AIG’s and, hence, AIGFP’s 
chief regulator was the OTS, who was similarly dazzled by the high credit ratings of the 
underlying tranches of CDOs, claiming that they helped make AIGFP’s CDSs “fairly 
benign products.”2193 
By the end of December of 2007, AIGFP had sold approximately $527 billion 
worth of CDSs, $78 billion of which provided credit protection on tranches of multi-
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sector CDOs.2194 Of that $78 billion worth of multi-sector CDO credit protection, roughly 
$61.4 billion were directly backed by subprime mortgages.2195 In hindsight, it is 
remarkable that since CDSs were virtually unregulated and not categorized as traditional 
insurance products, AIG did not have to set aside any money for potential losses on the 
subprime MBSs and CDOs that it was insuring. Joe Nocera likens this absurd situation to 
an insurance company recklessly insuring against earthquakes and not being legally 
required to put money away in reserve in case an actual earthquake occurs.2196 
One of the most striking aspects of AIG’s decline is that AIGFP recognized the 
dangers of their subprime exposure as early as the beginning part of 2004.2197 By the end 
of 2005, before the peak of the subprime mortgage boom in 2006, AIGFP decided to 
cease writing CDSs on tranches of CDOs backed by subprime mortgages altogether.2198 
Nevertheless, AIGFP’s subprime exposure through its CDSs proved to be fatal to AIG, so 
much so that it caused the parent company, which had $1 trillion worth of assets, to run 
out of cash.2199 I will now briefly examine the events leading up to, as well as the primary 
causes of, the collapse of AIG, one that Michael Lewis noted was “perhaps the most 
sensational corporate collapse in the history of finance.”2200  
Importantly, regardless of how well Gorton’s models measured the credit risk 
accompanying various tranches of CDOs, those same models did not assess at least two 
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other pertinent risks: the risk that AIG’s credit rating would be downgraded, and the risk 
that the tranches themselves would decline in value. AIG was aware of both of those 
omissions.2201 Still, as AIGFP was writing CDSs on tranches of CDOs backed by 
subprime mortgages in the early 2000’s, both of those risks most likely appeared to be 
remote.2202 
A harbinger of AIG’s collapse occurred as early as March of 2005 when the three 
major NRSROs downgraded the company’s credit rating from AAA (Aaa) to AA+ 
(Aa+).2203 Due to provisions contained in AIGFP’s CDS contracts, AIG was required to 
post $1.16 billion in collateral to compensate protection buyers for the hit to its 
creditworthiness.2204 AIGFP managed to churn out $4.424 billion in profits that year even 
with its parent company’s recently tarnished credit rating.2205 In 2006, AIGFP’s 
profitability sharply diminished, recording just $383 million in profits.2206 
In the summer of 2007, when the United States residential mortgage market in 
general, and the subprime mortgage market in particular, declined, the three major 
NRSROs began downgrading the ratings of many multi-sector CDOs. The ratings 
downgrades caused those CDOs to lose value. As explained by William K. Sjostrom, Jr., 
“The large majority of AIGFP's multi-sector CDO CDSs base[d] collateral posting 
requirements on the difference between the notional amount of the particular CDS and 
the market value of the underlying CDO security. Accordingly, as CDO values tanked, 
                                                 
2201 Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam Pleven and Randall Smith, “Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models 
Failed to Pass Real-World Test.” 
2202 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 957. 
2203 Robert O'Harrow Jr. and Brady Dennis, “Downgrades and Downfall.” 
2204 Ibid. 
2205 William K. Sjostrom, Jr., “The AIG Bailout,” 947. 
2206 Michael Lewis, “The Man Who Crashed the World,” 138. 
391 
 
AIG was obligated to post more and more cash collateral.”2207 AIG was suddenly 
confronted by a tidal wave of protection buyer collateral calls, most seriously a $1.5 
billion collateral posting demanded by Goldman Sachs in October of 2007.2208  
Approximately three years later, the chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, Phil Angelides, asked Goldman Sach’s CFO, David Viniar, about the 
criteria that arranger used to determine the amount of its collateral calls. Viniar 
responded, “For illiquid assets, it’s not a science, it’s an art, and there is judgment 
involved. We used our best estimate at all times of what the market was.”2209 An AIG 
executive later conceded that it “didn’t have an internal pricing system at that time” to 
dispute Goldman Sach’s estimates.2210 
The collateral calls and the turbulence in the residential mortgage market caused 
AIG’s stock price to tumble. In six weeks, from October to mid-November of 2007, 
AIG’s stock price plummeted 25%.2211 Compounding these difficulties, AIG’s auditor, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, informed the company that it “could have a material weakness” 
in its risk management.2212 The auditor further stated that they could not decipher whether 
the value that AIGFP placed on its CDS portfolio was accurate.2213 Despite these 
portents, AIG’s Chief Executive Officer at the time, Martin Sullivan, reassured investors 
in a December 2007 webcast that its CDS business was “carefully underwritten” and the 
probability that that the business would sustain a loss was “close to zero.”2214 About two 
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months later, on February 28, 2008, AIG announced that while AIGFP’s CDS portfolio 
had recently suffered an estimated $11.5 billion loss and that the company had posted 
$5.3 billion in collateral,2215 the company as a whole made $6.2 billion in 2007.2216 AIG’s 
stock closed that day at $50.15 per share.2217 
Over the first eight months of 2008, AIG’s CDS portfolio sustained another $19.9 
billion in losses.2218 In just two months, between July 1, 2008 and August 31, 2008, 
protection buyers of AIGFP’s CDSs impelled AIG to post an additional $6.0 billion in 
collateral, representing a whopping 34% of the cash and cash equivalents that the 
company had available at the beginning of July.2219 By the early part of September of 
2008, with their losses mounting and the residential real estate market steadily dropping, 
AIG was virtually unable to borrow money from the capital markets.2220  
The critical moment of AIG’s collapse came on September 15, 2008 when the 
three largest NRSRO’s further downgraded AIG’s credit rating. Instantly, AIG was 
contractually obligated to post over $20 billion in collateral to compensate its CDS 
protection buyers.2221 Unable to meet the collateral calls, the next day AIG met with 
representatives from Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York to put together “a $75 billion secured lending facility syndicated among various 
financial institutions.”2222 As the day progressed, it became increasingly apparent that a 
private sector lending agreement would not be reached.2223 Later that same evening, the 
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Fed announced, with the full support of the United States Treasury Department, that it 
“had authorized the NY Fed to bail out AIG through an $85 billion revolving credit 
facility.”2224 Congressman Barney Frank reportedly asked the Chairman of the Fed, Ben 
Bernanke, “if he had $85 billion to bestow in this way,” to which Bernanke memorably 
replied, “I have $800 billion.”2225 For the first time in American history, the Fed opened 
the discount window to an insurance company.2226 
According to a Fed press release that was issued on September 16, 2008, the legal 
authority for the bailout was derived from section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
which permitted the Fed to lend money to non-depository institutions in “unusual and 
exigent circumstances.”2227 The Fed determined that “a disorderly failure of AIG could 
add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially 
higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic 
performance,” thus warranting the emergency loan.2228 As Kathleen Engel and Patricia 
McCoy explain, “If AIG failed and reneged on its swaps, institutions that had bought 
default protection on the bonds they held would be forced to take write-downs, eroding 
their capital and forcing them to raise more equity just when the stock markets were in 
disarray.”2229 Another reason cited for the bailout was that AIG’s stock was one of the ten 
most widely held stocks in 401(k) retirement plans.2230 The failure of the venerable 
investment bank, Lehman Brothers, on the previous day was the largest bankruptcy filing 
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in United States history, which heightened the perception that AIG urgently needed to be 
rescued.2231 On September 17, 2008, AIG’s share price fell to $2.05 per share, a decline 
of 97.1% from its June 1, 2007 high of $72.65 per share.2232 
Just three weeks later, by October 8, 2008, AIG had already borrowed $61 billion 
of its available $85 billion line of credit. On that day, the Fed lent another $37.8 billion to 
the ailing insurance company.2233 It also surfaced on that day that, less than a week after 
AIG received its initial bailout, seventy of AIG’s top performers were rewarded with a 
week-long stay at the luxury St. Regis Resort in Monarch Beach, California, where they 
ran up a tab of $440,000.2234 Andrew Cuomo, the attorney general at the time, wrote a 
caustic letter to AIG’s board of directors that cited recent “unwarranted and outrageous 
expenditures,”2235 which included an $86,000 partridge-hunting trip in the English 
countryside.2236 
Three weeks after this second loan, on October 30, 2008, the Fed permitted AIG 
to borrow another $20.9 billion. The next month, the United States Treasury Department 
restructured AIG’s bailout package and the total aid to the company ballooned to $150 
billion. In March of 2009, just before AIG announced a quarterly loss of a breathtaking 
$61.7 billion, the company received another cash injection of $30 billion.2237 It was the 
largest quarterly loss in United States corporate history.2238 AIG ultimately posted an 
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incredible year-end $99 billion loss in 2008.2239 
On March 15, 2009, AIG revealed that approximately $120 billion of its bailout 
money had been paid out to domestic and international trading partners, mostly 
investment banks and municipalities.2240 Three of the largest recipients of the bailout 
money were Goldman Sachs ($13 billion), Société Générale SA ($12 billion), and 
Deutsche Bank ($12 billion). The disclosure elicited public outcry due to the fact that 
taxpayer funds were being used to make whole private businesses and international 
banks. It also simultaneously came to light that AIGFP employees received $450 million 
in bonuses in 2008.2241  
Then-director of the White House National Economic Council, Lawrence 
Summers, noted that while there were many troubling aspects of the financial crisis, what 
had happened at AIG was “the most outrageous.”2242 Chairman of the Fed, Ben 
Bernanke, stated that nothing had made him angrier since the outbreak of the financial 
crisis than AIG’s conduct. He proclaimed that the insurance company “made 
irresponsible bets” and “exploited a huge gap in the regulatory system.”2243  
Nearly a year after this disclosure, the United States House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Oversight and Reform uncovered the fact that the Fed instructed AIG to 
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withhold the names of its CDS counterparties during the initial stages of the bailout.2244 
The committee also discovered that part of the bailout agreement required AIG to forfeit 
its right to sue several of its CDS counterparties, including Goldman Sachs and Merrill 
Lynch, over any irregularities with any of the reference obligations for which it had sold 
credit protection.2245 Furthermore, the committee learned that the Fed ignored 
recommendations from their own advisors that it should force AIG’s counterparties to 
accept losses on their deals with AIG. Instead, the Fed opted to award AIG’s 
counterparties “100 cents on the dollar to unwind [the] debt insurance” that they had 
bought from the insurer.2246  
The committee held an emotional hearing on January 27, 2010 to discuss its 
findings and the bailout of AIG. The chairman of the committee, Congressman Edolphus 
Towns, opened the hearing by affirming:  
In effect, the taxpayers were propping up the hollow shell of AIG by 
stuffing it with money, and the rest of Wall Street came by and 
looted the corpse… [W]e can talk all we want to about complicated 
business deals, but this all boils down to a simple concept: when 
average people were losing their homes and jobs, the same big banks 
that caused the problems got every dollar back, courtesy of 
the American taxpayer. And the Federal Reserve tried to keep 
important information a secret.”2247  
 
John Carney, writing for The American Conservative, labeled AIG “perhaps the most 
efficient [wealth] redistribution machine ever built.”2248 
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All told, AIG received $182.4 billion in aid from the Fed and the Treasury 
Department: $89.5 billion in loans from the Fed, $49.1 billion in loans from the Treasury 
Department through the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and an additional $43.8 billion 
in loans from the Fed to capitalize two SPVs, Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III, 
which were created for the sake of housing CDOs that were initially purchased by AIG’s 
CDS counterparties.2249 In the middle part of 2009, shares of AIG’s stock were trading at 
less than $1.00 per share,2250 and the company ended up posting a $10.9 billion loss that 
year.2251 AIG’s losing streak continued into 2010, with the company posting a yearly loss 
of $898 million.2252  
In June of 2011, AIG completed a wind-down of AIGFP’s operations,2253 and on 
August 4, 2011, the insurance company announced a second quarter profit of $1.8 
billion.2254 AIG’s Chief Executive Officer, Robert Benmosche, declared in the wake of 
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the earnings announcement, “Our crisis is over. It’s done.”2255 AIG also recently revealed 
that it is planning to sue Bank of America over a material misrepresentation of hundreds 
of mortgage-backed securities, which caused the insurance company sustain billions of 
dollars in losses.2256 As of March 22, 2012, AIG still owes the Fed $9 billion and the 
Treasury Department $35.7 billion.2257 
Thus far, I have explored the fates of three of the key subprime arrangers 
(Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Stearns). Furthermore, I examined the 
relationship between AIG and subprime arrangers, noting how the former, for a fee, 
abetted the latter to imprudently securitize massive amounts of subprime MBSs and 
CDOs. I will now conclude this section by discussing how the last two arrangers standing 
on their own contributed to the subprime crisis. Those two arrangers are the most 
prestigious of them all: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.2258 
 
4.12. A Brief Examination of How Goldman Sachs Contributed to the 
         Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
Goldman Sachs, established in 1869 as an investment bank, was another arranger 
that had a significant presence in the subprime mortgage market leading up to the crisis. 
While its residential mortgage business began in 1984, Goldman Sachs did not heavily 
enter into the subprime mortgage market until 2002, when it issued $4.314 billion worth 
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of subprime securities that year.2259 By that time, Goldman Sachs had acquired a 
subprime lender of its own, Southern Pacific Funding Corporation.2260 One publication 
estimated that Goldman securitized $2.538 billion, $9.506 billion, $11.307 billion, 
$13.166 billion, and $6.802 billion worth of subprime MBSs in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
and 2007 respectively.2261  
According to The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Goldman Sachs acquired $53 
billion worth of mortgage loans from subprime lenders between 2004 and 2006.2262 The 
report calls attention to how, on one hand, the arranger provided billions of dollars to 
subprime lenders over that period of time, the majority of which went to Ameriquest, 
New Century, Countrywide, and Long Beach Mortgage Company, in order to fund the 
risky mortgages that those lenders were originating for borrowers.2263 On the other hand, 
the report also accuses Goldman Sachs of securitizing and selling those loans to 
investors, effectively pushing those risky mortgages into the financial system. The report 
additionally claims that during this period of time, Goldman Sachs issued $32 billion 
worth of CDOs.2264 Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,2265 pension plans, and insurance 
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companies2266 were some of the largest investors in these Goldman Sachs-issued 
subprime MBSs and CDOs. 
Recent probes into Goldman Sachs’ conduct as an arranger of subprime mortgage 
deals have revealed that the firm categorically knew that the MBSs and CDOs they were 
creating for investors were not as safe as their offering materials and, indeed, the credit 
ratings of those securities indicated.2267 As a September 2011 lawsuit filed by the FHFA 
against Goldman Sachs disclosed, the arranger knew as early as 2005 that the subprime 
market was headed for disaster.2268 The lawsuit notes that Goldman Sachs’ “sophisticated 
and powerful proprietary models analyzed trends in the performance of the hundreds of 
thousands of mortgages” that backed the subprime MBSs that the arranger was 
issuing.2269 Crucially, Goldman Sachs’ models revealed that their subprime MBSs had 
declined up to 70% of their face amounts.2270 One former Goldman Sachs employee 
stated that their models and the information that the arranger had in its exclusive 
possession showed that “the writing was on the wall in this market as early as 2005.”2271 
In a now-infamous e-mail, one Goldman Sachs executive, Fabrice Tourre wrote about the 
United States housing market in January of 2007, “More and more leverage in the 
system. The whole building is about to collapse anytime now... Only potential survivor, 
the fabulous Fab[rice Tourre]... standing in the middle of all these complex, highly 
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leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the 
implication of those monstruosities [sic]!!!”2272 I will now briefly describe some of the 
decisions that Goldman Sachs elected to make once they had this information at their 
disposal.  
First, Goldman Sachs continued to offer warehouse lines of credit to subprime 
mortgage lenders in order to purchase mortgages to bundle into MBSs and CDOs. 
However, it used its superior knowledge of the risk that those mortgages contained not to 
increasingly filter out fraudulent or questionable loans, but instead to negotiate a better, 
lower price for itself.2273 As the FHFA lawsuit against Goldman Sachs states, “[R]ather 
than reject defective loans from collateral pools, or cease doing business with 
consistently failing originators,” Goldman Sachs elected instead to use its data to simply 
“insist on a lower price from the loan originators, leaving more room for its own profits 
while the defective loans were hidden from investors such as Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in securitization pools.”2274 The lawsuit underscores that, internally, Goldman Sachs 
referred to its own subprime MBSs and CDOs that it was offering to investors as “junk,” 
“dogs,” and “monstrosities.”2275 
Second, using their unique access to the quality and direction of the subprime 
mortgage market, Goldman Sachs aggressively attempted to offload its existing inventory 
of subprime MBSs and CDOs onto investors. In an April 2011 report issued by the 
United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Goldman Sachs was 
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accused of knowingly selling “high risk, poor quality mortgage products to clients around 
the world, saturating financial markets with complex, financially engineered instruments 
that magnified risk and losses when their underlying assets began to fail.”2276 One 
particularly striking quote came from the former head of Goldman Sachs’ mortgage 
department, Daniel Sparks, who celebrated in January of 2007 that his team had 
“structured like mad and traveled the world, and worked their tails off to make some 
lemonade from some big old lemons.”2277  
The same report cites how Goldman Sachs’ senior management “knew its sales 
force was selling CDO securities at inflated prices and that the CDO securities were 
rapidly losing value.”2278 Astonishingly, Goldman Sachs would also mark down the value 
of its issued CDOs once they were sold, causing some of their customers “to incur 
substantial losses within days or weeks of a purchase.”2279 For instance, one Goldman 
Sachs salesperson regretted a recent sale of a CDO to a client by declaring, “Real bad 
feeling across European sales about some of the trades we did with clients. The damage 
this has done to our franchise is significant. Aggregate loss for our clients on just 5 trades 
alone is 1bln+.”2280 
In less than a year, from November 24, 2006 to August 31, 2007, Goldman Sachs 
greatly reduced its exposure to subprime loans and MBSs. Whereas the arranger had a 
subprime loan inventory worth $7.8 billion on November 24, 2006, the value of that 
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inventory was reduced by over 94% to $462 million by August 31, 2007.2281  In terms of 
subprime MBSs, over of the same period, Goldman Sachs had an inventory worth $7.2 
billion, which was eventually reduced by over 66% to $2.7 billion.2282 Goldman Sachs 
also frantically attempted to offload its subprime CDOs throughout 2007 by expanding its 
selling efforts to “nontraditional buyers” of the financial product as well as to “banks, 
hedge funds, and other clients in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.”2283 The arranger 
also “issued directives to its sales force to sell specific CDO securities on a ‘first priority’ 
basis,” offering them attractive incentives to push the sales through.2284 
Third, and perhaps most egregiously, Goldman Sachs used its superior knowledge 
of the subprime mortgage market to place bets that it would collapse, while continuing to 
market and sell their subprime MBSs and CDOs as though they were desirable 
investments. The arranger also purchased approximately $33 billion worth of CDS 
protection from AIG, which ultimately shielded it from having to absorb losses on assets 
worth $22 billion.2285 The April 2011 report issued by the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations provided an excellent example of this 
strategy.  
In March of 2007, Goldman Sachs securitized over $1 billion worth of subprime 
loans that it had purchased from the notorious subprime lender, Freemont Loan & 
Investment. The securitization created GSAMP Trust 2007-FM2.2286 The arranger 
marketed and eventually sold the securitization to Freddie Mac and then purchased CDSs 
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worth $15 million, which amounted to a wager that the securitization would decline in 
value. By August of 2009, every single tranche in the securitization had been 
downgraded to junk status.2287 About this strategy, one expert in structured finance 
remarked, “The simultaneous selling of securities to customers and shorting them 
because they believed they were going to default is the most cynical use of credit 
information that I have ever seen… When you buy protection against an event that you 
have a hand in causing, you are buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then 
committing arson.”2288 Another writer observed, “Goldman was like a car dealership that 
realized it had a whole lot full of cars with faulty brakes. Instead of announcing a recall, 
it surged ahead with a two-fold plan to make a fortune: first, by dumping the dangerous 
products on other people, and second, by taking out life insurance against the fools who 
bought the deadly cars.”2289 
As the subprime mortgage crisis began to unfold, a conflict of interest between 
Goldman Sachs’ proprietary trading and market making responsibilities emerged. Louise 
Story, writing for The New York Times, provides a memorable example of this conflict of 
interest. In March of 2007, Goldman Sachs created a CDO called Timberwolf, which was 
composed of $1 billion worth of mortgage-related securities. Evidence surfaced that 
Goldman Sachs knew the CDO was poorly constructed and within months its value 
declined by 80%. Significantly, one of Goldman Sachs’ clients at the time, Bear Stearns, 
elected to invest $300 million in the CDO. As Louise Story explains, “Around the same 
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time that Bear was investing in Timberwolf, Goldman was placing a bet that Bear’s 
shares would fall. Goldman’s short position in Bear was large enough that it would have 
generated as much as $33 million in profits if Bear collapsed.”2290 It is noteworthy that 
the “Volcker Rule,” which is “a yet-to-be implemented set of regulations that aim to stop 
government-backstopped banks from speculative trading,” aspires to eliminate 
proprietary trading altogether.2291 Paul Volcker noted in March of 2012 that proprietary 
trading often took place “at the expense of customer relationships” and that his rule 
would hopefully eventuate a “rebalancing of incentives” among arrangers.2292  
Another part of Goldman Sachs’ strategy was to act as a middleman between AIG 
and other arrangers. As explained by Serena Ng and Carrick Mollenkamp, writing for 
The Wall Street Journal, Goldman Sachs leveraged its reputation in order to serve as a 
protection seller with other arrangers. Then, on the protection that it had just sold, it 
would buy protection on the same subprime securities from AIG or other CDS protection 
sellers. Since Goldman Sachs charged more to act as a protection seller than AIG and 
other firms, the arranger was able to pocket the difference.2293 In the end, Goldman Sachs 
completed roughly $14 billion worth of these deals with AIG, which markedly 
contributed to the downfall of the latter.2294 
Goldman Sachs’ relentless devotion to wringing out every dollar that it could out 
of the subprime mortgage market is exemplified in the arranger’s decision to purchase 
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another subprime lender, Senderra Funding, in April of 2007. After the acquisition, 
Goldman Sachs converted it into a FHA lender and refinance organization.2295 As 
explained by an insightful Bloomberg Businessweek article, Goldman Sachs’ goal was to 
purchase subprime loans from lenders at drastically depressed prices and then refinance 
them into FHA-backed loans. Once the loans were converted into FHA-backed loans, 
Goldman Sachs could then sell the loans to investors at a premium. For example, in 
September of 2008, Goldman Sachs paid Equity One, Inc. $0.63 on the dollar for $760 
million worth of subprime loans. By converting those loans into FHA-backed loans, 
which are loans that are guaranteed by the federal government, Goldman Sachs could 
then sell the loans to investors for as much as $0.90 on the dollar, yielding a heady profit 
margin of over 40%. As the article notes, this process is entirely legal.2296 
Renowned as “the gold standard” in investment banking,2297 and maintaining that 
“integrity and honesty are at the heart” of their business,2298 and that their “clients’ 
interests always come first,”2299 one may wonder why a firm of Goldman Sachs’ stature 
would have ever chosen to become so heavily involved in a segment of the mortgage 
market that was stained with a history of questionable integrity and honesty. One 
compelling reason was the initial profit potential that the subprime mortgage market 
contained in the early part of the 2000’s. One should consider the annual profits that 
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Goldman Sachs posted once it became seriously involved in arranging deals that 
contained subprime mortgages. In 2002, the arranger earned $2.1 billion in profits, a 
number that grew to $3.01 billion at year-end 2003.2300 The arranger then posted annual 
profits of $4.6 billion,2301 $5.6 billion,2302 $9.5 billion,2303 and $11.6 billion2304 in 2004, 
2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. 
On March 14, 2012, an executive director of Goldman Sachs, Greg Smith, wrote a 
provocative op-ed piece in The New York Times, explaining why he was resigning from 
the arranger effective immediately. Smith cited a “decline in the firm’s moral fiber” as 
one of the principle reasons for his resignation, which included a profound deterioration 
in the quality of the firm’s leadership.2305 In addition, Smith revealed that the most likely 
candidates to receive promotions at Goldman Sachs are those that successfully persuade 
clients to invest their funds in ways that will merely yield the biggest profits for the 
arranger. Smith noted that he attended meetings “where not one single minute [was] spent 
asking questions about how we can help clients. It [was] purely about how we can make 
the most possible money off of them.”2306 Near the end of the piece, Smith maintained 
that the most common question he hears junior analysts ask is: “How much money did 
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we make off the client?”2307 Responding to this transformation of Goldman Sachs’ 
corporate culture, Smith concluded his piece by urging the board of directors to once 
again make “the client the focal point” of the arranger’s business and to eliminate the 
“morally bankrupt” employees, for those “who care only about making money will not 
sustain [Goldman Sachs] – or the trust of its clients - for very much longer.”2308 
 
4.13. The Subprime-Fueled Rise and Fall of Morgan Stanley 
 Morgan Stanley, the youngest of the five arrangers, was founded as a spinoff from 
JPMorgan in 1935 after the Glass-Steagall Act forced the separation of commercial and 
investment banks.2309 The firm eventually became one of the world’s leading financial 
institutions with a presence in 36 countries and housing over 60,000 employees.2310 As 
former CEO John Mack noted, “Morgan Stanley’s business model has historically 
focused primarily on providing financial advisory and capital-raising services to 
institutional and corporate clients, with individual services principally in the wealth 
management sector through brokerage services.”2311 
In 2005, as the subprime mortgage market was booming and Morgan Stanley’s 
earnings and stock price were lagging, then-CEO Philip Purcell came under heavy fire for 
being too risk-averse and failing to “deploy the firm’s capital as aggressively as his 
peers.”2312 For instance, in 2004, rivals Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Goldman 
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Sachs issued, respectively, $13.773 billion, $13.095 billion, and $9.506 billion worth of 
subprime MBSs that year, while Morgan Stanley issued $8.523 billion.2313 As one 
Morgan Stanley executive put it, the arranger had embraced a “culture of no.”2314 A 
Bloomberg Businessweek article elaborated upon this culture, noting that while 
competitors “such as Goldman, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers were making 
acquisitions and diving into risky but profitable endeavors,” senior managers at Morgan 
Stanley “were sending people with bold notions back to the drawing board.”2315 
On June 13, 2005, Purcell announced his resignation2316 and a few weeks later, 
Morgan Stanley appointed John Mack as its new CEO.2317 Upon his arrival, Mack vowed 
to investors that he would double Morgan Stanley’s pretax earnings by 2010.2318 Mack 
also maintained that the primary problem at Morgan Stanley was that the corporate 
culture was too soft and timid, which was causing the arranger to miss out on lucrative 
opportunities.2319  
 Under Mack’s leadership, Morgan Stanley elected to adopt a higher risk profile, 
which included an extensive move into subprime mortgages, an area that was “outside of 
the traditional expertise” of the arranger.2320 Part of this strategy consisted of an effort to 
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build a global, vertically integrated residential mortgage business.2321 The arranger 
rapidly acquired three mortgage companies over the first eight months of 2006. One of 
these acquisitions came in the form of paying a $156.9 million premium for a subprime 
mortgage underwriter, Saxon Capital, which the arranger paid a total of $706 million.2322   
 As explained by Michael Lewis in his book The Big Short, a small group of 
Morgan Stanley bond traders, led by the head of the arranger’s asset-backed bond trading 
division, Howie Hubler, began to bet against subprime CDOs at the end of 2004.2323 
Around this time, Hubler and his group of traders purchased $2 billion worth of CDSs 
from protection sellers on a triple-B-rated subprime CDO that was backed by triple-B-
rated MBSs. The CDS contract stipulated that Morgan Stanley would pay the protection 
sellers 2.5% ($50 million) a year in exchange for the latter agreeing to assume the credit 
risk accompanying the CDO.2324  
 Hubler’s group, however, was burdened by “a niggling problem”: by September 
of 2006, the CDSs had cost the arranger approximately $200 million, while failing to 
generate any of their anticipated returns.2325 These losses prompted Hubler’s group to sell 
an incredible $16 billion worth of CDSs on triple-A-rated tranches of subprime CDOs in 
just four months, from September of 2006 to January of 2007.2326 These triple-A-rated 
CDOs were also backed entirely by triple-B-rated subprime MBSs. The reason that 
Hubler’s team sold so much credit protection on triple-A-rated subprime CDOs was that 
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the premiums Morgan Stanley received from those CDSs were only one-tenth of the 
premiums that it was paying out as a CDS protection buyer. Triple-A-rated CDOs were 
supposedly far less risky than triple-B-rated CDOs, a view that Hubler’s team completely 
and uncritically accepted. From the team’s perspective, then, they were collecting 
virtually risk-free premiums by acting as a CDS protection seller of triple-A-rated CDOs, 
which would offset the running cost of paying premiums as a CDS protection buyer of 
triple-B-rated CDOs. According to Lewis, “Hubler felt certain [that their strategy] would 
one day very soon yield $2 billion in pure profits” once the triple-B-rated CDOs 
collapsed in value.2327 
  As discussed below, by the end of 2007, this strategy contributed to Morgan 
Stanley absorbing $9 billion worth of losses, which Michael Lewis claims is “the single 
largest trading loss in the history of Wall Street.”2328 While Hubler’s team correctly 
predicted that the triple-B-rated CDOs that were backed by triple-B-rated subprime 
MBSs were doomed to fail, the group and, indeed, Morgan Stanley’s upper management 
and risk management teams, mistakenly believed that the triple-A-rated CDOs that were 
also backed by triple-B-rated subprime MBSs were virtually riskless.2329 The central 
oversight that plagued Morgan Stanley is nicely described by Michael Lewis:  
 [T]hey genuinely failed to understand the nature of the subprime CDO. 
 The correlation among triple-B-rated subprime [mortgage-backed] bonds 
 was… 100 percent. When one collapsed, they all collapsed, because they 
 were all driven by the same broader economic forces.2330 
 
In other words, Morgan Stanley failed to realize that the underlying triple-B-rated 
subprime MBSs that were backing the CDOs that they both bought CDS protection for – 
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and sold CDS protection on – were essentially the same in the sense that they were 
destined to “default en masse the moment house prices stopped rising.”2331 This oversight 
was made possible by the NRSROs bestowing triple-A ratings on approximately 80% of 
every CDO that they rated, despite having “very little history to work with in the 
subprime mortgage bond market, and no history at all of a collapsing national real estate 
market.”2332 Quite simply, as Michael Lewis puts it, “Howie Hubler trusted the 
ratings.”2333 Hubler’s team and Morgan Stanley’s management relied so heavily on the 
accuracy of the NRSROs ratings that they failed to question “the wisdom of owning $16 
billion in complex securities whose value ultimately turned on the ability of… a Mexican 
strawberry picker with a single $750,000 home to make rapidly rising interest 
payments.”2334 
In addition to acquiring mortgage lenders and purchasing and selling subprime-
related CDSs, Morgan Stanley also became a prominent warehouse lender leading up to 
the subprime mortgage crisis, offering immense lines of credit to subprime lenders. For 
example, in 2006 alone, Morgan Stanley offered a $650 million warehouse line of credit 
to Accredited Home Lenders Inc., a subprime lender that eventually went under in 
2007.2335 During 2006 and into 2007, the arranger provided $3 billion worth of credit to 
the notorious subprime lender, New Century.2336 According to one source, Morgan 
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Stanley ended up securitizing nearly $30 billion worth of residential MBSs in 2006.2337 
The arranger also issued $21.3 billion worth of CDOs that year.2338   
Viewed from the perspective of short-term profitability, these strategies paid off 
quickly. Morgan Stanley posted a record annual profit of $7.5 billion in 2006.2339 John 
Mack received a year-end bonus of $40 million.2340 Galvanized by record earnings, John 
Mack stood in front of his board and shareholders during the arranger’s annual meeting in 
2007 and declared, “Do we take a lot of risk? Yes, I think this firm has the capacity to 
take a lot more risk than it has in the past.”2341 In March of 2007, the arranger announced 
its best quarter of earnings since it went public in 1986. At this point, Morgan Stanley’s 
profits had nearly doubled since Mack arrived in July of 2005.2342 The arranger’s Chief 
Financial Officer, David Sidwell, conceded that month during a quarterly earnings 
conference call that the arranger’s subprime mortgage activities were “a significant 
contributor” to its financial results.2343 That year, Morgan Stanley’s warehouse lines of 
credit to subprime lenders ballooned to $5.2 billion.2344 
 In the midst of these enviable March 2007 earnings, however, New Century’s 
struggles that same month anticipated Morgan Stanley’s own imminent decline. As the 
subprime mortgage market began to dry up in early 2007, New Century began to run out 
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of cash. While other arrangers believed that New Century was technically already in 
default on its debt obligations in March of 2007, Morgan Stanley puzzlingly agreed to 
lend the distressed company $265 million that was secured by New Century-originated 
subprime loans.2345 A July 5, 2011 lawsuit filed on behalf Allstate Insurance Company by 
the law firm Bernstein, Litowitz, Berger, & Grossmann LLP against Morgan Stanley 
contains a wealth of information on the arranger’s relationship with New Century, and it 
explains why the arranger would make such a questionable decision. Moreover, the 
lawsuit’s description of this relationship is the most detailed presentation of an 
arranger/lender relationship that I have encountered. A few words about this relationship, 
therefore, are warranted. 
 As the lawsuit explains, a conflict of interest came to plague the arranger/lender 
relationship in general, and the Morgan Stanley/New Century relationship in 
particular.2346 When an arranger extends a warehouse line of credit to a lender, the idea is 
that the latter will originate loans that meet certain arranger-specified standards. Once the 
lender originates a certain quantity of loans that meet those standards, it is typically 
authorized to draw on the arranger’s warehouse line of credit to reimburse itself. The 
arranger receives the amount and type of loans that it wants, while the lender has 
replenished its capital to fund and originate additional loans. 
One of the reasons that an arranger would choose to outsource mortgage 
origination duties to a lender was because it was more cost efficient to do so. An arranger 
could also charge lenders interest for extending those lines of credit to them.2347 What 
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would happen, though, if an arranger noticed that a lender was funding and originating 
loans that were of poorer, riskier quality than it wanted?  
  Initially, one may be tempted to respond that the arranger should simply reject 
the inferior loans and force the lender to replace them with loans that meet its stated 
standards. Continuing with this line of thought, what the arranger should ensure is that 
the lender should pay for those inferior loans with its own money, rather the money the 
latter borrowed or intended to borrow from a warehouse line of credit. The lender may be 
forced to absorb substantial losses stemming from those inferior loans because they will 
likely be difficult to sell to other arrangers, and the mortgage borrowers may not be able 
to timely repay the principal that they borrowed plus interest. However, those negative 
consequences should, nonetheless, be borne entirely by the lender since it was the party 
responsible for originating the inferior loans in the first place. 
 As reasonable as this response might initially appear, one would be presupposing 
at least two things. First, one would be assuming that the lender is in a financial position 
that is strong enough to absorb those losses. A financially vulnerable lender, though, 
could be ruined if an arranger made such a decision. An arranger, in turn, would find this 
scenario to be problematic if it had outstanding warehouse lines of credit with that lender. 
This is precisely the dilemma that ensnared Morgan Stanley in the early part of 2007: if 
the arranger forced New Century to replace its inferior loans, the former risked losing 
billions of dollars in outstanding warehouse lines of credit that it had already extended to 
the latter.2348  
 Second, one would be assuming that the arranger has complete leverage over the 
lender. As the lawsuit cited above notes, however, Morgan Stanley held no such 
                                                 
2348 Ibid., 74. 
416 
 
advantage over New Century. As early as late-2005 and into 2006, the arranger began to 
realize that the quality of New Century’s loans was progressively deteriorating. 
Interestingly, when Morgan Stanley reacted by rejecting more and more of New 
Century’s loans, the lender “began to complain to Morgan Stanley about its rejection 
rate… [and suggested] that it would begin to shift its business to other buyers.”2349 In 
response to this threat, “Morgan Stanley relented in order to maintain its access to a 
steady flow of New Century mortgages available for securitization.”2350  
From that point on, Morgan Stanley routinely purchased immense quantities of 
defective subprime loans from New Century for the sake of preserving their mutually 
profitable relationship. One former Morgan Stanley employee who had “intimate 
knowledge of Morgan Stanley’s loan purchasing and due diligence operations”2351 stated 
that when the arranger would purchase loans that it knew violated its own stated policies, 
his team would refer to the decision as a “business decision” or “BD” for short. 
According to this employee, the team’s use of the term “BD” was a “funny way of 
saying, ‘Let’s do something that we shouldn’t’.”2352 
Morgan Stanley’s interdependent relationship with New Century, then, prompted 
the arranger to profoundly compromise its own mortgage purchasing standards. For 
instance, the arranger supposedly placed a debt-to-income ratio (DTI) limit of 55% on all 
of its purchased subprime loans from lenders.2353 Morgan Stanley’s stated policy of a 
55% DTI limit on purchased loans meant that, if more than 55% of a given borrower’s 
gross monthly income went towards his or her monthly mortgage payment and mortgage-
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related costs, then the arranger would not purchase that loan from a lender. A mortgage 
loan with a DTI above 55% signaled to Morgan Stanley that there was a very low 
probability that the borrower would be able to repay it unless he or she refinanced.2354 
With this thought in mind, one should note that the Massachusetts Attorney 
General conducted an extensive investigation that ended in June of 2010 and concluded 
that Morgan Stanley knew that New Century was qualifying borrowers at low initial 
teaser rates instead of at the fully indexed rate. Given the prevailing interest rates at the 
time of the investigation, the Massachusetts Attorney General estimated that an ARM 
with a DTI of 41% would eventually reset at the fully indexed rate and transform into a 
loan with a DTI of 56%.2355 Thus, Morgan Stanley should have rejected all New Century 
ARMs that had a DTI of 41% or higher. In the end, the investigation found that over four 
out of ten of the ARMs that New Century originated in Massachusetts and successfully 
sold to Morgan Stanley had a fully indexed DTI that exceeded 55%. Even more 
astounding, the investigation discovered that 29% of the ARMs that New Century 
originated in Massachusetts and subsequently sold to Morgan Stanley had a fully indexed 
DTI that exceeded 60%.2356  
Morgan Stanley’s health was further entangled in the health of New Century 
because the former created an early purchase, or “EP” program with the latter. Under its 
EP program, Morgan Stanley provided subprime lenders with what amounted to a cash 
advance to purchase subprime loans. According to one former Morgan Stanley employee 
who was involved in the arranger’s warehouse lending activities, the EP program locked 
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the arranger into buying New Century’s loans “no matter their quality.”2357 As this same 
former employee explained, if Morgan Stanley made a cash advance to a subprime lender 
under the EP program and then later rejected a pool of subprime mortgages that the 
lender used the money to originate and initially fund, then the arranger risked losing 
some or all of the money that it had lent.2358  
It was later discovered that Morgan Stanley was so desperate to keep New 
Century afloat in March of 2007 that the arranger even provided millions of dollars of 
controversial “wet funding” to New Century mortgage borrowers that month. Essentially, 
“wet funding” is tantamount to a cash gift that an outside party gives to a borrower at the 
closing table. Morgan Stanley gave those cash gifts to borrowers so that they could close 
on subprime mortgage loans that, in the absence of the gifts, would not have otherwise 
been approved. Consequently, this strategy enabled Morgan Stanley to further amplify its 
incoming flow of New Century subprime loans to securitize and sell to investors.2359 
Small wonder, then, that Morgan Stanley extended a $265 million loan to New 
Century roughly one month before the lender filed for bankruptcy protection. If New 
Century failed, the arranger stood to lose far more than its $265 million loan. Morgan 
Stanley’s relationship with New Century was so vital to the financial health of the 
arranger that its traders came to refer to the lender as a “partner.”2360 
After New Century filed for bankruptcy protection in April of 2007, Morgan 
Stanley initially took on greater subprime-related risks by announcing its purchase a 
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subprime lender of its own for $6.5 billion: Crescent Real Estate Equities.2361 In June of 
2007, the arranger’s fantastic earnings streak surprisingly continued, inciting a writer for 
The New York Times to affirm that the results were “a vivid demonstration of Morgan 
Stanley’s ability to overcome the subprime problems that have plagued its rivals.”2362 On 
June 14, Morgan Stanley’s stock price peaked at $70.09.2363 For the remainder of 2007, 
however, the downsides of Morgan Stanley’s excessive subprime-related risks came to 
materialize. On its books at the time, Morgan Stanley had a total CDO inventory valued 
at roughly $13 billion, most of which was composed of the safest, super-senior tranches, 
a total subprime loan inventory of $2.9 billion, and a subprime MBS inventory of $4 
billion.2364 
By the time that Morgan Stanley released its earnings report for the third quarter 
in September of 2007, default rates on subprime mortgages sharply spiked and the 
arranger’s stock price had already plummeted 24% since June. Significantly, Morgan 
Stanley revealed that, over the previous three months, it had written down $940 million 
dollars due to the decreased value of risky subprime-related investments on its books. 
Morgan Stanley’s CFO, David Sidwell, stated, “I think given the extraordinarily difficult 
markets, we actually performed OK -- and we view ourselves as very well positioned to 
take advantage of opportunities that arise as the markets settle down.”2365 Over the course 
of two months, from the end of August to the end of October of 2007, Morgan Stanley 
                                                 
2361 Ben White, “Morgan Stanley Acquires Crescent,” The Financial Times (May 24, 2007). This purchase 
was completed on August 3, 2007. 
2362 Landon Thomas, Jr., “Morgan Stanley Earnings Climb 41% for a Record Quarter,” The New York 
Times (June 21, 2007). 
2363 The Financial Crisis of Our Time, 103. 
2364 Randall Smith, “How a Good Subprime Call Came to Hurt Morgan Stanley,” The Wall Street Journal 
(November 9, 2007). 
2365 Joe Bel Bruno, “Morgan Stanley 3Q Profit Tumbles 17 Percent,” USA Today (September 19, 2007), 
available at http:// www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2007-09-19-3628080920_x.htm. 
420 
 
frantically attempted to reduce its subprime-related exposure, eventually reducing it to $6 
billion from $10.4 billion.2366  
On December 20, 2007, Morgan Stanley announced its first quarterly loss in its 
72-year history, $3.59 billion, after writing down an incredible $9.4 billion worth of 
subprime-related investments.2367 Then-CEO John Mack declared, “The results are 
embarrassing for me and the firm.”2368 Despite posting profits of $3.2 billion for the 
year,2369 the arranger was in such desperate straits that it accepted a $5.5 billion injection 
from the China Investment Corporation. In exchange for the capital injection, the 
investment fund received a 9.9% stake in Morgan Stanley.2370 
In 2008, when the severity of the subprime mortgage crisis began to accelerate, 
Morgan Stanley posted a $1.5 billion profit over the first quarter2371 and reduced its 
subprime exposure down to $1.8 billion.2372 Then-CEO John Mack predicted at a 
shareholder meeting in April of 2008 that the troubles of the subprime market were in 
“the eighth inning or maybe the top of the ninth,” and that the crisis was approaching its 
end.2373 It is interesting to note that the arranger earned $1 billion that quarter from 
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shorting, or betting against, subprime mortgages.2374 These developments occurred in the 
wake of the collapse of Bear Stearns. 
The next quarter, in June of 2008, the arranger announced profits totaling $1.026 
billion,2375 while Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs posted losses. Morgan Stanley’s 
Chief Financial Officer, Colm Kelleher, optimistically asserted that the arranger’s excess 
capital made it “well-positioned” to take on more risk once the markets improved.2376 
This was a particularly startling statement when one considers the fact that the arranger 
had already written down over $14 billion worth of subprime-related assets at that 
point.2377  
On September 16, 2008, the day after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
Morgan Stanley released its third quarter earnings one day early in an effort to assuage 
market fears over its financial standing. The arranger posted a quarterly profit of $1.4 
billion. Nevertheless, the market was not impressed with the results and Morgan 
Stanley’s closing stock price declined 24% the next day.2378 Then-CEO John Mack later 
confessed that the move backfired because it came to be perceived as a sign of 
weakness.2379  
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By Friday September 19, Morgan Stanley’s stock price had decreased 71% since 
the beginning of the year.2380 As Kate Kelly and Aaron Lucchetti noted, writing for The 
Wall Street Journal, Morgan Stanley, along with Goldman Sachs, made an “ironic plea” 
to the SEC to temporarily ban short sales on financial stocks. The irony of their request 
centered on the fact that both firms serviced “scores of hedge funds,” which depended 
“heavily on the ability to short stocks” and they both lent “out shares used by others to 
short.”2381 Still, the SEC acquiesced to their demand and announced that day a temporary 
ban on the short selling of all 799 companies in the financial services sector.2382 
Meanwhile, in order to secure financing, Morgan Stanley considered merging 
with Wachovia or selling another, larger stake to the China Investment Corporation, one 
that would increase the firm’s holding up from 9.9% to 49%.2383 As the weekend 
progressed and no deal was finalized, at the behest of Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs, the Federal Reserve announced on Sunday night, September 21, that it had 
approved the two arrangers’ applications to become bank holding companies.2384 Three 
reporters, writing for The Wall Street Journal, observed, “With the move, Wall Street as 
it has long been known -- a coterie of independent brokerage firms that buy and sell 
securities, advise clients and are less regulated than old-fashioned banks -- will cease to 
exist.”2385 Joseph Weber, writing for Bloomberg Businessweek, claimed that the two 
arrangers “would never be the same,” and that the “swashbuckling, risk-taking, and 
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financially ingenious investment banks that produced stellar returns for years - and turned 
Wall Street into a stunningly lucrative place for even the most junior staffers” were 
quickly becoming “distant memories.”2386 Indeed, in adopting the status of bank holding 
companies, the two arrangers had their corporate charters rewritten, making them 
commercial banks, which was “a business they had [previously] regarded as beneath their 
pedigrees.”2387 Morgan Stanley, incredibly, was allegedly even discussing whether to add 
“automated teller machines inside its brokerage locations.”2388 
Among the many implications of this move, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, 
as bank holding companies, now had short term borrowing privileges with the Fed, which 
ensured that their future capital needs would be met. The move also signaled to the 
markets that the Fed “stood firmly behind both firms.”2389 However, their bank holding 
company status also subjected them to stricter capital requirements, which one economist 
labeled “the end of an era of extraordinary leverage.”2390 Whereas before the move the 
two arrangers had leverage ratios in the twenties and even thirties, their leverage now had 
to be reduced to that of other commercial banks, which was around ten.2391 Previously, as 
an independent investment bank, Morgan Stanley had $1.05 trillion worth of assets 
supported by a mere $30 billion of equity at the end of the 2007 fiscal year.2392 
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Even after the conversion into bank holding companies, the two arrangers’ stock 
prices continued to plummet. Morgan Stanley announced on September 29, 2008 that 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, the second largest bank in the world at the time, would 
invest $9 billion in the company in exchange for 21% of the arranger’s stock.2393 Despite 
this news, Morgan Stanley’s stock plunged nearly 70% in just eleven days, down to $7.19 
per share.2394 Consequently, the United States Treasury Department stepped in to reassure 
the Japanese bank that its investment would be protected, and Morgan Stanley was 
ultimately forced to sweeten the deal in order to attain the $9 billion cash injection.2395 
Reportedly, Morgan Stanley underestimated the length and cost of its future ties with 
Mitsubishi. Over two years later, the arranger was still paying the Japanese bank $220 
million each quarter in dividend payments, and that arrangement will continue “until the 
two parties can come to an agreement to end them or until the stock trades above $37.875 
for 20 days out of 30 consecutive trading days.”2396 As of July of 2012, the arranger’s 
stock price is below $15. 
One should note that Mitsubishi’s backing of Morgan Stanley also proved to be 
insufficient for rescuing the arranger. On October 28, 2008, Morgan Stanley received a 
fresh $10 billion in Troubled Assets Relief Program funds2397 and had already borrowed 
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over $100 billion, undisclosed, from the Fed.2398 On a single day, September 26, 2008, 
Morgan Stanley borrowed $47.6 billion. All told, the arranger borrowed money from the 
Fed through its “Primary Dealer Credit Facility” program an astonishing 212 times.2399 
Over the course of the final quarter of 2008, the arranger posted a $2 billion loss, which 
is a testament to how vulnerable the arranger was during this time.2400  
In 2009, Morgan Stanley earned approximately $857 million before taxes.2401 
That same year the arranger “closed the book” on its disastrous 2007 acquisition of 
Crescent Real Estate Equities, one that ultimately led to over $900 million in losses.2402 
The next year, in 2010, the arranger earned $4.5 billion.2403 Reacting to these earnings, 
one writer for The Wall Street Journal maintained that they “showed how much the 75-
year-old New York company” was trying “to forge a new identity in the wake of the 
financial crisis that nearly destroyed it.”2404 Part of this identity included the departure of 
“high-rolling traders,” a lower overall risk profile, and an increased focus on “lower-
octane businesses.”2405 The arranger earned $4.2 billion in 2011,2406 but was “still seen as 
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the potential weak link on Wall Street,” given the disproportionately high cost to insure 
its debt.2407 
 
4.14. Conclusion 
 In the preceding sections, I have attempted to provide a sketch of how the five 
largest arrangers contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. By acquiring or closely 
working with subprime lenders, purchasing subprime loans with short-term funds, 
pushing for the abolition of capital reserve requirements, and relentlessly packaging 
subprime loans into MBSs and CDOs, those five arrangers were a key catalyst for 
spreading the subprime contagion worldwide. By the third week of September in 2008, 
“Wall Street as it was known - loosely regulated, daringly risky, and lavishly rewarded - 
was dead.”2408 The two remaining stand-alone investment banks, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley, continue to struggle in 2012. Goldman Sachs’ stock price, as of 
February 2012, is 52% lower than its high in October of 2007, while Morgan Stanley’s 
stock price is down over 78% from its high in June of 2007. In a true sign of the times, 
Goldman Sachs announced in July of 2012 that it is building “an in-house bank to lend 
money to wealthy people and companies.”2409 Liz Rappaport describes this strategy as a 
cautious attempt to reshape its business as “new regulations, market turmoil and a 
sluggish economy” have dried up previously profitable revenue streams stemming from 
sources like trading and investment banking.2410  
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AIGFP, for its part, sold more credit protection on subprime MBSs and CDOs 
than it could ever hope to provide. By excessively absorbing the credit risk of so many of 
the arrangers’ subprime securitizations, AIGFP not only directly contributed to the 
collapse of its parent company, but it also enabled arrangers to securitize ever more 
subprime mortgage products, since they seemingly did not have to bear as much of the 
credit risk that those products carried with them. As of February 2012, AIG’s stock price 
is approximately 98% lower than its high in May of 2007. 
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Chapter Five 
 
5.0. The Credit Rating Agencies 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 On March 16, 2009, a scathing op-ed piece that was co-written by Jerome Fons 
and Frank Partnoy appeared in The New York Times.2411 In this piece, the two authors 
inveigh against the credit rating industry in general and the two largest credit rating 
agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, in particular.  At one point, they declare: 
No one has been more wrong than Moody’s and S&P. Less than a year 
ago both gave high ratings to 11 of the largest distressed financial 
institutions. They put the insurance giant A.I.G. in the AA category. 
They rated Lehman Brothers an A just a month before it collapsed. 
Until recently, the agencies maintained AAA ratings on thousands 
of nearly worthless subprime-related securities.2412   
 
In this section, I will attempt to discern precisely how the three largest credit rating 
agencies contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. Pursuant to this goal, I will begin 
by sketching out a brief history of the credit rating industry, focusing especially on why 
credit ratings were needed in the first place and the particular goods that the credit rating 
agencies were initially providing to the investing community. After examining the 
function of credit ratings, I will then argue that, in the early-to-mid 1970’s, there were 
two key developments in the credit rating industry that helped give rise to incentives for 
the three largest credit rating agencies to act in unreasonable and irresponsible ways. The 
first development was the change in the way in which the credit rating agencies were 
compensated, while the second development was the creation of the NRSRO status, 
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which largely insulated them from competition. I will contend that the confluence of 
these two developments enabled Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch to devalue the 
importance of their respective reputations for providing accurate credit ratings. 
Ultimately, I will demonstrate that the three largest credit rating agencies were part of an 
incentive structure that abetted them to function in profitable, though short-sighted, ways. 
 
5.2. A Short History of the Credit Rating Industry  
 
The history of credit ratings in the United States can be traced back to the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as “colonial importers customarily extended up to a 
year of credit to their retail customers, shopkeepers, and general stores.”2413 This nascent 
stage of credit ratings in America was both crude and inefficient. As Frank Partnoy 
observes, “Payments were often late… [borrowers’] letters of reference were faked or 
forged, detailed financial data were not available, and the process was tediously 
slow.”2414 Those willing to extend credit were largely unable to accurately judge the 
extent to which a given borrower was a good or poor credit risk. 
 It became apparent after the major financial crisis of 1837 that “the conditions 
which governed credit granting” were one of “the chief contributory causes of the crash 
and depression which followed.”2415 Merchants began to grasp “the necessity of clearer 
and more thorough scrutiny of credit risks.”2416 The heightened importance of credit 
ratings during a financial crisis is understandable, for “as the probability increases that 
any individual creditor will not be able or willing to pay its debts,” so too is there an 
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increase in “the value of information about [the] ability or willingness to pay debts.”2417 
One should also note that “[t]elegraphy, [an] improved postal service, and fast freight by 
rail and steamboat encouraged [American] citizens to strike bargains over vast distances” 
during this period.2418 As developments in technology, transportation, and 
communication began to outpace “economic, legal, and social infrastructures” in America 
during the late 1830’s and early 1940’s, a premium began to be placed on timely and 
accurate credit ratings.2419 Trading at vast distances prevented one from “looking [at] 
another man in the eye,” creating a need for an independent third-party to do the 
“looking” for entrepreneurs and businessmen across the country.2420 
 Rather fortuitously, the failed silk businessman, Lewis Tappan, had kept “detailed 
credit information about current and prospective customers, which included many 
commercial enterprises” over roughly the previous decade.2421 The high demand for this 
information after the crisis of 1837 enabled Tappan to form The Mercantile Agency in 
1841, “the first mercantile credit industry” in America.2422 Tappan’s motto was “Man’s 
confidence in Man”2423 and his business became wildly successful. By 1846, Tappan had 
hired 679 local informants to gather information on the credit-worthiness of men, and by 
1851 this figure expanded to over 2,000 informants.2424 Perhaps most impressive of all, 
The Mercantile Agency eventually claimed that it “could find and appraise nearly anyone 
in a crowd of 29 million (the U.S. population in 1857)… in 7 days.”2425 
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After ten years in business, Tappan had credit information on men filling “more 
than 100 books… extending to 600 and 700 pages each” with each page holding up to 
“1,500 words of tiny calligraphy.”2426 The entries in these books were terse, but 
descriptive. A memorable example can be found in an 1848 entry for J.B.N. Gould, “a 
tailor who absconded from Worcester,” which reads: “Failed & now in Boston, be sure & 
never trust him, will always be worthless.”2427 By 1859, Robert Graham Dun, who 
became the sole proprietor of The Mercantile Agency, “issued the Dun rating book,” 
which contained credit information on over 20,000 names.2428 John M. Bradstreet, who 
founded a credit rating firm in 1849, published the world’s first commercial ratings book 
in 1857.2429 
 The late 1800’s in America was a particularly prosperous period for reputable 
credit raters, creating conditions for the credit rating market to grow and providing 
incentives to evaluate credit risk in other areas like stocks and bonds.2430 Standard and 
Poor’s predecessor, Poor’s Publishing Company, began publishing Poor’s Manual, which 
analyzed “various types of investments, including bonds.”2431 Wall Street analyst, John 
Moody, noticed in the early 1900’s the enormous potential of rating bonds in terms of 
their credit risk and declared, “Somebody, sooner or later, will bring out an industrial 
statistical manual, and when it comes, it will be a gold mine.”2432 Moody initially 
attempted to analyze “elaborate statistics and detailed operating and financial data” that 
was being issued in the form of reports on the railroad industry, with the aim of 
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synthesizing that data into “a single rating symbol for each bond” issued by a given 
railroad company.2433 If able to successfully determine the relative credit risk 
accompanying bonds issued by railroad companies, Moody believed that he could 
profitably sell his ratings to interested investors.  
 Prior to and even after the publication of his book entitled Analysis of Railroad 
Investments in 1909, Moody was confronted by opposition from both bankers and Wall 
Street analysts.2434 One “old Wall Street buccaneer” called Moody a “young pipe 
dreamer” who was potentially throwing away “ten years’ experience of learning the rules 
of the game,” by choosing to “give the public all of the facts regarding the [railroad] 
corporations for the price of a book.”2435 This same man added, “Use your information 
yourself; don’t be a philanthropist. There’s no money in it!”2436 Moody himself stated 
that the publication of the book “raised a storm of opposition, not to mention ridicule 
from some quarters.”2437 
 Five years after the publication of Analysis of Railroad Investments, Moody’s 
Investors Service was incorporated and, by 1922, a formal rating department was 
established.2438 Moody’s Investors Service was covering nearly 100 percent of the U.S. 
bond market by 1924.2439 Three other rating agencies also emerged shortly after Moody’s 
published its first ratings in 1909: Poor’s Publishing Company (1916), Standard Statistics 
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Company (1922), and Fitch Publishing Company (1924).2440 Poor’s merged with 
Standard Statistics in 1941 to form Standard and Poor’s.2441 
 When one examines the American credit rating market in the 1920’s, at least three 
points are worth considering. First, the credit rating business model was one in which 
investors paid for the published ratings. Only those investors who paid the credit rating 
agencies’ subscription fees would have access to the ratings.2442 This investor-pays model 
lasted until the early 1970’s. 
Second, arrangers of bonds frequently “opposed the ratings,” viewing them as 
unwelcome intrusions “into the corporation’s business.”2443 At least initially, even the 
very act of an arranger challenging its rated bonds could, from the investor’s perspective, 
provide insight into whether a given arranger’s bonds were desirable investments. 
Partnoy provides a memorable example of an arranger receiving a low rating and then 
threatening an unnamed credit rating agency by declaring: “Send your man around, and 
we’ll show him a few things that will cause him to raise your rating.”2444 Soon enough, 
however, arrangers came to terms with the presence of credit rating agencies and realized 
that they “had no choice but to provide the agencies with valuable information, including 
non-public information.”2445 One should note that, despite the fact that such non-public 
information could have been and perhaps was valuable to the credit rating agencies, as it 
could help them generate more accurate ratings, this exchange of information and 
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arranger/rating agency employee interaction invited bribery. In return for higher ratings, 
arrangers could confer some sort of benefit to the rating agencies.2446 
Finally, the competition to enter into the credit rating market during this period 
was quite low, as evinced by the flurry of entrants2447 who seemingly had no trouble 
initially taking up the profession, while the competition within the credit rating market 
was fierce.2448 To illustrate this latter point, Partnoy states, “Every time an agency 
assigned a rating, that agency’s name, integrity, and credibility were subject to inspection 
and critique by the entire investment community.”2449 One of a credit rating agency’s 
greatest assets would have been its reputation. Earning a reputation for inaccurate ratings 
would have been fatal to a credit rating agency during this period. 
When the stock market crashed in 1929, the rating agencies were forced to lower 
their ratings on a substantial number of bonds.2450 Yet, it is surprising that the demand for 
credit ratings in the early 1930’s actually increased. One would perhaps expect the credit 
ratings market to contract during this period, since the reputations of the rating agencies 
had to have been tarnished for failing to anticipate the sharp drop in the value of many 
bonds. What could possibly explain investors’ increased reliance on credit ratings during 
this period, one in which it became reasonable to question the rating agencies’ ability to 
accurately rate bonds? 
Partnoy provides a compelling explanation. In order to quell the fear, uncertainty, 
and distrust that was permeating the American market at the time, the first formal rule 
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incorporating credit ratings was implemented in 1931.2451 According to Partnoy, “[t]he 
United States Treasury Department, through the Comptroller of the Currency, adopted 
credit ratings as the proper measures of the quality of the national banks’ bond 
accounts.”2452 The regulation stipulated that a national bank could hold, at cost, bonds 
rated BBB or higher by a credit rating agency. Any bonds that were rated lower than 
BBB by a credit rating agency required banks to perform fractional write-offs to help 
offset the additional risk of those bonds.2453 This decision by the United States Treasury 
Department received “wide attention at the time, including a front-page article in The 
Wall Street Journal.”2454 Over the next few years, several state banks adopted this ruling 
as well, including New York, Ohio, and Alabama.2455 
On February 15, 1936, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a pivotal and 
landmark ruling, one that was “promulgated as to further limitations and restrictions on 
the purchase and sale of investment securities for the bank’s own account.”2456 As stated 
by the comptroller in the ruling: “The purchase of ‘investment securities’ in which the 
investment characteristics are distinctly and predominantly speculative, or ‘investment 
securities’ of a lower designated standard than those which are distinctly and 
predominantly speculative is prohibited.”2457 In a footnote to this sentence, the 
comptroller additionally noted that “[T]he terms employed herein may be found in 
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recognized rating  manuals, and where there is doubt as to the eligibility of a security for 
purchase, such eligibility must be supported by not less than two rating manuals.”2458  
This ruling carried with it several important implications. Prior to the ruling, 
many banks “invested in bonds lower than BBB,” despite the required fractional write-
offs.2459 After the ruling, however, banks were only permitted to invest in bonds rated 
BBB or higher, which effectively reduced the number of “publicly-traded bonds that 
banks could purchase” by over 50%.2460 The demand for bonds rated BBB or higher 
dramatically rose. 
 Concomitant with this increased demand for BBB rated or higher bonds was the 
perhaps unavoidable shift in the way that credit rating agencies were perceived. No 
longer mere publishers of credit ratings, the credit rating agencies came to be viewed as 
“sources of authority… regardless of what information the rating agencies actually 
generated.”2461 In other words, the value of credit ratings, following the ruling, stemmed 
mainly from the fact that they determined which bonds could be purchased by banks and 
which could not. The value of credit ratings turned away from whether these ratings were 
accurate or not. The authority of determining which bonds were eligible for investment 
now had its source in the credit rating agencies. This shift in credit ratings’ value was 
fortunate for the credit rating agencies, for the accuracy of their ratings began to be 
questioned after the Great Depression. 
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 Partnoy incisively notes that even the Comptroller who issued the ruling, J.F.T. 
O’Connor, seemed uneasy over “the potentially perverse effects of the ruling.”2462 
O’Connor declared in front of the California Banker’s Association just three months after 
the ruling that “[t]he responsibility for proper investment of bank funds, now, as in the 
past, rests with the Directors of the institution, and there has been and is no intention on 
the part of this office to delegate this responsibility to the rating services, or in any way to 
intimate that this responsibility may be considered as having been fully performed by the 
mere ascertaining that a particular security falls within a particular rating 
classification.”2463 The comptroller was suggesting that “the proper investment of bank 
funds” was not tantamount to simply putting money into a bond that was rated BBB or 
higher by two more rating agencies. Yet the ruling itself seemed to imply that the credit 
rating agencies have a special authority, one fit for discerning which bonds have low 
credit risks and which do not. The message that the comptroller was apparently trying to 
convey was that a bond rated BBB or higher by two or more credit rating agencies was a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for making that bond worthy of investment for 
banks. 
 From 1940 through the early 1970’s, credit ratings “did not become significantly 
more important” as “no major new credit rating dependent regulation[s]”2464 came into 
being and there was “a lack of volatility in bond prices.”2465 The default of Penn Central 
Railroad in 1970 on $82 million of commercial paper, and the ensuing liquidity crisis that 
followed, contributed to a situation in which arrangers of bonds sought out ways to 
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“reassure nervous investors.”2466 A “cascade of regulation” began in 1973 in response to 
the disturbances in the American economy2467 and in 1975 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission created the concept of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSRO’s).2468  
The idea behind the concept was to “designate agencies whose credit ratings 
could be used by broker-dealers for purposes of complying with the SEC’s Net Capital 
Rule.”2469 The SEC adopted the Net Capital Rule (Rule 15c3-1) in 1975 and the rule 
required “broker-dealers, when computing net capital, to deduct from their net worth 
certain percentages of the market value of their proprietary security positions.”2470 
Designed to help protect customers of broker-dealer firms in the event that the firm fails, 
the rule also required those firms to set aside a specified percentage of liquid assets for 
the sake of immediate liquidation should they fall beneath minimum capital requirements. 
The credit ratings assigned by NRSRO’s would indicate the percentage that the firm 
would have to deduct.2471 A firm holding assets that were highly rated by the NRSRO’s 
would be able to set aside less capital, enabling it to lend and, hopefully, make more 
money. 
 It is truly remarkable that the SEC did not define the term “NRSRO” in the Net 
Capital Rule (Rule 15c3-1) and as future regulations began utilizing the term as well, 
they simply referred back to the Net Capital Rule.2472 The SEC did not announce the need 
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for a definition of an NRSRO until December of 1997 and did not offer a formal 
definition of it until April of 2005.2473 Although the SEC offered no guidelines as to what 
constitutes an NRSRO, they nevertheless “grandfathered” Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, 
and Fitch as the original NRSRO’s.2474 From 1975 to 2000, only four additional firms 
were recognized as NRSRO’s, but by the turn of the century mergers reduced the number 
of NRSRO’s to the original three.  
Since 1975, NRSRO’s have been “incorporated into hundreds of rules, releases, 
and regulatory decisions” including areas like securities, pensions, banking, insurance 
regulation, and real estate.2475 As of November of 2012, there are nine NRSRO’s: 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, DBRS Ltd., A.M. Best, Japan Credit Rating 
Agency, Egan-Jones Rating Company, Kroll Bond Rating Agency, and Morningstar 
Credit Ratings.2476 
 
5.3. What is the Function of the Credit Rating Agencies? 
According to Moody’s Investors Service’s “Code of Professional Conduct,” 
published in November of 2008, the main roles that Moody’s carries out are issuing 
credit ratings and monitoring those issued ratings.2477 Fitch2478 and Standard and 
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Poor’s2479 make identical claims in their respective codes of conduct. Moody’s defines a 
credit rating as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a debt or financial 
obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial instrument, or of an issuer of 
such a debt or financial obligation, debt security, preferred share or other financial 
instrument, issued using an established and defined ranking system of rating 
categories.”2480 Credit risk is defined as “risk that an entity may not meet its contractual, 
financial obligations as they come due and any estimated financial loss in the event of 
default.”2481 Credit ratings, then, are opinions of the probability that a debt instrument 
will default, as well as opinions of the severity of loss should that debt instrument, in fact, 
happen to default. In short, the credit rating agencies are in the business of credit risk 
differentiation, a fundamental requirement for global capital market order. They assign 
ratings to corporate bonds, preferred stock, commercial paper, mutual funds, municipal 
obligations, infrastructure projects, and even sovereign nations.2482 
The three largest credit rating agencies are also abundantly clear about what their 
ratings are not. Borrowing again from Moody’s “Code of Professional Conduct,” one 
discovers that credit ratings are not “statements of current or historical fact,” nor are they 
to serve as “investment or financial advice,” recommending that an investor should 
“purchase, sell, or hold particular securities.”2483 Both Fitch’s and Standard and Poor’s 
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codes of conduct contain similar disclaimers.2484 The apparent reason for these 
disclaimers is that the risk that credit ratings assess is only one factor in an investor’s 
decision-making process. Credit ratings do not account for factors like the price of the 
debt instrument, its term, the likelihood of prepayment, or other relevant characteristics 
that should play a part in an investment decision. 
One of the primary functions of the credit rating agencies is to help overcome the 
difficulties associated with asymmetric information.2485 When information asymmetry 
exists in the market, sellers have superior information about the quality of their product 
when compared to buyers, but they cannot “costlessly convey this information” to 
them.2486 Credit rating agencies can help buyers (investors) “pierce the fog” of 
asymmetric information2487 by providing information about “the amount of credit that can 
be extended” to arrangers of securities “without undue risk.”2488 
As opposed to having investors perform time-consuming, costly, and duplicative 
research on the credit risk of issued securities, credit rating agencies can improve the 
efficiency of the securities market by equipping investors with pertinent information that 
may factor into the decision of how to allocate their capital.2489 Similarly, arrangers of 
securities can, by way of credit ratings, make investors more confident in the quality of 
their products as well as pay a lower interest rate on higher rated securities, thus making 
them more profitable.2490  
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The question remains, however, as to how credit rating agencies generate their 
credit ratings. The credit rating process usually begins with the arranger approaching a 
credit rating agency to have either its firm or one or more of its securities rated.2491 In 
response to this request, the credit rating agency “assigns a lead analyst” to that arranger 
who then “conducts a preliminary analysis to prepare the rating.”2492 This analysis is 
based upon information attained from both the arranger and non-arranger sources “in 
order to gain a better understanding of the firm and its environment.”2493 The analyst also 
conducts meetings with a portion of the senior management staff.2494 Once the relevant 
information has been gathered and examined, the analyst submits a report to an ad hoc 
rating committee, who then “proposes a recommendation in the creditworthiness” of the 
arranger or its securities.2495 Should the lead analyst disagree with the proposed rating, he 
or she can protest and “the matter can be referred to an internal appeals court.”2496 One 
professor of business administration at the University of Pittsburgh has concluded that 
“only seventy-five percent of the rating process is based on statistical information and 
equations, and that twenty-five percent is subjective.”2497 Warren Kornfield, Managing 
Director at Moody’s, stated that Moody’s analyzes over fifty specific factors about the 
loans in a pool that comprises a mortgage-backed security, including the borrowers’ 
FICO scores, the amount of equity they have in their homes, how fully they documented 
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their assets on the loan applications, and whether the loans are for the sake of refinancing 
or purchase.2498 
Before the credit rating agency releases the rating, the arranger is allowed to 
“review the press release for factual verification and to ensure that no confidential 
information is disclosed.”2499 If an arranger disagrees with the rating, the rating may be 
appealed by way of “providing new and important information or by pointing out the 
rating’s reliance on incorrect information or dubious sources.”2500 The credit rating 
process concludes by the credit rating agency issuing “a press release that contains the 
rating as well as the rationale justifying it.”2501 
 
5.4. A Brief Analysis of the Credit Rating Industry Leading Up to the  
       Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
One of the key developments in the credit rating industry has been the adoption of 
the arranger-pays model in the early 1970’s. As mentioned before, the primary source of 
revenue for the credit rating agencies prior to this period was from subscriptions 
purchased by investors.2502 The advent of low-cost photocopying technology in the early 
1970’s, however, gave rise to a free-rider problem: the payments by the users of the 
ratings, the investors, were either suboptimal or unenforceable.2503 For example, one 
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investor could pay the asking price for the published ratings, make several photocopies of 
the ratings, and sell them to other interested investors for a price well below that of the 
asking price. From the credit rating agencies’ perspective, what was of concern was the 
reduction in revenue due to the decrease in investors paying the asking price. In short, 
inexpensive photocopying technology enabled parties to benefit from the ratings, while 
precluding the credit rating agencies from being completely compensated for those 
conferred benefits. 
This free-rider problem posed an interesting dilemma for the credit rating 
agencies. The party that was supposed to be benefiting from the ratings, the investors, 
could no longer be relied upon to fully compensate the credit rating agencies for their 
services. At the same time, there was nevertheless a demand for those services, since it 
would be economically inefficient for investors to perform their own research on credit 
risk. The solution was found by turning to the arranger-pays model. Instead of having 
investors pay for access to credit ratings, arrangers and issuers of bonds and securities 
could pay the credit agencies to have their financial instruments rated. The turbulence 
that was present in the United States’ economy during this time period gave arrangers the 
incentive to have their products rated, as they wanted to reassure nervous and fearful 
investors.2504 Still, this development severed the economic linkage between those who 
rely on credit ratings and those who provide them. The credit rating agencies were now 
being chosen and compensated by a party whose interests were not necessarily aligned 
with those who were primarily using the ratings. 
Steven Schwarcz cites a memorandum from Kenneth C. Kettering in which he 
speculates that the shift to the arranger-pays model is the result of the credit rating 
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agencies’ agendas.2505 Generally speaking, arrangers can be considered to be a more 
reliable source of revenue when compared to investors. The demand of investors is harder 
to predict and their payments are more difficult to acquire. This change in business model 
would have likely been desired by the credit rating agencies. More importantly, the 
investor-pays model burdened the credit rating agencies with a degree of responsibility 
that is not present in the arranger-pays model: namely, directly selling ratings to investors 
could appear to make the credit rating agencies more culpable for inaccurate or 
misleading ratings.2506 The three major credit rating agencies stress how their ratings are 
available to the public free of charge, a fact that perhaps underscores, at least from their 
perspective, a lack of responsibility to those choosing to use the ratings. One who pays 
for a given good or service may be in a better position to legitimately express one’s 
dissatisfaction with the provider of that good or service when compared to one who is 
receiving the same good or service for free. 
Up until the turn of the century, credit rating agencies had a “remarkable track 
record of success in their ratings.”2507 A March 30, 1991 Economist article mentioned 
how “only one company with an investment-grade rating from Moody’s has defaulted on 
long-term debt” in twenty years.2508 An “internal analysis” performed by Standard and 
Poor’s in January 2001 found that “all ‘A’ rated companies at the beginning of a given 
year would have an 87.94% chance of maintaining that same rating by year end.”2509 The 
stability of credit ratings during this period seems to suggest that the transition into the 
arranger-pays model did not threaten the credibility of the ratings. 
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Over the last decade, however, the three major credit rating agencies have had to 
downgrade an incredible number of their ratings. For instance, all three credit rating 
agencies rated Enron at investment grade just four days before their bankruptcy filing in 
2001, while all three rated WorldCom at investment grade a scant 42 days before it filed 
for bankruptcy in 2002.2510 Fitch downgraded $18.4 billion in subprime residential 
mortgage-backed securities that it rated in 20062511 and, as of October 2008, Standard and 
Poor’s had “downgraded more than two-thirds of its investment-grade ratings,” while 
Moody’s downgraded over “5,000 mortgage-backed securities.”2512 After recounting the 
recent struggles of the three largest credit ratings to the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, the chairman of the Committee, Representative Henry Waxman, 
stated, “The story of the credit rating agencies is a story of colossal failure.”2513 I will 
now examine some of the criticisms directed at the three largest credit rating agencies and 
seek to explain how and why they contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis. 
 
5.5. Criticisms of the Three Largest NRSRO’s  
 One of the more forceful criticisms leveled against the three largest credit rating 
agencies is that they have been insulated from lawsuits throughout their tenure as 
NRSRO’s, which has, in turn, created conditions that were fertile for moral hazard. 
Partnoy argues that the legal protection that Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch 
have enjoyed as NRSRO’s has its basis in two main claims. The first claim is that they 
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are members of the press and that their issued credit ratings are speech, which is 
“privileged” in the United States.2514 If they are, in fact, members of the press, then they 
are “protected from liability by the mandate of the First Amendment that there shall be 
‘no law… abridging the freedom… of the press.’”2515  
The “speech” or ratings are also, by this argument, protected by the “actual malice 
standard” that was established in the landmark and unanimous Supreme Court decision 
New York Times Co. v Sullivan in 1964. The New York Times published a full-page 
advertisement on March 29, 1960 that was paid for by civil rights activists. The 
advertisement contained criticisms of “the police of Montgomery, Alabama, for its 
conduct in demonstrations there.”2516 After the publication of the advertisement, L.B. 
Sullivan, the elected city commissioner whose duties included supervising the 
Montgomery police, sued both the activists and The New York Times for libel and was 
initially awarded $500,000. The Supreme Court, interestingly enough, reversed the 
decision in support of the United States’ “profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”2517 The 
Supreme Court held:  
The constitutional guarantees [of the First Amendment] require, we 
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering  
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ – 
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.2518 
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Thus, as members of the press, in certain circumstances, the credit rating agencies cannot 
be held liable unless they acted with “actual malice,” knowingly publishing false 
information or recklessly publishing information whether it is false or not.2519 
 For instance, in June of 1996, Orange County, California sued Standard and 
Poor’s for professional negligence and breach of contract, claiming that eleven of the 
county’s bonds were rated too high. These excessively high ratings enabled County 
Treasurer Robert Citron to use the proceeds of those debt issues to move forward with a 
risky investment strategy, one that eventually contributed to the county’s declaration of 
bankruptcy in December of 1994. Orange County sought $2 billion in damages, but “the 
court ruled that the First Amendment barred claims for negligence and breach of 
contract.”2520 The suit resulted in “a paltry settlement of $140,000, roughly 0.007% of the 
claimed damages.”2521 
 The second claim, found in slightly different forms in Moody’s, Standard and 
Poor’s, and Fitch’s respective codes of conduct and elsewhere, is that issued credit 
ratings are mere “opinions” and “not recommendations to buy, sell, or hold 
securities.”2522 For instance, in Standard and Poor’s “Rating Services Code of Conduct,” 
published in December of 2008, there is the following disclaimer: 
 Ratings do not constitute investment, financial or other advice. Ratings are 
 not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell a particular security or to  
 make any other investment decision. Ratings and other opinions do not  
 comment on the suitability of an investment for a particular investor and  
 should not be relied on when making any investment decisions.2523 
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Due to the fact that future cannot be known, the argument maintains, credit analysis must 
necessarily belong in the sphere of opinion. As certain sorts of opinions receive 
constitutional protections, a pertinent question is whether the NRSRO’s published 
“opinions” (their issued credit ratings) are the kind that is fit for receiving those 
protections.  
In a seminal Supreme Court case involving the protection of opinions, Milkovich 
v. Lorain Journal in 1990, the Court ended up making a crucial distinction between 
opinions that do not “contain a provably false factual connotation” from those that do.2524 
Opinions that do not “contain a provably false factual connotation” receive “full 
constitutional protection,” but those opinions that do contain such a connotation “are 
subject to suits under the common law of defamation.”2525  
A superb example of an NRSRO defending itself against a defamation charge is 
the Jefferson County School District v. Moody’s Investors Services, Inc. case, which took 
place in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The Jefferson County School District 
in Colorado decided to issue new bonds at lower interest rates that were available at the 
time in an effort to raise money. Previously, they hired Moody’s to rate their bonds, but 
on this occasion they chose to hire Standard and Poor’s and Fitch instead. On October 20, 
1993, the school district priced the bonds. Controversy arose when Moody’s, just two 
hours after the pricing of the bonds, “wrote in its electronic publication Rating News that 
‘[t]he outlook on the district’s general obligation debt is negative, reflecting the district’s 
ongoing financial pressures.’”2526 This unsolicited opinion provoked many buyers of the 
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bonds to cancel their orders, which, in turn, forced the school district to reprice the bonds, 
offering them at a higher rate. 
The ability to use unsolicited opinions as a “weapon” that potentially harms 
arrangers that choose to take their business to other credit rating agencies is alarming. For 
present purposes, however, the relevant point is that after the school district sued 
Moody’s for $769,000 to recover its increased interest expense, the court dismissed the 
case because “the phrases ‘negative outlook’ and ‘ongoing financial pressures’ are 
themselves too vague to be ‘provably false.’”2527 Moreover, the school district could not 
“identify a specific false statement reasonably implied from Moody’s article.”2528  
  While it is true that lawsuits brought against the three largest NRSRO’s in the past 
have typically been “dismissed or settled on favorable terms to the rating agencies,”2529 it 
is questionable whether this trend will continue in the wake of the current economic 
crisis. The “credit ratings are opinions, which are protected by the First Amendment” 
defense may be able to shield those NRSRO’s from accusations of defamation, but as 
Grais and Katsiris note, investors that choose to sue Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and 
Fitch, will likely not be filing defamation suits.2530 As for the “credit rating agencies are 
members of the press” defense, the decision reached in the case of In re Fitch, Inc. makes 
one wonder whether this defense, too, will be able to withstand future scrutiny. In 2003, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York concluded that 
Fitch was not a member of the press for two primary reasons. First, unlike “business 
newspapers and magazines,” which indiscriminately “cover any transactions deemed 
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newsworthy,” Fitch “only ‘covers’ its own clients,” that is, those clients that hire 
them.2531 Second, Fitch was found to have had an unusually high “level of involvement” 
with the clients that had hired them, one that is “not typical of the relationship between a 
journalist and the activities upon which the journalist reports.”2532 
 With the three largest NRSRO’s finding themselves “besieged in courts,”2533 the 
extent of their responsibility in contributing to the subprime mortgage crisis should 
become more apparent in the near future. An example of a recent lawsuit includes the 
Teamsters Local 292 Pension Trust Fund filing of a securities class action suit against 
Moody’s Investors Services. The plaintiff alleges that “Moody’s failed to disclose that it 
assigned excessively high ratings to securities backed by risky subprime mortgages.”2534 
What is intriguing about this suit is that the plaintiff is actually a shareholder of Moody’s 
as opposed to an investor who relied upon credit ratings. Moody’s “excessively high” 
ratings of subprime mortgage-backed securities led to an increase in Moody’s stock price, 
but as those securities began to be downgraded, the stock price fell. Teamsters Local 292 
Pension Trust Fund is seeking “redress under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.”2535 The Indiana Laborers Pension Fund has filed a similar suit 
against Fimalac, the parent company of Fitch Ratings. The plaintiff involved in this July 
1, 2008 class action suit accuses Fimalac of applying “low standards or no standards” 
when it came to rating mortgage-backed securities. The high ratings that were made 
possible by lax standards generated more business for Fimalac, “which boosted [their] 
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earnings… and artificially inflated its stock.”2536 Like the Teamsters Local 292 Pension 
Trust Fund, the Indiana Laborers Pension Fund claims that Fimalac “violated sections 
10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”2537 Decisions have not yet been 
reached on these two more recent lawsuits, though they are part of the influx of litigation 
that the three largest NRSRO’s are currently encountering. 
 One could argue that the legal immunization from liability that the three largest 
NRSRO’s experienced during and leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis could have 
contributed to conditions that were conducive to both group and general bias. With little 
(perceived) legal accountability, those NRSRO’s may have adopted more profitable, 
though riskier, practices since it would be the investors, the users of the ratings, who 
would bear the majority of the short-term costs of those practices. Power without 
accountability can give one the ability to have others shoulder a disproportionately large 
share of the downsides of risky behavior, while simultaneously ensuring oneself a share 
of the potential benefits resulting from such behavior. The three largest NRSRO’s and 
their primary customers, the arrangers, could profit from this arrangement, while casting 
the risks associated with misleading ratings off on other related parties. 
 Absent any real or perceived legal accountability, what measures or forces exist to 
check the conduct of the three largest NRSRO’s and make them more responsible for 
their practices? The standard answer2538 is that the NRSRO’s are restrained by their deep 
concern over the state of their reputations. Aside from violating securities laws or 
engaging in other illegal activities, a NRSRO’s reputation can supposedly be tarnished in 
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two ways: (1) if they violate their own publicly available policies, procedures, and codes 
of conduct (how they arrived at their ratings) or (2) if they gain a reputation for producing 
shoddy or inaccurate ratings (what those ratings are). I will consider the plausibility of 
both of these apparent reputation-based concerns in turn. 
 In an effort to begin to explore whether the NRSRO’s have a strong incentive to 
adhere to their own published policies, procedures, and codes of conduct, it would 
perhaps be helpful to consider a highly publicized exchange between two officials in 
Standard and Poor’s structured finance division, one in which they were discussing 
whether they should move forward with rating a particular deal. Here is a portion of the 
April 5, 2007 exchange: 
 Official One: That deal is ridiculous. 
 Official Two: I know, right. The model definitely doesn’t capture half  
             the risk. 
 Official One: We should not be rating it. 
 Official Two: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows 
           and we would rate it. 
 Official One: But there is a lot of risk associated with it – I personally 
            don’t feel comfy signing off as a committee member.2539 
 
Regardless of whether the model that the officials were speaking of was the arranger’s 
model or Standard and Poor’s, the crucial points are that the employees felt pressured to 
rate products that they thought had a significant amount of real, though ignored, risk 
attached to them and, further, that they thought it was somewhat of a norm at Standard 
and Poor’s to rate such products anyway, since they “rated every deal,” even if 
“structured by cows.”  
 At Moody’s, evidence surfaced that suggested they were assigning credit ratings 
to products without even completely understanding them. A crucial component of 
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assessing credit risk is discerning the recovery rate, or the amount that a creditor would 
recover in the event that a debtor defaults on its obligations.2540 As mentioned before, 
according to Moody’s “Code of Professional Conduct,” part of what informs their ratings 
is, in fact, the recovery rate or “the likelihood of default on a bond and the estimated 
severity of loss in the event of that bond’s default.”2541 Yet, a Moody’s document was 
discovered that “addresses the question of [the] weighted average recovery rate” of “an 
outstanding issue” by writing, “WARR – don’t ask .”2542 Presumably, the reason that it 
was requested that one should not ask about the weighted average recovery rate of the 
issue was because the issue itself was too complex and, consequently, resistant to such a 
measurement. 
 The three largest NRSRO’s would certainly be acting irresponsibly if they elected 
to rate a complex financial product after making the prior judgment that the quality of the 
product was indecipherable or misrepresented. Setting aside for a moment the question as 
to why the NRSRO’s would choose to act in such a way, it is important to note that 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s very own respective policies, procedures, and codes of 
conduct permit them to “rate every deal.”  Although Moody’s claims that it “will refrain 
from providing a Credit Rating unless it believes that it has sufficient information and 
analytical expertise to do so,”2543 they also maintain that they have “no obligation to 
                                                 
2540 Richard Beales and Robert Cyran, “The Sunny Side of Junk Bonds,” The New York Times (April 13, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/13/business/13views.html. 
2541 Code of Professional Conduct, 2. Italics mine. 
2542 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the 
Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” (July 2008), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf, 12. For the insight that the “select” credit 
rating agency in this example was Moody’s, please see Aaron Lucchetti, “S&P Email: ‘We Should Not Be 
Rating It,’” The Wall Street Journal (August 2, 2008), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121764476728206967.html. 
2543 Code of Professional Conduct, 8. The codes of conduct of Fitch and Standard and Poor’s contain 
similar claims. See Fitch Ratings Code of Conduct, 4-5; Rating Services Code of Conduct, 5. 
455 
 
perform, and does not perform, due diligence with respect to the accuracy of [the] 
information it receives or obtains in connection with the rating process.”2544 When taken 
together, this is an astounding disclaimer. Essentially, Moody’s is placing itself on “the 
honor system,” affirming that they will only rate deals if the arranger has supplied them 
with “sufficient information,” while, at the same, refusing to take responsibility for 
determining whether that information is accurate or not. What if the arranger-supplied 
information is considered to be sufficient for making a rating judgment, but the 
information upon which the judgment is being made is inaccurate?  
Standard and Poor’s “Rating Services Code of Conduct” essentially contains the 
same disclaimer, adding that they rely on the arranger, “its accountants, counsel, 
advisors, and other experts for the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the 
information submitted” to them.2545 To their credit, Fitch recently released a report titled 
“Ensuring Reliability and Transparency in the Rating Process” in which they declared 
that they have “strengthened [their] structured finance originator evaluations,” requiring 
that “loan level reviews must be conducted by an independent third party to better 
identify poor underwriting practices.”2546 Nevertheless, there is a section in their “Ratings 
Code of Conduct” that is titled “What Fitch Expects of Issuers.” Part of these 
expectations is that each arranger “will promptly supply Fitch all information relevant to 
evaluating the ratings” and that “all such information [will] be timely, accurate and 
complete in all respects.”2547 Prior to the February 2009 publication of “Ensuring 
Reliability and Transparency in the Rating Process,” it is likely that Fitch had the same 
                                                 
2544 Ibid., 6. 
2545 Rating Services Code of Conduct, 4. 
2546 Fitch, Inc., Ensuring Reliability and Transparency in the Ratings Process (February 5, 2009), available 
at http://www.fitchratings.com, 3. 
2547 Fitch Ratings Code of Conduct, 15-16. 
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posture towards performing due diligence on the loan-level information as Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s.  
 One may argue, like the Managing Director of Standard and Poor’s, Richard 
Gugliada, that “any request for loan level tapes is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE” from 
the perspective of the NRSRO’s.2548 A single mortgage-backed security may contain as 
many as 25,000 mortgage loans,2549 and collateralized debt obligations may contain 
numerous mortgage-backed securities (along with other kinds of debt instruments). 
Perhaps it was not possible, therefore, for the three largest NRSRO’s to perform due 
diligence on the quality of the loan-level mortgage information that they were using to 
rate mortgage-backed securities. Rather, it could be contended that the responsibility for 
performing such due diligence falls upon the arranger, as Standard and Poor’s “Rating 
Services Code of Conduct” states. 
 If this argument has any merit, the new question that emerges is whether 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch demanded that the arrangers of the mortgage-
backed securities perform due diligence at the level of loan origination. A July 2008 
report published by the SEC, the product of examining those NRSRO’s for 
approximately ten months,2550 clearly demonstrates that they did not make such demands 
on the arrangers. The SEC found that NRSRO’s were not required to insist that arrangers 
                                                 
2548 Henry A. Waxman, “Opening Statement: Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis,” 7. In this 
context, Gugliada was emphatically responding to a request from a Standard and Poor’s employee, Frank 
Raiter, who wanted access to collateral tapes so he could evaluate the credit risk of the underlying 
mortgage loans backing a collateralized debt obligation. 
2549 Frank Raiter, “‘Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis: Before the Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform,” (October 22, 2008), available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2250, 
3. 
2550 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the 
Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” (July 8, 2008), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf, 1. The examination period began in August of 
2007. 
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“perform due diligence, and they [were] not required to obtain reports concerning the 
level of due diligence” performed by arrangers.2551 
 What has been established so far in this section is that the three largest NRSRO’s 
policies, procedures, and codes of conduct (1) did not require them to perform due 
diligence on the loan-level information that they were relying upon to generate their 
ratings of mortgage-backed securities; (2) did not require them to demand that the 
arrangers of the mortgage-backed securities perform due diligence on that same 
information; (3) permitted them to use their own discretion as to whether the arranger-
supplied information was sufficient enough to make a credit rating judgment. Of course, 
the quality of a credit rating depends, in large part, upon the quality of the information 
used in making a rating judgment. If the underlying, loan-level information is false or 
incomplete, then the ratings that are constructed on the basis of that information will 
likely be inaccurate, no matter how flawless the risk model used in processing the 
information turns out to be. Perhaps anticipating such a concern, Fitch’s “Ratings Code 
of Conduct” contains the remarkable warning that its ratings “are not themselves facts 
and therefore cannot be described as being ‘accurate’ or ‘inaccurate.’”2552 
 The pivotal question, therefore, is whether the concern over gaining a reputation 
for publishing inaccurate ratings was a powerful enough incentive to dissuade the three 
largest NRSRO’s from making rating judgments on mortgage-backed securities on 
occasions where the arranger supplied inadequate loan-level information. This question is 
a particularly pressing one because their own published policies, procedures, and codes of 
conduct do not appear to take any measures to discourage them from moving forward 
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with making rating judgments on those occasions, beyond placing them on a self-policing 
“honor system.” Those manuals reveal that it is up to each NRSRO to assess whether the 
arranger-supplied information is “sufficient” for producing a credit rating. What if it is 
profitable, though, to produce a credit rating even when the information upon which the 
rating is based is insufficient? Does the incentive of preserving a reputation for issuing 
accurate credit ratings outweigh the incentive to make money, should the two be in 
conflict with one another? 
 During the nascent stage of credit ratings, prior to the Great Depression, it was 
noted that a credit rating agency’s reputation was, indeed, held by them to be of 
inestimable value. However, it will be argued that the confluence of two crucial factors 
created conditions in which “the road to profit” for the NRSRO’s no longer had to “pass 
through” the confines of maintaining a reputation for publishing accurate credit ratings. 
The first factor was that there was a government-mandated demand for credit ratings, 
accompanied by government-enforced restriction on the suppliers of those credit ratings. 
Second, the credit rating industry’s shift away from the investor-pays model and the 
subsequent adoption of the arranger-pays model in the early 1970’s gave rise to a 
business model in which the primary users of credit ratings were no longer the ones 
compensating those providing the credit ratings. Incidentally, the NRSRO’s were forced 
to grapple with an unprecedented conflict of interest between satisfying the demands of 
their paying customers and fulfilling their role as publishers of accurate credit ratings. 
Both of these factors will now be explored in greater detail. 
 The government-mandated demand for credit ratings began, as discussed before, 
after the Great Depression. The 1936 decree issued by the Comptroller of the Currency 
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was one that was intended “to encourage banks to invest only in safe bonds,” prohibiting 
them from investing in “‘speculative investment securities’ as determined by ‘recognized 
rating manuals’.”2553 Lawrence White, a professor of economics at the New York 
University Stern School of Business, maintains that “[t]his regulatory action importantly 
changed the dynamic of the bond information market,” for the banks “were no longer free 
to act on information about bonds from any source that they deemed reliable.”2554 At the 
same time, the government “outsourced… to the rating agencies their safety judgments 
about bonds that were suitable for banks’ portfolios,” bestowing upon those safety 
judgments “the force of the law.”2555 
 The government-enforced restriction on the supply of credit ratings culminated in 
the SEC’s creation of the NRSRO category, declaring that “only the ratings of NRSRO’s 
were valid for the determination of the broker-dealers’ capital requirements” as specified 
by the Net Capital Rule.2556 Partnoy argues that, since 1975, the term “NRSRO” is 
involved in a “web of regulation… so thick that a thorough review would occupy 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages.”2557 To substantiate this point, Partnoy performed 
a LEXIS-NEXIS database search for NRSRO citations and discovered that in securities 
regulation alone, the term was cited over 1,000 times.2558 Another report found that 
                                                 
2553 Lawrence White, “Statement for the Roundtable to Examine Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies,” 
(April 15, 2009), available at w4.stern.nyu.edu/news/docs/prof_white_sec_4-15-09.pdf, 3. 
2554 Ibid. 
2555 Ibid. 
2556 Ibid., 4. 
2557 Frank Partnoy, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?,” 692. 
2558 Ibid. The search was performed in 1999. 
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“NRSRO usage requirements” have been included in “at least 8 Federal statutes, 41 
regulations, and over 100 state acts and regulations.”2559 
 By giving credit ratings the force of law and, later, limiting which credit ratings 
could actually have that force, the government arguably helped loosen the shackles of 
reputational considerations that previously restrained the NRSRO’s. One can imagine the 
heightened status that Consumer Reports ratings would assume, if the United States 
government legally required all citizens to buy only highly rated consumer appliances, 
and further indicated that only Consumer Reports and a few other rating organizations 
were fit for determining what is a highly rated appliance and what is not. It is reasonable 
to posit that, in such a scenario, Consumer Reports would suddenly sell more 
subscriptions to their magazine than they previously had, regardless of whether they 
maintained a reputation for publishing accurate ratings.2560 Referring back to the credit 
rating industry, it should come as no surprise that “Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch produce 
about 98% of all ratings and earn 94% of all ratings revenue.”2561 Moody’s, in particular, 
saw its profits quadruple between 2000 and 2007, while maintaining “the highest profit 
margin of any company in the S&P 500 for five consecutive years.”2562 
 Partnoy persuasively argues that the role of the three largest NRSRO’s has shifted 
from one of selling information about credit risk to one of selling regulatory licenses. By 
a “regulatory license,” Partnoy means “a permit to participate in some regulatory 
activity,” not unlike a driver’s license permits an individual to participate in the regulated 
                                                 
2559 James H. Gellert and Patrick James Caragata, “SEC Roundtable Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies: 
Competition in the Credit Rating Industry” (April 15, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
579/4579-20.pdf, 3. 
2560 Frank Partnoy, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?,” 629. 
2561 Ibid., 1. 
2562 Joseph A. Grundfest and Evgenia Petrova, “Buyer Owned and Controlled Rating Agencies: A 
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activity of operating an automobile.2563 Whereas the buyer of a driver’s license pays for a 
permit to drive a car, the buyer of a mortgage-backed security credit rating, the arranger, 
pays for a “permit” to have that security attract investor funds. The “dysfunctional result” 
of this shift has been one in which market participants inordinately depend upon credit 
ratings, while Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch were “no longer constrained by 
reputation.”2564  Partnoy elaborates on this claim by adding:  
 [The three largest NRSRO’s] can issue low quality ratings, but market  
 participants will still pay for them. Indeed, they must pay for them, because  
 of regulations that depend on ratings. Without a rating, many issuers will be 
 locked out of the markets.2565 
 
In sum, due to the fact that credit ratings are “embedded in a web of U.S. regulations and 
laws”2566 and that the SEC has given three of the suppliers of those credit ratings a 
tremendous competitive advantage, the “pull” of the incentive for preserving a reputation 
for publishing accurate ratings has likely weakened. 
 The second factor that has likely diminished the three largest NRSRO’s concern 
over their reputation for producing accurate ratings can be found in the arranger-pays 
business model that emerged in the early 1970’s. It was noted in passing that the shift 
from the investor-pays model to the arranger-pays model may well have been for the sake 
of overcoming a free-rider problem that arose from the advent of low-cost photocopying 
technology during that time. Another possible explanation is that the bankruptcy of Penn 
Central Railroad, an arranger, in 1970 “shocked the bond markets” and made arrangers 
“more conscious of the need to assure bond investors that they really were low risk, and 
                                                 
2563 Frank Partnoy, “Securities and Exchange Commission Roundtable on Issues Related to the Oversight 
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that they were willing to pay the credit rating firms for the opportunity to have the latter 
vouch for them.”2567 Lawrence White contends that the “reasons for this change of 
business model have not been established definitively.”2568 
 The main change that the arranger-pays model brought about was that the 
investors who were using the ratings to inform their investment decisions were no longer 
the ones compensating the NRSRO’s for their work. Instead, the arranger began to pay 
the NRSRO’s to determine the credit risk associated with “a credit commitment, a debt or 
debt-like security,” or even the arranger itself of such obligations.2569 A common 
criticism though is that this “business model appears to generate a pervasive conflict of 
interest that benefits arrangers at the expense of investors as the agencies inflate ratings to 
curry favor with paying customers.”2570 In other words, it is an arrangement that is 
hospitable to group bias. How do arrangers benefit at the expense of investors and why 
would the NRSRO’s willingly inflate their ratings? 
 In response to the first part of that question, it is important to point out that an 
arranger’s ability to raise capital heavily depends upon the rating that they receive on 
their debt from the NRSRO’s. Receiving a high credit rating enables an arranger to offer 
its debt at a lower interest rate because it has been deemed, justifiably or not, to be on the 
safer side of the risk spectrum. As Standard and Poor’s rating scale explains, an 
obligation rated “AAA” signifies that, in their opinion, the “obligor’s capacity to meet its 
financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong.”2571 An arranger whose bond 
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is rated “AAA” can, because of the lower apparent risk, offer that bond at a lower interest 
rate to investors. Paying lower interest rates on their bonds leaves arrangers with a greater 
spread for themselves.2572 In other words, the higher the rating an arranger receives on its 
debt, the more cheaply that same arranger can raise capital. 
 The arrangers’ preoccupation with high ratings once the arranger-pays model 
came into being was not a new development.2573 What was a new development was the 
extent to which arrangers were able to influence the NRSRO’s ratings since they, unlike 
the investors, were now the paying customers. The well-chronicled difficulty that the 
NRSRO’s faced was that they had to serve two masters: (1) the arrangers who wanted 
high ratings and were now their source of revenue and (2) the investors, who were still 
relying on them to publish reliable and accurate ratings. Arrangers that were displeased 
with the preliminary rating that an NRSRO gave to one of their bonds could simply 
“shop” the bond around to be rated by one or both of the other NRSRO’s. The incentive 
structure that was now in place was for NRSRO’s to inflate their ratings (satisfying the 
desires of their paying customers), for they would otherwise lose market share to more 
“accommodating” competitors. 
 A May 25, 2004 e-mail from a Managing Director at Standard and Poor’s, with 
the subject of “Competition with Moody’s,” voiced concern over how they “just lost a 
huge Mizuho RMBS deal to Moody’s due to a huge difference in the required credit 
level.”2574 The Managing Director learned from the arranger of the residential mortgage-
backed security, the Japanese “mega bank” Mizuho, that the credit support level at 
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Standard and Poor’s “was at least 10% higher than Moody’s” enabling the latter to rate 
the security higher (less riskier) than the former.2575 Losing deals to competing NRSRO’s 
because of “criteria issues” was, according to this employee, “so significant that… [S&P] 
need[s] to address this now in preparation for the future deals.”2576 
 Similarly, a March 21, 2007 e-mail from a Managing Director at Moody’s called 
attention to how he heard that Fitch had “approached [arrangers] and made the case to 
remove Moody’s from their deals and have Fitch rate the deals [instead]” because of “the 
firm position” that Moody’s had taken with respect to haircuts.2577 When a NRSRO is 
evaluating the underlying value of a mortgage-backed security and arrives at the 
judgment that its value is uncertain, the NRSRO may require a haircut, or additional 
collateral, in order to give the security a particular, higher rating. The idea is that the 
haircut will compensate for the uncertainties associated with the underlying value of the 
security. The Managing Director at Moody’s is suggesting in the e-mail that they had 
“lost several deals” to Fitch because of their respective position on haircuts.2578 Whereas 
Moody’s had been promoting haircuts for “about 6 years,” Fitch had been privately 
arguing that haircuts “are not good and that managers should be allowed [to have] 
ultimate flexibility.”2579 The perception, then, that this Managing Director at Moody’s 
had of Fitch was that they value contouring their ratings to the needs of arrangers over 
producing ratings that accurately convey credit risk. Furthermore, he believed that Fitch’s 
more lenient methodologies for assessing credit risk were steering business away from 
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Moody’s. NRSRO’s that attempted to produce accurate credit ratings were being 
penalized for not being as “flexible” as their competitors. 
 The arranger’s ability to “rate shop” likely resulted in putting pressure on the 
three largest NRSRO’s to sacrifice the quality of their ratings for the sake of generating 
ratings that were as high as possible. Implicit in this incentive structure is the primacy of 
the desire for profit over the desire for a reputation for publishing accurate ratings, let 
alone any concern for potential ripple effects that misleading ratings could eventuate. 
One could also make the case that the lack of competition in the credit rating business 
enabled the three largest NRSRO’s to “coast” on the momentum brought about by brand 
recognition, which, itself, was made possible by historical performance and simply being 
in the market longer than other credit rating agencies. With a storehouse of goodwill 
already intact and protection from competition under the auspices of the NRSRO 
designation, perhaps Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch decided that the benefits 
of inflating their ratings outweighed the potential costs that those ratings would carry 
with them. The immediacy and certainty of profit may have had a pull that was stronger 
than the repelling force of having one’s reputation tarnished in the future. The “lag” in 
being able to assess the accuracy of a credit rating may have encouraged the three largest 
NRSRO’s to privilege the former over the latter to an even greater degree. With these 
conditions in place, one can posit that those NRSRO’s likely succumbed to the 
temptations afforded by group and general bias. 
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5.6. Conclusion 
The central argument in this section is that Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and 
Fitch were, especially around the turn of the century, in a position where they could act in 
a short-sighted, though profitable, fashion without burdening themselves with any 
imminent, negative consequences.2580 Or, as stated by an analyst at Standard and Poor’s 
in a December 15, 2006 e-mail, “Let’s hope that we are all wealthy and retired by the 
time this house of cards falters.”2581 In a 2009 op-ed piece in The New York Times, 
authors Michael Lewis and David Einhorn maintain that the three NRSRO’s “didn’t 
simply miss a few calls here and there,” rather, in “pursuit of their own short-term 
earnings,” they did “exactly the opposite of what they were meant to do.”2582 As opposed 
to exposing financial risk, the two authors contend that the three NRSRO’s “systemically 
disguised it.”2583 One set of analysts determined that, by 2010, over 90% of the mortgage-
backed securities rated AAA (Aaa) by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s in 2006 and 
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2007 were downgraded to junk status.2584 The Chairman of the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, Phil Angelides, called Moody’s “a triple-A factory,” citing how the 
company “slapped its coveted triple-A rating on 42,625 residential mortgage-backed 
securities” from 2000-2007.2585 The CEO of Moody’s, Raymond McDaniel, conceded 
that the company’s performance with respect to rating United States residential MBSs 
and CDOs during the 2000’s was “deeply disappointing.”2586 
Believed to be exempt from any legal repercussions for their published ratings 
and, in all likelihood, having a muted concern over the future state of their reputations, 
the three largest NRSRO’s had a compelling set of incentives to engage in excessively 
risky behaviors, while also facing a dearth of liabilities to hold them accountable for 
those behaviors. One of the main ways that they contributed to the subprime mortgage 
crisis is that they helped make subprime mortgage-backed securities appear to be 
reasonable investments to the investment community. A high rating for those securities 
was a key ingredient in creating a high demand for them. In exchange for this disservice, 
they were compensated by the arrangers who paid them to produce these flawed ratings. 
Subsequently, one may be apt to agree with Sean Egan, Managing Director of Egan-
Jones Rating Company, who stated that the three largest NRSRO’s ratings “were a major 
factor in the most extensive and possibly expensive calamity in recent American 
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history.”2587 Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, in other words, were indispensable 
players in the painful breakdown of the good of order that has been labeled the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
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Chapter Six 
 
6.0. The Housing GSEs: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Any account of the subprime mortgage crisis would be incomplete without an 
explanation of how the two housing government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, contributed to it. The first section of this long chapter presents a 
brief history of the two housing GSEs, while the second section explains what the term 
“GSE” means. Next, I will describe how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the 
recipients of a unique and multifaceted federal subsidy that enabled them to serve as a 
magnet for investor funds. I will then discuss their two primary lines of business and how 
one is riskier and more profitable than the other. After providing an account of how their 
reputations were tarnished in the early 2000’s, I will argue that despite the fact that 
Congress, at that point, should have strengthened its regulatory oversight of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, it failed to do so for a few key reasons. The remaining sections of the 
chapter chronicle the collapse of the two housing GSEs and outline the factors that 
contributed to their respective downfalls.  
        
6.2. A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
Title III of the National Housing Act of 1934 provided for the chartering of 
Fannie Mae, which was originally called the National Mortgage Association of 
Washington. Officially, the National Mortgage Association of Washington was chartered 
on February 10, 1938 and, later that same year, the institution’s name changed to the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Two of the primary reasons that 
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Fannie Mae was created were to demonstrate that Congress had “a national commitment” 
to American homeownership and to address the fact that, in the wake of the Great 
Depression, private lenders were either unable or unwilling to “ensure a reliable supply of 
mortgage credit throughout the country.”2588 As David Wheelock notes, between 1929 
and 1933 “U.S. personal income declined by 44 percent, real output fell by 30 percent, 
and the unemployment rate climbed to 25 percent of the labor force.”2589 The number of 
housing foreclosures during this period increased from 134,900 in 1929 to 252,400 in 
1933, while “as many as half of urban home mortgages were delinquent on January 1, 
1934.”2590 The combination of rampant unemployment, a substantial decrease in personal 
income, and a decline in housing prices took a heavy toll on private lending institutions 
and made them reluctant to “tie up their funds in illiquid long-term mortgages.”2591 
 Two of the original purposes of Fannie Mae, according to its charter, were to 
“provide stability in the secondary mortgage market for residential mortgages” as well as 
to “promote access to mortgage credit throughout the Nation (including central cities, 
rural areas, and underserved areas) by increasing the liquidity of mortgage investments 
and improving the distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage 
financing.”2592 Assuming that private lending institutions in the primary market, the 
market dealing directly with originating mortgages, adopted loaning practices that 
                                                 
 
2588 Fannie Mae, “About Fannie Mae” available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/charter.jhtml?p=About+Fannie+Mae. 
2589 David C. Wheelock, “Changing the Rules: State Mortgage Foreclosure Moratoria During the Great 
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2591 United States Department of the Treasury, Government Sponsorship of the Federal National Mortgage 
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Washington: United States Department of 
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2592 12 U.S.C. § 1716, “Declaration of Purposes of Subchapter,” available at 
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conformed to the guidelines established by the Federal Housing Administration, those 
institutions could then sell their originated mortgages on the secondary market to Fannie 
Mae. Confident that they could “easily turn these mortgages into cash if they needed to,” 
these private lending institutions would have more of an incentive to extend mortgage 
credit.2593 Thus, one reason why Fannie Mae was created was to establish a mechanism 
for transferring the credit risk that home borrowers would not pay back the principal 
amount that they borrowed plus interest away from private lenders on the primary 
market. 
 A second reason that Fannie Mae was invented was to “smooth out discrepancies 
between capital-rich and capital-poor regions of the country” with respect to financing 
residential mortgages.2594 By issuing bonds, Fannie Mae could serve as an intermediary 
between investors purchasing the bonds and those borrowers seeking conforming home 
mortgages, effectively creating “channels” for flows of capital that were previously 
unavailable due to geographical separation. Prior to the advent of Fannie Mae, lenders on 
the primary market were limited in the number of mortgage loans that they could finance 
by the amount of the cash deposits of their customers. Additionally, federal law forbade 
interstate banking, which necessarily limited the size of banks. Fannie Mae, on the other 
hand, had access to investor capital across the United States and could buy lender-
originated conforming mortgages nationwide. 
 In 1954, Title III of The National Housing Act of 1934 was revised. Instead of 
being a pure federal government agency, Fannie Mae was converted into a mixed-
ownership corporation by The Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act of 
                                                 
2593 International Directory of Company Histories, “Fannie Mae History,” available at 
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1954. In an important sense, The Charter Act of 1954 provided “the basic framework 
under which Fannie Mae operates today,” for it attempted to accommodate both 
government and private investor control.2595 It stipulated that the federal government 
would hold Fannie Mae’s preferred stock, while its common stock would be privately 
held. The Charter Act of 1954 also exempted Fannie Mae from all local taxes except 
property taxes.2596 
 The next key development in Fannie Mae’s structure occurred in 1968. The 
revolutionary Charter Act of 1968 split Fannie Mae into two separate corporations. One 
corporation was named The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) 
and the other retained the name The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae). Ginnie Mae became an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and began to guarantee mortgage-backed securities that had as their assets 
residential mortgages that were insured primarily by the FHA or by the Department of 
Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration or VA).2597 Fannie Mae, on the 
other hand, became a Government-Sponsored Enterprise (GSE), a unique, hybrid entity 
that is both privately owned, yet federally chartered. 
 Before discussing what a GSE is in greater detail, it is helpful to briefly note why 
Congress and the Lyndon Johnson administration invented the GSE structure in the first 
place and decided to transform Fannie Mae into a housing GSE. As Peter Wallison and 
Charles Calomiris explain, “In seeking to reduce the budget deficits associated with the 
Vietnam War and the Great Society programs, the [Johnson] administration hit upon the 
                                                 
2595 Ibid. 
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idea of ‘privatizing’ Fannie Mae by allowing the company to sell shares to the 
public.”2598 By becoming a GSE, Fannie Mae would be able to continue its activities of 
funding residential mortgages on the secondary market, while simultaneously taking the 
costs associated with those activities off of the federal budget.2599 In other words, in 
designating Fannie Mae a GSE, the federal government was able to both appear to be 
committed to the value of American homeownership, while having a significant portion 
of the costs accompanying that commitment financed by a different source. 
Two years later, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), the other major housing GSE, by passing the Emergency Home Finance 
Act of 1970. In an effort to support the crippled mortgage markets at the time, Congress 
made Freddie Mac responsible for securitizing mortgages that were originated by savings 
and loans associations.2600 Freddie Mac was a private, though not publicly traded, 
company throughout the 1970s and 1980s “with its equity shares held solely by the 
twelve Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) and by the S&Ls that were members of the 
FHLBS.”2601 What primarily differentiated Freddie Mac from Fannie Mae during this 
period was that Freddie Mac tended to securitize mortgages, originated mostly by the 
savings and loan associations, whereas Fannie Mae tended to hold mortgages in its own 
portfolio that it had bought predominantly from mortgage banks.2602 In 1989, Freddie 
Mac was converted into a publicly traded company, a decision anchored in the belief that 
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“a wider potential shareholding public would raise the price of the shares held by the then 
ailing S&L industry and thus improve the balance sheets of the latter.”2603 
 
6.3. What Does It Mean To Call Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a Housing  
       GSE? 
 
If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as housing GSEs, are not quite private sector 
companies, yet not exactly government agencies, precisely what are they? Perhaps the 
best place to begin answering this question is to mention that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are instrumentalities of the federal government. As instrumentalities, they are 
organizations “that carry out public purposes, but are not part of the government 
itself.”2604 In fact, they share attributes of both private companies and government 
agencies. Like many other private companies, the two housing GSEs trade issues of stock 
on the New York Stock Exchange. They are “operated by private owners and 
managers.”2605 Their officers and employees “can earn compensation comparable to that 
of other financial institutions of similar size,” and those individuals do not work for the 
federal government.2606 They pay federal income taxes as though they were private 
companies.2607 Finally, one of their purposes, as investor-owned companies, is to make 
profits for their shareholders. The 1919 Michigan Supreme Court case, Dodge v Ford 
Motor Company, “established that an investor-owned company may not divert significant 
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amounts of the shareholders’ money to purposes other than profitable activities.”2608 The 
implications of this last point will be examined in a later section. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also similar to federal government agencies. 
They are “exempt, in general, from state and local income taxation”2609 and they 
“generally need not register or obtain a license in the states where [they] may do 
business.”2610  They may only engage in activities “that they are expressly authorized to 
carry out or that are incidental to their otherwise authorized activities.”2611 Their charters 
specify identical “authorized” activities. First, they are to provide stability in and ongoing 
assistance to the secondary market for residential mortgages, including “activities relating 
to mortgages on housing for low and moderate-income families.”2612 Second, they are 
required to increase “the liquidity of mortgage investments” and improve “the 
distribution of investment capital available for residential mortgage financing.”2613 
 
6.4. The Importance of the Implicit Federal Government Guarantee and 
       Subsidy 
 
 Looking back, one of the more perplexing consequences that emerged out of the 
unusual structure of the two housing GSEs was that their debt obligations came to be 
commonly acknowledged2614 as being implicitly guaranteed by the federal government. 
                                                 
2608 Ibid., 79. 
2609 Ibid., 23. 
2610 Ibid., 20. 
2611 Ibid. 
2612 For Fannie Mae’s Charter, please see 12 U.S.C. § 1716 available at 
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2614 For examples of this acknowledgement, please see Dan L. Crippen, “Testimony Before Subcommittee 
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, United States House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services,” (May 23, 2001), available at 
http://cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=2839&zzz=12919; Douglas Holtz-Eakin, “Testimony Before the United 
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On the surface, it appears to have been unreasonable to assume that the federal 
government would “come to the rescue” of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in the event that 
either of them were threatened by failure.2615 Within a Fannie Mae prospectus, one will 
find the following disclosure: “The Certificates, together with interest thereon, are not 
guaranteed by the United States. The obligations of Fannie Mae are obligations solely of 
the corporation and do not constitute an obligation of the United States or any agency or 
any instrumentality thereof other than the corporation.”2616 On what grounds, then, could 
one have presumed that the United States federal government backed the two housing 
GSEs’ debt obligations? 
 One potential reason was that there has been a precedent for a GSE receiving 
federal aid in a time of crisis. During the farming financial crisis, which took place in the 
middle of the 1980’s, the federal government ended up providing the Farm Credit System 
with $4 billion in aid.2617 Since one GSE had already received assistance from the federal 
government during a period of financial hardship, perhaps one could have reasonably 
anticipated that the two housing GSEs would, likewise, receive federal aid should the 
need for it arise. 
 A more compelling reason for believing that the federal government backed 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt obligations was that Fannie Mae itself had already 
been the beneficiary of government assistance in the early 1980’s when interest rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=4642&type=0; June R. O’Neill, “Testimony Before Subcommittee on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, United States House of 
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2616 Congressional Budget Office, “Federal Subsidies and the Housing GSEs,” (May 2001), available at 
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http://www.cbo.gov/publication/17889, 1. 
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sharply rose and the housing GSE could not cover the cost of its debt.2618 In 1981, Fannie 
Mae had a negative net worth of almost $11 billion2619 and suffered “cumulative net 
losses of over $350 million in 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1985.”2620 The important point is 
that, in response to the housing GSE’s financial difficulties, “Congress passed a law that 
extended Fannie Mae’s tax loss carryback period,” a benefit that was later appraised to be 
worth $25 million.2621 As a 1990 United States General Accounting Office report points 
out, Congress was not legally obligated to pass this law.2622 One should also note that 
throughout this period of financial stress, Fannie Mae “retained the highest credit rating 
possible” and was able to borrow $31 billion in long-term debt and $64 billion in short-
term debt “with only a brief increase in its borrowing costs.”2623 The same report 
maintains that any other wholly private firm, under these circumstances, would “typically 
be blocked from borrowing or would be permitted to borrow only at extremely high rates 
of interest.”2624 
 Third, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt obligations received favorable 
treatment from the three largest credit rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, 
and Fitch. Those credit rating agencies bestowed a special status upon the two housing 
GSEs’ debt obligations, labeling them “U.S. agency securities.” This rating was so high 
that it was superior to all AAA-rated corporate debt and just below United States 
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Treasury bonds. Clearly, the basis for this high rating stemmed from the implied federal 
government guarantee of the two housing GSEs’ debt obligations, creating the perception 
that those obligations are safer than even those of the four remaining AAA-rated 
companies, Automatic Data Processing, Johnson & Johnson, Exxon Mobil, and 
Microsoft. One should keep in mind those three rating agencies’ definitions of an AAA 
rating. For Moody’s, an Aaa rating is an assessment that the obligations “are judged to be 
of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk.”2625 For Standard and Poor’s, an AAA 
rating is its “highest rating,” representing an “extremely strong capacity to meet financial 
commitments.”2626 As for Fitch, an AAA rating is “only assigned in cases of 
exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments” and denotes “the 
lowest expectation of default risk.”2627 In granting the two housing GSEs’ debt 
obligations a rating above even an AAA rating, the perception was promulgated that the 
United States government will not permit Fannie Mae and Freddie to default on those 
obligations.  
 Fourth, one could simply look at the unusual relationship that the two housing 
GSEs have with the federal government to arrive at the conclusion that the latter stands 
behind the obligations of the former. John Weicher describes this relationship as one that 
possesses an “Elizabethan character,” in the sense that the federal government “has 
conferred broad privileges on the GSEs” similar to how “sovereigns gave personal 
                                                 
2625 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols & Definitions,” (August, 2003), available at 
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favorites exclusive rights to manufacture or trade in some commodity.”2628 For instance, 
the two housing GSEs have a $2.25 billion line of credit with the United States Treasury 
Department, which suggests that there is available government financial support if 
necessary. The President of the United States is authorized to appoint up to five of the 
eighteen members of the two housing GSEs’ respective boards of directors.2629 Up until 
July of 2002, they were also exempt from having to “register their securities and file 
annual and periodic reports with the SEC” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which is a requirement imposed on all other publicly traded companies.2630 Even after 
agreeing to register their securities under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the 
agreement only applied to their equity securities, not their debt and mortgage-backed 
securities that they routinely issue.2631 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s special 
relationship with the federal government permits them to be the recipients of an indirect 
privilege: namely, that federally insured banks and thrifts are allowed, by law, to invest in 
GSE debt securities in unlimited quantities. Excluding the two housing GSEs, “regulated 
financial institutions can invest no more than 10 percent of their capital in the debt issued 
by a single bank.”2632 One could interpret this legal privilege as a “wink” from the federal 
government to investors that the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is safer than the 
debt issued by other financial institutions. 
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 The confluence of factors listed above created a common perception that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt obligations were tacitly guaranteed by the federal 
government. As Thomas Stanton aptly states, whereas United States Treasury bonds are a 
“general obligation” of the federal government, the obligations of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are “what might be called a moral obligation” of the federal government.2633 
As early as 1989, Marcia Stigum, in her book The Money Market, argued that the 
“[government]-sponsored agencies such as Fannie Mae… are regarded by most people 
that lend to them as the government in disguise.”2634 In May of 1996, the Congressional 
Budget Office published a report titled “Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” The Congressional Budget Office frankly acknowledged 
the existence of the implied federal government guarantee in this report, contending that 
“[s]hort of placing an explicit guarantee on the securities of the housing GSEs, the law 
could hardly be more clear: the government’s financial interests in the safety of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac ensure that their obligations are safe from the risk of default.”2635 
With respect to this study, what is important about this implied guarantee is that it 
enabled Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be the recipients of a unique subsidy that 
possessed an “opaque” transmission structure.2636 It is necessary, therefore, to examine 
the form and content of this implicit government subsidy. An analogy may be helpful 
here. 
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 When a college student receives a federal subsidized loan from a financial 
institution, the subsidy comes in the form of the federal government directly paying the 
accrued interest on the loan during the period of time in which it is in deferral status. The 
amount of the subsidy is transparent in the sense that it would be both for a certain 
specified dollar amount and part of the federal budget that was allocated for subsidizing 
higher education. One would be able to discover how much the subsidy was for and the 
kind of subsidy that it was.  
 The subsidy that the two housing GSEs have received, however, differs from the 
student loan subsidy because the government did not deliver it “in the form of Treasury 
checks made out to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”2637 June O’Neill, in 1996, noted that 
the entire federal budget, along with “all 1,174 pages” of President Clinton’s proposed 
budget, did not have “a single dollar… [that was] slated to be paid as a subsidy to the 
housing GSEs.”2638 How can one maintain, then, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
received a federal subsidy, if there was no actual outlay of funds from the federal 
government to the GSEs? Can there be such a thing as a non-cash subsidy? 
 One way to begin answering this question is to note that a person or institution’s 
financial position can be improved by being exempt from having to pay certain taxes or 
fees. Exemptions of this sort free up one’s capital for other purposes. In 2004, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that Fannie Mae received tax and 
regulatory exemptions worth $600 million in 2000, $800 million in 2001, $600 million in 
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2002, and $1 billion in 2003.2639 As for Freddie Mac, the same report estimated that it 
received tax and regulatory exemptions worth $400 million in 2000, $500 million in 
2001, and $1.3 billion in 2002.2640 The purported congressional reason for these 
exemptions is that they help the two housing GSEs provide low-cost financing for home-
buyers across America.2641 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also received an additional, more valuable subsidy 
that is more difficult to discern: they received free credit enhancement due to the 
aforementioned implied federal government guarantee of their debt obligations.2642 In a 
helpful analogy, W. Scott Frame and Larry Wall liken the implicit federal government 
guarantee to parents agreeing to co-sign a loan for one or more of their college-bound 
children. By co-signing a loan, the parents are providing a valuable benefit to their child. 
The benefit comes in the form of the child receiving more favorable loan terms than those 
that he or she could receive absent of the parental co-signing. The parents not only make 
this benefit possible, they also provide the benefit without actually making any monetary 
payment, assuming that the child repays the amount that he or she borrowed in a timely 
fashion.2643 Similarly, the fact that the investing public and even the credit rating agencies 
believe that the federal government is standing behind the two housing GSEs’ debt 
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obligations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to lower their borrowing costs.2644 
Lawrence White notes that, absent the implied guarantee, “the financial markets would 
either insist on a stronger balance sheet [from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] with more 
capital (net worth) as protection (which would be costly for the two companies) so as to 
achieve the AAA rating commensurate with the current interest rates at which they 
borrow; or the financial markets would insist on charging higher interest rates (which 
would be costly) commensurate with their current balance sheets.”2645 In 2004, White 
estimated that the federal government’s “annualized contingent liability” stemming from 
the implied guarantee of the two housing GSEs’ debt obligations came to $12-13 
billion.2646 
Part of the significance of the implicit federal government guarantee can be 
grasped by way of the following consideration. In general, the perceived risk associated 
with an investment shapes the potential return on that investment. If investment 
opportunity x is perceived to be riskier than investment opportunity y, x will likely have a 
potential higher rate of return than y to compensate for the greater risk. Since investors 
tended to view the federal government as “co-signers” on the loans that they were making 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they were willing to accept artificially low rates of 
return on their investment, irrespective of the two housing GSEs’ true default risk, the 
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risk associated with their ability to repay those loans with interest in a timely fashion.2647 
To phrase this point differently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to borrow money 
more cheaply than they otherwise could have done because investors viewed their debt 
securities as being implicitly guaranteed by the federal government and, hence, as safer 
investments than they would be standing alone, devoid of the implicit guarantee.  
As far back as 1990, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
expressed concern over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s privileged borrowing position. In 
a report titled “Government-Sponsored Enterprises: The Government’s Exposure to 
Risks,” the General Accounting Office noted that the two housing GSEs’ ties with the 
federal government were weakening “the discipline that creditors normally provide to 
completely private firms.”2648 The creditor or investor perception of the implicit federal 
guarantee of the two housing GSEs’ debt obligations made it possible for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to borrow money from them at lower interest rates. Douglas Holtz-Eakin 
argues that the two housing GSEs’ “ability to borrow at lower rates of interest than any 
fully private firm holding the same amount of private equity capital and taking the same 
risks” is “the principal benefit” of having the GSE status.2649 A 1996 Congressional 
Budget Office report laments the federal government’s provision of free credit 
enhancement to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because it is costly to taxpayers. Rather 
than offering the credit enhancement for free, the report incisively notes, “the government 
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could sell the right to share its credit standing… [and from] the receipts of such a sale, the 
government could increase spending for any public purpose or reduce taxes.”2650 
In 2004, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that between 1995 and 1999, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received a total of $13.9 billion in off-budget federal 
subsidies. In the same report, the CBO estimated that the two housing GSEs received 
$22.9 billion in off-budget federal subsidies from 2000-2003.2651  Wayne Passmore, a 
Federal Reserve economist, reported in a 2005 study that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
received a median gross subsidy worth $149 billion between April 1997 and May 
2003.2652 Provocatively, Passmore also estimated that 44% to 89% of the two housing 
GSEs’ respective market values are due to the implicit federal government subsidy.2653 
The Congressional Budget Office, in an earlier 1996 report, found that 42% of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s profits in 1995 were either directly or indirectly derived from 
their government backing.2654 
Nevertheless, Fannie Mae has publicly called the subsidy “theoretical” because 
they have never received a check from the federal government.2655 Former Chairman and 
CEO of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, has denied altogether that the housing GSE 
receives a subsidy,2656 and no less than former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill has 
                                                 
2650 “Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” 11. 
2651 Congressional Budget Office, “Letter to the Honorable Richard C. Shelby: Updated Estimates of the 
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2652 Wayne Passmore, “The GSE Implicit Subsidy and the Value of the Government Subsidy,” Federal 
Reserve Board: Finance and Economics Discussion Series (January 2005), 12-13. 
2653 Ibid., 14. 
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2655 Ross Guberman, “Fannie Mae Before the Meltdown: The View from August 2002,” The 
Washingtonian (August 2002), available at http://www.washingtonian.com/print/articles/6/171/8593.html. 
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publicly agreed with him.2657 Former Executive Vice President of Fannie Mae, Robert 
Zoellick, also voiced a clear denial of receiving a federal subsidy. In his July 31, 1996 
testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Securities and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Zoellick asserted that Fannie Mae 
does “not receive any federal subsidies… [and their] debt is not guaranteed by the federal 
government.”2658 Zoellick also testified that it “is impossible to accurately measure the 
value of a subsidy that does not explicitly exist,” yet it is possible to “identify the many 
tangible benefits” that Fannie Mae provides to homebuyers.2659 
 
6.5. What do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do? 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac engage in two lines of business, neither of which 
involves making mortgage loans directly to home-buyers.2660 As Alan Greenspan 
explains: 
 
 The first is… [that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] purchase mortgages, 
 bundle them together, and then sell claims on the cash flows to be generated 
 by these bundles. These claims are known as mortgage-backed securities. 
 The second… involves Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchasing mortgages or their 
 own mortgage-backed securities outright and financing those purchases by 
 selling debt [to investors] directly in the name of the GSE.2661 
 
                                                 
2657 Nicholas Kulish, “Fannie Mae Gains Praise from O’Neill, Who Says Firms Doesn’t Get a Subsidy,” 
Wall Street Journal (February 9, 2001). 
2658 Vern McKinley, “The Mounting Case for Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” Cato Policy 
Analysis, No. 293 (December 29, 1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-293.html#N_92_. 
2659 Ibid. 
2660 Underwriting mortgages, or the process of discerning the level of risk that a given borrower possesses, 
used to be the responsibility of the parties in the primary mortgage market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
became the largest underwriters of mortgages after they developed their own automated underwriting 
systems.  Fannie Mae’s system is called “Desktop Underwriter,” while Freddie Mac’s is called “Loan 
Prospector.”  
2661 Alan Greenspan, “Testimony Before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs: Government-Sponsored Enterprises,” (February 24, 2004), available at 
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In the first line of business, “they issue and guarantee mortgage-backed securities,” while 
in the second line of business they “invest in mortgage assets” and hold them in their 
respective portfolios.2662 In 1980, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s share of residential 
mortgage debt outstanding through these two lines of business was around 7%.2663 By the 
end of June 2008, this share grew to nearly 50%.2664 Both of these lines of business 
warrant closer inspection, as they are the primary activities by which the two housing 
GSEs attempt to meet the demands of their charters and generate profits for their 
shareholders. 
 What is involved in issuing and guaranteeing mortgage-backed securities and, 
furthermore, how do these activities contribute to making mortgage investments more 
liquid and the secondary market more stable? In an effort to answer these questions, it 
will be useful to examine the process of mortgage securitization, for it is an indispensable 
element of this first line of business. A 1996 United States Treasury Department report 
describes the process of mortgage securitization as one involving the transformation of 
“illiquid mortgage loans into liquid, tradable mortgage-backed securities, which represent 
interests in a pool of loans.”2665 Prior to 1970, “mortgages were largely a non-traded debt 
instrument.”2666 Those lenders that originated mortgage loans typically held on to them 
until they matured or were prepayed, “collecting interest and principal repayments in the 
interim.”2667 The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) began 
                                                 
2662 Lawrence J. White, “Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Housing Finance: Why True Privatization is Good 
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issuing the first “pass-through” mortgage-backed securities in 1970. Freddie Mac and 
Fannie began issuing pass-through mortgage-backed securities of their own in 1971 and 
1981, respectively.2668 How are illiquid mortgage loans transformed into liquid, tradable, 
pass-through mortgage-backed securities? 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are permitted to buy both individual and groups of 
mortgages from the financial institutions (the lenders) that originated them on the primary 
market, provided that the loan or loans meet their requirements. The two housing GSEs 
are required by law to purchase “single-family mortgages with origination balances 
below a specified amount, known as ‘the conforming loan limit.’”2669 From 1980 through 
2010, the conforming loan limit increased 344.8%, from $93,750 to $417,000. Between 
1996 and 2002, the conforming loan limit grew 45.3%. From 2002 to 2010, the 
conforming loan limit increased another 38.7%. Beginning in 2008, what constitutes the 
conforming loan limit is contingent upon the area in which the property unit is located. 
As determined by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the “general” single unit 
conforming loan limit as of 20102670 is $417,000, while the “high-cost” single unit 
conforming loan limit is $729,750.2671 A residential mortgage financing a single unit 
property in Allegany County, Maryland, has a “general” conforming loan limit of 
$417,000, while a residential mortgage financing a single unit property in Dukes County, 
                                                 
2668 Lawrence J. White, “Mortgage-Backed Securities: Another Way to Finance Housing,” (August 11, 
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2669 Federal Housing Finance Agency, “Conforming Loan Limit,” available at 
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Massachusetts has a “high-cost” conforming loan limit of $729,750.2672 Both of the 
housing GSEs would be prohibited from buying a mortgage financing a single unit 
residential property in either of those areas, should the amount of the mortgage exceed 
the designated conforming loan limit. 
 In a typical transaction between the housing GSEs and a lender on the primary 
market, the former will buy a pool of mortgages from the latter. The mortgages within 
this pool, in addition to meeting all of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s requirements, will 
usually have “similar interest rate structures, age, and underwriting characteristics.”2673 
Next, by way of a swap-transaction, the ownership-interest in the pool of loans is 
converted into a security, a bond, known as a mortgage-backed security, which can then 
be sold on the secondary market.2674 Each mortgage-backed security has a coupon, which 
is the interest rate that an investor receives, shorn of a servicing fee and a guarantee fee, 
should he or she choose to invest in the security.2675 The servicing fee goes to the 
institution that is responsible for collecting the payments made by the borrowers of the 
mortgage loans and the two housing GSEs retain the guarantee fee. The reason that the 
mortgage-backed security is labeled a “pass-through” is due to the fact that the interest 
received by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the underlying loans, minus the servicing 
and guarantee fees, is passed through to those that invested in the security.2676 
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 It is by way of the guarantee fee, usually around 20 basis points or one-fifth of 
one-percent of the remaining principal, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac make money in 
this line of business.2677 The guarantee that they provide for the fee is that there will be 
timely repayment of principal and interest to the investor, even if it has not been collected 
from the borrower.2678 If the mortgage loans backing the security are amortizing fixed-
rate mortgages, then each is scheduled to pay interest and principal each month, which 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be responsible for passing along to investors, minus 
the fees listed above, regardless of whether all of the borrowers made their monthly 
mortgage payments on time.2679 Mortgage-backed securities containing variable rate 
mortgages have the interest passed through on the basis of a weighted average pass 
through rate, one that varies depending upon any adjustments in the interest rates of the 
mortgages as well as prepayments made by borrowers.2680 
 One other point about the two housing GSEs’ form of securitization is worth 
mentioning. From the perspective of the borrower, securitization has the benefit of 
making residential mortgage financing more available. The enhanced availability of 
mortgage financing, however, comes at the expense of exacerbating the problem of 
asymmetric information that accompanies loan transactions of all kinds. As Lawrence 
White explains, when “Party A lends money or resources to Party B at time t and expects 
to be repaid at some future time t+1,” Party A “must generally be concerned about the 
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assurance of repayment.”2681 Mortgage lenders face the problem of asymmetric 
information because the borrower is much more likely to “know more about its own 
proclivities with respect to repayment than does the lender.”2682 Therefore, a lender will 
usually attempt to assess the creditworthiness of a borrower by gathering extensive 
before-the-loan information on and making during-the-loan observations of that 
borrower.2683 Securitization creates a situation in which investors in Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac-issued mortgage-backed securities are even further removed from being 
able to assess the creditworthiness of the borrowers whose mortgages are backing their 
investments. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s guarantee enables them to create investment 
opportunities that are devoid of credit risk, which, in this case, is the risk that borrowers 
will not meet their mortgage obligations. Their guarantee, however, does not protect 
investors from prepayment risk, which is the risk that all or part of the principal of a pool 
of mortgage loans will be paid back prior to the loans’ final scheduled payment dates. In 
a given mortgage-backed security, should any of the borrowers whose mortgages are in 
the security refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates, relocate and sell their 
homes, or default on their mortgages, at least some of the principal will be returned to 
those who invested in that security ahead of the amortization schedule.2684 The 
prepayment risk of investing in a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac-issued mortgage-backed 
security in this case is not whether one will receive one’s investment back, but rather that 
one will fail to receive the expected return on that investment. The effects of prepayment 
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risk can be acutely felt when, upon receiving one’s guaranteed principal earlier than 
expected, interest rates have dropped since the time of original investment of that 
principal. In essence, an investor in a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac-issued mortgage-
backed security is “buying a future stream of payments that will result in a particular 
yield over a particular time period.”2685 If one invests $10,000 into a mortgage-backed 
security in 1991 with a coupon of 9% and a maturity of ten years, one would anticipate 
earning a return of 9% on that investment for ten years. However, for illustrative 
purposes, suppose that for one reason or another all of the mortgages in that mortgage-
backed security are paid off in full in 1996. Suppose further that interest rates have 
dropped to 6%. In this scenario, one would be deprived of the future interest payments on 
the invested principal at the expected 9% rate and, additionally, one would likely be 
unable “to earn the same yield elsewhere.”2686  
 A June 1, 2009 Fannie Mae single family mortgage-backed security prospectus 
identifies other investor risks including the potential for prevailing interest rates to rise, 
which would cause borrowers to prepay less rapidly, thereby resulting in both slower 
borrower loan payments and, ultimately, the investor having his or her capital tied up “at 
a time when reinvestment rates are higher.”2687 In sum, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
guarantee only ensures that investors in their mortgage-backed securities will receive 
interest payments insofar as there is still principal invested to earn interest, that they will 
receive the interest in a timely fashion, and that they will not lose their principal. The two 
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housing GSEs are not guaranteeing that investors will actually make any money on their 
investments. 
 Historically, the credit risk associated with this securitization-and-guarantee line 
of business has been low for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Peter Wallison estimates that, 
in the early 2000’s, credit risk related losses totaled around one to two basis points,2688 
while Lawrence White maintains that between 1987 and 2002, credit risk related losses 
averaged approximately 5.4 basis points annually.2689  Given that this line of business 
was relatively safe and assuming that it adequately provided stability and liquidity in the 
secondary mortgage market, why did the two housing GSEs also continue to partake in a 
second line of business, Fannie Mae’s original line of business of purchasing and holding 
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities? Wallison insightfully notes that engaging in 
this second line of business, after the advent of securitization, is “highly 
counterintuitive.”2690 After all, he adds, “the essence of liquidity is supply – a large 
number of [mortgage-backed] securities available for purchase or sale,” but the 
purchasing-and-holding line of business reduces the supply of mortgage-backed 
securities available to the market, and consequently reduces liquidity.2691 For every 
mortgage-backed security that the two housing GSEs hold in their portfolios, that is one 
less mortgage-backed security available to attract investor capital.2692 
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 Former Chairman and CEO of Freddie Mac, Richard Syron, provides one 
justification for participating in this second line of business. The reason that the two 
housing GSEs purchase and hold mortgage-backed securities in their retained portfolios 
is that it is, in fact, a “critical” part of their effort to meet the requirements of their 
chartered mission to ensure “liquidity, stability, and affordability of mortgage credit 
across the country.”2693 The fact that “the demand for mortgage assets is volatile and 
unpredictable,” could potentially serve as a formidable obstacle that would prevent them 
from making the secondary mortgage market more stable and liquid.2694 At any given 
time, it is difficult to accurately forecast how much investor demand there will be for 
their issued mortgage-backed securities. Syron maintains that their retained portfolios 
serve as “an important corollary to the securitization process” because investors know 
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will buy their mortgage-backed securities if they later 
need to sell.2695 Thus, the retained portfolio line of business reassures investors, which, in 
turn, “supports demand” for their issued mortgage-backed securities by creating a larger 
domestic and international investor base for those securities. Ultimately, then, this line of 
business “helps keep the markets liquid and mortgage rates low across economic 
environments.”2696 Syron estimates that about two-thirds of Freddie Mac’s retained 
                                                                                                                                                 
retained portfolio, Mudd stated that 35% consists of “whole loans that are not packaged into mortgage-
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mortgage portfolio “either directly or indirectly supports the affordable housing 
component” of their mission.2697  
Indeed, when Democrats in the United States Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs voted against a 2005 bill, S. 190, that aimed to severely 
restrict the two housing GSEs’ retained portfolios, the reason for their dissent closely 
mirrored Syron’s justification. The Democratic Senators stated, “The retained portfolios 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac help keep interest rates low; they have helped markets 
function effectively, even when other sectors experienced severe credit crunch problems; 
and they attract funds from all over the world to be invested in the U.S. mortgage 
markets.”2698 There is a considerable body of research available that supports this 
argument.2699  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this argument has been 
universally accepted. For instance, on February 24, 2004, the Federal Reserve Chairman 
at the time, Alan Greenspan, testified before the United States Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and he asserted that “[d]eep and liquid markets for 
mortgages are made using mortgage-backed securities that are held by non-GSE 
investors” as opposed to being held by the two housing GSEs themselves.2700 Greenspan 
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further stated that “Fannie’s and Freddie’s purchases of their own or each other’s 
securities with their debt do not appear [to be] needed to supply mortgage market 
liquidity or to enhance capital markets in the United States.”2701 Likewise, Douglas 
Holtz-Eakin, former director of the Congressional Budget Office, categorically affirms 
that the “large mortgage portfolios held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not 
necessary for the secondary mortgage market to operate efficiently; those enterprises 
issuance of mortgage-backed securities can accomplish that outcome.”2702 In terms of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s retained portfolios contributing to the goal of lowering 
mortgage rates, a study conducted by three Federal Reserve economists found that the 
effects of the retained portfolios on “both secondary and primary mortgage rate spreads” 
were not “statistically different from zero,”2703 accounting for a difference in mortgage 
interest rates of approximately two basis points, or one-fiftieth of one-percent.2704 In a 
July 12, 2006 editorial in the congressional newspaper, The Hill, Senator Richard Shelby 
bluntly declared that that the two housing GSEs’ retained portfolios “have only been used 
as a vehicle for corruption, mismanagement and greed,” which GSE reform must 
eliminate.2705  
Precisely how the two housing GSEs’ retained portfolios benefit the secondary 
mortgage market and borrowers is, in my opinion, unclear and, moreover, whether any 
benefits are conferred at all is questionable. A far less controversial justification for the 
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retained portfolio line of business is that it is extremely profitable. Whereas the average 
guarantee fee (from the first line of business) was a little over 20 basis points in 2003, the 
average spread between “the interest rate earned on the mortgage assets [in a housing 
GSE’s retained portfolio] and the interest cost of the funding liabilities” was 172 basis 
points for Fannie Mae and 186 basis points for Freddie Mac that same year.2706 As 
Dwight Jaffee makes clear, the “relatively large size of this rate spread arises from the 
low interest cost of the F&F debt (due to the implicit Treasury guarantee) and the 
compensation for accepting the interest rate risk associated with the mortgage securities 
held in the portfolios.”2707 Investors are willing to accept lower returns from the two 
housing GSEs – even lower than the returns provided by AAA-rated bonds - because, as 
it was argued before, the implied federal government guarantee creates the impression 
that, one way or another, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will meet their debt obligations. 
The profound competitive advantage that emerges is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
can purchase and hold their own or one another’s mortgage-backed securities with the 
capital raised by selling bonds to investors with yields that are lower than those returns 
expected from the mortgage-backed securities. If the two housing GSEs can “borrow 
funds at 4% to buy mortgages that pay 5%, they will do quite well.”2708 
In terms of revenue, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac generated over $22 billion 
from the net interest received on their retained portfolios in 2003, compared to about $4 
billion from guarantee fees on their mortgage-backed securities that same year.2709 From 
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1997 to 2001, Fannie Mae had an average return on equity generated by their retained 
portfolio line of business of 29.22%, while Freddie Mac averaged a return on equity of 
24.54% from the same line of business.2710 Comparatively, the industry return on equity 
“for all FDIC insured commercial banks” from 1998-2002 was around 13.6%.2711  
With respect to the size of their retained portfolios, Gloria Gonzalez-Rivera 
estimates that, at the end of 1999, Fannie Mae’s portfolio was worth about $523 billion, 
while Freddie Mac’s was worth approximately $324 billion.2712 By the end of 2001, “the 
GSEs together held in their portfolios about one-third of all mortgage-backed securities 
outstanding, [worth] about $1.2 trillion.”2713 Four years later, at the end of 2005, their 
retained portfolios had an aggregate value of approximately $1.5 trillion.2714 As of June 
30, 2008, this figure ballooned to $1.8 trillion.2715 In contrast to their first line of 
business, the two housing GSEs’ retained portfolio line of business is both more 
profitable and has grown more rapidly. Although it is debatable whether their retained 
portfolios are necessary for fulfilling the demands imposed by their federal charters, the 
profits generated by those portfolios provide a compelling incentive for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to engage in that line of business. 
At this point, one may be tempted to believe that the question of whether Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac should engage in the retained portfolio line of business is one that 
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is of minimal importance. Maybe this line of business assists the two housing GSEs with 
meeting the requirements of their federal charters, or perhaps it does not. In either case, 
one could reason, this line of business is, by the most unfavorable appraisal, a mere 
opportunistic pursuit of profit. Even if their retained portfolios are not directly assisting 
their federally mandated efforts to create a stable and liquid secondary mortgage market, 
these portfolios are not detracting from those efforts and should, subsequently, be 
permitted. 
Such a conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that the two housing GSEs’ 
retained portfolios were at the heart of political concerns over the extent to which Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac should be regulated in the early 2000’s. At first glance, this is a 
surprising claim. As mentioned before, Fannie Mae’s original line of business, dating 
back to 1938, was its retained portfolio line of business. Furthermore, from at least 1990 
for Fannie Mae and 1980 for Freddie Mac, the total amount of their respective 
outstanding issued mortgage-backed securities, excluding the mortgage-backed securities 
that were held in their portfolios, exceeded the total amount of their retained 
portfolios.2716 So whatever the concern over the retained portfolios happened to be, the 
securitization-and-guarantee line of business is larger. One may wonder, then, why their 
securitization-and-guarantee line of business was not the focal point of regulation 
discussions in the early 2000’s. Why was there concern over regulating Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in the first place? I will address each of these questions in turn. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2716 W. Scott Frame and Lawrence J. White, “Fussing and Fuming over Fannie and Freddie: How Much 
Smoke, How Much Fire?,” 172. 
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6.6. Why the Retained Portfolio Line of Business is Riskier Than the  
       Securitization-and-Guarantee Line of Business 
 
Before examining Congress’ efforts to regulate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 
the early 2000’s, it would be helpful to explain why their respective retained portfolio 
lines of business were a congressional cause for concern during this time. Briefly stated, 
although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s securitization-and-guarantee line of business 
was bigger, their retained portfolio line of business was, and continues to be, far riskier. 
As mentioned before, in their securitization-and-guarantee line of business, one who 
invests in a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac mortgage-backed security assumes all of the 
risks accompanying that investment, except for the credit risk, which is borne by either of 
the housing GSEs. Conversely, in their retained portfolio line of business, it is Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac themselves who assume all of the risks associated with investing in 
their own mortgage-backed securities, with interest-rate risk being the most dangerous 
one.  
Interest-rate risk exists because market interest rates change and are extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict. It is important to note that, regardless of whether 
interest rates rise or fall, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s retained portfolio line of 
business can be harmed. To return to a previous example, if either of the housing GSEs 
borrow money from investors at, say, 4%, and purchase and hold mortgages that pay an 
average of 5%, they will make a handsome profit.2717 However, if the interest rates on the 
funds that they borrowed from investors eventually rises to 6%, the two housing GSEs 
will lose money as long as they are paying investors “above the average rate [that] they 
                                                 
2717 Peter J. Wallison, “Fannie and Freddie’s Gambit.” 
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receive on the mortgages in their portfolios.”2718 In other words, the cost of borrowing 
money can unexpectedly rise, which can, in turn, transform once-profitable mortgage 
payment streams into investment losses.  
Another troubling aspect of interest-rate risk is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
can also experience losses if interest rates fall. Homeowners tend to refinance their 
mortgages when interest rates go down. If either of the housing GSEs are holding 
mortgages that happen to be refinanced in their portfolios, those mortgage loans are, from 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s perspective, repaid in full. Although they could opt to buy 
and hold replacement mortgages, those mortgages would probably have interest rates at 
the prevailing, lower rate, meaning that borrowers would be paying less in interest 
charges. The situation can become especially grave for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if 
an influx of mortgages in their mortgage-backed securities are paid off (refinanced) 
before the bonds that helped finance the purchase of those securities mature. The 
challenge is that, in such a situation, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would have previously 
“locked” themselves into an interest rate that they are obligated to pay their bond 
investors, but the projected source of funding the interest due on those bonds (mortgage 
payments made by borrowers over the course of a predetermined time) has now 
disappeared.  
Exactly how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac attempt to grapple with mismatches 
between the life of mortgages in their mortgage-backed securities and the life of the 
bonds that fund the purchase of those mortgage-backed securities – let alone how the two 
housing GSEs accommodate rising and falling market interest rates - is a question that 
cannot be explored in this study. The key point is that the form of interest-rate risk that 
                                                 
2718 Ibid. 
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has just been described is one of the primary reasons that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
retained portfolio line of business is much riskier than their securitization-and-guarantee 
line of business. In the latter line of business, investors assume the interest-rate risk, 
while the housing GSEs simply take on the credit risk. In the retained portfolio line of 
business, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are exposed to both types of risk.2719 
It would be amiss not to mention that, time and again, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the early 2000’s denied that their retained portfolios were risky and resisted any 
congressionally enforced limitations on their portfolios. The two-pronged argument that 
the two housing GSEs put forth to delegitimize claims that their retained portfolios were 
risky was: (1) their retained portfolios are mostly homogenous, consisting almost entirely 
of residential mortgages, which makes the retained portfolios easier to manage; and (2) 
residential mortgages are among the safest investments available. Combining the two 
parts of the argument, one can arrive at the conclusion that the housing GSEs’ retained 
portfolios carry with them very little risk, since residential mortgages are safe assets to 
own and the retained portfolios themselves contain mostly the same type of product, 
residential mortgages.2720  
R. Glenn Hubbard, Dean of the Columbia University Graduate School of 
Business, argued in a 2004 Fannie Mae-commissioned paper that the homogeneity of the 
housing GSE’s mortgage-based balance sheet was a boon, since losses on mortgages 
                                                 
2719 Jerry Knight, “Loan Refinancings Put the Squeeze on Fannie Mae,” The Washington Post (September 
23, 2002).  
2720 Daniel Mudd, the former CEO of Fannie Mae, presented this argument practically word for word in his 
written response to a question asked by Senator Mel Martinez. Mudd’s response was part of his testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on June 15, 2006. Mudd affirmed, 
“Fannie Mae invests exclusively in residential mortgages – among the safest assets in the world – which 
allows us to focus on managing their risks, making it less complex for us than managing the range of assets 
that others do.” United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “The OFHEO 
Report of the Special Examination of Fannie Mae,” 138. 
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have been historically low.2721 Hubbard also maintained that Fannie Mae’s risk on a 
“stand-alone” basis was low in absolute as well as relative terms. In absolute terms, the 
probability of Fannie Mae defaulting on their obligations, according to Hubbard, stood at 
around one in 1,000. Relative to other large commercial banks, Hubbard stated that the 
likelihood of a Fannie Mae default was lower, with a lower expected loss should a default 
actually take place.2722 In a later section, I will touch upon another purported reason why 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resisted limitations on their retained portfolios: because 
such limitations would have inhibited their ability to fulfill the demands of their chartered 
mission. 
 
6.7. The Deterioration of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Reputations: The 
       Early 2000’s 
 
From 1995 to 2003, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were highly profitable 
companies. In each of those years, Fannie Mae was ranked in the Top 30 of Fortune 
magazine’s “Most Profitable Companies” list, while Freddie Mac consistently ranked in 
the Top 65. Whereas Fannie Mae posted $2.131 billion in profits in 1995, they posted 
$4.618 billion in profits in 2003. Freddie Mac, on the other hand, posted $983 million in 
profits in 1995 and, eight years later in 2003, posted an extraordinary $5.764 billion in 
                                                 
2721 Canfield &Associates, “Fannie Mae’s Commissioned Report by Economist Hubbard Concludes ‘the 
GSEs are not very risky’,” The GSE Report (September 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.gsereport.com/2004/Sept 6-Sept 20.pdf, 12. Hubbard’s paper is entitled “The Relative Risk of 
Fannie Mae,” Fannie Mae Papers, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (2004). 
2722 R. Glenn Hubbard, “The Relative Risk of Fannie Mae.” James C. Miller III and James E. Pearce, in a 
2006 paper prepared for Freddie Mac, cite Hubbard’s findings with approval. This paper is entitled, 
“Revisiting the Net Benefits of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,” Paper Prepared for Freddie Mac 
(November 2006), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/pdf/2006 Pearce Miller 
report.pdf. 
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profits.2723 In total, Fannie Mae made over $32.5 billion during those eight years and 
Freddie Mac made over $21 billion.2724 One can also get an idea of the two housing 
GSEs’ phenomenal growth by considering that, from 1984-1998, Fannie Mae’s stock 
rose 14,000%, outperforming 99.8% of all United States equity investments. Freddie 
Mac’s stock, from 1989-1998, actually outperformed that of Fannie Mae!2725 
Accompanying their profitability, during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s the two 
housing GSEs enjoyed, for the most part, a very positive public image. A November 4, 
2001 article in The New York Times featured the headline, “Learning to Love Fannie and 
Freddie,” and applied American actress Mae West’s famous quote that “too much of a 
good thing can be wonderful” to the way that Wall Street security analysts felt about 
Fannie Mae.2726 The housing GSE was one of eleven companies profiled in the 2001 best 
selling business book Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap… and Others 
Don’t, written by Jim Collins. At one point in the book, Collins expresses his 
astonishment over Fannie Mae’s profit performance and asks, “Who would have thought 
that Fannie Mae would beat companies like GE and Coca-Cola?”2727 The two housing 
GSEs were also the top charitable contributors in Washington D.C. in 2001, according to 
                                                 
2723 This information was found at CNNMoney magazine’s “Fortune 500 Database,” available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500_archive/full/1955. 
2724 Ibid. 
2725 Canfield & Associates, “The GSE Report Special Supplement: GSE Expansion into Subprime and 
Home Equity Lending, Private Gain at Public Cost,” (March 1999), available at 
http://www.thegsereport.com/SSS/GSEExpansion.pdf, 11. 
2726 Robert D. Hershey, Jr., “Learning to Love Fannie and Freddie,” The New York Times (November 4, 
2001), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/business/investing-learning-to-love-fannie-and-
freddie.html. 
2727 Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap… and Others Don’t (New York: 
HarperBusiness Press, 2001), 6. 
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the Washington Business Journal, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac making 
contributions of $27.1 million and $13.8 million, respectively.2728 
Fannie Mae was recognized as one of “America’s Most Admired Companies” by 
Fortune magazine and, in the spring of 2004, Business Ethics magazine ranked it #1 in its 
list of the “100 Best Corporate Citizens.” The criteria used to inform this ranking 
included the company’s service to stockholders, employees, customers, and the 
community. This ranking was not an anomaly. Business Ethics magazine ranked Fannie 
Mae #9 in 2000, #3 in 2001, #3 in 2002, and #12 in 2003.2729 In January of 2003, 
Standard and Poor’s gave Fannie Mae a corporate governance score of a 9 out of 10, 
noting that the housing GSE was “not only demonstrating its own strong governance 
practices,” but it was also “showing leadership in the United States with regard to 
providing greater openness and disclosure about its corporate governance standards.”2730 
As for Freddie Mac, it appeared on Fortune magazine’s list of “America’s Most Admired 
Companies” for six straight years, and Business Ethics magazine ranked it #10 and #26 in 
2001 and 2002, respectively, in its list of the “100 Best Corporate Citizens.”2731  
The year 2003, as Peter Wallison observes, “became a turning point” for the two 
housing GSEs, however.2732 Part of the fallout from the Enron scandal, which surfaced in 
late 2001, was that the ruined company’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, voluntarily 
surrendered its licenses to practice as Certified Public Accountants in the United 
                                                 
2728 Jacqueline L. Salmon, “In the Business of Giving, Bit of a Boom During 2001,” The Washington Post, 
(March 28, 2002). 
2729 Business Ethics, “100 Best Corporate Citizens,” available at http://www.thecro.com. Business Ethics 
magazine is now called the Corporate Responsibility Officer magazine. 
2730 United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “The OFHEO Report of the 
Special Examination of Fannie Mae,” (June 15, 2006), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate05sh109.html, 19. 
2731 Ibid. 
2732 Peter J. Wallison, “The Evolution of a Policy Idea: How Restrictions on the Size of the GSEs’ 
Portfolios Became the Central Issue in Reform of Their Regulation.” 
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States.2733 Arthur Andersen was found guilty of obstructing justice in June of 2002 
because “it destroyed Enron Corp. documents while on notice of a federal 
investigation.”2734 Prior to this development, Arthur Andersen was Freddie Mac’s 
auditor. 
On March 6, 2002, Freddie Mac selected PricewaterhouseCoopers as its new 
auditor. Early the next year, in January of 2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers raised questions 
about whether Freddie Mac “had properly accounted for its portfolio of derivatives.”2735 
An investigation was launched shortly thereafter, one that eventually revealed that 
Freddie Mac “had manipulated its earnings in order to reduce reported volatility,” 
apparently in an effort to make its profits appear to have been growing more steadily.2736 
On June 9, 2003, the president of Freddie Mac, David Glenn, was fired after he admitted 
that he had altered a notebook that contained notes of business meetings, which 
obstructed the investigation.2737 Freddie Mac’s two other most senior officials, CEO 
Leland Brendsel and CFO Vaughn Clarke, followed suit by stepping down abruptly.2738 
Ultimately, it came to light that Freddie Mac had understated2739 its profits for years and 
eventually it agreed to a $5 billion restatement.2740 
                                                 
2733 Ibid., “Regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Now it Gets Serious.” 
2734 Luisa Beltran, Brett Gering, and Alice Martin, “Andersen Guilty: Once Grand Accounting Firm Now 
Faces Five Years Probation, $500,000 fine and possibly its own end,” CNNMoney (March 16, 2002), 
available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/06/13/news/andersen_verdict. 
2735 Alex Berenson, “Mortgage Concern in Broad Shake-Up,” The New York Times (June 10, 2003), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/10/business/mortgage-concern-in-broad-shake-up.html. 
2736 Peter J. Wallison, “Regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Now it Gets Serious.” 
2737 Alex Berenson, “Mortgage Concern in Broad Shake-Up.” 
2738 Ibid. Brendsel retired and Clarke resigned. 
2739 Ibid., “Report Says Freddie Misled Investors,” The New York Times (July 24, 2003). Berenson notes 
that Freddie Mac “faced the uncommon problem of having profits that substantially exceeded forecasts,” 
which prompted the housing GSE to understate earnings for the sake of creating “a reserve of earnings for 
later years.” The understating of the profits also enabled Freddie Mac to closer approximate Wall Street’s 
forecasts, projecting the illusion of steadier growth than what was actually taking place. 
2740 Bethany McLean, “The Fall of Fannie Mae.” 
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Fannie Mae responded to the Freddie Mac scandal with what Bethany McLean 
describes as “astonishing self-righteousness.”2741 The CEO of Fannie Mae at the time, 
Franklin Raines, held a press conference “in which he accused Freddie of causing 
‘collateral damage.’”2742 Eager to distance itself from Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae added 
the following statement to its “Frequently Asked Questions” section of its website: 
“Fannie Mae’s reported financial results follow Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles to the letter… There should be no question about our accounting.”2743 
One of the most significant parts of this scandal was that Freddie Mac’s regulator, 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), issued “a glowing report” 
on Freddie Mac’s accounting practices and financial statements just five days before the 
firing of David Glenn,2744 deeming Freddie Mac’s internal controls to be “accurate and 
reliable.”2745 This embarrassing regulatory failure prompted Congressman Richard Baker, 
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets at the time, to declare that the 
two housing GSEs’ “current regulatory oversight” was inadequate2746 and ignited one of 
the most fascinating political struggles of the young century.  
The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 
created OFHEO, which was an independent office within the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). Broadly speaking, the 1992 Act created two regulators for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. HUD was charged with “mission regulation,” or ensuring 
that the two housing GSEs were fulfilling the requirements of their respective chartered 
                                                 
2741 Ibid. 
2742 Ibid. 
2743 Ibid. 
2744 Kathleen Day and David S. Hilzenrath, “Restatement to Add Billions to Freddie Profits; Adjustment to 
Cover Three Years,” The Washington Post (June 26, 2003). 
2745 Bethany McLean, “The Fall of Fannie Mae.” 
2746 Kathleen Day and David S. Hilzenrath, “Restatement to Add Billions to Freddie Profits; Adjustment to 
Cover Three Years.” 
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missions. OFHEO, the other regulator, was designed to oversee the safety and soundness 
regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, eventually establishing capital standards for 
them and performing regulatory audits of their operations.2747 According to Bethany 
McLean, the very existence of OFHEO was, interestingly enough, an “illustration of 
Fannie’s political power.”2748 OFHEO’s budget came from fees paid by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, enabling the latter to “effectively control” the former.2749 McLean also calls 
attention to how propitious it must have been for the two housing GSEs to have OFHEO 
placed within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, a department that had 
no prior experience regulating financial markets.2750  
To give one illustration of the ineffectiveness of OFHEO in overseeing the safety 
and soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, one should consider that Federal 
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 required that OFHEO 
establish a risk-based capital rule for the two housing GSEs by December 1, 1994. The 
purpose of the rule was to contribute to making Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac safer 
financial institutions by determining the level of capital that they needed to possess in 
order to withstand a ten-year stress test. Significantly, the rule did not become effective 
until September of 2001, nearly seven years after the congressionally mandated deadline. 
In this light, one can begin to comprehend why Former Treasury official, Richard S. 
Carnell, deemed OFHEO to be a watchdog that was “hobbled, muzzled, and 
                                                 
2747 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Report to Congress on the Root 
Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,” (January 2010), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/foreclosure_09.pdf, 55. 
2748 Bethany McLean, “The Fall of Fannie Mae.” 
2749 Ibid. 
2750 Ibid. 
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underfed.”2751 It is in this context that OFHEO failed to identify Freddie Mac’s earnings 
manipulation. 
Shortly after the Freddie Mac accounting scandal, OFHEO, under the leadership 
of director Armando Falcon, resolved to embark on a more thorough examination of 
Fannie Mae. Mortified by their failure to detect any malfeasance at Freddie Mac, and 
concerned that Fannie Mae may have also manipulated its accounting, OFHEO hired, in 
early 2004, the accounting firm Deloitte and Touche with Bob Maxant, the man who 
handled “the Enron board’s in-house investigation,” as the lead partner.2752 Later that 
same year, on September 17, 2004, OFHEO released a 211-page report on Fannie Mae 
entitled “Report of Findings to Date,” which contained allegations of accounting and 
management failure at the housing GSE. The report was the product of reviewing “over 
200,000 documents and e-mails” and “hundreds of interviews and depositions of current 
and former staff at Fannie Mae.”2753 In the report, OFHEO called into question Fannie 
Mae’s “previously reported financial results, the adequacy of [their] regulatory capital, 
the quality of [their] managerial supervision and [their] overall safety and soundness.”2754 
Moreover, OFHEO accused Fannie Mae of maintaining “a corporate culture that 
emphasized stable earnings at the expense of accurate financial disclosures.”2755 
                                                 
2751 Ibid. 
2752 Ibid. 
2753 United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, “The OFHEO Report: Allegations of Accounting and Management Failure at 
Fannie Mae,” (October 6, 2004), available at 
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2754 Ibid. 
2755 David S. Hilzenrath, “Report Slams Fannie Mae: U.S. Regulators Find Accounting Failures at Housing 
Financier,” The Washington Post (September 23, 2004). 
510 
 
A “dramatic”2756 hearing before the United States House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and the Government Sponsored Enterprises 
took place on October 6, 2004 to discuss the findings of the OFHEO report. In the 
opening statement of the hearing, Chairman Richard Baker announced that he had 
attempted to acquire information detailing “the levels of executive compensation” at 
Fannie Mae, information “that had not been made public previously.”2757 Within days, 
Baker affirmed, Fannie Mae “made it clear that civil actions would be filed… if the 
information were to be released.”2758 When Baker asked Franklin Raines, the CEO of 
Fannie Mae at the time, about whether executive bonuses were triggered by earnings-per-
share determinations, Raines, after initially responding in the affirmative, proceeded to 
complain of the “very small type” on the executive compensation chart that Baker 
presented.2759 Raines also protested that the information was “confidential” and protected 
“by the laws of the United States.”2760 Seemingly in an effort to avoid answering Baker’s 
questions about the levels of executive compensation at Fannie Mae, Raines proceeded to 
change the subject by stating that “earnings per share” had nothing to do with a Fannie 
Mae employee’s salary, nor with the fringe benefits that such an employee would 
receive.2761 When Baker clarified that he was not asking about salaries or fringe benefits, 
but of the $245 million in bonuses that was paid out at Fannie Mae between 1998 and 
                                                 
2756 Peter J. Wallison, “Regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Now it Gets Serious.” 
2757 United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government 
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2003, Congressman Barney Frank interrupted the inquiry and asked Baker if all of the 
rest of the representatives would “get this much time.”2762  
Baker’s concern over the exorbitant bonuses being paid to executives of a 
company that has a public mission and receives government privileges is 
understandable.2763 Yet, as Wallison correctly states, “the tenor of things in Congress was 
still so supportive of the GSEs that Armando Falcon… received a far more hostile 
reception than Raines” during the hearing.2764 Consider, for example, the outburst of 
Congressman William Lacy Clay, who declared that the entire hearing was “about the 
political lynching of Franklin Raines.”2765 
To further demonstrate this point, one can look at how Congressman Michael 
Capuano defended Fannie Mae during his interrogation of Armando Falcon. Here is a 
portion of their remarkable exchange: 
 
Capuano: I guess in the normal course of events, absent different issues, 
          and not all the time, is it not a normal circumstance where many 
                entities within the rules of GAAP (Generally Accepted 
                          Accounting Principles), within the rules of various FAS’s  
       (Financial Accounting Standards) and other accounting  
      Procedures and tax procedures, try to on occasion smooth out  
      earnings? Is that not something that happens here and there in 
      the business world? 
  
 Falcon:    If it happens, it is wrong. It is not proper to try to smooth out 
      earnings by violating accounting rules. 
 
 Capuano: I did not say violate it. You did not hear the question. Within the 
      rules of accounting, within the rules allowed by various regulators, 
                                                 
2762 Ibid. 
2763 In May of 1999, then-CEO of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines promised investors that, over the course of 
the next five years, the company would double its earnings per share, having it grow by 15% each year. 
Please see: “Major Investor Sells Stake in Fannie Mae,” The Washington Post (March 13, 2001). 
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      there are times and certain situations that it is allowed. 
 
 Falcon:    If it is within the rules of accounting, it is not improper. 
 
 Capuano: So within the rules, the concept of smoothing out earnings in and 
      of itself is not a violation…2766  
 
A little later in the interrogation of Falcon, Congressman Spencer Bachus proceeded with 
a line of questioning that essentially amounted to a prolonged gripe over “somebody” 
prematurely disclosing the substance of the report to The Wall Street Journal, reminding 
Falcon that the disclosure of nonpublic information was a violation of OFHEO 
guidelines, and insinuating that he had not done enough to identify the party or parties 
that were responsible for the leak of information.2767 Most memorable of all was 
Congressman Artur Davis’ interrogation, which was so forceful and accusatory that 
Falcon felt forced to proclaim, “We are just trying to do our job as a regulator. You can 
question my motives, my judgment, even my qualifications… but that will not change the 
contents of the report.”2768  
In a later statement, Chairman Baker said that some of the committee members 
“verbally assaulted” Falcon during the hearing.2769 A congressional aide, recalling what 
had transpired during the hearing, said, “I have never seen anyone treated as 
disrespectfully as Armando Falcon was by the Democrats and by Franklin Raines.”2770 
For his part, Falcon declared that the Democrats on the committee were “so blinded by 
their loyalty to Fannie” that they could not see what was really happening.2771 
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 One should note that, despite the overall hostile reception of the 2004 OFHEO 
report by the House subcommittee, the Securities and Exchange Commission began an 
informal investigation of its own, intriguingly at the insistence of Fannie Mae, and it 
eventually vindicated both the report and Falcon. On December 15, 2004, about thirty 
people, including Raines, Falcon, three members of Fannie Mae’s board, representatives 
from two accounting firms, and Justice Department officials “piled into a conference 
room at the SEC headquarters in Washington D.C.”2772 During this meeting, the SEC’s 
chief accountant, Donald Nicolaisen, “announced that Fannie Mae did not comply ‘in 
material respects’ with accounting rules, and that as a result, Fannie would have to restate 
its results.”2773 Raines responded to the accusation by asking what Fannie Mae had done 
wrong. Nicolaisen famously answered Raines by holding up a piece of paper and stating 
that if “the four corners of the sheet represented what was possible under GAAP, and the 
center was perfect compliance… [then] ‘you weren’t even on the page.’”2774 When 
Fannie Mae representatives attempted to argue that if they could not follow the principles 
properly then no one could, Nicolaisen responded, “Many companies out there get it 
right.”2775 
 In the end, the SEC concluded that Fannie Mae had violated accounting rules in 
its treatment of derivatives and loans, and required the housing GSE to “restate its 
earnings over the previous four years.”2776 It was soon discovered that the combination of 
mismanagement, earnings manipulation, and unconstrained growth resulted in an 
estimated $10.8 billion in losses. Fannie Mae’s Board of Directors allowed Raines to 
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“retire” on December 20, 2004, receiving an annual pension of $1.37 million, $5.8 
million in stock options, and $8.7 million in deferred compensation to be paid through 
2020.2777 After it was disclosed that Raines would be retiring, he publicly stated, “By my 
early retirement, I have held myself accountable.”2778 In 2007, Raines sued OFHEO for 
delaying his receipt of a $3.9 million stock award.2779 The Chief Financial Officer of 
Fannie Mae at the time, J. Timothy Howard, was fired on December 21, 2004 and he 
ended up receiving an annual pension of $432,852, stock options worth $4.4 million, and 
$4 million in deferred compensation.2780  
 As it turned out, the “revelations about the GSEs’ distorted accounting… had 
more far-reaching effects than the dismissal of [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s] top 
officers.”2781 One could no longer assume that the two housing GSEs were well-run 
institutions, which consequently underscored questions involving the risks that they 
posed to the economy. St. Louis Reserve President, William Poole, stated in a January 
13, 2005 speech that a GSE crisis could have a tsunami-like impact on the financial 
markets.2782 The Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, openly 
expressed concern over the dangers posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, stating, “I 
believe the evidence clearly shows that the current regulatory structure is not well-
equipped to oversee the operations and effectively monitor the risks of the large and 
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complex housing GSEs.”2783 Major media outlets, such as The Wall Street Journal, The 
Washington Post, and The Financial Times even “began to assign reporters to the Fannie 
and Freddie ‘beat.’”2784 Over the course of one and a half years, from June of 2003 
through December of 2004, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s operations were no longer 
above suspicion. 
 
6.8. The Failure of Congress to Reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Prior to 
       the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Group Bias in Action 
 
 Politically, there appears to have been at least a modicum of awareness amongst 
some of the members of Congress that the regulation of the two housing GSEs prior to 
and during these scandals was inadequate. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine 
these bills in detail, but quick mention of them will demonstrate that, since the turn of the 
century, Congress did, in fact, discuss possible reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The first bill to appear in the 2000’s came from Congressman Richard Baker, who 
introduced H.R. 3703, the “Housing Finance Regulatory Improvement Act,” on February 
29, 2000. Congressman Baker expressed concern at a March 22, 2000 hearing before the 
United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, 
and Government-Sponsored Enterprises that eight years after the creation of OFHEO, a 
stress test designed for determining the capital adequacy of Fannie Mae and Freddie had 
yet to be implemented, despite a congressionally mandated deadline in 1994.2785 H.R. 
3703 contained provisions for establishing a single regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
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Mac and also for eliminating their respective lines of credit with the United States 
Treasury Department. Although hearings were held discussing the bill, H.R. 3703 never 
made it to the House of Representatives for a vote. 
On July 15, 2002, Congressman Ron Paul introduced a bill, H.R. 5126, to the 
House Committee on Financial Services. The bill was entitled the “Free Housing Market 
Enhancement Act” and it sought to “prohibit the provision of Federal funds to the 
housing-related government-sponsored enterprises and to remove certain competitive 
advantages granted under law to such enterprises.”2786 These “competitive advantages” 
included Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s line of credit with the United States Treasury as 
well as “their SEC exemption, their exemption from state and local taxes, the president’s 
authority to appoint five members of their board of directors… and the authority for 
national banks to make unlimited investments in the GSEs’ obligations.”2787 This bill was 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, but it too was never voted upon, 
so it failed to become a law as well. 
 A little over a year later and the month following the eruption of the Freddie Mac 
scandal, on July 31, 2003, Senator Charles Hagel, along with Senate co-sponsors 
Elizabeth Dole, Trent Lott, John McCain, and John Sununu, introduced a bill, S. 1508, 
entitled “The Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2003.” It is worth 
noting that, similar to H.R. 3703, the bill aimed to establish a single, unified, 
strengthened regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, eliminating the dual-regulators 
of HUD and OFHEO. On March 31, 2004, the day before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs was scheduled to hold an executive session to work 
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on the bill, Fannie Mae launched a television advertisement that featured “a worried 
looking Hispanic couple” expressing concern over the bill. The advertisement contained 
the following dialogue: 
 Man: Uh-oh. 
 Woman: What? 
 Man: It looks like Congress is talking about new regulations for Fannie Mae. 
 Woman: Will that keep us from getting a lower mortgage rate? 
 Man: Some economists say rates may go up. 
 Woman: But that could mean we won’t be able to afford the new house. 
 Man: I know.2788 
The next day, on April 1, 2004, the bill passed in the Senate Banking Committee, with 
the Democrats unanimously opposing. With the Republicans in the Senate only holding 
51 seats at the time, presumably it was anticipated that S. 190 would never pass the 60-
vote cloture rule that was necessary for a Senate floor vote. Thus, the Senate never voted 
on the bill and S. 190 died in the 108th Congress. 
 A flurry of other congressional bills seeking to regulate the two housing GSEs 
also surfaced around the time of the Freddie Mac scandal, including H.R. 2022 
(sponsored by Congressmen Christopher Shays and Edward Markey), H.R. 2803 
(sponsored by Congressman Ed Royce), and H.R. 2117 (sponsored by Congressman 
Fortney Stark). All three bills were referred to the appropriate committees, but the House 
of Representatives never voted on any of them. 
 Senator Hagel, along with Senate co-sponsors Dole, McCain, and Sununu, 
reintroduced S. 190 on January 26, 2005, soon after the accounting scandal at Fannie 
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Mae came to the surface. The bill, entitled the “Federal Housing Enterprise Reform Act 
of 2005,” contained many of the provisions that were found in the 2003 version, though it 
also required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to “reduce their [retained] portfolios to near 
zero – permitting them only to accumulate mortgages for the purposes of 
securitization.”2789 On July 28, 2005, the Senate Banking Committee once again voted on 
S. 190, with the same end result: the bill passed, but all 9 of the Democratic Senators 
opposed. The Federal Housing Enterprise Reform Act of 2005 died in the 109th Congress. 
 Returning to the United States House of Representatives, Congressman Richard 
Baker once again sponsored a bill, H.R. 1461, which was entitled the “Federal Housing 
Finance Reform Act of 2005.” The bill was introduced to the House of Representatives 
on April 5, 2005. Similar to its S. 190 counterpart, H.R. 1461 aimed to reform the “safety 
and soundness” and “mission fulfillment” regulation of the two housing GSEs. The bill 
passed in the House on October 26, 2005 with a vote of 331-90. However, H.R. 1461 
never received the necessary 2/3 Senate vote, so it too died in the 109th Congress. 
 The purpose of mentioning these bills is to establish that Congress was cognizant, 
at least to some extent, of the potential dangers posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
before the subprime mortgage crisis erupted in 2007. Yet for any number of reasons, 
Congress was unable to muster the political willpower that was necessary to pass 
meaningful housing GSE reform legislation. In speaking in vague terms of “any number 
of reasons,” I am acknowledging that, in all likelihood, there were many factors that 
blocked congressional reform of the housing GSEs during this time period and, further, 
that each of those factors carried with them varying degrees of efficaciousness.  
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 Congressional fear of public backlash, for instance, is one potential reason why 
the House of Representatives and the Senate failed to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. Ralph Nader once declared, “What makes it difficult to deal in any rational manner 
with Fannie and Freddie’s power is the fact that these GSEs are wrapped around a 
product – housing – that is right up there in the American psyche with apple pie and 
motherhood.”2790 During a June 15, 2000 hearing before the House Banking 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 
Nader acknowledged that proponents of housing GSE reform are “immediately 
bombarded” with charges that they are “destroying the great American dream of home 
ownership” from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2791 Nevertheless, Nader added, “For far 
too long… Congress has played the role of an indulgent parent to the GSEs. The GSEs 
have long since grown beyond adolescence.”2792 Nader’s observations have proven to be 
prescient and warrant a few words of elaboration.  
The cultural climate in America promoted and continues to promote 
homeownership not only as a good, but, by and large, as an unassailable good. One of 
Fannie Mae’s slogans was “We’re in the American Dream Business,” while one of 
Freddie Mac’s was “Opening the Doors to Homeownership.”2793 It would be difficult to 
deny that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac attempted to capitalize on the value that many 
Americans placed on homeownership, whether in their efforts to resist legislation that 
they perceived to be unfavorable or in their advertisements.  
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Consider this example, one that is taken from an incident that occurred in May of 
2000. As mentioned before, Congressman Richard Baker introduced a bill, H.R. 3703, on 
February 29, 2000, which contained provisions for creating a single regulator for Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, limiting their non-mission related investments, eliminating their 
lines of credit with the United States Treasury, and subjecting them to “tougher approval 
standards for new products and business activities.”2794 Congressman Baker stated that 
the legislation was needed because the size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed “a 
potential threat to taxpayers, who might be asked to bail them out if they fall into 
financial trouble.”2795 It will be shown in a later section that Baker’s premonition was 
well founded. 
Fannie Mae’s response to this legislation is telling. The Chairman and CEO 
Fannie Mae at the time, Franklin Raines, announced that the company was under 
“attack,” and the housing GSE launched an initiative that they called The Coalition for 
Homeownership.2796 Prior to a House Banking Committee hearing on H.R. 3703, Fannie 
Mae contacted constituents in all of the districts of the committee members and 
purchased lists of homeowners in those areas from vendors.2797 A telemarketing firm then 
called those homeowners, soliciting their opposition to H.R. 3703 measures. The 
Coalition for Homeownership also circulated letters to homeowners in those designated 
areas, suggesting that the mere scheduling of the House Banking Committee hearing on 
H.R. 3703 already “raised [mortgage] interest rates” and “denied homeownership to 
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206,000 families.”2798 One of the letters bluntly stated, “I hope you will fight against 
Congressman Baker’s bill, H.R. 3703, which would increase the cost of 
homeownership.”2799 
Congressman Donald Manzullo, one of the members of the House Banking 
Committee, received over 2,000 letters from constituents in his district that had signed 
petitions “in support of lowering the cost of homeownership and lowering mortgage 
interest rates.”2800 Another member of the committee, Congressman John Sweeney, 
complained that his office had been “barraged by 5,000 letters, mail-grams and e-mails 
from Fannie Mae and the Coalition for Homeownership.”2801 When Congressman 
Manzullo “directed his staff to call 30 constituents whose names were on the Fannie Mae 
letters,” he discovered that many of the constituents “could not remember the letter or 
[did not] have any idea about the bill or who contacted them,” though some of them 
thought that a “non-profit affordable housing group” had organized the movement.2802 
Congressman Manzullo eventually accused Fannie Mae of conducting a “bogus” 
grassroots lobbying campaign against H.R. 3703.2803 Still, the House of Representatives 
never voted upon H.R. 3703, so the bill never became a law. 
Predictably, the good of homeownership was the centerpiece of many of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s advertisements.  In 1996, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that 
Fannie Mae’s television advertisements, like ones featuring “families or young couples 
struggling with housing and credit issues,” were consistent with its chartered mission of 
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increasing homeownership.2804 One of those advertisements depicted “a woman on a bus 
dreaming about the wonderful life she would have if she could afford to buy the 
Victorian-style home she is passing on her way downtown.”2805 Another advertisement 
featured “puppies gambol[ing] in the yard as families beam proudly outside new homes 
acquired with capital” from Fannie Mae.2806 Advertisements of this sort were part of 
Fannie Mae’s “educational outreach program,” which itself was part of the Fannie Mae 
Foundation that was established in 1979.2807 Though data was difficult to locate, the 
Fannie Mae Foundation spent approximately $43 million on advertising in 1998,2808 $48 
million in 2001,2809 and $87.2 million in 2003 and 2004 combined.2810 According to John 
McKinnon, “the Fannie Mae Foundation spends more of its money on advertising than 
anything else,” including its contributions to charitable organizations.2811  
John Buckley, then-senior vice president of communications at Fannie Mae, 
explained that the company devotes so much money to advertising because it is “vital to 
us to make sure people understand that if we weren’t there, there would be higher 
mortgage rates and a significantly less consumer-oriented mortgage finance system.”2812 
One Freddie Mac advertisement, that appeared in the middle of July of 2000, compared 
the 3% mortgage downpayment it offers to its American customers to “other countries” 
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that require their borrowers to make mortgage downpayments as high as 50%.2813 The 
text of the advertisement asked, “Why are homebuyers in America so much better off?” 
and then proceeded to answer its own question by stating “because America has a 
secondary mortgage market to provide funds for home mortgages,” of which “Freddie 
Mac is a critical part.”2814 
In late 1999, Fannie Mae sponsored a series of advertisements that targeted their 
critics, portraying them as “a cabal of anonymous executives plotting to drive up 
mortgage rates.”2815 One print advertisement in particular consisted of “an overhead 
photo” that showed “a half-dozen people sitting around a table drinking coffee” with the 
caption: “Can you believe it? They're actually organizing the Coalition for Higher 
Mortgage costs.”2816 In another Fannie Mae print advertisement, “the critics are shown as 
dark silhouettes, furtively plotting to ‘roll back products that cut consumers’ costs’.”2817 
The important point is that members of Congress had a powerful disincentive to 
pass legislation that would have strengthened the regulation of the two housing GSEs 
prior to the subprime mortgage crisis: perceived popular public dissent. Acting in a way 
that hindered how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conducted business ran the risk of being 
perceived or portrayed as impinging upon the value of homeownership and, hence, as 
acting against the will of American voters. Members of Congress that made the decision 
to show unconditional support for the housing GSEs as they were structured before the 
subprime mortgage crisis likely faced few, if any, immediate negative consequences.  
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Indeed, congressionally supporting the housing GSEs during this time was much 
more likely to be politically advantageous. Nicholas Kulish and Jacob M. Schlesinger 
mention in a 2001 article, written in The Wall Street Journal, how Fannie Mae won “the 
gratitude of politicians by staging local events with them, often to ‘announce’ its plans to 
buy local mortgages.”2818 As the two authors note, these publicity stunts were 
“invaluable” for the politicians, for they were able to “bask in the glow and score points 
with voters.”2819 Yet, the authors call attention to the strangeness of the relationship 
between Fannie Mae and members of Congress, as though “Ford or Microsoft could 
allow politicians to gain some credit with voters for every Escort or Windows package 
sold in their districts.”2820 One of the unique features of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
“product” is that politicians can publicly endorse homeownership without alienating any 
significant portion of voters. The near-universal American support for homeownership 
created a powerful incentive for members of Congress to avoid or delay investing any 
energy in reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in any substantial way prior to the 
outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis. Former Congressman Jim Leach beautifully 
expressed the spirit of this point when he noted that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “put 
their power to use protecting their vested interest, and it so happens that their vested 
interest in large, but not complete, measure is the public interest.”2821 Former Fannie Mae 
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CEO, Franklin Raines, conveyed this point even more concisely when, in describing his 
company, he stated, “We are what people have asked for.”2822 
A second potential reason for the sluggish congressional response to the need for 
reforming Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is that both of the housing GSEs spent sizeable 
sums of money on campaign contributions and hiring lobbyists to influence legislation. In 
terms of campaign contributions, the two housing GSEs, along with their employees, 
donated over $14.6 million to the campaign funds of dozens of members of Congress 
between 2000 and 2008.2823 A September 11, 2008 report, published by The Center for 
Responsive Politics, lists all 354 members of Congress who have received campaign 
contributions from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since the latter became a publicly traded 
company in 1989. The two housing GSEs and their employees were most generous over 
this period of time (with donations totaling $165,400) to the current Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development, Senator Christopher 
Dodd.2824 Ranking Member of the House Committee on Financial Services, Congressman 
Spencer Bachus, as well as the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senator Richard Shelby, were also among the ten members 
of Congress who received the most campaign contributions from the two housing GSEs 
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during this period of time. Congressman Bachus received $103,300, while Senator 
Shelby received $80,000.2825 
One should further note that in April of 2006, the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) fined Freddie Mac $3.8 million for violating federal campaign-finance laws. The 
FEC accused Freddie Mac of “using corporate resources to raise $1.7 million at political 
fundraisers, most of them for Republican members of Congress and many involving 
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Michael G. Oxley.”2826 The FEC probe 
of Freddie Mac’s internal documents revealed that its chief lobbyist, Mitchell Delk, 
organized an “orchestrated effort… to court key lawmakers through lavish dinners and 
other events.”2827 In the end, Delk’s effort “pumped money into the campaigns of more 
than 50 politicians who had direct oversight… or were considered supportive of” Freddie 
Mac.2828 In one particularly incriminating document, Delk wrote that over the course of 
holding “over 40 fundraisers” for Oxley, “[w]e [Freddie Mac] proposed to Chairman 
Oxley a political model that was bold and unprecedented. We offered to use our 
fundraising model to marry his interest as Chairman with our interest in assisting 
committee members supportive" of Freddie Mac's goals.2829 Another document, one that 
summarized Delk’s work at Freddie Mac from 2000-2003, noted that he had “held over 
75 events for members of House Financial Services Committee” raising almost $3 
million.2830 Of those 75 events, the document indicated, “90 percent” were held “to 
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benefit Chairman Oxley.”2831 Ultimately, Freddie Mac agreed to the $3.8 million 
settlement without admitting or denying that it had broken the law. FEC also honored 
Freddie Mac’s request for a “global settlement,” one that would include any wrongdoings 
committed by the company and all of its employees. This “global settlement” enabled 
Freddie Mac to avoid having to pay any civil fines that potentially could have been levied 
against Delk, former CEO Leland Brendsel, and any other Freddie Mac employee.2832 
As for lobbying members of Congress, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac spent over 
$165 million on political lobbying expenditures between 2000 and 2008.2833 This is, at 
first glance, a perplexing claim. Why would two companies that are sponsored by the 
government, possessing numerous government privileges, spend such a large sum of 
money lobbying members of Congress?  
In response to this question, Thomas Stanton persuasively argues that political 
risk, as opposed to economic risk, is the greatest threat to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
survival. As Stanton states, the two housing GSEs live or die “according to the value of 
the benefits provided by [their] enabling legislation”2834 instead of by “the financial 
acumen of their managers.”2835 Jim Johnson, who was the Chairman and CEO at Fannie 
Mae from 1991 to 1998, devised two strategies to manage political risk, ones “that he 
believed would insure that Congress never took away Fannie’s special status.”2836 
Johnson called the first strategy “indispensability” and the second one “tangibility.”2837 
As Bethany McLean explains, “[Johnson] wanted Congress to see that America couldn’t 
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live without Fannie Mae. And he wanted Fannie Mae to be practically synonymous with 
the idea of home-ownership.”2838 In an effort to provide a concrete example of how 
Fannie Mae attempted to cope with “political risk,” I will present an instructive anecdote. 
In the summer of 1994, Congressman Pete Stark scheduled a House District Committee 
hearing that was designed to focus on Washington D.C.’s budget problems. Part of 
Stark’s legislative proposal was to eliminate the statutory tax exemptions that Fannie Mae 
had enjoyed in the District for the sake of raising funds for other public purposes. 
Notably, only one witness testified in favor of the legislation, a housing activist from 
Boston who was “subjected to a harsh line of questioning by Congressman Cass 
Ballenger, who [in turn] was lobbied by Fannie Mae and held stock in the firm for several 
years.”2839  
Washington D.C. Council Chairman, David Clarke, initially supported the 
legislation and “intended to ask his council colleagues to vote in favor of taxing Fannie 
Mae.”2840 Fannie Mae was the District’s most profitable company at the time, and its tax 
break was estimated to be worth approximately $300 million a year. Eliminating the tax 
break would have served as a “simple solution to the District’s financial crisis,” and a 
D.C. Council vote in favor of this measure would have sent “a strong message to 
Congress,” the party responsible for making “the final decision about whether to permit 
any new tax” on Fannie Mae.2841  Clarke later admitted, however, that Fannie Mae was 
organizing people that it worked with in the District of Columbia to give him “a little bit 
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of heck,” so he elected not to put the matter on the council agenda.2842 Dennis Jacoby, 
Managing Director of the Financial Research Institute, based in Washington D.C., 
described Fannie Mae’s approach to blocking the legislation as an “iron fist in [a] velvet 
glove.”2843 I propose that this is an example of a housing GSE managing “political risk.” 
In sum, since the time that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each came into 
existence, Congress has always been the only party that has had the authority to alter or 
eliminate any of the privileges that the GSE status conferred to the two companies. Yet, 
Congress was in an “uncomfortable position” when it came to regulating the two housing 
GSEs. Patrick Barta frames the dilemma quite well: “Do they look the other way, because 
of all the good that Fannie and Freddie do? Or do they rein in the companies, reducing 
the likelihood of future problems but also possibly driving up mortgage rates and pushing 
some potential homeowners out of the market?”2844 On top of potentially raising 
mortgage interest rates and preventing “potential homeowners” from owning a home, 
congressional attempts to “rein in” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could have had 
politically ruinous consequences. Before the subprime mortgage crisis erupted, Peter 
Wallison affirmed that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “were the most powerful companies 
in the country, and literally controlled the Congress… Congress would not do anything 
that they did not want Congress to do – and that came through some very sophisticated 
political activities and public relations that made it very difficult to challenge them.”2845  
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A 1996 Congressional Budget Office report summarized the fragile and hazardous 
relationship between Congress and the two housing GSEs by noting that “once one 
agrees to share a canoe with a bear, it is hard to get him out without obtaining his 
agreement or getting wet.”2846 Leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, a 
congressional majority elected not to get the bear out of the canoe and instead idly stood 
by as the two housing GSEs layered excessive risk upon excessive risk until the 
companies imploded in the fall of 2008. 
 
6.9. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Serving Two Irreconcilable Masters2847 and 
       Torn Between Providing Two Sets of Particular Goods 
 
A further pertinent question that needs to be answered is: Why were Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac so reluctant to give up any of their government-conferred privileges, 
whether it was their $2.25 billion line of credit with the United States Treasury 
Department, their state and local tax exemptions, their highly leveraged retained 
portfolios,2848 or any of the other privileges enumerated above? In answering this 
question, it will become apparent that there is an inherent contradiction in the structure of 
the two housing GSEs.  
                                                 
2846 Congressional Budget Office, “Assessing the Public Costs and Benefits of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac,” 44. 
2847 I am borrowing the phrase “serving two irreconcilable masters” from a text edited by Peter Wallison, 
Serving Two Masters, Yet Out of Control (Washington: AEI Press, 2001). 
2848 During a June 15, 2006 hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
Acting Director of OFHEO, James Lockhart, asserted: “[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] have $1.5 trillion of 
debt outstanding, and they have used that debt to buy $1.4 trillion of assets. To hedge those assets, they 
have $1.3 trillion of derivatives, and on top of that they have $2.6 trillion in guarantees. And that is all built 
on a combined capital of only $75 billion.” United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, “The OFHEO Report of the Special Examination of Fannie Mae,” 24. In 2001, it was 
reported in The Birmingham Business Journal that “for every $10,000 in Fannie Mae’s $1.3 trillion book of 
business, it has reserved only $6 to cover losses.” This information came from the article “Think Private 
For Housing,” The Birmingham Business Journal (May 6, 2001), available at 
http://birmingham.bizjournals.com/birmingham/stories/2001/05/07/editorial1.html. 
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In December of 2004, the CEO of Freddie Mac at the time, Richard Syron, 
concisely offered one explanation for why the two housing GSEs resisted congressional 
efforts to retract any of their government-conferred privileges: 
Our critics can’t have it both ways. They can’t demand that we meet 
ambitious goals and at the same time strip away what makes us unique 
and treat us as if we were just another couple of private-sector financial 
institutions. Because those types of changes would make it 
all-but-impossible for us to serve our mission. And they would harm 
our partners just as they would harm the families we serve.2849  
 
In short, revoking any of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s privileges would have, in Syron’s 
estimation, impaired their ability to meet the expectations of either Congress or their 
shareholders, or perhaps both. It is the fact that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “have two 
irreconcilable roles,” they serve “two masters,” each with conflicting objectives, which 
makes a reduction in or revocation of their privileges unpalatable to them.2850 On one 
hand, the two housing GSEs are responsible for providing the particular goods of 
liquidity, stability, and affordability of mortgage credit across the country, yet they also 
have a fiduciary duty to provide the particular good of maximizing returns to their 
shareholders. Two contrasting quotes by Syron nicely bring out this tension.  
In his March 15, 2007 written testimony submitted to the House Committee on 
Financial Services, Syron speaks of the “awkward reality” of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac regulatory reform being a “delicate balancing act.”2851 According to Syron, Freddie 
Mac has a “responsibility to take into account the full impact of any proposed legislation 
                                                 
2849 Canfield & Associates, “Freddie Mac’s CEO Syron Warns of Unintended Consequences of GSE 
Regulatory Reform,” The GSE Report (December 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.gsereport.com/2004/nov. 29-dec. 10(2).pdf, 9. Syron made these remarks at an affordable 
housing symposium that was sponsored by The National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB). 
2850 Peter J. Wallison, Serving Two Masters, Yet Out of Control, 1. 
2851 Richard Syron, “Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on 
Financial Services,” (March 15, 2007), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htsyron031507.pdf, 15. 
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on our continuing ability to fulfill our statutory mission of providing liquidity, stability, 
and affordability to the nation’s housing markets.”2852 In another context, in March of 
2008, Syron was asked if Freddie Mac would raise capital to increase purchases and 
guarantees of home loans, in effect contributing to the liquidity of the secondary 
mortgage market, even though those actions would lead to diluting shareholder equity in 
the company. Syron unwaveringly affirmed, “This company will bow to no one on our 
responsibility to the shareholders… As long as we are what we are, it’s clear what our 
fiduciary responsibility is.”2853  
During a hearing conducted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in April 
of 2010, former Fannie Mae CEO, Daniel Mudd, reflected on this tension. Mudd 
affirmed, “On one hand, without revenue and profits and growth, [Fannie and Freddie] 
could not attract global capital to the U.S. housing market. And on the other hand, 
without meeting the mission goals for affordable housing and liquidity, [Fannie and 
Freddie] could not meet the requirements of their congressional charter.”2854 Mudd 
proceeded to claim that the GSEs “could not do what a private firm could do” once the 
mortgage market deteriorated, for they “had to stay in the market [and] provide 
liquidity.”2855 
In the event that a given piece of legislation is needed to help Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac satisfy the demands imposed by their federal charters – yet that same piece 
of legislation is anticipated to have a negative impact on the housing GSEs’ shareholders 
– what are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to do? Alternately put, what if Fannie Mae and 
                                                 
2852 Ibid., 12. 
2853 Peter J. Wallison, “Private Profits, Public Risks,” The Wall Street Journal (March 24, 2008). 
2854 Zachary Goldfarb, “Former Regulator, CEO Blame Each Other for Fannie’s Failure,” The Washington 
Post (April 10, 2010). 
2855 Ibid. 
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Freddie Mac grasp that moving forward with a given course of action will likely benefit 
their shareholders, but simultaneously detract from their efforts to provide liquidity, 
stability, and affordability to the domestic housing market? 
June O’Neill, over ten years before the emergence of the subprime mortgage 
crisis, understood the nuances of this difficulty and provided a wonderful analogy to draw 
out its complexity: 
Of course we have food stamps. But suppose instead that we said the  
way we are going to provide subsidized food to low income people in 
the District of Columbia is to give a subsidy to Giant and Safeway  
[the two dominant food retailers] and expect them to pass it on. Well,  
they would be in a quandary. They would be getting this subsidy that  
would enable them to be more profitable. What would they do with it?…  
I think everyone would easily see that it is an inefficient thing to do. 
 That is sort of what we have been doing with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
 Mac in terms of requiring them to do additional good deeds and try to 
 subsidize low income populations.2856 
 
The “additional good deeds” that O’Neill mentions could also include those mandated 
tasks to provide stability and liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. The issue at 
stake, then, is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the recipients of an opaque federal 
subsidy and, further, every dollar of the subsidy that they use to fulfill the requirements 
of their charters is potentially one less dollar that could be passed along to their 
shareholders, or retained by executives, or utilized for any other non-mission related 
purpose. 
 Taking this argument one step further, when one juxtaposes the chartered 
mission-related goals (providing stability, liquidity, and affordability of mortgage credit) 
with the shareholder-related goal (generating a profit to maximize returns to 
                                                 
2856 June O’Neill, “Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises,” (June 17, 1996). I came across this quote in Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises: Mercantilist Companies in the Modern World, 21. 
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shareholders), the primacy of the latter becomes apparent. Assuming that the federal 
government is not implicitly standing behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt 
obligations,2857 then if the two housing GSEs are unprofitable companies over time, they 
will become insolvent and unable to proceed with either of their lines of business. In such 
a scenario, not only would Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fail to maximize returns to their 
shareholders, they would also be unable to continue to buy-and-hold mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities for their retained portfolios or provide guarantees on their 
mortgage-backed securities to investors. The upshot is that sustained profitability is a 
necessary precondition, absent the implied federal government guarantee of their debt 
obligations, for the two housing GSEs to successfully meet their mission-related goals. 
Without being profitable companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would eventually be 
unable to provide stability, liquidity, and affordability of mortgage credit across the 
country. 
 To return to June O’Neill’s point, subsidizing private companies to provide public 
goods is an inefficient use of resources because a private companies’ provision of those 
public goods will necessarily be a secondary concern. Every dollar of the subsidy that is 
spent on bringing about the designated public goods is a dollar that could have been spent 
making the company more profitable. Perhaps there can be some overlap between the two 
goods (a private company that spends subsidized money in a certain way for the sake of 
bringing about a public good, also results in turning a profit for the company), but it is 
hard to rectify, consistently and over time, the underlying tension between government-
                                                 
2857 In light of the Obama Administration’s Christmas Eve 2009 decision to offer unlimited financial 
assistance to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in their efforts to meet their debt obligations, this assumption is 
simply untenable. 
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mandated public-spiritedness and private company profit-seeking, especially when the 
latter must take precedence over the former in the sense that was just explained. 
 With this thought in mind, it is important to reflect upon Peter Wallison’s 
observation that “the contradiction between performing a government mission and 
serving the interests of private shareholders [is] obscured” when the housing market is 
growing and housing prices are rising.2858 More specifically, I think the fundamental 
tension that was masked as the housing market was expanding and housing prices were 
increasing was between the two housing GSEs’ felt urgency for chasing profitability and 
their responsibility to create conditions for a stable secondary mortgage market. The two 
other government mission-related objectives of providing liquidity to the secondary 
mortgage market and making mortgage credit more affordable nicely harmonize with the 
objective of maximizing returns to shareholders. As long as the two housing GSEs could 
continually churn out profits, they could consistently be in a position to provide a 
favorable rate of return to shareholders as well as appear to be credible issuers of bonds 
to investors.2859 Profitability, likewise, ensured that there would be a steady incoming 
stream of investor capital targeted at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s bonds and 
guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, which would contribute to making the secondary 
mortgage market more liquid: more readily available capital for a traditionally illiquid 
product (home mortgage loans). The other government mission-related objective, making 
mortgage credit more affordable, is also well-served by profitability.  Regardless of 
whether the two housing GSEs actually allocated some of their profits for lowering 
                                                 
2858 Peter J. Wallison, “Private Profits, Public Risks.” 
2859 Of course, the perceived implicit federal government guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt 
obligations also contributed to the two housing GSEs’ profitability. 
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mortgage interest rates,2860 being profitable firms certainly would not hinder their efforts 
to do so. 
 The government mission-related objective of bringing stability to the secondary 
mortgage market, however, differs from the other two mission-related objectives in that it 
inherently carries with it a peculiar element of restraint. Profitability, liquidity, and 
affordability alone are incapable of creating conditions for a stable secondary mortgage 
market. Stability, among other things, requires one to consider how sustainable one’s 
business operations are both in the present and future. Preserving a stable secondary 
mortgage market entails looking not only at the current and short-term profitability of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also at their long-term profitability. A commitment to a 
stable secondary mortgage market would place reasonable limits on the affordability of 
mortgage credit. Finally, a stable secondary mortgage market would obviously need to be 
liquid, but would also entail having prudential measures in place to perpetuate that 
liquidity. Without a stable secondary mortgage market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
would be unable to meet those three goals. I propose that the gradually intensifying 
instability of the secondary mortgage market, the market of which Fannie Mae and 
                                                 
2860 It is interesting that the term “affordable” came to be equated with “obtaining a home mortgage with a 
low mortgage interest rate.” Intuitively, this makes a certain amount of sense because the lower the 
mortgage interest rate, the lower the monthly mortgage payment will be. To the extent that monthly 
mortgage payments are lowered, more people will be able to afford making those payments. This is 
especially true if lenders do not require a down payment of, say, 20%. However, making homeownership 
more affordable in this sense contributed to an 85% increase in home prices from 1997 to 2006 alone. 
Defining the term “affordable” in this way also overlooks the fact that some of these mortgages with low 
interest rates are not fixed-rate mortgages. One could obtain an “affordable” adjustable-rate mortgage with 
an initial low interest rate, but then suddenly be responsible for making unaffordable monthly mortgage 
payments when one’s mortgage resets at a higher rate. My concern is that homeownership could increase 
(more people could attain a mortgage) without that good actually being more affordable for at least some of 
the homeowners. When something is genuinely affordable, it seems to me, one is able to pay for the entire 
amount of that thing, whether all at once or over time, without substantially hindering one’s ability to pay 
for the rest of one’s expenses. Merely being approved for a home mortgage does not necessarily mean that 
the home is affordable. Please see: John Christoffersen, “Economist: U.S. Housing Slump May Exceed 
Depression,” Business News (April 22, 2008). 
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Freddie Mac were stewards, was hidden when the housing market was growing and home 
prices persistently increased. The recent decline in home prices, according to two 
prominent national home price indices, supports this claim.  
The Standard & Poor's/Case-Schiller National Home Price index, which is a 
composite of single-family home price indices for the nine United States Census 
divisions,2861 reached a peak in the second quarter of 2006 and continued to decline 
through the first quarter of 2009.2862 Another significant home price index, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency House Price Index (FHFA HPI), which used to be called the 
OFHEO Housing Price Index, did not report a quarterly decline in home prices until 
November 29, 2007, which was the first quarterly decline in the index in thirteen 
years.2863  
As of May 2010, the S&P/Case-Schiller index remains above that low point in 
2009, but after a 6.5% increase in home prices over the second and third quarters of 2009, 
the index has since dropped 4.2%.2864 As for the FHFA HPI, housing prices dropped 
8.2% in 2008,2865 the worst devaluation of American real estate since the 1930’s, and as 
of March 2010, the index is 13.2% below its peak in April of 2007.2866 One may wonder 
if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been able to continue their delicate balancing act, 
                                                 
2861 Standard and Poor’s, S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices: Index Methodology (November 2009), 
available at 
https://www.constellationvpi.com/docs/sp/Methdology_SP_CS_Home_Price_Indices_Web.pdf, 27. 
2862 Ibid., S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices 2009, A Year in Review (January 2010), available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/index-research/en/us/?type=All&category=Economic, 2. 
2863 Glenn Setzer, “OFHEO Home Price Index Down for First Time in 13 Years,” Mortgage News Daily 
(November 30, 2007), available at 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/11302007_OFHEO_Home_Prices.asp. 
2864 Standard and Poor’s, “The First Quarter of 2010 Indicates Some Weakening in Home Prices According 
to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index,” S&P Indices Press Release (May 25, 2010), available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com. 
2865 Timothy R. Homan and Courtney Schlisserman, “Housing Prices in 20 U.S. Cities Fall a Record 
18.5%,” Bloomberg L.P. (February 24, 2009). 
2866 Julie Haviv, “U.S. Home Prices Fell 2nd Straight Month in January,” Reuters (March 23, 2010). 
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satisfying the demands of both its shareholders and members of Congress, since housing 
prices began to drop.  
With respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s stock price, on May 26, 2010 
shares of Fannie Mae common stock were selling for $0.95 a share, while shares of 
Freddie Mac common stock were selling for $1.21 a share. Looking back over the 
previous five years, the highest price for shares of Fannie Mae’s common stock was 
$70.57, while that of Freddie Mac was $71.92.2867 Thus, Fannie Mae’s shares on that day 
were 98.65% below its five year high, while Freddie Mac’s shares were 98.32% below its 
five year high. I am not implying that the aforementioned drop in housing prices directly 
caused those stock losses.2868 Rather, I want to call into question just how well the two 
housing GSEs maximized returns to their shareholders in the midst of adverse housing 
conditions. Referring to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Thomas Stanton argues that a 
period of “apparently high profits can mask the emergence of conditions that will cause 
financial distress.”2869 As long as the two housing GSEs could still find ways to produce 
profits, the systemic risk that they posed to the economy could be rationalized away, 
ignored, or denied altogether.2870 
                                                 
2867 In terms of examining the prices of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s common stock, I acknowledge that 
both a 5 year look-back period and the date of May 26, 2010 are arbitrary dates. However, for the sake of 
discussing the dramatic loss in value of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s common stock since the emergence 
of the subprime mortgage crisis, these dates suffice for that purpose. I am not attempting to provide a 
detailed, historical analysis of the highs and lows of their respective common stock prices. I acquired the 
information on the prices of their common stock from Morningstar’s website, available at 
http://www.morningstar.com. 
2868 Of course, the decline in house prices certainly contributed to those losses. 
2869 Government-Sponsored Enterprises: Mercantilist Companies in the Modern World, 47. 
2870 For example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning professor at Columbia University’s Business 
School, along with Jonathan E. Orszag, and Peter R. Orszag, were commissioned by Fannie Mae and 
published a paper in March of 2002 in which they examined the adequacy of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s risk-based capital standard. They conclude their paper by noting, “This analysis shows that, based on 
historical data, the probability of a shock as severe as [the one] embodied in the risk-based capital standard 
is substantially less than one in 500,000 – and may be smaller than one in three million. Given the low 
probability of the stress test shock occurring, and assuming that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold 
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As for the “mission” portion of their business, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
placed into conservatorship on September 8, 2008, “one of the most sweeping 
government interventions in private financial markets in decades.”2871 The FHFA was 
named the two housing GSEs’ conservator, who has “full powers to control the assets and 
the operations of the two firms.”2872 As outlined by James Lockhart, the Director of the 
FHFA, some of the “key components” of the conservatorship included the ousting of the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac CEOs at the time, the suspension of dividend payments to 
their shareholders owning common and preferred stock, and the cessation of all lobbying 
expenditures.2873  
Initially, part of the conservatorship arrangement also included the two housing 
GSEs each receiving a $100 billion line of credit with the United States Treasury 
Department, far more than their previous $2.25 billion lines of credit, which permanently 
removed any lingering doubts over whether the federal government was, all along, 
implicitly guaranteeing their debt obligations.2874 On February 18, 2009, the Obama 
                                                                                                                                                 
sufficient capital to withstand that shock, the exposure of the government to the risk that the GSEs will 
become insolvent appears quite low.” Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jonathan E. Orszag, Peter R. Orszag, 
“Implications of the New Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Risk-based Capital Standard,” Fannie Mae Papers, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2002), 6. Italics mine. 
2871 Zachary A. Goldfarb, David Cho, and Binyamin Appelbaum, “Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie; 
Regulators Seek to Keep Firms’ Troubles From Setting Off Wave of Bank Failures,” The Washington Post 
(September 7, 2008). 
2872 Mark Jickling, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship,” CRS Report for Congress 
(September 15, 2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf, 1. 
2873 James B. Lockhart, “FHFA Statement,” (September 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_statement_090708hp1128.pdf, 7-8. 
2874 On October 24, 2012, the United States Justice Department filed a civil complaint against Bank of 
America for allegedly defrauding Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from 2007 to 2009. As Jonathan Weil 
astutely observed, “Prosecutors are suing under a statute called the False Claims Act, which imposes 
liability on those who defraud the federal government. Curiously, the suit is seeking damages for acts that 
Countrywide Financial Corp. committed before Fannie and Freddie were seized by the government -- back 
when U.S. officials were adamant that Fannie and Freddie didn’t have any implicit government guarantee.” 
Jonathan Weil, “The Oddest Revelation From the Bank of America Fraud Suit,” Bloomberg News (October 
26, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-26/the-oddest-revelation-from-the-bank-
of-america-fraud-suit.html. Weil rightly wonders how Bank of America (which purchased Countrywide in 
July of 2008) could be sued for defrauding the federal government prior to September of 2008, since 
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Administration announced that it would double its commitment to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, providing them each with $200 billion lines of credit with the Treasury 
Department.2875 Near the end of that same year, on December 24, 2009, the Obama 
Administration removed the $400 billion cap and promised unlimited emergency 
financial assistance to the two housing GSEs.2876 As of May 2010, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have received $137.5 billion in aid from the federal government, with both 
companies recently requesting a total of $19 billion more in federal assistance.2877  
The losses that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have endured since the latter half of 
2008 can be described as staggering. Over the course of the third and fourth quarters in 
2008, the two housing GSEs reported a combined $103.1 billion in losses.2878 Combined, 
both of the housing GSEs recorded losses of over $47 billion during the first two quarters 
of 2009, 2879 and losses totaling $49.4 billion over the third and fourth quarters of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were resolutely affirmed by the federal government as being publicly-traded, 
shareholder-owned companies before they were placed into conservatorship. 
2875 Binyamin Appelbaum, “U.S. Doubles Fannie, Freddie Backing to $400 Billion,” The Washington Post 
(February 19, 2009). 
2876 Zachary A. Goldfarb, “U.S. Promises Unlimited Aid to Mortgage Giants,” The Washington Post 
(December 25, 2009). 
2877 Binyamin Appelbaum, “Fannie Mae Asks For Aid at Bad Time for Obama; Republicans Use Request 
to Push Overhauling U.S. Mortgage Giants Quickly,” The International Herald Tribune (May 12, 2010). 
2878 Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Fannie Mae Lost $29 Billion in Third Quarter,” The Washington Post 
(November 11, 2008); Ibid., “Freddie Mac Gets Cash Infusion; Treasury Pumps $13.8 Billion Into 
Mortgage Giant After Firm Loses $25.3 Billion,” The Washington Post (November 15, 2008); Ibid., 
“Fannie’s Red Ink Prompts U.S. Aid; Mortgage Firm Lost $59 Billion in 2008,” The Washington Post 
(February 29, 2009). In this article, Goldfarb reports that Fannie Mae lost $25.2 in the fourth quarter of 
2008; James R. Hagerty, “Freddie Reports $23.9 Billion Loss,” The Wall Street Journal (March 11, 2009). 
Hagerty reveals in this article that Freddie Mac lost $23.9 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009. 
2879 Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Fannie Loses $23 Billion, Prompting Even Bigger Bailout; Chance of Repaying 
Taxpayers is Slim,” The Washington Post (May 9, 2009); Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Freddie Mac Loses $10 
Billion for Quarter; Mortgage Giant’s Bailout Tops $50 Billion,” The Washington Post (May 13, 2009); 
Nick Timiraos, “Fannie Seeks $10.7 Billion From Treasury After Big Loss,” The Wall Street Journal 
(August 6, 2009). Timiraos reports that Fannie Mae lost $14.8 over the course of the second quarter of 
2009; Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Freddie Mac Reports Profit; Mortgage Giant Says It Won’t Tap Treasury for 
More Aid,” The Washington Post (August 8, 2009). Goldfarb reports that Freddie Mac, oddly enough, 
posted a profit of $768 million in the second quarter of 2009. 
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2009.2880 As for the first quarter of 2010, the most recent earnings report that has been 
submitted by the two housing GSEs, Fannie Mae posted a loss of $11.5 billion, while 
Freddie Mac reported a loss of $6.7 billion.2881 Adding these figures together, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have lost a total of $217.7 billion since the third quarter of 2008.  
On June 16, 2010, the New York Stock Exchange announced that Fannie Mae 
would be delisted from the exchange due to the fact that their shares fell below $1 for 
over 30 straight days, which was a violation of the NYSE’s listing requirements. The 
FHFA, in response to this announcement, ordered Freddie Mac to delist from the 
exchange as well. Both stocks were relegated to trading “on relatively obscure over-the-
counter stock markets” once the delisting takes place.2882 The magnitude of these losses 
suggests that regardless of how well Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac met the objectives of 
maximizing returns to shareholders, providing liquidity to the secondary mortgage 
market, and making mortgage credit more affordable, they emphatically failed to create a 
lasting, stable secondary mortgage market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2880 Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Hit By Huge Loss, Fannie Mae Seeks More Federal Aid; Mortgage Giant 
Expects Further Losses and Continued Need for Help,” The Washington Post (November 6, 2009). Here, 
Goldfarb writes that Fannie Mae lost $19 billion in the third quarter of 2009; Nick Timiraos, “Freddie to 
Request Further Handouts,” The Wall Street Journal (November 7, 2009). Timiraos reports that Freddie 
Mac lost $6.3 billion in the third quarter of 2009. Suzanne Kapner, “Fannie Mae Asks for $15 Billion More 
in Public Aid,” The Financial Times (February 27, 2010). Kapner writes that Fannie Mae lost $16.3 billion 
in the fourth quarter of 2009; Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Freddie Mac Posts Loss, Says Aid Isn’t Needed; 
Administration Delays Proposal for Reforming Mortgage Giants,” The Washington Post (February 25, 
2010). Goldfarb reports that Freddie Mac lost $7.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2009. 
2881 Zachary A. Goldfarb and Brady Denis, “GOP Senators Pushing to Halt ‘Free Ride’; Fannie Reports Big 
Loss, Says $8.4 billion is Needed to Keep It Afloat,” The Washington Post (May 11, 2010). 
2882 David Cho, “Fannie, Freddie Ordered to Delist Shares from NYSE; Regulator Says Action is No 
Reflection on Firms’ Performance, Direction,” The Washington Post (June 17, 2010). 
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6.10. The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 
Having mentioned that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are on “life support,”2883 
having been placed into conservatorship with an impending delisting of their shares from 
the NYSE, posting incredible quarterly losses, and essentially only being able to operate 
because of infusions of cash that have been injected by the federal government, it is now 
necessary to put forth the two most salient reasons why their financial downfall has 
occurred. After briefly introducing both of these explanations, I will unpack and examine 
them in greater detail in the next section. 
First, then, the most prominent explanation for the near-demise of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac can be stated this way: the combination of their fiduciary duty to 
maximize returns to shareholders, the enthusiastic public and political support for the 
value of homeownership, and the investor-perceived implicit federal government 
guarantee of their debt obligations created conditions in which the growth of the two 
housing GSEs outpaced consumer demand for conventional, 30-year, fixed-rated 
mortgages. The unacceptable prospect of becoming less profitable companies prompted 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to take on more risk, both by possessing dangerously large 
mortgage-related obligations, eventually totaling $5.5 trillion, “almost half of all 
residential mortgage debt outstanding,”2884 and by electing to enter into the subprime 
mortgage market. The implicit government guarantee of their obligations made the 
financing for those ventures possible. 
 The second explanation for the enormous losses that the two housing GSEs have 
experienced stems from the affordable housing goals that Congress thrust upon them. In 
                                                 
2883 Mary Williams Walsh, “Burdens by the Billions,” The New York Times (December 17, 2009). 
2884 W. Scott Frame, “The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” 8. 
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effect, Congress required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to enter into the subprime 
mortgage market as part of their chartered mission to make mortgage credit more 
affordable to Americans. Depending upon how this explanation is rendered, the housing 
GSEs reluctantly, or at least dutifully, entered into the subprime mortgage market and 
bore greater risks because Congress stipulated that they do so. Both of these explanations 
need to be developed more fully and examined more carefully. 
 As a way of approaching the argument that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
growth surpassed the consumer demand for conventional, 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages, 
and thus led to a profit-driven initiative to take on greater risks, one should note that from 
1982-1994, the American homeownership rate was approximately 64%. From 1994-
2000, this homeownership rate increased over 3% to 67.5%. Then, from 2000-2006, there 
was yet another increase in the homeownership rate, an increase of 1.7% to 69.2%.2885 
One of the more significant features of this two decade-plus increase in American 
homeownership is that from 2001-2006, conventional mortgage originations sharply 
dropped, from 57.1% of all mortgage originations in 2001 to 33.1% in 2006.2886 
Although there was an increase in the percentage of Americans that owned a home during 
this time,2887 there was eventually a marked decrease in the percentage of homeowners 
who were receiving conventional mortgages. 
 It is necessary to pause for a moment and recall that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s area of expertise was purchasing single-family mortgages with origination 
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balances within the conforming loan limit, securitizing these mortgages, and then either 
issuing them to investors with guarantees, or holding them in their retained portfolios. If 
conventional, conforming mortgage originations dropped approximately 42% from 2001 
to 2006, one could anticipate that this decline would impact their profitability. Neither 
company once posted an annual loss from 2001 to 2006, though Fannie Mae’s profits 
peaked in 2003 and Freddie Mac’s profits topped out in 2002. Looking at Fannie Mae’s 
yearly profits beginning in 2001, the company announced that it had made $5.89 billion 
in 2001,2888 $4.62 billion in 2002,2889 $7.9 billion in 2003,2890 $4.98 billion in 2004,2891 
$6.29 billion in 2005,2892 and $4.1 billion in 2006.2893 Freddie Mac reported that it made 
$4.15 billion in 2001,”2894 $5.76 billion in 2002,2895 $4.82 billion in 2003,2896 $2.83 
billion in 2004,2897 $2.13 billion in 2005,2898 and $2.21 billion in 2006.2899  
Each year, from 1995 to 2000, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reported profits 
that were higher than the previous year’s earnings. Fannie Mae made $2.1 billion in 
1995,2900 $2.7 billion in 1996,2901 $3.06 billion in 1997,2902 $3.42 billion in 1998,2903 
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$3.91 billion in 1999,2904 and $4.45 billion in 2000.2905 Freddie Mac, meanwhile, made 
$1.1 billion in 1995,2906 $1.243 billion in 1996,2907 $1.395 billion in 1997,2908 $1.7 billion 
in 1998,2909 $2.22 billion in 1999,2910 and $2.55 billion in 2000.2911 Armando Falcon, 
former director of OFHEO, testified that, since the early 1990’s, “Freddie Mac promoted 
itself to investors as Steady Freddie, a company strong in profits, and developed a 
corporate culture that placed a very high priority on achieving such results.”2912 
One can reasonably assume that specializing in one product, conforming 
residential mortgages, and posting year over year gains from at least 1995 to 2001 caused 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a significant amount of consternation. After all, there are, 
of course, a limited number of Americans who can qualify for a conventional conforming 
mortgage. If an individual decides to purchase a home and the amount of the mortgage 
exceeds the conforming loan limit, that person cannot receive a conforming mortgage. 
Moreover, a borrower must meet certain down payment, income verification, and credit 
score requirements in order to qualify for such a mortgage. This is a significant point 
because evidence suggests that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were unable to sustain their 
prodigious profitability by limiting their business to the conforming residential mortgage 
market alone. I will now examine two pieces of evidence that support this claim. 
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One piece of evidence surfaced during a December 9, 2008 hearing before the 
House of Representatives’ Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 
Congressman John Tierney, as part of his interrogation of then-Fannie Mae CEO Daniel 
Mudd, presented a document that was found in Fannie Mae’s internal files. The title of 
the document was “A single family guarantee business facing strategic crossroads.”2913 It 
was dated in June of 2005 and, as Tierney states, was listed as “confidential” and “highly 
restricted.”2914 One of the headings of the document was: “The risk in the environment 
has accelerated dramatically.”2915 Underneath the heading, listed in bullet-points, was 
recognition that there had been “a proliferation of higher-risk alternative mortgage 
products… a growing concern about housing bubbles… a growing concern about 
borrowers taking on increased risk and higher debt, and lenders… [having] engaged in 
aggressive risk layering.”2916 Additionally, there is also mention in the document of “the 
growth in adjustable-rate mortgages” continuing at “an aggressive pace,” as well as 
“emphasis on the lowest possible payment” and homes “being utilized more like an 
ATM.”2917  
With this acknowledgement of the heightened risk that was circulating throughout 
the mortgage business at the time, the document continues: “We are at a strategic 
crossroads, and we face two stark choices. One is stay the course, and the other is meet 
the market where the market is.”2918 The benefits of staying the course, of focusing on 
“the more secure fixed-rate mortgages” were, according to the document, that Fannie 
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Mae would maintain its “strong credit discipline, it would protect the quality of the book, 
it would intensify [its] public voice on concerns about the housing bubble and 
accelerating risk, and, most importantly, it would preserve capital.”2919 The benefits of 
meeting the market where the market is, conversely, were that Fannie Mae would be able 
to “meet current consumer and customer demands for alternative mortgage products” and 
consequently would be able to take advantage of “a revenue opportunity and a growth 
area.”2920 The document also lists the downsides of both courses. If Fannie Mae stays the 
course, they would “have lower revenues and slower growth,” but if they meet the market 
where it is they would “have increased exposure to unknown risks.”2921 The final quote 
that Congressman Tierney read from the document was portentous: “If we do not 
seriously invest in these underground-type efforts [to dedicate resources and funding to 
develop a subprime infrastructure], we risk becoming a niche player, becoming less of a 
market leader, and becoming less relevant to the secondary market.”2922 
Congressman Tierney did an admirable job summarizing the information in the 
document by declaring, “Based on these slides, Mr. Mudd, you faced a fundamental 
decision in 2005: Do you keep your focus on the more secure fixed-rated mortgages but 
potentially lose out on some profits, or do you compete with private lenders by entering 
into riskier sectors of the market?”2923 One needs to note, however, that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were not confronted by this “fundamental decision” in 2005. Before the 
term “subprime” began to carry with it strong negative connotations, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac both publicly stated on multiple occasions that they were making efforts to 
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move into the subprime market in the late 1990’s. At a September 30, 1999 news 
conference, for instance, then-CEO of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, announced “a new 
product” called the “Timely Payment Rewards Mortgage,” which would allow the 
housing GSE “to enter the subprime market.”2924 Raines further indicated at this same 
press conference that Fannie Mae “plans to use the product to target half of all the 
subprime market.”2925 In an astonishingly prescient article, Steven Holmes, writing for 
The New York Times, warned in late September of 1999: 
In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae 
is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any  
difficulties during flush economic times. But the government- 
subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, 
prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan 
industry in the 1980's.2926 
 
Almost exactly nine years later, Holmes’ premonition came to fruition when the two 
housing GSEs were placed into conservatorship. 
Another example of the two housing GSEs late-1990’s immersion into the 
subprime market can be gleaned from an announcement made by then-Freddie Mac CEO, 
Leland Brendsel. In October of 1997, Brendsel revealed that Freddie Mac would begin 
purchasing the least risky kind of subprime loans by the end of the year and, further, that 
they would start buying even riskier subprime loans by the end of 1998 or early 1999.2927 
Earlier that same year, Freddie Mac purchased and guaranteed a $227 million pool of 
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4,300 subprime mortgages.2928 A June 24, 1997 article in The American Banker had the 
headline:  “Split Over Subprime Push by Fannie, Freddie; Smaller Lenders Enthusiastic; 
Specialists See a Competitive Threat.”2929 Heather Timmons opens her September 29, 
1997 article in The American Banker by writing, “It’s only a matter of time before 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae dominate the subprime mortgage market. At least, that was 
the opinion of lending executives at the Subprime ‘97 conference here last week.”2930 
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were unquestionably confronted by a decision to 
enter into the riskier subprime mortgage market or remain in the safer conventional 
mortgage market, both firms arrived at this “strategic crossroads” well before 2005. 
There is a second piece of evidence that supports the claim that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac reached a point where they were longer able to confine themselves entirely 
to the conventional conforming mortgage market and simultaneously remain profitable. 
The two housing GSEs had, in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, already forayed “into 
other areas of the financial economy,” engaging in what has come to be known as 
“mission creep.”2931 As Robert P. Cochran, former CEO of Financial Security Assistance, 
noted in a 1997 New York Times article, “They’ve grown so large that they cannot put all 
of their capital to work and expand their base without reaching out into others parts of the 
market.”2932 In 1999, as reported by The White House Bulletin, the Board of Directors of 
the Financial Services Roundtable (FSR) released “a new resolution addressing [the] 
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government sponsored enterprises.”2933 Part of the resolution expressed concern that 
“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have current and planned activities beyond their core 
missions including: providing liquidity for home equity and subprime loans; undertaking 
investment portfolio activities beyond housing as well as housing related investments that 
increase risk; creating consumer financial services ‘accounts’ tied to mortgages; [and] 
undertaking real estate disposition activities.”2934 It would be germane to provide a few 
specific examples of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s “mission creep,” and I will offer 
three of them. 
On September 14, 1999, then-CEO of Fannie Mae, Franklin Raines, revealed at a 
Merrill Lynch Investor’s conference that “one of the ways Fannie would increase its 
market share there was by purchasing home equity loans.”2935 At the same conference, 
Raines further stated, “Another way we’re going to expand the mortgage debt market is 
to help consumers capitalize on the equity in their homes for things they need, whether 
it’s reverse mortgages to finance retirement, or home equity loans to expand or improve 
their homes.”2936 Raines eventually made good on his promise, as Fannie Mae began to 
buy unsecured home equity loans, funded by Chevy Chase Bank of Maryland, “to buyers 
of siding, roofing, or windows at Home Depot Inc.”2937 In fact, a November 8, 1999 
article in Asset Sales Report indicated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were “already 
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major buyers” of home-equity loans.2938 Even a spokesman for Freddie Mac, Douglas 
Robinson, conceded in the article that Freddie Mac had been “a buyer of home-equity 
loans for awhile,” justifying the venture on the grounds that the loans “support our 
mission and mortgage assets.”2939 But, as Wallison, Stanton, and Ely observe, home 
improvement loans are a type of consumer lending and, subsequently, do not fall within 
the range of the housing GSEs’ charter-permitted activities.2940 
A second variety of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s “mission creep” is their 
lending to “developers of apartment housing, including luxury housing,”2941 and the 
purchasing of non-single family conventional, residential mortgages. For instance, on 
December 9, 2002, Freddie Mac purchased a “$140 million mortgage from HSBC Bank 
USA to finance The Caroline, a mixed-use property located in the Chelsea section of 
Manhattan.”2942 The Caroline houses “431 dwelling units, 105,000 square feet of retail 
and a 278-car parking garage” and includes “a 12,000 square foot landscaped private roof 
deck and formal landscaped European garden with Carrera statuary, indoor valet parking, 
maid and valet services, linen service, [and] room service from first class dining 
establishments” located on the premises.2943 The building also includes a 44,000 square 
foot New York Health and Racquet Club and “a 50-foot sky lit swimming pool.”2944 It is 
doubtful that this investment or other investments in apartment housing or commercial 
real estate serve the housing GSEs’ federally chartered missions. Rather, I think that this 
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supports Congressman Richard Baker’s assertion in 2002 that “the gorilla has outgrown 
the cage.”2945 
Undoubtedly, the most alarming form of “mission creep” is Fannie Mae’s 
successful efforts to attain patents that are altogether unrelated to its chartered mission. 
Patent No. 6,904,336 was filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office on 
November 8, 2002 and issued on June 7, 2005 to Fannie Mae and CO2e.com, LLC. The 
name of the patent is “System and Method for Residential Emissions Trading,” and 
former CEO Franklin Raines is credited as being one of the inventors. According to the 
patent’s abstract, the invention “is directed to a method of residential emissions trading 
and a residential emissions trading commodity.”2946 In an April 20, 2010 article in The 
Washington Examiner, Barbara Hollingsworth argues that the patent “covers both the 
‘cap’ and the ‘trade’ parts of Obama’s top domestic energy initiation, [and] gives Fannie 
Mae proprietary control over an automated trading system that pools and sells credits for 
hard-to-quantify residential carbon reduction efforts… to companies and utilities that 
don’t meet emission reduction targets.”2947 Of the many significant ethical issues that 
accompany Fannie Mae’s ownership of this patent,2948 I want to note in passing that it 
pursued this patent while receiving government privileges that were intended to be used 
for fulfilling a public mission. 
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A few months before filing for this patent, on April 3, 2002, Fannie Mae filed for 
another patent with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, No. 7,089,503, titled 
“Mortgage Loan Customization System and Process.” This patent is for a “computerized 
mortgage loan system” that enables borrowers “to design mortgage loans that meet their 
particular individual needs and financial goals.”2949 Some critics2950 contend that “the 
patent has as its purpose the improvement of loan origination, [which is] a function that it 
prohibited by the Fannie Mae Charter Act.”2951 Moreover, the patent “applies to all loans 
(auto, credit cards, commercial, etc.), not just mortgage loans” and further applies to “all 
loans originated, not just those loans that Fannie Mae decides to guaranty and/or purchase 
for their own portfolio.”2952 The patent’s broad applicability elicited concerns from The 
Mortgage Bankers Association that the “mere existence of the patent [could] stifle 
innovation in the lending industry, thus harming consumers and diminishing secondary 
market competition,” while being “at odds with Fannie Mae’s secondary market mission 
and government-sponsored status.”2953 
These three forms of “mission creep,” along with the evidence cited above from 
the December 9, 2008 hearing before the House of Representatives’ Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, support the argument that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s growth outpaced the consumer demand for conventional mortgages and threatened 
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the future stability and profitability of both companies. As a result, both companies were 
compelled to expand outside of the secondary market for conventional mortgages and 
attempted to earn profits in other ways, including the decision to enter into the far riskier 
subprime mortgage market. 
Aside from this argument, there is a second, supplementary one that explains why 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac moved away from the conventional mortgage market and 
into the subprime mortgage market. According to this argument, Congress made 
increasing demands on the two housing GSEs to make homeownership more affordable 
for Americans that could not qualify for a conforming mortgage. These increasing 
demands “shoved” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into the subprime market because they 
were required to assist borrowers that could not qualify for prime mortgage loans. 
There is certainly some merit to this argument and, for the sake of brevity, I will 
only provide a rough sketch of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s affordable housing goals 
in the mid-1990’s and into the 2000’s to lend credence to it. On July 16, 1991, 
Congressman Henry Gonzales introduced H.R. 2900, the “Government-Sponsored 
Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1991.” One of the key parts 
of the bill outlined a list of affordable housing goals for the two housing GSEs. In a 
September 17, 1991 report, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Banking, 
Finance, and Urban Affairs clearly explained the rationale behind the goals. The 
Committee wrote, “[These affordable housing] goals will… facilitate the development in 
both enterprises of an ongoing business effort that will be fully integrated in their 
products and cultures to service the mortgage finance needs of a growing nonprofit, 
public, and for-profit sector that is developing and preserving affordable housing for very 
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low- and low-income persons.”2954 The language of the bill is informative. As 
government-sponsored enterprises, the bill states, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have “an 
affirmative obligation to promote affordable housing for low- and moderate-income 
families.”2955 The next year, on May 15, 1992, Senator Donald Riegle introduced S. 
2733, the “Federal Housing Enterprises Regulatory Reform Act of 1992.” S. 2733 also 
contained provisions for establishing affordable housing goals for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. Neither H.R. 2900 or S. 2733, however, became a law. 
On June 6, 1992, Congressman Gonzalez introduced H.R. 5334, the “House 
Community Development Act of 1992,” which became a law on October 28, 1992. Title 
XIII, Part 2, Subtitle B is the section of the bill that imposed “three broad affordable 
housing goals” on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2956 Title XIII was a compromise 
between the affordable housing provisions contained in H.R. 2900 and S. 2733.  The first 
of the three affordable goals was the low- and moderate-income goal, “for borrowers or 
renters earning no more than the area median income where they reside.”2957 The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) did not provide a specific target 
percentage for meeting this goal until 1996, when they decided that at least 40% of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchases had to be for low- and moderate-
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income borrowers.2958 HUD increased this percentage to 42% for 1997-2000, 50% for 
2001-2004, 52% for 2005, 53% for 2006, 55% for 2007, and 56% for 2008.2959 
The second affordable housing goal was a geographically targeted goal, one that 
involved borrowers or renters residing in underserved areas or higher minority areas.2960 
HUD asserted that underserved areas are characterized by “low-income and high-
minority census tracts [that] have high mortgage denial rates and low mortgage 
origination rates.”2961 HUD set the initial “underserved areas goal” in 1996 and it 
required that 21% of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchases be for 
borrowers living in an area “at or below 90 percent of area median income in 
metropolitan areas or at or below 95 percent of area median income in nonmetropolitan 
counties” or in an area with “a high minority census tract.”2962 HUD increased this 
percentage to 24% for 1997-2000, 31% for 2001-2004, 37% for 2005, 38% for 2006-
2007, and 39% for 2008.2963 
The third and final goal that was established by The Federal Housing Enterprises 
Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 was the “targeted income-based goal, for 
special affordable housing, which is housing that is affordable to very low-income 
families and low-income families living in low-income areas.”2964 This goal targeted 
borrowers or renters “earning no more than 60 percent of area median income or residing 
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in low-income census tracts and earning no more than 80 percent of area median 
income.”2965 Similar to the other two affordable housing goals, the HUD released the first 
targeted income-based or “special affordable” goal in 1996, stipulating that 12% of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s mortgage purchases meet the criteria for special 
affordable housing.2966 HUD increased this percentage to 14% for 1997-2000, 20% for 
2001-2004, 22% in 2005, 23% in 2006, 25% in 2007, and 27% in 2008.2967 
 It is far beyond the scope of this paper to analyze whether HUD’s affordable 
housing goals were reasonable. I mention these regulations, however, to avoid the fairly 
popular misconception that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered the subprime mortgage 
market with subterfuge and solely out of a desire to perpetuate profitability. As far back 
as 2000, Patrick Barta, writing for The Wall Street Journal, reported, “HUD has long 
charged that Fannie and Freddie don’t do enough to help low-income and minority 
families purchase homes.”2968 In 1994, Fannie Mae pledged to finance $1 trillion in loans 
for disadvantaged families within seven years, and in 2000 the housing GSE promised to 
underwrite $2 trillion “of new mortgages during the next ten years for minorities, young 
families, woman-headed families, immigrants, and others whose homeownership rates 
lag behind the general population.”2969 Barta notes that the announcement in 2000 was 
made “in the wake of a continuing dispute between the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development and Fannie Mae over whether the company's lending policies 
discriminate against minorities.”2970 
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One needs to remember that there were very real political pressures being applied 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase subprime mortgages from lenders in the mid-
1990’s and early 2000’s. Prior to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, Congress 
failed to diffuse the systemic risks posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s gigantic 
retained portfolios and simultaneously required the two housing GSEs to take on greater 
risks in the interest of assisting underserved borrowers. Of particular importance is the 
fact that, with respect to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s respective chartered government 
missions, Congress tended to privilege the “affordable mortgage credit” objective over 
the “stable secondary mortgage market” goal. Any discussion of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s role in the subprime mortgage crisis that does not include their complex 
relationship with Congress is, in my opinion, deficient.  
 
 
6.11. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Immersion Into the Subprime Mortgage 
         Market 
 
 Before embarking on an investigation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
involvement in the subprime mortgage market, it is important to articulate what 
constitutes a “subprime” mortgage loan. As Edward Pinto notes, “One of the reasons for 
confusion about the number of subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding at any time in 
the U.S. is that many of the participants and reporting agencies used different definitions 
of the same terms.”2971 Peter Wallison and Charles Calomiris argue that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac used their own impoverished definitions of subprime mortgages to 
                                                 
2971 Edward Pinto, “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to 
Subprime and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” available at 
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/documents/view/1406, 2. 
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“purposely and significantly understate their commitment” to them.2972 Offering a 
definition of this crucial term will help bring about a more effective examination of the 
extent to which the two housing GSEs’ purchased these risky products. Furthermore, a 
definition of an “Alt-A mortgage” needs to be presented. An analysis that focuses entirely 
on the total amount of subprime loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased, while 
excluding their Alt-A loan purchases, only captures part of the risks that the two housing 
GSEs undertook in the mid-1990’s well through the first decade of the 2000’s.  
 To bring clarity to this discussion, Edward Pinto suggests that there are actually 
two “varieties” of subprime mortgage loans: self-denominated subprime loans and 
subprime loans by characteristic. Self-denominated subprime loans are those that are 
classified as “subprime” by the originator of the loans, which is usually either “a lender 
specializing in the subprime business” or a subprime division within a large lender.2973 
This is a terribly important distinction because Fannie Mae elected to label its purchased 
loans as “subprime” only if the loans were self-denominated as such. To phrase this point 
differently, the only criterion that Fannie Mae used to determine if their purchased loans 
were “subprime” was who the originator of those loans happened to be. Pinto claims that 
this classification system “had the effect of reducing [Fannie Mae’s] subprime loan count 
to a very small number.”2974A large lender that does not have a subprime division could 
have obviously originated mortgage loans of subprime quality.  
 The second variety of subprime loans is what Pinto calls “subprime loans by 
characteristic.” In this case, a loan is considered to be subprime on the basis of “objective 
                                                 
2972 Peter J. Wallison and Charles W. Calomiris, “The Last Trillion Dollar Commitment: The Destruction of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” 
2973 Edward Pinto, “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to 
Subprime and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” 2. 
2974 Ibid. 
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risk characteristics,” most commonly a borrower FICO score of 660 or below.2975 Pinto 
maintains that using a borrower FICO score below 660 “as the demarcation between 
prime and subprime loans” dates back to 1995.2976 There appears to be some justification 
for using a 660 FICO score as a line of demarcation between subprime and prime loans. 
Borrowers with a FICO score between 620-659 have proven to be 6.4 times more likely 
to default on their mortgages than borrowers with a FICO score of 660 and above.2977 As 
for those borrowers with a FICO score below 620, they are 9 times more likely to default 
on their mortgages than borrowers with a FICO score of 660 and above.2978 
 In addition to subprime loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also purchased Alt-A 
mortgage loans. Alt-A mortgages received their name from being “alternative to agency,” 
which means that they “did not meet the traditional underwriting guidelines” of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac in one or more ways.2979 In many cases, Alt-A mortgage loans 
have either “low or no [borrower] documentation requirements,”2980 earning the derisive 
nickname of “liar loans.” Pinto maintains that the two housing GSEs became “active Alt-
A purchasers” in 2002, leading to a tremendous expansion of the Alt-A market through 
2008.2981 
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2976 Ibid. 
2977 Ibid., “Memorandum: High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992-2007 and 
Fannie, Freddie, FHA and VA’s Role,” available at 
http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/09/Pinto%20Government-Housing-Policies-in-the-Lead-up-to-the-
Financial-Crisis-3-Memoranda-2.5.11-rev.7.25.11.pdf, 38. 
2978 Ibid. 
2979 Ibid., “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to Subprime 
and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” 3. 
2980 Ibid., “Memorandum: High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992-2007 and 
Fannie, Freddie, FHA and VA’s Role,” 38. 
2981 Ibid., 49. 
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Similar to his distinction within subprime loans, Pinto argues that there are two 
varieties of Alt-A loans: self-denominated and Alt-A loans by characteristic.2982 A self-
denominated Alt-A loan receives that title if the lender or originator delivering the loan to 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac initially classified it as such, or if the loan was placed in an 
Alt-A private mortgage-backed security.2983 An Alt-A loan by characteristic is one that 
was not “initially classified as Alt-A” by the lender or originator and features non-
traditional adjustable rate mortgage terms, like a “teaser” rate or “no or negative 
amortization.”2984 If an adjustable rate mortgage has a teaser rate, the mortgage will have 
a low introductory interest rate that will reset and increase at some point in the future. A 
negative amortization mortgage loan is one that, for an initial, specified period of time, 
requires the borrower to make a payment that is smaller than the interest due. The unpaid 
interest is then added to the remaining loan balance, increasing the total amount that the 
borrower owes. A mortgage loan with no amortization, or an interest-only loan, requires 
the borrower to only pay the interest due for a predetermined period of time.   
Alternately, an Alt-A loan by characteristic could also be one that has a “high original 
LTV,” including a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 97% or even 100%.2985 LTV ratio refers 
to the size of the mortgage loan compared to the value of the property that the loan is 
securing. If a borrower takes out a $194,000 mortgage loan to purchase a house that has 
been appraised for $200,000, that loan would have a LTV ratio of 97%. Mortgage loans 
with high LTV ratios are accompanied by lower borrower downpayments.  
                                                 
2982 Ibid., “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to Subprime 
and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” 3. 
2983 Ibid. 
2984 Ibid. 
2985 Ibid. 
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Pinto provided a great service by parsing out the characteristics of subprime and 
Alt-A mortgage loans, for it is apparent that both types of loans are less-than-prime and, 
consequently, riskier than conventional loans. Media fixation on the term “subprime”2986 
could have contributed to a distorted public perception of the risks that accompanied 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Alt-A loan purchases. Pinto accuses the two housing 
GSEs of failing to “classify many of their loans with Alt-A characteristics as Alt-A 
loans” as early as the beginning part of the 1990’s.2987 Thus, an investor or any other 
individual who was knowledgeable of the risks associated with Alt-A mortgage loans 
would have had a difficult time discovering the extent to which Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were in involved in the Alt-A mortgage market. 
Having offered definitions of subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans, it is now 
necessary to examine the extent of the two housing GSEs’ exposure to these loans. 
According to Pinto, as of June 30, 2008, Fannie Mae held or guaranteed 7,026,000 
subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans, totaling approximately $1.077 trillion.2988 It is 
striking that the vast majority of those loans were not self-denominated subprime loans, 
which were the only ones that Fannie Mae classified as “subprime.” Of those 7,026,000 
loans, 6,616,000 of them (a little over 94%) were either subprime by characteristic, self-
denominated Alt-A, or Alt-A by characteristic.2989 Pinto estimates that those loans have a 
value of roughly $1.011 trillion.2990 As for Freddie Mac, Pinto reports that, as of June 30, 
                                                 
2986 Consider, for example, the fact that the word “subprime” was voted as the 2007 “Word of the Year” by 
The American Dialect Society. Dan Jamieson, “‘Subprime’ is Word of the Year,” Investment News 
(January 21, 2008). 
2987 Edward Pinto, “Memorandum: High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992-
2007 and Fannie, Freddie, FHA and VA’s Role,” 43. 
2988 Ibid., “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to Subprime 
and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” 5. 
2989 Ibid. 
2990 Ibid., 7. 
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2008, the housing GSE held or guaranteed 4,913,000 subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans 
worth $758 billion.2991 Of those loans, 4,155,000 of them (about 84.5%) were either 
subprime by characteristic, self-denominated Alt-A, or Alt-A by characteristic, 
possessing a total value of $635 billion.2992 Putting these figures in perspective, Pinto 
claims that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held or guaranteed nearly one-third of all 
subprime mortgage loans and approximately two-thirds of all Alt-A mortgage loans at the 
end of 2008.2993 Moreover, the 11,939,000 subprime loans that they held or guaranteed at 
the end of 2008 were approximately 21.8% of the 55 million mortgages outstanding in 
the United States at the time.2994 
In a later report, Pinto asserted that “the long term misrepresentation by the GSEs 
as to the risks they were acquiring was finally admitted by Fannie on November 10, 2008 
when it disclosed its 10-Q.”2995 Fannie Mae’s confession is worth quoting in full: 
We have classified mortgage loans as Alt-A if the lender that delivered 
the mortgage loans to us had classified the loans as Alt-A based on 
documentation or other features. We have classified mortgage loans as 
subprime if the mortgage loan was originated by a lender specializing in 
the subprime business or by subprime divisions of large lenders. We apply 
these classification criteria in order to determine our Alt-A and subprime  
loan exposures; however, we have other loans with some features that are 
similar to Alt-A and subprime loans that we have not classified as Alt-A 
or subprime because they do not meet our classification criteria.2996 
 
The “long term misrepresentation by the GSEs” to which Pinto is referring comes in the 
form of Fannie Mae holding or guaranteeing over $1 trillion worth of subprime and Alt-A 
                                                 
2991 Ibid., 8. 
2992 Ibid. 
2993 Lynnley Browning, “Ex-Officer Faults Mortgage Giants for ‘Orgy’ of Nonprime Loans,” The New York 
Times (December 10, 2008). 
2994 Peter J. Wallison, “Dissenting Statement: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,” (January 2011), 
available at http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf, 454. 
2995 Edward Pinto, “Triggers of the Financial Crisis,” (March 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/PintoFCICTriggers.pdf, 2, italics mine.  
2996 Ibid. Italics mine. 
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mortgages without labeling them as such because the lenders supplying the loans did not 
specialize in the “subprime business” or were not large lenders with “subprime 
divisions.”  
Given the extent of their commitment to riskier loans in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, I agree with Congressman Mark Souder’s insight that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were “enabler’s” agencies.2997 Their aggressive entrance into the subprime mortgage 
market had an incredible demand-enhancing effect on subprime mortgages, encouraging 
lenders in the primary market to incautiously originate a higher proportion of these 
mortgages to match the increased demand for them. As Wallison and Calomiris explain, 
“[Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s] buying patterns and interests were followed closely in 
the markets. If Fannie and Freddie wanted subprime or Alt-A loans, the markets would 
produce them.”2998 As government-sponsored enterprises, their demand for subprime 
(and Alt-A) mortgages signaled to the lenders in the primary market to accelerate their 
originations of these loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s decision to enter into the 
subprime market was, therefore, an indispensable condition for the wild expansion of that 
market and the subsequent saturation of the global financial economy with subprime 
mortgage-backed securities.2999  
 
                                                 
2997 United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “The Role 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis,” 87. 
2998 Peter J. Wallison and Charles W. Calomiris, “Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess,” 
The Wall Street Journal (September 23, 2008). 
2999 In a recent book written by Simon Johnson and James Kwak, the two authors write, “The financial 
crisis was not primarily due to Fannie and Freddie.” Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street 
Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon, 2010), 144. The two authors argue that 
although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac created demand for conventional mortgages, “regulatory constraints 
prevented them from plunging too far into subprime lending.” Ibid., 145. This assertion obviously hinges 
on one’s definition of “subprime,” and it appears that their definition includes only self-denominated 
subprime loans, as defined by Edward Pinto. I find Pinto’s definitions of subprime and Alt-A mortgages to 
be more comprehensive and useful for discussing the role that the two housing GSEs played in the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  
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6.12. Conclusion 
 
 In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt stated, “The broad interests of the nation require that 
special safeguards should be thrown around homeownership as a guarantee of social and 
economic stability.”3000 Two of the special safeguards that surrounded homeownership in 
the United States were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Endowed with government 
privileges, the two housing GSEs were enlisted to serve as mortgage alchemists: 
transforming the luxurious good of homeownership into an affordable good, converting 
illiquid mortgage loans into liquid securities, and creating a stable secondary market for a 
product that is plagued with credit, prepayment, and other latent risks. As privately 
owned companies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had the additional challenge of 
performing those tasks while maximizing shareholder returns. This tension, between a 
congressionally-mandated mission to the public and a fiduciary duty to shareholders, was 
mostly reconciled when housing prices were rising and the conventional mortgage 
marketing was growing. However much success Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had in 
meeting both of those goals, they were nevertheless embroiled in scandals and legal 
issues throughout the early 2000’s and placed in conservatorship a year before Freddie 
Mac celebrated its twentieth year as a publicly traded company.  
Congress, under the sway of group bias, was unable to enact significant 
legislation in time to mitigate the risks that the two housing GSEs were posing to the 
economy, most notably by the size of their retained portfolios. Protected by their 
respective missions, a near-ubiquitous public endorsement of the good of homeownership 
that was stoked by effective advertisements, campaign contributions, and other factors 
                                                 
3000 James Lardner, “Beyond the Mortgage Meltdown: Addressing the Current Crisis, Avoiding a Future 
Catastrophe,” Demos (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/housingpaper.pdf, 13. 
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listed above, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to become two of the largest 
purchasers of subprime mortgages, while remaining predominantly immune from any 
serious congressional dissent.  
In conclusion, one could view Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s hybrid structure, 
part instrumentality, part shareholder owned, as a failed experiment. Unable to protract 
their extraordinary growth and profitability in the face of quarterly earnings pressure nor 
satisfy the demands of Congress by remaining exclusively in the prime, conventional 
mortgage market, both of the housing GSEs ventured into the subprime mortgage market 
in search of greater profits and a larger pool of low-income borrowers. Both Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were already involved in the subprime mortgage market by the late 
1990’s and this venture was indeed encouraged by Congress, who imposed three broad 
affordable housing goals on the housing GSEs. These goals became effective in 1996 and 
progressively more demanding during each successive year up until 2008. The implied 
federal government guarantee of their debt obligations enabled Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac to attract investor capital for their subprime mortgage purchases, intensifying a 
market demand for them.  
Ultimately, then, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were responsible for pulling off 
what proved to be an intricate and unsustainable balancing act. With home prices rising, 
the mortgage market expanding, mostly unwavering political support, and a reliable 
incoming flow of investor capital, the two housing GSEs were temporarily able to 
provide spectacular returns to their shareholders, bring liquidity to the secondary 
mortgage market, and arguably make mortgage credit more affordable for borrowers 
traditionally deemed to be under-qualified. Purchasing and holding subprime (and Alt-A) 
567 
 
mortgages in their retained portfolios conferred upon Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac a 
triple-benefit. First, they could plausibly claim that they were working towards Congress’ 
affordable housing goals as they purchased subprime mortgages, thus making mortgage 
credit more affordable. Second, since it appeared that the two housing GSEs were 
outgrowing the conventional mortgage market, delving into the subprime mortgage 
market provided an opportunity for further growth and profitability, which would assist 
with their efforts to maximize returns to shareholders.  Finally, with the demands of 
Congress and their shareholders appeased, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were in a prime 
position to continue serving as seemingly attractive investment opportunities to investors. 
Both of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s lines of business could thrive and the steady flow 
of investor capital contributed to creating a liquid secondary mortgage market. 
What has become apparent, however, is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
unable to provide all of these services while simultaneously ensuring that the secondary 
mortgage market would remain stable. The losses for both firms have continued through 
the end of 2011: Fannie Mae lost $16.855 billion during the year, while Freddie Mac lost 
$5.266 billion.3001 Since year-end 2007 to the end of 2011, Fannie Mae has posted 
$163.595 billion in losses. Over that same period of time, Freddie Mac suffered $94.057 
billion in losses.3002 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the two housing 
GSEs may cost taxpayers nearly $400 billion over the next decade.3003 As Zachary 
Goldfarb noted, writing for The Washington Post, “[I]t is becoming increasingly clear 
                                                 
3001 N. Eric Weiss, “Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial Problems,” CRS Report for Congress (April 
2, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34661.pdf, 2. 
3002 Ibid. 
3003 Ibid., “Costs Surging for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,” The New York Times (June 20, 2010). 
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that the rescue of Fannie and Freddie will be the most expensive part of the government’s 
response to the financial crisis.”3004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3004 Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Mortgage Bailout’s Ballooning Price,” The Washington Post (October 22, 
2010). 
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“Yet as things are, in the aftermath of economic and political upheavals, amidst the fears 
of worse evils to come, the thesis of progress needs to be affirmed again.” 
 
       Bernard Lonergan, Insight, p. 710 
 
 
Conclusion 
 The product of a staggering accumulation of biased decisions over time, the 
subprime mortgage crisis was an avoidable outcome. With house prices on the rise and 
reliable profits to be earned, subprime mortgage market participants were tempted, with 
the aid of the general bias of common sense, to leap to the irresistible conclusion that 
house prices would interminably rise and profits could, therefore, be inexhaustibly mined 
from this historically risky segment of the market. This biased perception of the profit 
potential of the subprime mortgage market was the central and defective cog around 
which certain flawed institutional relationships were built. 
Subprime lenders originated and extracted fees from mortgage loans that were 
inappropriate for borrowers because arrangers were more interested in the volume of 
subprime loans than in their quality. Arrangers clamored for high volumes of subprime 
loans with unknown or questionable credit risk because the loans could be securitized 
into MBSs and CDOs. Once securitized, these financial products could be submitted to 
one or more of the three largest NRSRO’s for a credit rating evaluation. Since the 
NRSRO’s were not compensated for the accuracy of their credit ratings, but for the sheer 
amount of ratings that they could produce, they had an incentive to give their paying 
customers, the arrangers, the type of rating that they wanted most: those of the triple-A 
variety. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, meanwhile, began to outgrow the conventional 
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mortgage market around the turn of the century. The two housing GSEs discovered that 
the subprime mortgage market conveniently had the capacity to satisfy both of their 
masters: Congress and their shareholders.  
In the short term, subprime lenders, which were enshrouded in immense financial 
holding companies, benefited from a fragmented federal regulatory apparatus that forced 
each regulator into its own silo. Effective oversight of these lenders was also undermined 
by a phenomenon known as “charter shopping,” which incited the OCC and OTS to give 
a light touch to their regulatory efforts in exchange for lender-paid fee revenue and a 
heightened perception of relevance. Among the most devastating of these deregulatory 
decisions was the one that enabled the OCC and OTS to preempt state consumer 
protection laws. The Federal Reserve, for its part, refused to determine what should 
constitute unfair and deceptive mortgage practices until it was too late and, in the process, 
abstained from regulating non-depository mortgage lending affiliates, like Countrywide 
Home Loans.   
The five largest arrangers were the short-term beneficiaries of the SEC’s woefully 
misguided “Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,” which permitted them to set their 
own leverage ceilings, removing the more prudent leverage ratio of 15 to 1. The program 
also transformed the nature of the SEC’s oversight of the five arrangers. Now only under 
the weak pull of submitting to voluntary supervision, the arrangers were in a position to 
take wildly excessive and ultimately destructive risks. By the end of 2008, Bear Stearns 
and Merrill Lynch were acquired by other firms, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy 
protection, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were compelled to become bank 
holding companies. 
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In the wake of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae’s accounting scandals in 2003 and 
2004, respectively, Congress was in a prime position to create timely regulations that 
could have made the two housing GSEs safer and sounder institutions before the 
subprime mortgage crisis began to unfold. Ultimately, however, Congress failed to enact 
any such legislation, which likely proved to be politically advantageous to individual 
members of the House of Representatives and Senate, but incredibly costly to American 
taxpayers. In four years, from the end of 2007 to the end of 2011, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac combined to post a total of over $257 billion in losses. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 combined to severely impair any effective regulatory 
oversight of the budding CDS market. Unmoored from virtually all regulatory 
requirements and seduced by what it thought was a steady incoming flow of virtually 
risk-free profits, a unit within AIG elected to sell a reckless amount of credit protection 
on subprime-related securities without setting aside an adequate reserve of money to 
shield it from potential losses. As the subprime mortgage market cratered, a nearly 90 
year old company – with over $1 trillion worth of assets – ran out of cash in September of 
2008. AIG was kept afloat by receiving $182.4 billion in aid from the Federal Reserve 
and the Treasury Department. 
In the final analysis, institutions and the individuals working within them have the 
potential to carry out or undermine values. One does not have to travel very far up 
Lonergan’s scale of values to discover that social values, those values that, when chosen, 
contribute to the functioning of the good of order, were profoundly neglected as the 
different parties involved in the subprime mortgage crisis operated and cooperated in 
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biased ways. As Lonergan notes, decisions infected with group bias start off as neglected 
possibilities, as lost opportunities for freely chosen intelligent, reasonable, and 
responsible courses of action to contribute to human progress. Over time, however, these 
neglected possibilities accumulate and congeal into a grotesquely distorted reality.3005  
This development was obscured, at least to a certain extent, by the cultural value 
of homeownership in America. Viewed through the lens of the American Dream, owning 
a home was not equated with the mere particular good of shelter. Homeownership, as a 
sign of success, a pillar of stability, and an embodiment of freedom and independence 
became, as Michael Hudson aptly observed, “the great popular arena in which to seek 
speculative gains.”3006 Since owning a home in America carries with it certain visceral 
cultural values, the large variety of institutions responsible for ultimately providing 
instances of this treasured particular good were able to use its cultural significance as a 
platform for relegating personal values beneath the subjectively satisfying and 
dissatisfying. In particular, these institutions masked a neglect of social values by way of 
generating the particular good of short-term profits. In other words, the various parties 
involved in the subprime mortgage crisis could use the cultural currency of the value of 
homeownership in America to disguise or at least justify personal decisions that, 
eventually, not only failed to respect that cultural value,3007 but also bypassed 
considerations that would have embraced social values. These latter, inadequately 
entertained considerations would have raised further pertinent questions for evaluation 
                                                 
3005 Insight, 250. 
3006 Michael Hudson, “Speech Given at the Veblen, Capitalism and Possibilities for a Rational Economic 
Order Conference: Veblen’s Institutionalist Elaboration of Rent Theory,” (June 6, 2012), available at 
http://michael-hudson.com/2012/07/veblens-institutionalist-elaboration-of-rent-theory. 
3007 For example, from September of 2008 to June of 2012, there have been 3.7 million foreclosures, 
according to the data analysis firm, CoreLogic. Please see: “Completed U.S. Foreclosures Hold Steady in 
June,” Reuters (July 31, 2012), available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/usa-housing-corelogic-
idINL2E8IV1PK20120731. 
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and deliberation, beyond those involving profitability, such as whether one should 
assume certain roles and how one should go about performing certain tasks. 
The combination of group bias with general bias triggered the subprime mortgage 
crisis, an instance of Lonergan’s notion of the longer cycle of decline, which is a process 
that results in the cumulative deterioration of the social situation.3008 Mass foreclosures, 
rampant unemployment, widespread wealth destruction, and a growing popular 
resentment of what has come to be labeled “the 1%” are all manifestations of this 
distorted social situation. Lonergan vividly describes this deterioration in Insight, a 
depiction that hauntingly applies to the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis: 
The objective social situation possesses the intelligibility put into it by 
those that brought it about. But what is put in, less and less is some 
part of a coherent whole that will ask for its completion, and more and  
more it is some arbitrary fragment that can be rounded off only by giving  
up the attempt to complete the other arbitrary fragments that have  
preceded or will follow it. In this fashion social functions and enterprises 
begin to conflict; some atrophy and others grow like tumors; the objective 
situation becomes penetrated with anomalies; it loses its power to suggest 
new ideas and, once they are implemented, to respond with still further 
and better suggestions. The dynamic of progress is replaced by  
sluggishness and then by stagnation.3009 
 
Yet, even as bleak as things may potentially seem, nothing is inevitable,3010 and the 
dynamism of human intelligence has the extraordinary capacity to creatively and sagely 
address the daunting challenges posed by what has now become a formidable social surd. 
This surd “resides least of all in outer things and most of all in the minds and wills of 
men.”3011 The beginnings of a solution to the present ills have their roots in each 
                                                 
3008 Insight, 254. 
3009 Ibid. 
3010 Ibid., 258. 
3011 Ibid., 712. 
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individual’s “personal authenticity, honesty, and genuineness.” Or, as Lonergan puts it, 
“The only solution lies in ‘the good man’.”3012 
 
  
                                                 
3012 Bernard Lonergan, “The Human Good,” 346. 
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Glossary of Abbreviated Terms 
 
 
AIGFP: American International Group Financial Products. A part of AIG’s Financial 
Services unit that included AIG Financial Products Corporation, AIG Trading Group, and 
all of their respective subsidiaries. 
 
ARM: Adjustable-Rate Mortgage. A type of mortgage whose interest rate adjusts to a 
particular index over some specified period of time.  
 
CDO: Collateralized Debt Obligation. The generic term for a type of security that can be 
backed by any type or combination of types of debt.3013 For example, CDO’s can be 
backed by subprime MBSs. 
 
CDS: Credit-Default Swap. A type of contract whose value and structure is derived from 
certain referenced underlyings, such as debt obligations. A CDS contract links two parties 
together, a protection buyer and a protection seller. The protection buyer, for a periodic 
fee, offloads the credit risk that the referenced underlyings possess onto the protection 
seller.3014 
 
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
GAO: The United States Government Accountability Office. 
 
GSE: Government-Sponsored Enterprise. The two housing GSEs are Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. 
 
HUD: The Department of Housing and Urban Development. One of the two federal 
regulators of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis. 
HUD’s responsibility was to ensure that the two housing GSEs were fulfilling their 
chartered missions’ requirements. 
 
Leverage: When an institution’s assets exceed its equity base, that institution is 
leveraged. Arrangers engaged in leverage “by borrowing to acquire more assets, with 
the aim of increasing their return on equity.”3015 
 
MBS: Mortgage-Backed Security. A security that is backed by collateral that comes in 
the form of mortgages on borrowers’ homes.3016 
                                                 
3013 Janet M. Tavakoli, Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations (Hoboken: John Wiley and 
Sons, 2008), 2. 
3014 Janis Sarra, “Financial Market Destabilization and the Role of Credit Default Swaps: An International 
Perspective on the SEC’s Role Going Forward,” 631; Norman Menachem Feder, “Deconstructing Over-
the-Counter Derivatives,” 681-718. 
3015 Katia D’Hulster, “The Leverage Ratio: A New Binding Limit on Banks,” The World Bank Policy Brief: 
Crisis Response, No. 11 (December 2009), available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/pdf/levrage-ratio-web.pdf, 1. 
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NINA loan:  No Income / No Asset documentation mortgage loan.  
 
NRSRO: Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization. The three largest 
NRSRO’s are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. 
 
OCC: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The regulator of federally 
chartered national banks and their non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries. 
 
OFHEO: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. A federal regulator that 
was responsible for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s safety and soundness oversight. 
 
OTS: The Office of Thrift Supervision. The regulator of federally chartered thrifts and 
their non-depository mortgage lending subsidiaries. On July 21, 2011, all of the OTS’ 
functions were transferred to the OCC.3017  
 
Repo: An abbreviation of the term “repurchase agreement.” A repo is a transaction in 
which “a borrower sells a security to a lender with an option to repurchase it at a price 
that provides the lender with a return appropriate for a secured loan.”3018 This was a key 
funding source for many arrangers leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis. 
 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3016 Patricia A. McCoy and Elizabeth Renuart, “The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and Nontraditional 
Home Mortgages,” 28 
3017 John C. Lyons, Jr., “Description: Supervisory Policy Integration Process,” OCC Bulletin, No. 2011-47 
(December 8, 2011), available at http://occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2011/bulletin-2011-47.html. 
3018 Peter J. Wallison, “Dissenting Statement: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,” 477. 
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